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Failed ethnic Federalism: the accommodation of constituentnationalities in Yugoslavia before and after Tito’s leadership(1...
If we understand the federal agreement as it has been presented so far then we might come tothe conclusion that federalism...
3within the Partisan/Party organization (Burg, 1977).            In the same line as the soviet case,federalization of the...
boosted and ongoing process. It is not the idea to study the death the Tito himself buy to use itas a reference for the de...
9Dorff emphasizes the necessity to understand federalism both as structure and process. Thatis to analyze not only its for...
The inception of the Yugoslav FederalismAfter the Second World War, without the necessity of a Soviet invasion as opposed ...
the supreme control over its administration; Legislation concerning the distribution of revenuesto the Federal budgets of ...
changes meant that the local Government was the beneficiary and not the republic themselves.The effective power, nonethele...
the institutionalization of the delegations elected by the republican and provincial assembliesand make impossible any mis...
Despite that the major moves towards decentralization already occurred in the 60s, asmentioned before 1968 can be picked a...
27the young population.        The implementation of liberal reforms on one side created expectationsin career advancement...
oligarchies” (Veiga, 2002). He states that even if they argue from using in principle the defenceof the self-management sy...
management, that is, the relationship between the republics and between the republics and thefederation.1980-1992: Death o...
This period saw the re-appearance of serious discord among the nationalities (the Albano-Serbian conflict, and antagonism ...
republic governments, together with the party organizations, are seeing as providing institutionalbases of power that oppo...
party political activities in its ranks, about 96% of the officer corps were members of the League                 34of Co...
ideal political conditions upon the death of Tito. That is, it had determinant effects on the systemregardless its ethical...
but to a politics of competition between the center and the periphery and among the units of theperiphery.References:Weber...
Curtis, Glenn (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a country study. Area handbook series, 550-99. Washington,DC: Federal Research Division, ...
AnnexMap 1: Republics, Autonomous regions boundaries and ethnic groups in the SFRY              Source: A Map Folio, CIA, ...
Table 1: Social Product per capita in the Republics of Yugoslavia (%)                                                   Av...
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Working paper failed ethnic federalism - yugoslavia

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Working paper failed ethnic federalism - yugoslavia

  1. 1. Failed ethnic Federalism: the accommodation of constituentnationalities in Yugoslavia before and after Tito’s leadership(1968-1980 and 1980-1992) Miguel MorillasTheoretical frameworkThe logic to accommodate minority or constituent nations stems from the very nature ofFederalism: the principle of authority and liberty that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon talked about backin 1863. He stated that the principle of authority, familial, patriarchal, magisterial, monarchical,theocratic, tending to hierarchy, centralization, absorption, is given by nature, and is thusessentially predestined, divine, as you will. Its scope, resisted and impeded by the opposingprinciple, may expand or contract indefinitely, but can never be extinguished. On one hand, theprinciple of liberty is subject to extension or restriction, but it likewise cannot be exhausted as itgrows, nor it can be nullified by constraint (Proudhon, 2005). There are some elements of bothin any given society regardless the amount of authoritarian rule a regimen may have orapparent unbound freedom people could attain. No political arrangement is exempt and it couldbe affirmed that even no group arrangement among people that are equals or tend to equality inany context where humans interact. Therefore, it has to be taken in consideration that any sortof analysis of “diversity into unity” has to be done with a mental model in which complete ruleand total absence of rule are in the extremes but just to have a landscape of reality in which interms of power relation we are located between these extremes. Thus, according to Proudhon,the aim of any government is the balancing of authority and liberty and viceversa. Following thisstatement, Federalism seems to be the ideal system to solve this conflict from an authority vsliberty perspective.Furthermore, federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared rule.In the broadest sense, federalism involves the linkage of individuals, groups and polities inlasting but limited union, in such a way as to provide for the energetic pursuit of common endswhile maintaining the respective integrities of all parties (Elazar,1991). Putting aside some fewexamples that according some authors could be Iceland or Portugal most of the societies in theworld consist in multinational states with different kind of ethnic minorities or minority nations.Federalism, thus, seem to be a just way to govern the destiny of nations. Nevertheless, realityhas proven to be more complex and some minority nations or subunits seem to hold multipleidentities, that is, people may identify themselves with the state-wide nation or other kind ofentity that embrace their “prime identity”. In words of De Schutter, the cultural landscape weinhabit is imbued with cultural hibridity and opacity. It is always characterised by multipleidentities, minorities within minorities, and bi-and multilingualism (De Schutter, 2010). All thesecharacteristics will have to be taken into account if a fair Federal system has to be implemented.That is the challenge of any federative agreement. If possible to manage this complexityFederalism would be the fairest way to accommodate internal differences. 1
  2. 2. If we understand the federal agreement as it has been presented so far then we might come tothe conclusion that federalism is consubstantial to liberal democracy and liberal democracy isthe precondition to a reliable federal agreement. Therefore, Federalism cannot possibly exist ina non-democratic context. Elazar remarks the importance of the role of democratic rule in thedefinition of Federalism: according to him the essence of federalism is democratic. However, therelationship between democracy and federalism is complex. It existed and exists severalcountries with different forms of federal agreements that claim to be federations even if theymay not always fit purely in what can be called democracies understanding by it respect forsome basic features: individual rights, civil liberties, etc. According to some authors federalismimposed by force and ruled from the top is neither true federalism nor is it destined to besuccessful on account of Federalism is too intimately associated with democratic republicanismfor that (Elazar,1991). During the XX century there were nation-states that claimed to befederations but which would not fit in the idea of plural democracies as they were run in itsorigins by one party system. In the European context this was the case of those authoritarianfederative socialist republics which contained wide range of ethnicities in their composition: 1Union Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).In the case of the USSR it was reconstituted as a Federation by Lenin and his colleagues in theCommunist Party because they felt they had no choice and saw in this system the only way toconciliate the many nationalities within the territory under their control and make possible the 2Communist rule (Elazar, 1991) . The ideology of the triumphant party after the internal war,Bolshevism, held the doctrine of Democratic centralism which consisted in an organizationalmethod that describes the freedom of members of the political party to discuss and debatematters of policy and direction, but once the decision of the party is made by majority vote, allmembers are expected to uphold that decision. If we take a retrospective look, according to itsconstitution the USSR was a Federation but until its last years in the eighties and early nineties,in practice, its governance was highly centralized. That is, while Soviet federalism was formallyso open that the soviet constitution guaranteed the republics the right of secession, in fact theCommunist party monopolized all the power in offices of the Republics.In Yugoslavia, during the course of fighting a guerrilla war against foreign occupiers while at thesame time waging a social revolution, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) adopted aFederal formula for the organization of the state over which they were confident they would rulein the post-war period. Federalization based on the Soviet model was the Party’s response tothe manifest ethnic problems of the interwar Kingdom, and the evolving patterns of relationships1 Although Czechoslovakia was considered run by a federal system, I will avoid mention it as it was abinational country having Czechs and Slovaks as the constituent nationalities.2 Elazar called it “reluctant federalism”. Other authors “nominal federalism”. 2
