INSURGENCY IN ALGERIA
INTRODUCTION
PREVIEW• PART I   -   INFO OF ALGERIA.• PART II -    CAUSES OF INSURGENCY.• PART III -   MODUS OPERANDI OF TRTS.• PART IV ...
PART IHISTORY OF ALGERIA
GEOGRAPHICAL LOC
FLAG OF ALGERIA
EMBLEM OF ALGERIA
GEOGRAPHICAL INFO• ALGERIA      COMPRISES     2,381,741    SQUAREKILOMETERS OF LAND.• MORE THAN FOUR-FIFTHS IS DESERT, INN...
GEOGRAPHICAL INFO• IT HAS A LONG MEDITERRANEAN COASTLINE,MOST OF WHICH IS MORE PROPERLY TERMEDTHE ALBORAN SEA, WHICH IS TH...
MILITARY INFO• THE ARMED FORCES OF ALGERIA COMPRISE OF 319,000SOLDIERS. THE MILITARY IS DIVIDED INTO THE FWG :   THE LAND...
PART IICAUSES OF INSURGENCY
CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• BY THE END OF 1987, THE SINGLE-PARTY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC UNDERWHICH ALGERIA HAD FARED RELATIVELY WELL...
CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• THE FIS RAPIDLY BECAME BY FAR THE BIGGEST ISLAMIST PARTY,WITH A HUGE FOLLOWING CONCENTRATED ESPECIAL...
CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• FIS WAS BANNED AND THOUSANDS OF ITS MEMBERSARRESTED.• ISLAMIST GUERRILLAS RAPIDLY EMERGED AND BEGAN ...
CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• FMN OF ISLAMIC ARMED MOVEMENT (MIA), BASED IN THEMOUNTAINS, AND THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA), BASED...
PART IIIMODUS OPERANDI
MODUS OPERANDI• OF THE FEW FIS ACTIVISTS THAT REMAINED FREE, MANYTOOK THIS AS A DECLARATION OF WAR.• THROUGHOUT MUCH OF TH...
MODUS OPERANDI• BY 26 AUGUST 1992 , IT HAD BECOME APPARENT THAT SOME GUERRILLASWERE BEGINNING TO TARGET CIVILIANS AS WELL ...
MODUS OPERANDI• IT WAS FAR LESS SELECTIVE THAN THE MIA, WHICH INSISTEDON IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING; AS A RESULT, IT WAS REGULAR...
MODUS OPERANDI• ON MARCH 10, 1994, OVER 1000 (MAINLYISLAMIST) PRISONERS ESCAPED TAZOULT PRISON INWHAT APPEARED TO BE A MAJ...
MODUS OPERANDI• ZITOUNI EXTENDED THE GIAS ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS TOFRENCH SOIL, BEGINNING WITH THE HIJACKING OF AIR FRANCEFL...
MODUS OPERANDI• IN JULY 1996 GIA LEADER DJAMEL ZITOUNI WAS KILLED BY ONE OFTHE BREAKAWAY EX-GIA FACTIONS AND WAS SUCCEEDED...
ALGERIAN MASSACRES• IN 1997, MASSACRES IN WHICH OVER 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED:   THALIT MASSACRE3 - 4 APRIL   HAOUCH KHEMIS...
MODUS OPERANDI• THE AIS, WHICH AT THIS POINT WAS ENGAGED IN AN ALL-OUT WARWITH THE GIA AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT, FOUND IT...
PART IVTHE START OF THE CHANGE
GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• AFTER RECEIVING MUCH INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO ACT,THE EU SENT TWO DELEGATIONS, ONE OF THEM...
GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• ELECTIONS WERE ARRANGED, AND ON APRIL 15, 1999, THEARMY-BACKED EX-INDEPENDENCE-FIGHTER ABDE...
GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• THIS LAW WAS FINALLY APPROVED BY REFERENDUM ON16 SEPTEMBER 1999, AND A NUMBER OF FIGHTERS,I...
