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F.M.E.C.A pdf


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Failure Mode Effect and Critical Analysis.
of a system of working Body or a Organization.

Published in: Engineering
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F.M.E.C.A pdf

  1. 1. Use Of F.M.E.C.A In Safety Analysis
  2. 2. Group Members
  3. 3. FMECA Definition Failure Modes = Incorrect behavior of a subsystem or component due to a physical or procedural malfunction. Effects = Incorrect behavior of the system caused by a failure. Criticality = The combined impact of  The probability that a failure will occur  The severity of its effect Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) = a step-by-step approach for identifying all possible failures in a design, a manufacturing or assembly process, or a product or service.
  4. 4. Evolution of FMECA  FMEA was originally developed by NASA to improve and verify the reliability of space program hardware.  MIL-STD-1629 establishes requirements and procedures for performing FMECA
  5. 5. Phases Of Process Identify Analyze Act
  6. 6. Purpose of FMECA  Select the most suitable design with high reliability and high safety potential in the design phases.  List potential failures and identify the severity of their effects in the early design phases.  Develop criteria for test planning and requirements.  Provide necessary documentation for future design and consideration of design changes.  Provide a basis for maintenance management.  Provide a basis for reliability and availability analyses.
  7. 7. Basic Questions of FMECA  Why failures will happen (Failure mode)?  What is the consequence when the failure occurs (Failure effect)?  Is the failure in the safe or danger direction (Failure Criticality)?  How to remove the failure or reduce its frequency?
  8. 8. Benefits of FMECA  FMECA is one of the most important and most widely used tools of reliability analysis.  The FMECA facilitates identification of potential design reliability problems  Identify possible failure modes and their effects  Determine severity of each failure effect  FMECA helps  removing causes of failures  developing systems that can mitigate the effects of failures.  to prioritize and focus on high-risk failures
  9. 9. Benefits of FMECA It provides detailed insight about the systems interrelationships and potentials of failures. Information gained by performing FMECA can be used as a basis for  troubleshooting activities  maintenance manual development  design of effective built-in test techniques.
  10. 10. The results of the FMECA  Rank each failure mode.  Highlight single point failures requiring corrective action  Identify reliability and safety critical components
  11. 11. FMECA Techniques  The FMEA can be implemented using a hardware (bottom-up) or functional (top-down) approach  Due to system complexity, it isperformed as a combination of the two methods.
  12. 12. FMECA Techniques  Hardware Approach :  The bottom-up approach is used when a system design has been decided already.  Each component in the system on the lowest level is studied one- byone.  Evaluates risks that the component incorrectly implements its functional specification.
  13. 13. FMECA Techniques  Functional Approach :  Considers the function of each item. Each function can be classified and described in terms of having any number of associated output failure modes.  The functional method is used when hardware items cannot uniquely identified  This method should be applied to when the design process has developed a functional block diagram of the system, but not yet identified specific hardware to be used.
  14. 14. FMECA Procedure  FMECA pre-requirements  System structure and failure analysis  Preparation of FMECA worksheets  Team review  Corrective actions to remove failure modes
  15. 15. FMECA Prerequisites  Define the system to be analyzed  System boundaries.  Main system missions and functions.  Operational or/and environmental conditions.  Collect available information that describes the system functions to be analyzed.  Collect necessary information about previous and similar designs.
  16. 16. Functional Block Diagram  Functional block diagram shows how the different parts of the system interact with each other.  It is recommended  to break the system down to different levels.  to review schematics of the system to show how different parts interface with one another by their critical support systems to understand the normal functional flow requirements.  to list all functions of the equipment before examining the potential failure modes of each of those functions.  to include operating conditions (such as; temperature, loads, and pressure), and environmental conditions in the components list.
  17. 17. Functional Block Diagram
  18. 18. Rate the Risks Relatively  A systematic methodology is used to rate the risks relative to each other. The Risk Priority Number is the critical indicator for each failure mode.  RPN = Severity rating X Occurrence rating X Detection rating  The RPN can range from 1 to 1,000  Higher RPN = higher priority to be improved.
  19. 19. Severity Classification  A qualitative measure of the worst potential consequences resulting from a function failure.  It is rated relatively scaled from 1-10.
  20. 20. Severity Classification 1 Failure would cause no effect. 2 Boarderline pass but still shippable. 3 Redundant systems failed but tool still works. 4 Would fail manufacturing testing but tool still functions with degraded performance. 5 Tool / item inoperable with loss of primary function. No damage to other components on board. Failure can be easily fixed (for example, socketed DIP chips). 6 Tool / item inoperable with loss of primary function. No damage to other components on board. Failure cannot be easily fixed (true if not field repairable). 7 Tool / item inoperable, with loss of primary function. Probably cause damage to other components on board or system. 8 Tool / item inoperable with loss of primary function. Probably scraping one or more PCBAs. 9 Very high severity ranking. A potential failure mode affecting safe tool operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning. 10 Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe tool operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning.