  3. 3. 3within the Partisan/Party organization (Burg, 1977). In the same line as the soviet case,federalization of the state apparatus did not mean participation of opposite forces in the politicalscene. The Party elite remained a tightly knit, and strongly Stalinist group whose sharedideology and vision of the future outweighed regional liberties or responsibilities.Considering the precedent events, it has been said that the decision to create a Federation wasoriented to satisfy the important psychological needs of the Yugoslav peoples for recognition oftheir national individuality, and give each nationality the assurance for first time, of enjoying a 4truly special status with the other national groups (Shoup, 1968) (See Annex: Map 1). In theseregards we note the different nature or spirit of the establishment of a federation giving thehistorical particularities of the Balkan area if compared with the USSR which was deemed justas a tool or transitional mechanism designed to provide autonomy until the communist stateemerged (Elazar, 1991). The way to maintain unity in diversity in its inception was under asingle party system, the idea of yugoslavness and the figure of Josip Broz Tito as thetriumphant leader in the war of the “liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia”.The leadership of Tito considering its historical legitimization had evident elements of the 5Weberian model of charismatic authority which will work as a powerful resource during his rule.Several authors have made remarks on the fact that the Yugoslav federation was an example ofcoexistence until Tito perished leaving space for the arise of ethnic nationalism in the republics,others affirm that Tito’s death was just the “last straw” of a process that would imminently endup in the dissolution of the federal agreement. One way or the other with the end of hisleadership, the old Yugoslav ties that held the constituent parts together seemed toprogressively being eroded. As an expert in national security stressed: the failure of theYugoslav federalism would certainly have occurred sooner had it not been for the unique roleplayed by Tito in enforcing an overarching national perspective on the republics (Dorff, 1994).It could be argued that the war starting in 1991 was not the final destruction of Yugoslavia butrather the instrument that Tito’s successors would use to implement a new social andadministrative order: the ethnically homogeneous or “pure” communities and nation states. Aprecondition for this It is not the attempt to investigate why the absence of Tito determined thefederal disintegration –if it was the case at all- as we understand that this fact accelerated or3 The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a state stretching from the Western Balkans to Central Europe whichexisted during the often-tumultuous interwar era of 1918–1941.4 Nationalities are referred to the majoritarian ethnic groups of the constituent republics (with theexception of the republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina which was the only multiethnic republic with abalance of ethnic groups) whereas “national minorities” stand for the ethnic minorities within therepublic, for example, Hungarians and Albanians in the republic of Serbia.5 According to Max Weber, charisma is “a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of whichhe is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at leastspecifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person,but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned istreated as a leader”. Weber, Maximillan. Theory of Social and Economic Organization. From Chapter:"The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization", 1947. 3
  4. 4. boosted and ongoing process. It is not the idea to study the death the Tito himself buy to use itas a reference for the development of this paper and halve the time to be explored.Some historians have talked about old resentment among the ethnic groups as a cause ofdisaster. Taken this a cause would encapsulate us in a deterministic perspective but we cannotneglect its importance because it has been suggested that generally speaking the maintenanceof ethnic identities in the Balkans are the ideas that, the whole Eastern European region wassubjected to an universalistic logic of big empires: when different ethnic communities werejoining a certain empire, loose ties were established with the central authority. That is whyethnic communities managed to preserve their autonomy and to develop continuously their self-awareness (Janjić, 2002). Thus, we have to keep in mind that federalism within the easternEuropean context had to deal with this strong sense of belonging. Thus, a type of federalismcalled “ethnic federalism”, created to solve the problems of communal life in multi-ethniccommunities (Vujačić, 2001). The case of the union of the South Slavic people could partlytrace its legitimatization here. The overall system can be called “ethnic federalism” because therepublics that composed the Federation previously defined themselves as separated entities,and it was always accepted that the subunits possessed differentiated cultural features such aslanguage and religion. Moreover, the ethnic boundaries and the republic boundaries in theBalkans coincide extensively (See Annex: Map 2).It is of importance to understand how Yugoslav federalism was established after the WWII andhow the first federal constitution was drawn. Yet the aim of this work focuses the period of timethat starts in 1968 and finishes in 1992. The decision of setting it in 1968 takes into account thatkey facts occurred in the international arena having the Cold War as the ideological context.The ideas of liberalization penetrated the Eastern bloc and following the French May of 68, thePrague spring took place which are believed to be related with the Croatian Spring of 1971 aspart of a wider process. As it has been pointed out by an expert in the area: the road that lead to 6 7 8the disaster started in 1968 (Veiga, 2002). In the same way, it has been proposed thatinternal economical and political liberalization of the 1960s had produced the conditions and theopportunity for the rebirth of sub-state nationalism and the federalizing response in theconstitutional changes of 1967-71 (Binns, 1989). The Post-Titoist period started with his deathin 1980 finishing approximately in 1992 after the secession of Republics of Slovenia, Croatiaand Bosnia and Herzegovina and the outbreak of the war.6 According to Veiga, go back on time to understand what happened in the Balkanic state is an exercisethat could easily make us put reality out of our sight. In addition, try to understand the disintegration ofYugoslavia from the period right before the rise of Slobodan Milosević is neither enough nor realistic.7 In 1968 also ethnic Albanians went to street demonstrations manifesting their discontent in the Provinceof Kosovo calling to be granted with a Republican status.8 According to Robert H. Dorff around that year is when the devolution of power to the periphery inYugoslavia began. 4