PART VTHE FINAL ROAD TO PEACE
THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• WITH THE GIAS DECLINE, THE GSPC WAS LEFT AS THE MOSTACTIVE REBEL GROUP, WITH ABOUT 300 FIGHTERS IN...
THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• THE RELEASE OF FIS LEADERS MADANI AND BELHADJ IN 2003 HADNO OBSERVABLE EFFECT ON THE SITUATION, IL...
THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• THE PROPOSAL WAS IMPLEMENTED BY PRESIDENTIALDECREE IN FEBRUARY 2006, AND ADOPTED ON SEPTEMBER29, 2...
CONCLUSION
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
Insurgency in algeria
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Insurgency in algeria

  1. 1. INSURGENCY IN ALGERIA
  2. 2. INTRODUCTION
  3. 3. PREVIEW• PART I - INFO OF ALGERIA.• PART II - CAUSES OF INSURGENCY.• PART III - MODUS OPERANDI OF TRTS.• PART IV - THE START OF THE CHANGE.• PART V - THE FINAL ROAD TO PEACE.
  4. 4. PART IHISTORY OF ALGERIA
  5. 5. GEOGRAPHICAL LOC
  6. 6. FLAG OF ALGERIA
  7. 7. EMBLEM OF ALGERIA
  8. 8. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO• ALGERIA COMPRISES 2,381,741 SQUAREKILOMETERS OF LAND.• MORE THAN FOUR-FIFTHS IS DESERT, INNORTHERN AFRICA, BETWEEN MOROCCO & TUNISIA.• IT IS THE LARGEST COUNTRY IN AFRICA.• ITS ARABIC NAME, AL JAZAIR (THE ISLANDS),DERIVES FROM THE NAME OF THECAPITAL ALGIERS (AL JAZAIR IN ARABIC), AFTER THESMALL ISLANDS FORMERLY FOUND IN ITS HARBOR.
  9. 9. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO• IT HAS A LONG MEDITERRANEAN COASTLINE,MOST OF WHICH IS MORE PROPERLY TERMEDTHE ALBORAN SEA, WHICH IS THE WESTERNMOSTELEMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA.• THE NORTHERN PORTION, AN AREA OFMOUNTAINS, VALLEYS, AND PLATEAUS BETWEEN THEMEDITERRANEAN SEA AND THE SAHARA DESERT,FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SECTION OFNORTH AFRICA KNOWN AS THE MAGHREB. THIS AREAINCLUDES MOROCCO, TUNISIA, AND THENORTHWESTERN PORTION OF LIBYA KNOWNHISTORICALLY AS TRIPOLITANIA.
  10. 10. MILITARY INFO• THE ARMED FORCES OF ALGERIA COMPRISE OF 319,000SOLDIERS. THE MILITARY IS DIVIDED INTO THE FWG :  THE LAND FORCES (ANP)  NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA  AIR FORCE  TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENCE FORCE• FOUNDED IN 1954 ( ARMÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE ).• CURRENT FORM 1962 (ARMÉE NATIONALE POPULAIRE).• LEADERSHIP :  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : PRESIDENT ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA.  MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : PRESIDENT ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA.
  11. 11. PART IICAUSES OF INSURGENCY
  12. 12. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• BY THE END OF 1987, THE SINGLE-PARTY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC UNDERWHICH ALGERIA HAD FARED RELATIVELY WELL SINCE THE 1960s NO LONGERSEEMED VIABLE.• GOVERNMENT HAD RELIED HEAVILY ON HIGH OIL PRICES, AND WHEN, IN1986, OIL PRICES WENT FROM $30 TO $10 A BARREL, THE PLANNEDECONOMY CAME UNDER SEVERE STRAIN, WITH SHORTAGES ANDUNEMPLOYMENT RIFE.• OCTOBER 1988 MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT CHADLIBENDJEDID TOOK PLACE THROUGHOUT ALGERIAN CITIES, WITHAN ISLAMIST ELEMENT PROMINENT AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS.• THE ARMY FIRED ON THE DEMONSTRATORS, LEAVING SOME DEAD ANDSHOCKING MANY.• IN 1989, PRESIDENT CHADLI BROUGHT IN A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICHDISESTABLISHED THE RULING PARTY, THE NATIONAL LIBERATIONFRONT (FLN)• BY THE END OF THE YEAR, A VARIETY OF POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BEINGESTABLISHED AND RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT—AMONG THEM,THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS).
