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Governance failure at
SATYAM
GROUP MEMBERS
Arun K S 13020841118
Akansha Mohanty 13020841064
Ankit Uttam 13020841066
Nishigandha sorte 13020841090
Siddi...
1. Circumstances for Exposure & Reasons
for fraud
 Dec 16th -17th :Maytas acquisition failure: 51% in Maytas infra(listed...
• Anonymous email to board stating financial
irregularities and lack of liquidity, three more
independent directors resign...
In retrospect this scam could have been prevented,
 The buck stops with CEO at any organization, in Satyam’s case
the sca...
• The BOD agreed with the Maytas without consenting with the share
holders and when the scam broke they distanced themselv...
3. Corporate Governance at
Satyam
 Satyam was one of those few companies in India that supposedly had
been doing things t...
 The knowledge available to independent directors and even
audit committee members is inherently limited to prevent wilfu...
Our Analysis
 “Independent directors should also (in addition to the
management) be held accountable for board decisions
...
4. Responsibility of statutory audit
 Internal Audit committee- Headed by the CFO, Srinivas Vadlamani
 Statutory Audit c...
5. Analysis of Resignation Letter
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
 He inflated the cash and bank balances of Rs 5040 crore.
 Interest...
 Apart from the Financial Analysis, there were some other important
points in the letter.
 The only reason why he confes...
6. ROLE OF BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
BOD- ROLES & CG
The principal role of the board of directors –is to oversee the
function of the organization and ensure th...
SATYAM & BOD
 Saytam revealed that it did not have a financial expert on the board
during 2008
 Board of Directors’ lack...
7. Regulatory Changes is the
Answer?
 To some extent…. Yes. Enforcement of regulations
definitely plays the key.
 Absenc...
Regulatory Changes after Satyam Scandal
• The new companies bill proposes fundamental changes in the
way companies are run...
Negatives of excess regulations
 It is not clear that more paperwork is the answer,
consider Sarbanes-Oxley, which did no...
8. Lessons Learnt
 Improvement required in Law regulatory systems
 Rotation of auditing firms
 Strengthening of quality...
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Corporate governance failure at satyam

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A look on the Corporate Governance in Satyam and why it failed, from an outsider's point of view.

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Corporate governance failure at satyam