  5. 5. 9Dorff emphasizes the necessity to understand federalism both as structure and process. Thatis to analyze not only its formal characteristics (written constitution, bicameral nationallegislature, division of power between the central and regional governments…) what heconsiders is the traditional way to see federalism. In this sense, Elazar observes that manypolities with federal structure were not federal in practice. To make a difference he introducesthe category of process adding that only in those polities where the processes of governmentreflect federal principles is the structure of federalism meaningful. Thus, Dorff take this idea andconsiders that federal processes include a sense of partnership on the part of the parties to thefederal compact, manifested through negotiated cooperation on issues and programs andbased on a commitment to open bargaining between all parties to an issue on such way as tostrive for consensus or, failing that, accommodation which protects the fundamental integrity of 10all partners. Accommodation is referred to the capability to articulate and conciliate thedemands and yearnings of the constituent parts with the central power within a federativesystem.Federalism has been regarded by many as the fairest system for accommodation of culturaldifferences as De Schutter suggested. However a critic would be casted from the structure-process perspective proposed by Dorff to understand federalism in Eastern Europe where inreality federalism did not ameliorate ethnic conflict instead saying the opposite would understatethe role of the communist party as a “peculiar mechanism of control”. Moreover, it convenientlyoverlooks the argument that federalist structures exacerbated those tensions by providing anexcellent organizational base for political leaders to exploit with nationalist appeals once the 11centre began to weaken. From this standpoint federalism did not promote at all “politics ofaccommodation” but was rather a mirage that gave the illusion of power sharing on an ethnicbasis. That will lead us to think that spirit underlying the establishment of a federal system in 12Yugoslavia aimed to suppress ethnic differences and not to accommodate them. It is preciselythe intention of this paper to explore the reasons why what seemed to be a prosper example ofa multiethnic federation in terms of conciliation of allegedly ancestral rivalries eventually failed.9 Dorff, Robert H. Federalism in Eastern Europe: Part of the problem or part of the solution? Publius:The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994).10 Elazar, Daniel J. Federalism and Consociational regimes. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 15(Spring 1985).11 Dorff remarks that federalism itself when only considered as structure cannot ensure accommodationfor the cases of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Indeed, he blames the communist partystructures for being a mechanism for depriving ethnic groups the ability to mobilize and,eventually, thesesame mechanisms were used in changing circumstances to increase ethnic tensions.12 According to Elazar this was the case in the establishment of a federative system in the USSR to makepossible the Communist rule but which evolved in an expected way: “although initially established as atransitional mechanism designed to provide for cultural autonomy until the communist state emerged,Soviet federalism has become firmly entrenched as a means for accommodating diverse ethnic andnational differences…” (Elazar, 1991). According to Dorff, prior to the decentralization of the mid1970`s, Yugoslavia had been federalist only in the same structural way as the USSR. 5
  6. 6. The inception of the Yugoslav FederalismAfter the Second World War, without the necessity of a Soviet invasion as opposed to othercountries of Eastern Europe the Communist forces of Tito, multiethnic and dispersed over allthe provinces, raised as the new ruling force in a new created state. Tito’s followers supportedthe creation of a Narodni front (NOF) -primarily led by the Communist Party- destined to rulethe state which will represent the different interests and political positions but mediatised by theCommunist Party. The Front won the elections with more than 90% of votes benefited greatlyfrom their wartime exploits enjoying genuine support among the populace.The first article of the Constitution of 1946 following the 1936’s Stalin Soviet Constitutiondefined Yugoslavia as a federal peoples state, republican in form, a community of peoplesequal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of 13separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state. Moreover it declaredthe composition to be formed by the People’s Republic of Croatia, the People’s Republic ofSlovenia, the People’s Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People’s Republic ofMacedonia and the People’s Republic of Montenegro. The People’s Republic of Serbiaincludesd the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous Kosovo-Metohijan 14region. Each of them embraced in the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia which wasconstructed as territorial multinational federation with formally equal status for federal republicsthat were defined as the homelands of titular nationalities. In addition, the national minoritieswithin each Republic were granted with special rights of protection of their own cultural 15development as well as the free use of their language.Among the main characteristics of symmetrical Federations is the existence of two spheres ofgovernment, including federal government on the one hand, and several federated units on theother (Barry and Foweraker, 2001). This was indeed the case of FPRY having the NationalAssembly from 1946 –re-establishing the name from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia- divided inFederal Council and the Council of Nationalities in which republics and Provinces had equal 16 17representation. Both houses of the Assembly had equal rights. It could be identified thatmany of the main competences were held by the Federal government such as the amendmentsof the Constitution and its control over the compliance of the Constitution of the People’sRepublics; the representation of the Federation in international relations and internationaltreaties; the federal budget, the passing of the general state budget and of final accounts and13 Constitution of the Federative People´s Republic of Yugoslavia (1946). Chapter I. Article 1.14 Constitution of the Federative People´s Republic of Yugoslavia (1946). Chapter I. Article 2.15 Constitution of the Federative People´s Republic of Yugoslavia (1946). Chapter III. Article 13.16 Principles of parity and proportional representation among nationalities have been applied consistentlysince 1946 in all major functional and territorial bodies at the national level, including the League ofCommunists, the Socialist Alliance, the Conference for Civic Activity of Yugoslav Women, the Councilof the League of Trade Union, the League of Youth, and the Federal Board of the League of Associationsof Veterans.17 Constitution of the Federative People´s Republic of Yugoslavia (1946). Chapter VII. Article 57. 6
  7. 7. the supreme control over its administration; Legislation concerning the distribution of revenuesto the Federal budgets of the republics and those of autonomous and administrative territorial 18units. In fact the character of the relations between the Federal Government and theconstituent units was asymmetrical but not among the Federal units which were theoretically atequal footing. Each republic had its own Constitution but had to be in conformity with theFederal Constitution. The law of the republics in any case could surpass Federal law in case ofdiscrepancy.The principal of organization of the state was federal but the economy was centralized andplanned and the heavy industry was boosted. There was little doubt about the consolidation ofthe system intimately related with Stalinism. However, In 1948, after clashes with the USRR,Yugoslavia is expulsed from the Kominform as it is accused by the agency of abandoning thesocialist ideals, and falls into revisionism and sustains a Petite bourgeoisie-like nationalism.This fact will be crucial as a door opened for the establishment of the “Yugoslavian way ofsocialism” announcing that it will take distance from the USSR and that it will set up a model ofeconomic self-management and political-administrative decentralization highlighting a federalprincipleThe economic reforms began on 26 June 1950 when the introduction