  13. 13. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• THE FIS RAPIDLY BECAME BY FAR THE BIGGEST ISLAMIST PARTY,WITH A HUGE FOLLOWING CONCENTRATED ESPECIALLY IN LARGEURBAN AREAS.• MAY 1991, THE FIS CALLED FOR A GENERAL STRIKE TO PROTEST THEGOVERNMENTS REDRAWING OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS, WHICH ITSAW AS A FORM OF GERRYMANDERING.• ON DECEMBER 26, THE FIS HANDILY WON THE FIRST ROUNDOF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND AN FIS GOVERNMENTSEEMED INEVITABLE.• ARMY SAW THIS OUTCOME AS UNACCEPTABLE. ON JANUARY11, 1992 THE ARMY CANCELLED THE ELECTORAL PROCESS,FORCING PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID TO RESIGN ANDBRINGING IN THE EXILED INDEPENDENCE FIGHTER MOHAMMEDBOUDIAF TO SERVE AS A NEW PRESIDENT.
  14. 14. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• FIS WAS BANNED AND THOUSANDS OF ITS MEMBERSARRESTED.• ISLAMIST GUERRILLAS RAPIDLY EMERGED AND BEGAN ANARMED CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND ITSSUPPORTERS.
  15. 15. CAUSES OF INSURGENCY• FMN OF ISLAMIC ARMED MOVEMENT (MIA), BASED IN THEMOUNTAINS, AND THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA), BASED INTHE TOWNS.• GUERRILLAS INITIALLY TARGETED THE ARMY AND POLICE, BUTSOME GROUPS SOON STARTED ATTACKING CIVILIANS.• IN 1994, AS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT ANDTHE FISS IMPRISONED LEADERSHIP REACHED THEIR HEIGHT, THEGIA DECLARED WAR ON THE FIS AND ITS SUPPORTERS.• THE MIA AND VARIOUS SMALLER GROUPS REGROUPED,BECOMING THE FIS-LOYALIST ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY (AIS).• A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED, AND MANY ORDINARYCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE SUSPENDED. ANY PROTESTS THATOCCURRED WERE SUPPRESSED, AND HUMANRIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,REPORTED FREQUENT GOVERNMENT USE OF TORTURE ANDHOLDING OF SUSPECTS WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL. THEGOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY DISSOLVED THE FIS ON MARCH 4.