  1. 1. Governance failure at SATYAM
  2. 2. GROUP MEMBERS Arun K S 13020841118 Akansha Mohanty 13020841064 Ankit Uttam 13020841066 Nishigandha sorte 13020841090 Siddiqui Zeeshan 13020841104 Taranpreet Kaur 13020841113 Pankaj 13020841119
  3. 3. 1. Circumstances for Exposure & Reasons for fraud  Dec 16th -17th :Maytas acquisition failure: 51% in Maytas infra(listed in BSE), 100% in Maytas Properties(unlisted) lead to negative investment failure.  Total value of these two companies $1.6 billion. Justification given was slow down in IT industry and diversification.  Decline 55% in Satyam’s ADR, share price by 33%  Dec 23rd :World Bank suspended Satyam for 8 years for bribery charges, but denied the allegations  Dec 26th :Mangalam Srinivasan independent director since 1991,resigned taking responsibility for not voting against acquisition.  Dec 28th :board meeting got postponed, IL&FS Trust sold 4.41 million shares in open market, family stake dilution from 8.65% to 5.13
  4. 4. • Anonymous email to board stating financial irregularities and lack of liquidity, three more independent directors resigned. • To keep up the share price, even though profit is 3% • PwC India had failed to independently confirm cash balances in bank accounts that supposedly rose to over $1 billion by the time the fraud ended • Lack of Transparency: Embezzlement of funds over 20 crore from 13000 non-existent employee’s salary account.
  5. 5. In retrospect this scam could have been prevented,  The buck stops with CEO at any organization, in Satyam’s case the scam started with Raju’s mishandled ambitions  Even though CEO acts as a gatekeeper to all the misappropriations and creative accounting practices. But in this case the CFO-Srinivas Vadlamani, COO-themselves collude with CEO  Even though PwC initially distanced them from the Scam but, as the primary auditor of the 4th largest company of India they were lax and on a large extent they were major partner in the scam as per analysis. 2. Could this fraud have been prevented and by Whom?
  6. 6. • The BOD agreed with the Maytas without consenting with the share holders and when the scam broke they distanced themselves from the scam. So we understand that they should be more aligned to the companies interest more than the CEO • Industry associations like CII-Confederation of Indian Industry, NASSCOM should have been proactive in implementing corporate governance across hierarchies in the firm.
  7. 7. 3. Corporate Governance at Satyam  Satyam was one of those few companies in India that supposedly had been doing things the right way. It allegedly had all the checks and balances a U.S. company would want in an overseas business partner. Its financial statements received repeated clean bills of health from a respected outside auditor, Price Waterhouse Coopers. And still its corporate governance rotted away from the inside. So apart from the corporate governance point of view the important thing is that you have to trust that your overseas partners are working honestly. Satyam is an ugly reminder that we should keep that point very, very small.  SEBI requires Indian publicly held companies to ensure that independent directors make up at least half their board strength.
  8. 8.  The knowledge available to independent directors and even audit committee members is inherently limited to prevent wilful withholding of crucial information  The reality is, at the end of the day, even as an audit committee member or as an independent director, One would have to rely on what the management was presenting to him.  Satyam was one of the world’s largest implementers of SAP systems. In an effort to compete against Satyam, HCL acquired Axon, an SAP consulting firm, at a cost of $800 million. Any Satyam director should have been puzzled that the company was proposing to invest $1.6 billion in real estate at a time when a competitor as formidable as HCL was gunning for one of its most lucrative markets.
  9. 9. Our Analysis  “Independent directors should also (in addition to the management) be held accountable for board decisions and audit-related compliance practices.”  “The concept of CEO and Board chair separation is well accepted in Europe, and American companies are steadily moving in that direction. This would bring a better balance in the boardroom.”  “Accountability and action against fraud/negligence are major concerns. Professionals (auditors) should be made accountable and consequences (punishment) should follow if there are any deficiencies and slip-ups.”
  10. 10. 4. Responsibility of statutory audit  Internal Audit committee- Headed by the CFO, Srinivas Vadlamani  Statutory Audit committee- PricewaterhouseCoopers(PwC) contracted in 2000  Audit committee of the board- Headed by independent board member.  Under the Companies Act, an auditor is required to express an opinion as to whether the annual accounts give a true and fair view of the company’s state of affairs and financial position.  PwC was paid INR430 million for auditing which was close to thrice the fees paid by other IT companies.  PwC should have declined the offer of such huge fees at the very first place and should have raised a red flag that why Satyam was ready to pay so much money.  PwC management should have questioned its own employees who were auditing Satyam.  It should have verified the cash and bank balances properly and fairly.  The auditors have to perform an essential function of fraud prevention and deterrence.  Auditors should not have neglected the misrepresented amounts, fake invoices etc. But PwC failed in all the aspects in Satyam case.
  11. 11. 5. Analysis of Resignation Letter FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  He inflated the cash and bank balances of Rs 5040 crore.  Interest of 376 crore was not shown in the books.  He understated the liability of RS. 1230 crore  He overstated the debtors position by 490 crore  For the September quarter he showed the revenues as 2700crore and operating margin as 649crore but in reality these figures were 2112crore and 61 crore
  12. 12.  Apart from the Financial Analysis, there were some other important points in the letter.  The only reason why he confessed his crime was because of his inablility to fill the marginal gap between the actual operating profit and the one reflected in books that had attained unmanageable proportions as the size of the company operations grew significantly.  In his resignation letter he also stated that the MAYTAS deal was the last attempt to fill that gap but as this didn’t happen hence the gap could not be filled  In the conclusion he also recommended the board about some merging opportunities and also requested for the restatement of the accounts and also apologized to all the stakeholders and satyamites and requested them to stand by the company in this hour of crisis
  13. 13. 6. ROLE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
  14. 14. BOD- ROLES & CG The principal role of the board of directors –is to oversee the function of the organization and ensure that it continues to operate in the best interests of all stakeholders.  Strategic asset for the company  Promoting a transparent culture that promotes effective dialogues among the directors, senior management, and various function and risk managers Boards of directors in large public companies is that the board tends to have more de facto power. Issue of fundamental importance in economics  BOD responsible for the strategic aspect of the firm.  This implies that the underlying management strategy comes under the purview of their roles and responsibilities.  Includes the control of the same.
  15. 15. SATYAM & BOD  Saytam revealed that it did not have a financial expert on the board during 2008  Board of Directors’ lack of independence  The Board first came under fire on December 16, 2008 when it approved the Maytas Deal. The Board rescinded the approval after shareholders and investors went against it.  Krishna Palepu, Rommohan Rao, and Vinod Dham all resigned from the Board within two days of the rescission of the transaction.  The botched transaction provided the investors with the impression that the Board was not actively monitoring Satyam. Furthermore, the Board should have caught some of the same red flags that the auditor, PWC, missed.  Additionally, the Board of Directors should have been concerned with the knowledge that Mr. Raju decreased his holdings of Satyam significantly over the three years leading up the disclosure of the fraud.  Points out to not efficient policy administration , faulty procedures and systems
  16. 16. 7. Regulatory Changes is the Answer?  To some extent…. Yes. Enforcement of regulations definitely plays the key.  Absence of stringent Laws : ‘‘White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002’’ provides for the penalty for such crimes. In fact section 906 of this Act provides for 20 years of imprisonment Whereas in India, the Company’s Act (1956), Section 628 provides for 2 years imprisonment only.
  17. 17. Regulatory Changes after Satyam Scandal • The new companies bill proposes fundamental changes in the way companies are run in India. 1. In Company Act 2013, Independent Directors constitute at least one-third of the BOD in every public limited company. 2. Mandatory disclosure of Pledged Securities 3. Increased Financial Accounting Disclosures 4. Adoption of IFRS (International financial reporting standards) 5. Strict civil and criminal laws 6. Rotation of audit partners every five years. 7. Constitution of Serious Fraud Investigation Office(SFIO).
  18. 18. Negatives of excess regulations  It is not clear that more paperwork is the answer, consider Sarbanes-Oxley, which did nothing to prevent the current scams in the US.  More regulation, especially in bureaucrat-heaven India, will probably just choke businesses to death, suffocating, License Raj – which, incidentally, did enrich those that had the right contacts.
  19. 19. 8. Lessons Learnt  Improvement required in Law regulatory systems  Rotation of auditing firms  Strengthening of quality review  Criteria for remuneration to key personnel  Education on ethical values  Empowering whistle blowers. However, One must understand no matter how strong a regulatory systems is, it cannot always prevent fraud. There are limits to legislations as a lot depends on the integrity and ethical values of various corporate players. The key lies in management decisions and its commitment to establish and follow rigorous systems.

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