of workers self- 19management was announced. Economic control was delegated to the individual republics,with government departments in Belgrade becoming coordination councils for cooperation. Withthe new system, workers councils controlled production and the vast majority of the profits,which were in turn distributed among the workers themselves (as opposed to the state orowners/stockholders). Industrial and infrastructure development programs were implemented aswell, as the country finally began to develop a strong industrial sector. After the approval of theself-management law until 1956-57 the directors of the factories were designated by the stateapparatus. To have an idea of this worked, the state as well controlled the prices and worker’swages and could intervene in the financing of the factories curtailing its autonomy.As a product of the break with the USSR the country was losing its Stalinist characteristics suchas the centralization of the political power which followed the Marxism-leninst like logic. In thedrawing of the new Constitution of 1953 the central power was reduced to five reduced areas:Interior, National Defence, International Relations, Economy and Public Administration leavingthe rest of the competences to the republics of the Federation (De la Guardia, 1997). The18 Constitution of the Federative People´s Republic of Yugoslavia (1946). Chapter VI. Article 44. Points1, 4, 13 and 21.19 In a self-management system the workers from the lower echelons controlled and mandated thedecisions made by higher management. Worker’s councils, composed of as many as 50 individuals inlarge factories, represented the “will” of the worker. Further, since the state itself was intended to witheraway, political leadership attempted to shift responsibilities to the worker’s commune or opština whichwas meant, in turn, to raise its own funds, sets its own budgets, and provide workers with necessary socialservices. 7
  8. 8. changes meant that the local Government was the beneficiary and not the republic themselves.The effective power, nonetheless, remained in the hands of the Party rebaptized in that year asLeague of Yugoslav Communists (SKJ). The Constitution of 1963 reflected the perceived needfor recentralization: the parliamentary Federal Assembly was divided into one general chamber,the Federal Chamber, and four chambers given specific bureaucratic responsibilities. In aneffort to end regional conflict and promote national representation of the Yugoslav people, theconstitution directed that individual republics be represented only in the Chamber ofNationalities, a part of the Federal Chamber. The 1963 constitution also introduced the conceptof rotation, which prohibited the holding of higher or lower level executive positions for morethan two four-year terms. Other notable provisions extended human and civil rights andestablished constitutionally guaranteed court procedures (Curtis, 1992). These provisions hadno precedent among the so-called Communist states.1968 – 1980: Political and economical liberalization and progressive devolutionIn 1967, The Draft Thesis on Future Development and Reorganization of the League ofCommunists of Yugoslavia was published. The work suggested that the functional structures ofthe SKJ should adequate to the new social reality since an economic and social evolution hadtaken place in the last years after the implementation of self-management. The Congress of1969 will be the key for the insertion of the SKJ into the self-management system. Following thethesis of 1967 it adopted a more democratic statutes regarding freedom of expressing opposedpolitical ideas among the militants but also less centralizing policy of the State institutions.The Federal Assembly passed six amendments to the Constitution to endow the Council ofnationalities of more competences and independence as it was understood that it representedthe genuine interests of the republics. In this manner, each republic had the power to intervenein the decisions that affected them and, in the majority of the cases, could exert veto to thosemeasurements that could be considered harmful for their interests (De la Guardia, 1997). Thatis, the competence of the Chamber of nationalities was extended to include all issues affectingthe economic interests of the republics, making it in all but name a separate parliamentary body.These reforms also affected the Federal council, in 1970, a symmetric feature was introduced:the almost parity of competences for all the republics and autonomous provinces was 20decreed. Nonetheless, the Chamber did not have sufficient influence on the formulation offederal policy but all federal legislation had to receive the approval of the Chamber. It wasindeed suggested that Yugoslavia would be considered a “Confederation” rather than aFederation.A Confederation understood as federal agreements between independent states which goal topursue some specific objectives (Barry and Foweraker, 2001) could not be applied in this casebecause the Chamber will take decisions as single chamber which will prevent any possibility of20 This will allow the republics to establish relations with other states. Such was the case, for example, ofSlovenia and Croatia which got closer to Austria and Germany. 8
  9. 9. the institutionalization of the delegations elected by the republican and provincial assembliesand make impossible any misuse of veto from any delegates from the republic or province.With this panorama, a skism took place: the division between the Federal governments and therepublics or “unitarists” and decentralizers often associated with nationalistic ideas. This has tobe understood in its complexity that the struggle was not clear between two positions butinstead several: those to who sought to preserve “hard-won rights” of the republics while at thesame time controlling the excesses of nationalism, and those who appear to have forged analliance with the nationalists and were seeking to use the force of the nationalist wave to breakdown resistance to further devolution of power to the republics (Burg, 1977). We assist aprocess of nationalisms threatening not a mere centre but centre with a polycentric distributionof power in which the system of decision-making based on negotiations of multiple centers ofpower, or what the Jovan Djordjević, Titos great federalist advisor and constitution-maker,defined as “Polyvalent Federalism”, an original and innovative type of Federalism developed 21only in the Yugoslav society as an expression of the self-management system. It has alsobeen named “Communal Federalism” referring to a system in which leaders and groups in localcommunities share a greater relative influence over what occurs in society as a whole thanleaders and groups occupying positions in provincial, republic or federal organs (Dunn, 1975)remarking the importance of communities to influence the decision-making.Neither of these authors address the flaws that may appear as the decision are taken within theideological setting of the SKJ without giving chance to the confrontation of ideological positionsnot being compelled by the limitations imposed by the party. This will lead to the debates we areused to witness in liberal democracies. The single party system and the ideological control,along with the revival of historical background of the different nationalist traditions as source of 22identity can be a possible explanation of the tension that existed in the 70s. It has has beendescribed by a foreign observer about those times that the psico-social atmosphere of theYugoslav politics is close to a state of paranoia in which the federal government considered 23every issue as a manifestation of nationalism from the republics.21 Polyvalent Federalism was defined as by Djordjević as a new kind of social federalism that derivesfrom a multiethnic community but primarily from the superstructure of a society based on the “socialownership of means of production and social management”. For Djordjević -what then was modernsociety- is in process of transition from political federative association, from territorially basedcommunity to functionally-based community, from a mechanistic constitutional model. “In thisdevelopment Yugoslav constitutional law and political theory during the last quarter of this century mayplay the role American constitutional law and political theory played during the last quarter of theeighteen century” (Djordjević, 1975).22 According to Denitch, there two confronted vision of the state by Serbs and Croats (which were onlytwo of the republics but whose political clash would be key for the dynamics of the Federation). WhileSerbs have a developed parliamentary tradition and a Jacobin conception of the state influenced byFrench ideals in the 19th century leading to centralizing integralist ideas (The Kingdom of Yugoslavia,dominated by Serbs is a clear example); the political history of Croatia in the 19th century was one drawn-out parliamentary and legal battle for the “historical rights” of the Croats or, more specifically, the Croatstate (Denitch, 1977).23 I was reported that “every current issue: economic, social, cultural and others… was treated as anaspect of the national question in Yugoslavia. The order of things up to then was completely reversed. 9
