F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                        F -X C h a n ge
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F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
F -X C h a n ge                                                                                                           ...
Integrated Emergency Manageme and CBRN Deliberate Eventsnt
Integrated Emergency Manageme and CBRN Deliberate Eventsnt
Integrated Emergency Manageme and CBRN Deliberate Eventsnt
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Integrated Emergency Manageme and CBRN Deliberate Eventsnt

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Paper published for VIIth International CBRN Defence Symposium

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Integrated Emergency Manageme and CBRN Deliberate Eventsnt

  1. 1. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Deliberate Acts A discussion paper for the VIIth INTERNATIONAL CBRN DEFENCE SYMPOSIUM Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham 10 – 12 November 2004 Author: Arthur Rabjohn DipEP, MEPS, MBCI, MIAEM Senior Consultant – Crisis Management & Civil Contingencies Systems Consultants Services (SCS) Ltd. Contributors: Abstract submitted for consideration: Paper submitted: ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  2. 2. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Index Introduction 1. Current thinking 1.1 Shelter 1.2 First Responders 1.3 Enhanced Infrastructure 2. New Technologies 2.1 Mapping CBRN Incidents 2.2 Warning and Informing Glossary Bibliography ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  3. 3. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Introduction ‘Experience has shown that it is advisable to consider ‘worst case’ scenarios’ – Dealing with Disaster1 When considering a deliberate act involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents, the worst case scenario takes us back into the realms of the cold war amongst civilian emergency planners. Such an attack is unlikely to be anything other than terrorism; even its use by a protest group is likely to be branded an act of terrorism. It must also be recognised that the chemical (C), biological (B) and radiological (R) elements differ considerably from nuclear (N) incidents. CBR incidents involve the release of CBR agents whereas an N incident involves the detonation of a nuclear device which would produce extensive blast and fire damage, intense direct radiation effects and widespread contamination from radioactive fallout. This paper doesn’t look at the blast and fire aspects of a nuclear incident, but can be considered with regard to the hazards of radioactive fallout. Terrorist groups have a wide variety of potential agents and delivery methods to choose from if they were to mount CBRN attacks. Their goal in using of CBRN is to cause mass disruption and or casualties; however, most attacks will be small scale, incorporating relatively crude delivery means and easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological substances. The success of any such attack and the number of ensuing casualties would depend on many factors, including the technical expertise of those involved, but most scenarios could cause panic and disruption within the population attacked.2 There is currently no single source document for the integrated emergency management response to CBRN incidents. In fact the current version of Dealing with Disaster (DwD) avoids the subject stating ‘The fourth edition will also pay more attention to topical issues (response to CBRN incidents, mass evacuation, decontamination, widespread emergencies, public information and so on)’. Whilst the Revised 3rd Edition was published post 911, the 4th Edition is still awaited. Note that the quote above makes no mention of shelter, more on this in Chapter 1. Current response strategies are also limited in their probability of success in dealing with a deliberate release of CBRN materials as they have been built on our experience of ‘conventional’ attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) or conventional military materials or methods. This will be explored further in Chapter 1 – Current Thinking Speed of response is still a key factor in dealing successfully with such incidents. A missing part of that speedy response is the current capability to obtain quick accurate data on the type, scale and nature of any such release of CBRN agents. This is hindered by the inability to deploy emergency service personal in appropriate protective equipment in sufficient numbers quickly enough. This will be explored further in the following chapters. 1 Dealing with Disaster (Revised Third Edition) - Cabinet Office 2 Terrorist CBRN: Materials & Effects CIA Reports www.cia.gov/cia/reports ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  4. 4. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Whilst this paper looks specifically at the deliberate release of CBRN agents it must be recognised that accidental releases are not that dissimilar and that the discussion points and recommendations may equally apply to such accidental events. This raises the question as to whether our emergency services should have the same capabilities and powers to deal with accidental incidents as they have to deal with terrorist ones. Surely the primary objective in both accidental and deliberate incidents involving CBRN is the protection of life and property? Primary recommendation: That the UK emergency management capability for CBRN must be reviewed and addressed by the Cabinet Office (CO), Home Office (HO) and Department of Health (DoH) in the same way as the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) New Dimension project has addressed Fire Service requirements. ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  5. 5. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Chapter 1 Current Thinking The United Kingdom government accepts that there is a realistic possibility of some form of unconventional terrorist attack in the western world and that this could involve CBRN material. - Guidance for Local Authorities on The release of CBRN substances or material3. 