  16. 16. PART IIIMODUS OPERANDI
  17. 17. MODUS OPERANDI• OF THE FEW FIS ACTIVISTS THAT REMAINED FREE, MANYTOOK THIS AS A DECLARATION OF WAR.• THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE COUNTRY, REMAINING FISACTIVISTS, ALONG WITH SOME ISLAMISTS TOO RADICAL FORFIS, TOOK TO THE HILLS WITH WHATEVER WEAPONS WEREAVAILABLE AND BECAME GUERRILLA FIGHTERS.• THEIR FIRST ATTACKS ON THE SECURITY FORCES BEGANBARELY A WEEK AFTER THE COUP, AND SOLDIERS ANDPOLICEMEN RAPIDLY BECAME TARGETS.• AS IN PREVIOUS WARS, THE GUERRILLAS WERE ALMOSTEXCLUSIVELY BASED IN THE MOUNTAINS OF NORTHERNALGERIA, WHERE THE FOREST AND SCRUB COVER WERE WELL-SUITED TO GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND IN CERTAIN AREAS OFTHE CITIES
  18. 18. MODUS OPERANDI• BY 26 AUGUST 1992 , IT HAD BECOME APPARENT THAT SOME GUERRILLASWERE BEGINNING TO TARGET CIVILIANS AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT FIGURES:THE BOMBING OF THE ALGIERS AIRPORT CLAIMED 9 LIVES AND INJURED 128PEOPLE. THE FIS CONDEMNED THE BOMBING ALONG WITH THE OTHERMAJOR PARTIES, BUT THE FISS INFLUENCE OVER THE GUERRILLAS TURNEDOUT TO BE LIMITED.• THE INITIAL FIGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LED BY THE SMALLEXTREMIST GROUP TAKFIR WAL HIJRA AND ASSOCIATED EX-AFGHANFIGHTERS. HOWEVER, THE FIRST MAJOR ARMED MOVEMENT TO EMERGE,STARTING ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COUP, WAS THE ISLAMIC ARMEDMOVEMENT (MIA).• IN FEBRUARY 1992, EX-SOLDIER, EX-AFGHAN FIGHTER, AND FORMER FISHEAD OF SECURITY SAID MEKHLOUFI FOUNDED THE MOVEMENT FOR ANISLAMIC STATE (MEI)• IN JANUARY 1993, ABDELHAK LAYADA DECLARED HIS GROUP INDEPENDENTOF CHEBOUTIS. THE NEW FACTION WAS CALLED THE ARMED ISLAMICGROUP (GIA, FROM FRENCH GROUPE ISLAMIQUE ARME). IT BECAMEPARTICULARLY PROMINENT AROUND ALGIERS AND ITS SUBURBS, IN URBANENVIRONMENTS.
  19. 19. MODUS OPERANDI• IT WAS FAR LESS SELECTIVE THAN THE MIA, WHICH INSISTEDON IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING; AS A RESULT, IT WAS REGULARLYINFILTRATED BY THE SECURITY FORCES, RESULTING IN A RAPIDLEADERSHIP TURNOVER AS SUCCESSIVE HEADS WERE KILLED.• THE MIA AND MEI, CONCENTRATED IN THE MAQUIS,ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A MILITARY STRATEGY AGAINST THESTATE, TYPICALLY TARGETING THE SECURITY SERVICES ANDSABOTAGING OR BOMBING STATE INSTITUTIONS.• IT ASSASSINATED JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS (SUCHAS TAHAR DJAOUT), SAYING "THE JOURNALISTS WHO FIGHTAGAINST ISLAMISM THROUGH THE PEN WILL PERISH BY THESWORD.“• IT SOON STEPPED UP ITS ATTACKS BY TARGETING CIVILIANSWHO REFUSED TO LIVE BY THEIR PROHIBITIONS, AND LATER IN1993 BEGAN KILLING FOREIGNERS.
  20. 20. MODUS OPERANDI• ON MARCH 10, 1994, OVER 1000 (MAINLYISLAMIST) PRISONERS ESCAPED TAZOULT PRISON INWHAT APPEARED TO BE A MAJOR COUP FOR THEGUERRILLAS.• THE NEXT FEW MONTHS SAW THE KILLING OFSOME 100 ISLAMIST PRISONERS IN THE SERKADJIPRISON MUTINY, AND A MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THESECURITY FORCES IN BATTLE AT AIN DEFLA,RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OFGUERRILLA FIGHTERS.• CHERIF GOUSMI WAS EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDEDBY DJAMEL ZITOUNI AS GIA HEAD.