  10. 10. Despite that the major moves towards decentralization already occurred in the 60s, asmentioned before 1968 can be picked as a crucial moment for the Federation. Thedissemination of liberal ideals, especially in the Croatian and Slovenian elites, and the 344.000unemployed people at the beginning of that year will create proper conditions for the republicsto put more pressure for political renewal in the sense of a greater political and administrativedecentralization. But the idea is that the pressure for decentralization that was accepted by theTitoist direction masked that it was not intended to follow the liberalizing stream that originated 24the revolutions of 1968 in other European countries, neither in a democratic sense norrelaying the parties’ leadership and power structures.1968 is when the process of federalization of the League of Communists began as therepublican congresses were held. For first time, Republican parties decided about their politicalplatform and orientation and chose their representatives in the federal bodies. This fact isimportant in understanding the series of events at the beginning of 1970s leading to the 1974Constitution (Popovski, 1995). Administrative reforms in the late Sixties empowered the sixrepublics (soon also the two autonomous provinces) with legislative power on the federal level.Thereafter –for some authors- movement toward confederation and sovereignty for therepublics was inevitable (Ramet, 1992). There were two crisis identified: in 1968 with theprotests of Yugoslav students demanding social, and political reforms, more equality, more 25democracy and more real socialism in connection with the student movement in that yearthroughout Europe. The second took place in 1971, the so called Croatian spring when theLeague of communists of Croatia (SKH) demanded more economic autonomy and eventuallyput forward a claim for Croatian independence. It has been said that in spite of thedecentralizing policies and the competences granted to the republics, the Croatian nationalistspresent in the party and in the state organs of decision kept pushing for an effective autonomywhich was detrimental for the power of the federation. Their original political pressure fordemocratic reforms was rapidly converted in a pure nationalist sense. A process of 26“decentralization without democracy” was taking place to quote Veiga.An important point to think about is that in previous decades an important investment ineducation in all the Republics has been made, so the new generations had more academiccredentials but also growing expectancies regarding the quality of life, acquisition of jobs andmaterialism. As the economic problems grew at the end of the 60s it also did the restiveness ofThe national question ceased to appear or to be treated as a phenomological form with certain content. Onthe contrary, every economic, social, cultural and other aspect of life began to be presented as a form withnational essence” (Perić, 1974) in Burg, 1977.24 Yugoslavia supported the Czechoslovakian revolution which sponsored a “socialism with human face”.25 Examples are: Ŝtudensko gibanje, 1982; Praxis, 1968, 1971.26 Veiga, Francisco. La trampa balcánica. Una crisis europea de fines del siglo XX. Ed. Grijalbo,Barcelona, 2002. 10
  11. 11. 27the young population. The implementation of liberal reforms on one side created expectationsin career advancement but at the same time there was a near-monopoly over executive andprofessional positions but by the cadres of the revolution which were often poorly qualified.Paradoxically, the fight for social egalitarianism in the conformation of the Yugoslav society afterthe revolution would bring about 25 years later the promotion of conflict between leadingpersonnel and upwardly mobile groups with increasing education and qualifications.The constitution of 1974 only partially reversed the extreme decentralization of the early 281970s. It added elaborate language protecting the self-management system from stateinterference and expanding representation of republics and provinces in all electoral and policyforums. The Constitution called the restructured Federal Assembly the highest expression of theself-management system (Curtis, 1992). Although, it is important to highlight that it was de jurea self-management federalism basing sovereignty in the principles of working class and nation.Thus, Yugoslavia was considered a Federation because it was a multinational state pursuingself-management based upon negotiation and agreement (Popovski, 1995). This Constitutionadded symmetrical features as the direct participation of the federal units in the decisionmaking. The important decisions had to be based in interregional consensus. Although it lookedlike a fair solution these measures did bring several problems that will appear later.On the other side, the increased bureaucracy made the rule of the Federation cumbersome.The result was a very problematic relation between the central authority and the regional andprovincial powers. To have a better insight of the federative constitutionalism that emerged in1974 to “make everybody happy” it encompassed the following constitutional instruments ordocuments: a) a unique constitution of Yugoslavia or a Federal Constitution; b) constitutions ofthe republic; c) constitutional laws (acts) of autonomous provinces; d) statues of municipalities(communes) and of towns; e) statutes of self-managing organizations of associated labour as 29well as those of other self-managing institutions. Many authors have pointed out the difficultiesin the decision-making in such complex structure with so many layers and often opposedinterests.As we can see the attempts of decentralization in a non-democratic context with lack of politicalpluralism will lead the SJK to split its preeminence among the six communist parties in therepublics and the two other from the autonomous provinces. Critically, Veiga, puts the nature ofdecentralization as stemming from the “pressure exerted from the regional communist27 This was not only the case of Slovenia and Croatia but in all the Republics. In June 1968, BelgradeUniversity students staged a week-long strike focusing on the mentioned problems.28 Edvard Kardelj wrote that its formula “did not correspond neither to a federation nor a Confederation”.Bennett defines it as a “intricate series of check and balances designed to prevent any individual fromacquiring as much power as Tito himself has held and to prevent any of Yugoslavia’s peoples fromdominating the federation” adding “with 405 clauses it was the world’s longest constitution, and,probably on account of its absurd length, was virtually untranslatable and largely nonsensical”. (Bennett,1995).29 Djordjević, Jordan. Remarks on the Yugoslav Model of Federalism. Publius 5, No. 2 (Spring 1975) 11