1.1 Shelter The UK emergency management principles of response have been developed through the experience of a terrorist bombing campaign that strangely enough had an unofficial set of rules that were rarely broken. We came to expect warnings to be given, genuine or hoax, and time to evacuate. Whilst this wasn’t always the case, security operations often led to evacuations around suspect objects or vehicles. The nail bombings of April 2000 introduced us to a new era of unannounced attacks by ‘conventional’ tactics using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on previously unidentified targets. This learning process continued into the evolution of suicide bombing that most recently reached a new level in the co-ordinated attack on 11th March 2004 against the Madrid railway network (ongoing events in Iraq and Israel disregarded). As a result of this experience the current IEM strategy for protection of the population in the UK is heavily in favour of evacuation We only have to look at the quote from DwD in the introduction of this paper and the considerable publicity given to Operation Sassoon4 to recognise that evacuation is given far greater consideration than the alternative of shelter. It seems that both the public, and in many cases the emergency services, have little or no understanding of this alternative protective measure. Yet the opportunity to safely evacuate is likely to pass in the moment of attack, especially when the attack is CBRN based. When considering such incidents the focus of CBRN planning tends to be immediately drawn to the problem of self evacuation by the population who believe they are at risk. In a CBRN incident the current thinking is that for every real casualty there will be 5 others that believe they are a casualty - ‘the worried well’5. Both of these attitudes reflect the ignorance amongst the UK population of the real risks associated with CBRN and the actions that they can take to protect themselves. In the same national guidance document the policy of shelter only receives a mention in Appendix G, the last page of the document, under communications issues. It appears that little or nothing is being done to address the publics’ expectation to ‘run away’ from the threat rather than shelter from it. An educated public who know the value of sheltering in the event of a CBRN type incident are far easier to control from an incident commanders point of view. A sheltering population allows for a far more controlled response to an incident and limits the redistribution of contaminants. Such a procedure also has the possibility of containing the attackers or highlighting their movements by limiting the amount of pedestrian or vehicular traffic in the area ordered to shelter. When discussing shelter with IEM practitioners, particularly Business Continuity practitioners, invariably the response is “Oh you mean inward evacuation”. This is typical 3 Home Office publication August 2003 http://www.ukresilience.info/cbrn/index.htm 4 Plans for evacuation of large areas of London. 5 4.10 Strategic National Guidance: The Decontamination of people exposed to CBRN substances or material. ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  6. 6. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 of the lack of understanding, because inward evacuation is not taking shelter. Shelter, unlike inward evacuation, is likely to be a medium to long term requirement for those asked to implement it. It requires a number of positive actions to be successful, not just the requirement to move to a designated shelter zone inside the building. In nearly all cases of a CBR incident ‘taking shelter’ is the most effective protection measure to be taken. In the US the emergency management agencies readily admit that in any emergency, local authorities may or may not immediately be able to provide information on what is happening and what the public should do. To address this they have informed their population of the two protective measures that may be implemented – evacuation or shelter. They have given information on both to every citizen to educate them in preparation for such events. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has published advice in both web and leaflet form entitled ‘Deciding to Stay or Go’6. They give the following advice – ‘There are other circumstances when staying put and creating a barrier between yourself and potentially contaminated air outside, a process known as "shelter-in- place," is a matter of survival. Use available information to assess the situation. If you see large amounts of debris in the air, or if local authorities say the air is badly contaminated, you may want to take this kind of action’. In the UK the ‘Go In Stay In Tune In’ (GISITI) public safety message created as a result of the work of the National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public (NSCWIP) has been poorly resourced and has only been delivered to the public in areas where statutory requirements are in place. If you are a citizen of the UK fortunate enough to live in the public information zone (PIZ) of a COMAH7 or REPPIR8 site you may have received details of how to take shelter in the form of a GISITI leaflet, or a video presentation to your school aged children as part of the education syllabus. As an example, in one English town with a single COMAH site, only 1932 families will have received a comprehensive explanation of the shelter policy from a population of 143,000. The GISITI message was developed out of a paper published in 1994 and the completed project was launched in July 2000 by Home Office Minister Mike O’Brian. But direction and support failed to follow the launch as no single government department took ownership of the project.9 At the time of writing this paper the publication – ‘Preparing for emergencies, what you need to know’ has just been released. Whilst it gives mention to the GISITI principles it provides no detail of the shelter requirements and additional measures that should be undertaken. The government web sites carry advice to the public, but there appears to be an assumption that the UK public all have web access. In researching this section I came across Annex 5 of Deliberate Release of Biological & Chemical Agents: Guidance to help plan the health service response.10 This annex is entitles ‘Should the population be advised to shelter or evacuate? This annex gives some good analysis of the values of each protective measure; however the 1 st paragraph identifies the fatal flaw in our current thinking: 6 http://www.ready.gov/stay_or_go.html 7 Control of Major Accident Hazards 8 Radiation Emergency Planning and Public Information Regulations 9 http://www.nscwip.info/goinstayintunein.htm 10 Department of Health publication August 2002 ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  7. 7. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 ‘In the event of a deliberate or threatened release of a toxic agent, it is for the police to decide whether to advise people to take shelter or to evacuate. In reaching their decision, they will receive scientific advice from the Chemical & Biological Defence Agency, Porton Down but will also consult with the health authority and local authority.’ The US advice above recognises that the potential victims must make their own decision intially and supports that process by informing them of their options. An incident commander needs to make an instant and informed decision on the protective measures to take in a CBRN incident. Currently the training and experience of such decision makers appears to be heavily weighted towards evacuation when even the limited guidance available states that shelter is the most effective protective measure for CBRN type events. This is supported by the legislative powers that police have. Controlling the public in major incidents is a problem that the UK police have struggled to deal with for non-terrorist incidents. A refusal to evacuate by members of the public in incidents such a flooding or Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) operations is now usually met with a request to sign a disclaimer and a warning as to their future conduct during the incident. I know of no power that enables the police to impose a shelter regime and prevent the movements of people within the shelter zone or prevent their efforts to leave it other than the untested use of common law powers. In fact Schedule 6A to the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996 (PoTA’96) directly refers only to powers of police to enforce evacuation and remove persons or vehicles from the cordoned area. This will be a major stumbling block for any concerted imposition of a shelter policy on the population. The UK population does not have the ‘Do Not Cross’ mindset that is evident in the US and other EU legislative powers whereby the cordon line is a barrier to unauthorised movement rather than a filter to support evacuation. The lawful duty of a citizen not to cross a police line in the US has allowed the control of the law abiding population without the need to deploy fencing, barriers or continuous lines of police officers to sterilise major incident scenes. Admittedly the shelter mindset is easily adopted inan armed society where firearms incidents part of the national pyschy. In many cases the publics understanding is that for their safety, if they are inside a cordoned area, they should go inside their homes, offices or nearby buildings to await direction by the emergency services. Such a public understanding of responsibility, linked to an educated understanding of the value of shelter, must be our goal for the UK if we are going to be able to respond to CBRN deliberate releases with the maximum effect. The powers of police to contain a population, and the rules of engagement for such a decision, must be predetermined as the delay for a regulatory order from a minister as currently prescribed by the Civil Contingencies Bill will prevent the necessary immediate control being established. The rapid implementation of wide area shelter supported by effective cordoning to reduce the spread of contamination must be the basis of the emergency services response to possible CBRN incidents. In looking for documented support for this paper I finally came across Annex B of Guidance for Local Authorities: The release of CBRN substances or material - where paragraphs 25-28 are dedicated to the evacuation versus shelter protective measures. The third paragraph, which is 3 lines, states ‘In most cases following an airborne CBRN release, the best advice is to shelter indoors’. Yet the other three paragraphs, including the preceding two, in this section focus on evacuation. This and other referenced ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  8. 8. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 reading in this paper clearly demonstrates the current bias in UK emergency management thinking towards evacuation. Recommendations: 1. Incident command training must give greater weight to the shelter protective measure and ensure that it is understood by the decision makers in the first few minutes of a CBRN incident. 2. That consideration should be given to a new set of police / fire service powers that will meet the needs of cordoning and controlling areas impacted by the envisaged risks from CBRN events. 3. That the ‘Go In, Stay In, Tune In’ public warning / advisory message must be given a higher profile in the UK and become a standard communications policy for incident commanders. 4. Incident command and first responder training for CBRN incidents must be given a far greater degree of realism through immersive command team training and live exercising in realistic environments. ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  9. 9. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 1.2 First Responders I have heard the current police response principle of the emergency services with regard to CBRN referred to as ‘123 all fall down’. Quite simply if the first emergency responder attending falls over start to think CBRN, if the second falls over consider the incident to be CBRN, if a third falls over it’s definitely CBRN. Is this really an appropriate approach in the light of the current threat level and risk assessments that are being voiced by the senior government and police representatives? In the US the problem of protection of first responders has be approached slightly differently by investigating a minimum standard of protection for all, not just protection for those equipped with full CBRN PPE. It has been recognised that from the potential inventory of CBRN agents that only a short list are readily obtainable, deliverable and have fatal consequences. Therefore the approach has been taken to provide protection to the respiratory system and absorbant area of the face and head by issuing first responders with filtered hoods. This approach has been formulated on the recognition that standard uniform provides a degree of protection and that there are few skin absorbant agents that are fatal and readily available. According to Assistant Commissioner David Veness we are at a ‘new threshold of threat’ and with regard to risk the ‘revised scale is enduring’.11 The resources of the emergency services in the UK, outside of the major cities, are very thin on the ground and response times are invariably at the limits of the standards set. If the first 3 responding units are going to fall over then the immediate response capability is going to be almost totally removed from the incident commanders’ capability. Also, as discussed in the previous section, the mind set of the first units attending is heavily set towards evacuation due to the training and experience that is the current knowledge base of our emergency services. 23% of casualties at the Tokyo Sarin attack were first responders. I believe that a major change is required if we are to be able to meet the challenge of an attack on the UK using CBRN agents. We must recognise that the biological characteristics of such an attack are likely to be very different from those of chemical, radiological or nuclear (CRN) and are unlikely to be immediately obvious. Medical identification of source, containment of infection and the control of cross contamination will be key to the response to a biological type incident. For CRN type incidents it will need to be recognised that hard decisions on our capability to deliver immediate assistance to the site of release must be made. In the current climate of expectation it is reasonable to assume that the first CBRN attack is unlikely to be a single act. Multiple targeting or repeat attacks must be considered and against that our ability to continue to respond if our finite emergency service resources are expended too cheaply due to our immediate response strategies. This will be especially hard for our medical services to come to terms with where the value of the responder may need to be put before the needs of the casualty. For suspected CBRN incidents far greater emphasis must be placed on the SAD (Survey, Assess and Disseminate)12 aspects of the standard approach to major 11 Emergency Planning, Security & Business Continuity: A Co-Ordinated Approach – RUSI Conference 01.07.04 12 SAD CHALET – pneumonic used by police to train officers in major incident first responder attendance ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  10. 10. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 incident scenes by first responders. This process must be linked to wide area cordoning that can be reduced upon risk assessment, rather than the standard cordoning principles that have evolved as a result of our IED experience. Containment and control of the risk, contamination by CBRN agents, must be seen as a priority over the immediate needs of those obviously directly affected. Only a staged and appropriately equipped response to the release site will protect the first responders and maintain our capability to respond. To achieve this, a higher investment in personal protective equipment (PPE) and the training to support its use must be considered. The capability to immediately respond with appropriate detection and surveillance equipment must support the day to day policing of high risk target areas whilst the current level of threat exists. The variety of risk due to the numerous possible CBRN agents makes this an extremely difficult capability to achieve. However rationalisation of the risks could provide a minimum standard of protection and detection required to protect first responders from contamination or at least minimise the risks from contamination. In the UK we continue to hold onto a legacy of IEM structure for response to such incidents that is unlikely to be fully effective in dealing with a CBRN incident. The Lead Government Department (LGD) principle is not sufficiently responsive to take a clear governmental lead to reassure the public. There is no single recognised Minister that the public can put their trust in to have their protection as their single objective. The division of the emergency services to separate government departments only adds to this lack of clearly identified leadership when the civilian population is under attack. The creation of a new level of command and control in the UK crisis management structure by introducing 9 Regional National Co-ordinators between potentially 43 strategic command centres and central government has yet to be tested. However experience has already shown us that longer reporting lines and complicated crisis management structures only create more friction points and therefore potential points of failure. To my knowledge the business mapping process of the UK Crisis Management Organisation, a virtual concept of the integration of all responding agencies to a particular crisis, has never been undertaken other than by one government department for its own crisis management response (MOD). The national level of our IEM structure still appears to be confused and untested, yet the current level of threat indicates a need for a clear national lead. The upcoming TopOff 3 exercise is likely to be the first true test of our current IEM structure in the UK under the legislation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2005. Current training exercises appear to draw simple hot zones and locate cordons and corridors in suitable places with decontamination facilities in sensible and logical locations. The exercises, with the exception of Osiris – Bank Tube Station and Horizon - NEC, take place in large open spaces such as air fields and therefore present little in the way of communications or cordoning challenges. Such a process of training and exercising brings little reality to the experience and therefore fails to develop incident commanders understanding of the complex environments in which they are likely to have to work. Without access to the official debrief reports of the two exercises named above it is difficult to know what lessons have been identified and if they have been put in place. What was clearly evident from Exercise Horizon was that the current dependency of some UK police CBRN cadres on MOD Mark IV NBC PPE is not appropriate to the UK model of emergency response to such issues. Publicity of the exercise gave the uninformed the and act as an aide memoir for their first actions. ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  11. 11. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 message that our CBRN response in the UK is military based, as the majority of non fire responders were in combat clothing. Such an impression gives weight to the thinking by attackers that secondary devices are of greater value as they will target the military resources responding. Current training and exercising across the emergency planning community allocates little in the way of time or resources to the recovery aspects of emergency management. Yet events such as Exercise Counter Balance, Home Office CBRN Consequence Management exercise 2003, pointed out that the downwind area from such incidents will remain hazardous until the scene is decontaminated. The Anthrax incidents in the US have shown us that decontamination needs to be a planned process if the targeted area is to be recovered and returned to use with full public support. Despite the considerable release of guidance documents from central government, listed in the bibliography, I am unable to source a single exercise that has focused on the recovery aspects of a CBRN incident. Yet such an undertaking will be a major medical, media, community involvement and local government resources issue. Recommendations: 5. That first responder training must now include a more detailed approach to first on scene assessments that will quickly identify the potential for the incident to be of CBRN origins. 6. That first responder protective equipment be investigated for use by those not fully equiped with CBRN PPE. 7. That a business mapping study be undertaken of the ‘UK Crisis Management Organisation’. 8. That a single source of CBRN guidance and advice be compiled as a UK CBRN Deliberate Release Plan. 9. The ‘civilianisation’ of police CBRN equipment must be prioritised to remove the current impression of military response to such incidents. ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  12. 12. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 1.3 Enhanced Infrastructure The lengthy time required to deploy the current decontamination capability and carry out the decontamination process was clearly demonstrated at recent exercises. (Victims left waiting hours for help after mock attack – Times 19th July 2004). Even generous estimations of 3 minutes per person for decontamination only allow 20 people per hour per decontamination unit to pass through the system and make the assumption that all victims are able to walk13. To overcome the deployment time delay, and increase decontamination capability, I would suggest a change of approach is required through infrastructure enhancement. High risk target areas should be assessed for the capability to build into the current infrastructure permanent decontamination capabilities. The enhancement of underground or multi-storey car park sprinkler and drainage systems is an obvious starting point. Consideration should be given to a regulated capability for all venues of mass gatherings that are built in the future. This should be a major consideration for the current build programme for the new Wembley Stadium and any future construction linked to the London Olympic bid for 2012. The speed at which current cordons are deployed and their proximity to the incident leads to the calculation that large numbers of contaminated or worried well persons will escape the containment and overwhelm the local hospital(s). Whilst some work has been done to support this conclusion by the planning and provision of a decontamination capability at hospitals, most hospital managers recognise that they are not well positioned to deal with such large scale self referrals. The capability of hospitals to ‘lockdown’, secure all points of access, their facilities has been degraded by the open planning approach used in our public building scheme. Hospitals are vital public assets and outside of the major cities are very limited resources. Some large towns and small cities are dependent on a single A&E facility which if it were removed from the local health care provision through contamination would create a life risking gap in medical cover. One such hospital that I am familiar with had 32 points of access, and 4 security guards, during its normal daily operation. Lockdown on such an establishment was not achievable without the deployment of considerable additional resources from partner agencies. In the event of a CBRN incident it is unlikely that such assistance would be forthcoming. Recommendations: 10. High risk target areas should be assessed for the capability to build into the current infrastructure permanent decontamination capabilities. 11. Consideration should be given to new building regulation for all venues of mass gatherings to ensure a decontamination capability is delivered to deal with the attending crowds. 11. The Department of Health should undertake an assessment of key resources in high risk target areas and review the security capabilities of those facilities with a view to achieving lockdown and external decontamination to protect the asset. 13 Startegic National Guidane: The decontamination of people exposed to CBRN substances or material Home Office May 2004 ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  13. 13. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 Chapter 2 New Technologies 2.1 Mapping of CBRN incidents The current process for mapping such incidents, Allied Training Publication (ATP) 45, is a manual process that is poorly suited to the complex urban environment that is the likely target zone for a deliberate CBRN release. The use of ATP 45 is limited to the military and the emergency services have no equivalent capability. They have a dependency on the call out of military experts or specialists from government departments to obtain such information on the incident they are dealing with. This has been witnessed in a number of exercises where ATP 45 has been applied to the modelling of nuclear accidents in the vicinity of urban centres. The model provided took no account of local climate anomalies such as industrial hotspots, power station cooling towers or high rise developments that were reheating or diverting the air flow. The UK MOD NBC Battlefield Information System Application (BISA) being developed as part of the digitisation of the current ATP 45 is the way forward to provide tactical commanders with a tool to manage such incidents. However it will need to be integrated into the civilian, primarily police, C4I systems and have to be capable of providing solutions appropriate to smaller more complex environments than the standard battlefield considerations. Such a Major Incident Information System Application (MIISA) will need to utilise the current standard in Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and the 3 dimensional enhancements now available. For small localised releases of CBRN agents the ‘plume modelling’ for such deliberate acts will need to map the likely dispersal of the agent taking into account areas of air stability or instability created by wind shelters or tunnels as a result of the built environment. Environmental conditions created by both the above ground and the sub terrain activity must also be considered. For example in London the commander would need to give consideration to the points at which the underground system is drawing air into the system and pushing it out elsewhere. High speed trains or fast roads, at the time of release, may be creating additional dispersal patterns that need to be considered. Complex urban environments may also lead to the pooling of some CBRN agents rather than an even dispersal and as such may create a high priority area for protecting the population or committing decontamination resources. Of course to carry out such accurate mapping the input data must be both accurate and plentiful. The rapid response deployment of detector and sensor equipment is vital if the accurate model required is to be available to the commander with sufficient speed to support the decision making process. In some cases where likely targets are identifiable this may be achieved by the investment in a permanent detection capability. However current technology allows for the rapid deployment of independent surveillance resources that can be wirelessly linked into the C4I system through the MIISA. Cameras and sensors with their own fuel sources and the capability to utilise GSM / GPRS networks to transmit the recorded film or readings, as well as GPS data, are no longer the high cost resource hey used to be. The capability for a commander to deploy a sensor / surveillance net rapidly across an incident is already with us and can be achieved with minimal risk to or use of manpower. Such systems are of course easily transportable and deployable to planned events in the planning and preparation stages allowing for the propositioning and integration of such a resource into the event management plans. For example a sensor / ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various
  14. 14. F -X C h a n ge F -X C h a n ge PD PD ! ! W W O O N N y y bu bu to to k k lic lic C C w w m m w w w w o o .d o .c .d o .c c u -tr a c k c u -tr a c k ARJ/SCS/1854/v.3 190704 surveillance net could be deployed to monitor a major sporting event and then easily removed upon completion of the task. Linked to the current unmanned vehicle developments such deployments will undoubtedly prove more cost effective than current capabilities which are heavily dependent on valuable and costly resources such as helicopters which can in turn create their own dispersion risks. In considering the response to the deliberate acts envisaged, the national capability must look at the military or space developments that could be utilised to provide the protection that the population requires. The mind set that military resources are too expensive must be overcome as it is not now the case. The transition of resources developed for the military or space markets to other civilian areas is now far quicker than ever before. As such the new technology available to the emergency services is no longer ‘state of the art’, as the art moves on so quickly, and therefore the commercial cost is no longer so high. The cost of component parts of such resources has also been reduced greatly by their mass production for the commercial market. In many cases it is readily available technology that is being utilised in a novel way that creates the new capability. Recommendations: 12. That police incident command facilities should be equipped with a capability to manage CBRN incident information flows to produce timely and factual based outputs for decision makers. 13. That an investigation of current capabilities to deploy detection and surveillance resources to CBRN incidents should be undertaken and an enhancement of that capability undertaken in high risk areas. 2.2 Warning and Informing New technology capabilities must also be embraced to ensure the capability to immediately disseminate warning messages and advice to as many of the affected population as is possible. Only through such a capability can the decision making processes and protective measures required be implemented with any chance of success. The latest advancements in telecommunications and broadcast capabilities now make it possible to reach large numbers of the population almost instantaneously to the decision to send a warning or advice. Much of this capability is under investigation as part of the national capabilities study that was commenced in 2003. The integration of new siren technology and GSM capability can ensure a high reception ratio across the population of an area impacted by a CBRN type incident. This work must be brought to a conclusion and public warning systems identified and funded as part of an enhancement of capability in those areas identified as high risk targets if our Category 1 Responders are going to be able to respond to the threats envisaged. Recommendations: ©Systems Consultants Services Ltd 2004 17/08/2010 ARJ/SCS/Various

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