  21. 21. Probability of Occurrence  Probability that an identified potential failure mode will occur over the item operating time.  It is rated relatively scaled from 1-10.
  22. 22. Occurrence Classification 10 >= 50% (1 in two) 9 >= 25% (1 in four) 8 >= 10% (1 in ten) 7 >= 5% (1 in 20) 6 >= 2% (1 in 50) 5 >= 1% (1 in 100) 4 >= 0.1% (1 in 1,000) 3 >= 0.01% (1 in 10,000) 2 >= 0.001% (1 in 100,000) 1 Almost Never
  23. 23. Detection rating  A numerical ranking based on an assessment of the probability that the failure mode will be detected given the controls that are in place.  It is rated relatively scaled from 1-10.
  24. 24. Detection Rating 1 Detected by self test. 2 Easily detected by standard visual inspection. 3 Symptom can be detected. The technician would know exactly what the source of the failure is. 4 Symptom can be detected at test bench. There are more than 2-4 possible candidates for the technician to find out the sources of failure mode. 5 Symptom can be detected at test bench. There are more than 5-10 possible candidates for the technician to find out the sources of failure mode. 6 Symptom can be detected at test bench. There are more than 10 possible candidates for the technician to find out the sources of failure mode. 7 The symptom can be detected, and it required considerable engineering knowledge/resource to determine the source / cause. 8 The symptom can be detected by the design control, but no way to determine the source / cause of failure mode. 9 Very Remote. Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Theoretically the defect can be detected, but high chance would be ignored by the operators. 10 Absolute uncertainty. Design Control will not and /or cannot detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
  25. 25. FMECA CASE STUDY  Component = D1  Function = restricting the direction of current  Failure = short  Cause = Physical Damage  Effect = Reverse current
  26. 26. FMECA CASE STUDY  Severity = 7  Occurrence = 5  Detection = 9  RPN = 7*5*9 = 315
  27. 27. FMECA Worksheet Component Function Severity Occurrence detection RPN Failure Cause Effect Recommendation D1 restricts the direction of current 7 5 9 315 short Physical Damage Reverse current Change test procedure
  28. 28. Corrective Actions  RPN reduction: the risk reduction related to a corrective action.
  29. 29. FMECA Checklist  System description/specification  Ground rules  Functional Block Diagram  Identify failure modes  Failure effect analysis  Worksheet (RPN ranking)  Recommendations (Corrective action)  Reporting
  30. 30. Simple Example: Flashlight This flashlight is for use by special operations forces involved in close combat missions (especially hostage rescue) during low visibility conditions in urban areas. The light is to mounted coaxially with the individual's personal weapon to momentarily illuminate and positively identify targets before they are engaged. The exterior casing including the transparent light aperture are from an existing ruggidized design and can be considered immune to failure.
  31. 31. Simple Example: Flashlight (cont.) How can it fail? What is the effect? Note that Next Higher Effect = End Effect in this case. Part
  32. 32. Severity  SEVERITY classifies the degree of injury, property damage, system damage, and mission loss that could occur as the worst possible consequence of a failure. For a FMECA these are typically graded from I to IV in decreasing severity.  The standard severities defined in MIL-STD1682 may be used or equipment specific severities may be defined with customer concurrence (recommended).
  33. 33. Simple Example: Flashlight (cont.)  Severity  Severity I Light stuck in the “on” condition  Severity II Light will not turn on  Severity III Degraded operation  Severity IVNo effect
  34. 34. Simple Example: Flashlight (cont.) Item Failure Mode End Effect Severity bulb dim light flashlight output dim III no light no flashlight output II switch stuck closed constant flashlight output I stuck open no flashlight output II intermittent flashlight sometimes will not turn on III contact poor contact flashlight output dim III no contact no flashlight output II intermittent flashlight sometimes will not turn on III battery low power flashlight output dim III no power no flashlight output II
  35. 35. Criticality  CRITICALITY is a measure of the frequency of occurrence of an effect.  May be based on qualitative judgement or  May be based on failure rate data
  36. 36. Simple Example: Flashlight (cont.)
  37. 37. Simple Example: Flashlight (cont.) Can circled items be designed out or mitigated? (There may be others that need to addressed also.)
  38. 38. Integrated FMECA  FMECAs are often used by other functions such as Maintainability, Safety, Testability, and Logistics.  Coordinate your effort with other functions up front  Integrate as many other tasks into the FMECA as possible and as make sense (Testability, Safety, Maintainability, etc.)  Integrating in this way can save considerable cost over doing the efforts separately and will usually produce a better product.  If possible, use the same analyst to accomplish these tasks for the same piece of hardware. This can be a huge cost saver.
  39. 39. FMECA Facts and Tips  FMECAs should begin as early as possible  This allows the analyst to affect the design before it is set in stone.  If you start early (as you should) expect to have to redo portions as the design is modified.  FMECAs take a lot of time to complete.  FMECAs require considerable knowledge of system operation necessitating extensive discussions with software/hardware Design Engineering and System Engineering.  Spend time developing ground rules with your customer up front.