  12. 12. oligarchies” (Veiga, 2002). He states that even if they argue from using in principle the defenceof the self-management system what is found behind is a nationalistic sentiment. Self-management could be used as a strong political argument or strategy to acquire morecompetences, nationalism will work the same way but the first can be tolerated from the centralpower, the second will have a more restrictive treatment. In any case, both will push in the same 30direction: more decentralization. As time passed the nationalist rhetoric replaced the economic 31arguments.In 1977, the chief ideological theoretician of Titoism, Edvard Kardelj, attempted to lay theideological groundwork for a diversified post-Tito political system. In his The Directions ofDevelopment of the Political System of Self Management, he admitted that pluralism was aninevitable fact of Yugoslav political life, but he insisted that this pluralism had nothing incommon with the pluralism of the bourgeois democracies of the West. In Yugoslavia, he said,conflicting interests could be accommodated within the scope of the SKJ (Curtis, 1992). Thepoint that needs to be stressed is that any kind of political pluralism could not be thought out ofthe realms of the communist party, the ideological sphere embraced any kind of decentralizationattempt. But the logic of liberalization in economic terms was hand on hand with the allegedlyhistoric attempt of independence of Slovenia and Croatia.In fact, the first expressions of nationalism could be identified at the same time that economicand ideological conflicts faced the developed and less-developed republics after the liberaleconomic reforms were implemented in 1965 aiming to tackle the income disparities (SeeAnnex: Table 1). Contrarily, the attempt to distribute wealth within the Federation failed. Insteadof becoming narrower, the gap between poor and rich republics widened. In consequence, amajor ideological confrontation was created as a dispute for the allocation of the scarceresources advanced. On one side, the conservatives viewed centralized allocation as the mostappropriate means of achieving the redistribution and equalization of wealth to which the Partywas committed and the liberals that saw that investment in the developed areas will be the mostefficient way of increasing the development in all the regions. In this direction, the singularity ofYugoslavia is that there is a coincidence of division based on the federal structure of the stateand those based on ethnicity and levels of development (Burg, 1977). Having most of theliberals clearly coming from Slovenia and Croatia and the conservatives from Serbia,Montenegro and Macedonia; a door was open to the several factors to intertwine to makenegotiations more problematic. According to Burg, of the divisions mentioned only the federalstructure of the state and the federal commitment of the Party were susceptible to short termalteration and were appropriate on the basis of the evolving model of a society based on self-30 Sekelj writes about this: “local promoters asked for more autonomy in the decision in order to benefitof the success of their work or to hide their failures. This pressure was more intense as the economicsystem produced good per capita dividends: since 1950 personal income grew faster than globalproductivity. In whole Yugoslavia, between 1954 and 1965 the productivity grew 3,6%, the income percapita 5,9%; between 1966 and 1970, the percentages were 5 and 7,% respectively” (Sekelj, 1993).31 Steven L. Burg concerning the Serbian-Croatian confrontations puts is as the “forces of nationalism onboth sides of the issue exploited the freedom of action that came with liberalization” (Burg, 1977). 12
  13. 13. management, that is, the relationship between the republics and between the republics and thefederation.1980-1992: Death of the leader, ethnonationalist momentum and disintegrationIn the six years between the promulgation of the 1974 constitution and the death of Tito in 1980the Federation was dominated by two overriding issues: economic crisis and fears about whatwould happen to the country both internally and externally, after Tito’s death. The Constitutionof 1974 was designed to operate in two phases: during Tito’s life and after it. The idea was thatthe Constitution will work as an automatic mechanism at the image and likeness of the leader inhis absence. This is what will be called bureaucratization of the charisma (Sekelj, 1993). Fromthat moment a presidency was replaced by an eight person “collective presidency” (with each ofthe eight representing one of the eight units) wherein one of the eight was elected chairman onan annual rotation basis. This constitutional provision did not come into practice until 1980. Theunderlying intention was the development of a “consociational structure of conflict resolution”that could enable it to survive in the absence of the leader as Binns expressed.It is revealing, specially for those strongly committed with the idea that the figure of Tito, as apolitical leader, will be enough to keep a Federation together that we also have to count with acrucial fact that was occurring about that time which is the economic crunch: when the loansdried up and Yugoslavia had to begin repaying the national debt. The panorama was not verypromising. Yugoslavia’s inflation and trading balance with the West had become so bad by themid-1970’s, partly under the impact of the OPEC price rises and subsequent Westernrecession, that it was forced to seek help from the IMF and western banks. The apparentprosper times that the Federation enjoyed previously could not be maintained and by the 1980sthe crisis was all over. Instead o limiting domestic consumption and cutting living standards asthe IMF urged. Yugoslavia borrowed heavily from private Western Banks. According to anobserver, the country’s foreign debt rocketed from under $3,5 billion in 1973 to more than $20.5billion in 1981 (Bennett, 1995). In 1982 as the federal government the country worked out thefull indebtedness they came across that only 35 per cent was raised at the federal level and 65 32per cent by the republics and the two autonomous provinces.Discontent grew exponentially in the republics due to the impact of the internal economic crisisand the poorer areas that had benefited less from central redistribution as the system wasbecoming more confederal hitting them harder as the richer areas became less willing to balethem out. Indeed, one of the features of the post-Tito situation has been the increasingstalemate at federal level in the face of economic crisis but also the national tensions.32 According to Bennett, uncontrolled borrowing sprees at the republican and provincial level were oftenunknown to the federal authorities and had become endemic. 13
  14. 14. This period saw the re-appearance of serious discord among the nationalities (the Albano-Serbian conflict, and antagonism among the South Slavs). The nationalist clash was inflamedby the destabilization of the power structure set up in the context of socialist self-management:decentralization at republic and commune level, and consensus between the leadership and thepopulation (Canapa, 1991). Binns, argues notes that the absence of an authoritative figure(resulting from the rotational leadership system) capable of knocking heads together at crucialtimes, as Tito was, and the fact that since 1980 the in camera conflict- resolution procedureswhich he preferred turned into “acrimonious public wrangles” (Binns,1995). Here it is particularlyinteresting to know that a shift in the decision-making process, making it more transparent,which can be considered one of the ideal characteristics of liberal democracies, did not seem towork as expected possibly given the lack of the democratic tradition of deliberation and problemsolving out of the realms of the Party.It was certainly convenient for some factions within the party in their seek for more autonomousto fan these nationalist feelings if proper economic conditions would be found: the decline ofliving standards between 1980 and 1986 was at average of 6% on a year basis, with ever moreclear differences among the territories of the Federation created the right situation. Forexample, in 1986 the average wage in Kosovo was 26% inferior to the Federal average and in 33Slovenia, 35% superior to that average.The partys influence declined and the party moved to a structure that gave more power to partybranches in Yugoslavias constituent republics. The XII Congress of the SKJ was marked inparticular by divisive tendencies. The axes of the discussion spin around federalism-centralismand economic, liberalization and control, strict titoism and political renovation. In a retrospectivecomparison Pavlowitch argued that at the end of the sixties the Party had to face a multiformnationalism which they thought they had eliminated. On the contrary, in the 80s it was realizedthat the national question was more serious than the thirties when it was manifested in aconstitutional and political manner: in the 80s it had acquired an economic, political and culturaldimension. Furthermore, it has been noted that the party instead of acting following theguidelines of the political elite in Belgrade started acting autonomously at a republic level.A key character in the scene was the emergence of the figure of Slobodan Milosevic who wasable to climb with the Party to the state presidency starting a recentralizing process. Serbiannationalism became then a first-order threat both real and perceived to the non-Serbian ethnicgroups and their federalist enclaves. Nationalism was then widespread along the republics andwas used as an instrument by the self-interested politicians as Sabrina Ramet argues. She seesrather like an opportunist move than as an enduring, historical set of forces that would inevitablyand inexorably tear these countries apart. She considers as well the federalist structure asplaying a pivotal role. Putting together opportunism and the federal structure she writes that the33 Data from: Martín de la Guardia, Ricardo M. La Europa balcánica : Yugoslavia, desde la segundaguerra mundial hasta nuestros días. Síntesis, Madrid, 1997. 14
  15. 15. republic governments, together with the party organizations, are seeing as providing institutionalbases of power that opportunistic politicians seek to control. To the extent that these republicswere dominated by one ethnic nationality or another, they induced ambitious politicians toappeal to nationalists sentiments in their attempts to consolidate power. Dorff’s approach of thefederal structure as a cause of the fragmentation of societies in Eastern Europe is very suitablehere given that decentralization through the gradually greater transfer of competences to therepublics, did not contribute to regenerate the system but with time it aggravate crisis. One maythink that decentralization legitimized the practices of the regional elites which, when they couldnot take more advantage of the federative structure, casted nationalist propaganda to settletheir absolute power without the federal control.As nationalism was used for populist politicians and by the mid-eighties was already settledamong the republics the new panorama will have different clashing fronts. The territory of theFederation excepting Serbia and Slovenia is ethnically mixed and there is not totalcorrespondence of an ethnic group within the boundaries of the republics. Slovenia is the onlycountry that did not have a minority in the other republics but, for example, there weresubstantial Serbian minorities in the other regions. This will cause a situation in which when anationalist and reformist movement gained impulse in a certain republic automatically theminority, in most of the cases attached to the “mother republic”, will feel threatened putting thepressure in the other regions or federative units where this minority was historically linked. Thiswill have the effect on the other unit (where the minority feel attached) on one side of resistingthe demands of the other region and also to maintain the control of the minority that constitutesits own ethnic group. In consequence, a double legitimization of nationalism can be developedto use as a model to understand the complexity of the process of disintegration and that willenforced mutually: 1) The nationalism that can be used for seeking for more autonomy, 2) Thenationalism used to protect their own “brothers” living in other republic.In a retrospective glance we could locate the first in the activities in Slovenia and Croatia andthe second in Serbia at the late eighties fanned specially as Slobodan Milošević seize control ofthe Party.The collective presidency became the target of Milošević’s political power play. By reducing theMontengro, Vojvodina and Kosovo to satellites of Serbia, he effectively controlled four of theeight votes of the collective presidency and was able to produce deadlocks in the presidency atwill (Ramet, 1992). A door was then open then for the dissolution but also for the worst. Inaddition, the logic of crossed disputes between the republics were aggravated -and used as areason for demanding more or total autonomy- by the “serbianisation” of the JNA regarded asone of the symbols of unity of the federation. In 1991 the officer corps of the JNA were drawnpredominantly from among Serbs and Montenegrians. The estimations suggested that 54.25%of the officer corps were Serbs. Moreover, until January 1991, when the JNA officially banned 15
  16. 16. party political activities in its ranks, about 96% of the officer corps were members of the League 34of Communists.Finally, the immediate events that precipitated the complete dissolution of Yugoslavia had theirorigins in 1987-1989 when the “Serbian Party” – by then under the leadership of the avowedlynationalist Milošević- again set itself on a course of alliance-building and hoped to isolateSlovenia and Croatia. This show the lack of a key component mentioned by Elazar in federalism 35as a process as exposed at the beginning: the willingness of accommodation. Logically, theeffects of nationalism eroded the willingness of accommodation. Is yet to be investigated byhistorians if whether a substantial idea of yugoslavness really existed prior to the establishmentof federation or if it was developed as the federative experiment evolved and was part of thejustification of the federalist structure of the party-state and also if it the sentiment was sharedby the constituents units. The reviewed literature seems to dissuade us from this statement.Final remarks:What is key here is to understand that the decentralization was not performed in a democraticsetting but rather in a single party system. All the efforts of achieving more decentralizationwere channelized by the SKJ. The pressure from the elites of the republics for moredecentralization was within the realm of the SKJ, aiming for more power but not fordemocratization.The ideological ground of the Party was both titoism, referring to a particular way of socialismbased on a charismatic leader, and yugoslavness, or the idea of historical brotherhood betweensouth slav nations. The death of Tito occurred in a period of crisis that affected the party whichwas already disintegrating itself as it started to act more autonomously at the republics level.The absence of Tito and the economic bankruptcy will create more aspirations for the republicsto define their own destiny regardless of the central power.At the beginning at the eighties takes place a process of sharpening of an ongoing political andeconomic crisis. The crisis created ideal conditions for the fanning of nationalism in therepublics claiming more autonomy even though the transfer of competences had been regularduring the life of the Federation.Whether the nationalism was used as an historical right of recognition or as politicalopportunism for an elite, either one way or the other, it could be noted a lack of willingness fornegotiation and compromise from the constituent republics raised in the period studied buthaving its first manifestations at the end of the sixties, going through the seventies and finding34 Kipp, Jacob W. and Timothy L. Sanz. The Yugoslav Peoples Army: Between Civil War andDisintegration. Military Review 71 (December 1991): 36-45.35 Lipjhart leaves open the willingness of accommodation but expressing it with a positive undertone: “theleaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behaviour and thus aggravate mutual tensionsand political instability, but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing andunstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” in Dunn, 1975. 16
  17. 17. ideal political conditions upon the death of Tito. That is, it had determinant effects on the systemregardless its ethical nature or “veracity”.I would like to have the chance to talk about “irrationality” as a mean appealed by the republic 36elites to fan nationalism, an irrational ethnic-nationalism , in order to pursue their goals. In thissense it can also be stated that charisma –as Titoism itself was a doctrine permeated by thecharismatic personality of the leader- was a major factor that served to keep the Federationtogether. So what can we consider as “non-rational” factors affected the dissolution of thefederation and not only from one side but passions seemed to be very present in the politicalculture of the region. This could make us think that a strong ethnic sense of ethnonationalbelonging still existed and were revived despite in the establishment of the federation and in itsevolution, despite the ruling elites “naïvely hoped that federalism will be an answer to allnational tensions and that the national question would be solved because class relations hadbeen solved” (Popovski, 1995).In this line, authors seem to take different positions regarding the spirit of Yugoslavness and its 37ethos. While some authors like Elazar consider it an artificial creation and highlights itsauthoritarian character as a mean to secure its unity, others not only express the existence of aspirit of comity among the South Slavic people but also identify the existence of core values thathave been expressed in the successive Yugoslav constitutions (1946, 1953, 1963, 1974):decentralization, citizen and worker control, voluntary regulation of political, social andeconomic relationships, an independent role for republics and communes, and the principle of 38market regulation of economic processes. Adding also that during the period studied it untilthe late eighties the ethnically balanced distribution of power at the federal levels has been takein particular care. In any case, decentralization of a federal constitutional order is not asubstitute for genuine political pluralism.Finally, we witnessed during this period a process towards decentralization having aprogressive devolution of competences from the center to the periphery. But this occurs within aparty-state represented by the SKJ and Tito. When the power of the center began to weakenthe political system shifted not toward a decentralized politics of accommodation –as there was 39not a pre-existence tradition of ethnic democracy expressed out of ethnonationalistic terms-36 In this concern, Daniel J. Elazar affirmed in an article about the outbreak of the Balkan wars that “themain problem in Yugoslavia is that historic ethnic passions easily overwhelm rational efforts at resolutionof the crisis and things get out of hand, as they have in the last few weeks” (Elazar, 1991).37 “After World War II it took Tito to forge a new unity on a federal basis, but the will to remain unitedderived from the agreement of all concerned that they wanted to remain independent of the Soviet Unionat a time when the Soviet threat was a powerful one” (Elazar, 1991).38 Dunn, W. N. Communal Federalism: Dialectics of Decentralization in Socialist Yugoslavia. Publius:The Journal of Federalism (Spring 1975).39 I refer here to the liberties that are associated today in the way we understand liberal democracy.Radically opposed with the Marxist way to understand cultural particularities. In Yugoslavia as other 17
  18. 18. but to a politics of competition between the center and the periphery and among the units of theperiphery.References:Weber, Maximillan. Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Chapter: The Nature ofCharismatic Authority and its Routinization translated by A. R. Anderson and Talcott Parsons,1947.Ramet, Sabrina P.. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962- 1991. Bloomington IN:Indiana University Press, 1992.Elazar, Daniel J. and Merkaz ha-Yerushalmi. Federal systems of the world : a handbook offederal, confederal and autonomy arrangements / compiled and edited by Daniel J. Elazar andthe staff of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Longman, London, 1991.Elazar, Daniel J. Exploring Federalism. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,352,1987.Denitch, Bogdan. Ethnic Nationalism: the tragic death of Yugoslavia. University of MinnesotaPress, Minneapolis,1994.Veiga, Francisco. La trampa balcánica. Una crisis europea de fines del siglo XX. Ed. Grijalbo,Barcelona, 2002.Martín de la Guardia, Ricardo M. La Europa balcánica : Yugoslavia, desde la segunda guerramundial hasta nuestros días. Síntesis, Madrid, 1997.Bennett, Christopher. Yugoslavias Bloody Collapse - Causes, Course and Consequences. NewYork, NY University Press, 1995.Barry Clarke, Paul and Foweraker, Joe (editors). Encyclopedia of Democratic thought.Routledge, London and New York, 2001.Popovski, Vesna. Yugoslavia: Politics, Federation, Nation, in Federalism: The MultiethnicChallenge. G. Smith ( ed.). London: Longman, pp. 180-207, 1995.Vujačić, Ilija. The challenge of ethnic federalism: experiences and lesson from the formerYugoslavia in Federalism and Decentralization: Perspectives for the Transformation Process inEastern and Central Europe by Rose, Jurgen and Ch. Traut, Johannes (Eds), 2001.Žagar, Mitja. The Collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and the Viability of AsymmetricalFederalism. The Changing Faces of Federalism: Institutional Reconfiguration in Europe fromEast to West. Sergio Ortino, Mitja Žagar and Vojtech Mastny (eds). Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, pp. 107-133, 2005.Bringa, Tone (2004) The peaceful death of Tito and the violent end of Yugoslavia.Death of the father: An anthropology of the end in political authority. John Borneman (ed.): NewYork: Berghahn Books pp. 63-103Binns, Cristopher. Federalism, nationalism and socialism in Yugoslavia. In Federalism andSocialism. Forsyth, Murray. New York, St Martins Press: 115-147, 1989.Shoup, Paul. Communism and the Yugoslav national question. New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 308, 1968.socialist countries it was understood that definition of the individuals as attached to a social class willeventually absorb the use of culture or religion as a source of identity, this proved to be wrong with time. 18
  19. 19. Curtis, Glenn (Ed.). Yugoslavia: a country study. Area handbook series, 550-99. Washington,DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1992.Papers:Dunn, W. N. Communal Federalism: Dialectics of Decentralization in Socialist Yugoslavia.Publius: The Journal of Federalism (Spring 1975).Dorff, Robert H. Federalism in Eastern Europe: Part of the problem or part of the solution?Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24, 99-114, (Spring 1994).Elazar, Daniel J. Federalism and Consociational regimes. Publius: The Journal of Federalism15 (Spring 1985).Djordjević, Jordan. Remarks on the Yugoslav Model of Federalism. Publius 5, No. 2 (Spring1975).Burg, Steven L. Ethnic conflict and the Federalization of Socialist Yugoslavia: The Serbo-Croatconflict. Publius: The Journal of Federalism (Fall 1977).Kipp, Jacob W. and Timothy L. Sanz. The Yugoslav Peoples Army: Between Civil War andDisintegration. Military Review 71, 36-45, (December 1991):Denitch, Bogdan. The evolution of Yugoslav Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism(Fall 1977).W. Harriet Critchley. The failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia. International journal, 1993(48):3,Sum , p. 434-447.Canapa Marie-Paule. Crise des nationalités et crise du système politique en Yougoslavie. In:Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest. Volume 22, N°3. pp. 81-107, 1991.De Schutter, Helder. Federalism as Fairness. Journal of Political Philosophy, 2010.Others:Constitution of de Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946.Constitution of de Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, 1953.Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1963.Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974. 19
  20. 20. AnnexMap 1: Republics, Autonomous regions boundaries and ethnic groups in the SFRY Source: A Map Folio, CIA, 1992.Map 2: Ethnic Structure of the SFRY (Absolute ethnic majorities, over 50%) Source: Population census of the SFRY (March 31, 1981). 20
  21. 21. Table 1: Social Product per capita in the Republics of Yugoslavia (%) Average anual growth 1947 1965 1975 1978 (1947 – 1978) Yugoslavia 100 100 100 100 5 Slovenia 162 177 201 205 5,8 Croatia 105 120 124 127 5,7 Vojvodina 100 122 121 115 5,5 Serbia 101 95 92 98 4,9 Macedonia 70 70 69 68 4,9 Bosnia 86 69 69 64 4,1 Montenegro 94 71 70 71 4,1 Kosovo 49 39 33 29 3,2 Developed areas 110 118 121 124 5,5Less developed areas 77 64 62 59 4,1Source: Ekonomska politik, nº 1.370 (July 3 of 1978), (in Ramet, Sabrina P.: Nationalism and Federalismin Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, Bloomington, Indiana Univeristy Press, 1992). 21

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