  21. 21. MODUS OPERANDI• ZITOUNI EXTENDED THE GIAS ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS TOFRENCH SOIL, BEGINNING WITH THE HIJACKING OF AIR FRANCEFLIGHT 8969 AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1994 ANDCONTINUING WITH SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND ATTEMPTEDBOMBINGS THROUGHOUT 1995.• IN ALGERIA ITSELF, HE CONTINUED LIKEWISE, WITH CARBOMBS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF MUSICIANS, SPORTSMEN,AND UNVEILED WOMEN, AS WELL AS THE USUAL VICTIMS.• THE REGION SOUTH OF ALGIERS, IN PARTICULAR, CAME TOBE DOMINATED BY THE GIA, WHO CALLED IT THE "LIBERATEDZONE“.• REPORTS OF BATTLES BETWEEN THE AIS AND GIA INCREASED,AND THE GIA REITERATED ITS DEATH THREATS AGAINST FIS ANDAIS LEADERS, ASSASSINATING A CO-FOUNDER OF THEFIS, ABDELBAKI SAHRAOUI, IN PARIS. AT THIS POINT, FOREIGNSOURCES ESTIMATED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS TOBE ABOUT 27,000.
  22. 22. MODUS OPERANDI• IN JULY 1996 GIA LEADER DJAMEL ZITOUNI WAS KILLED BY ONE OFTHE BREAKAWAY EX-GIA FACTIONS AND WAS SUCCEEDED BY ANTARZOUABRI, WHO WOULD PROVE AN EVEN BLOODIER LEADER.• STARTING AROUND APRIL (THE THALIT MASSACRE), ALGERIA WASWRACKED BY MASSACRES OF INTENSE BRUTALITY ANDUNPRECEDENTED SIZE. GIA GUERRILLAS KILLED TENS, ANDSOMETIMES HUNDREDS, OF CIVILIANS AT A TIME.• THESE MASSACRES CONTINUED THROUGH THE END OF 1998,CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATIONCONSIDERABLY.• PREGNANT WOMEN WERE SLICED OPEN, CHILDREN WEREHACKED TO PIECES OR DASHED AGAINST WALLS, MENS LIMBS WEREHACKED OFF ONE BY ONE, AND, AS THE ATTACKERS RETREATED, THEYWOULD KIDNAP YOUNG WOMEN TO KEEP AS SEX SLAVES.• ARMY BARRACKS WERE STATIONED WITHIN A FEW HUNDREDMETERS OF THE VILLAGES, YET DID NOTHING TO STOP THE KILLINGS.
  23. 23. ALGERIAN MASSACRES• IN 1997, MASSACRES IN WHICH OVER 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED:  THALIT MASSACRE3 - 4 APRIL  HAOUCH KHEMISTI MASSACRE - 21 APRIL  DAIRAT LABGUER MASSACRE -16 JUNE  SI-ZERROUK MASSACRE -27 JULY  OUED EL-HAD AND MEZOUARA MASSACRE -3 AUGUST  SOUHANE MASSACRE -20 - 21 AUGUST  BENI-ALI MASSACRE -26 AUGUST  RAIS MASSACRE -29 AUGUST  BENI-MESSOUS MASSACRE -5 - 6 SEPTEMBER  GUELB EL-KEBIR MASSACRE -19 SEPTEMBER  BENTALHA MASSACRE- 22 SEPTEMBER  SID EL-ANTRI MASSACRE -23 - 24 DECEMBER  WILAYA OF RELIZANE MASSACRES- 30 DECEMBER
  24. 24. MODUS OPERANDI• THE AIS, WHICH AT THIS POINT WAS ENGAGED IN AN ALL-OUT WARWITH THE GIA AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT, FOUND ITSELF IN ANUNTENABLE POSITION.• THE GIA SEEMED A MORE IMMEDIATELY PRESSING ENEMY, AND AISMEMBERS EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE MASSACRES—WHICH IT HADCONDEMNED MORE THAN ONCE—WOULD BE BLAMED ON THEM.• ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1997, THE AIS HEAD, MADANI MEZRAG,ORDERED A UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE STARTINGOCTOBER 1, IN ORDER TO "UNVEIL THE ENEMY THAT HIDES BEHINDTHESE ABOMINABLE MASSACRES.“• THE AIS THUS LARGELY TOOK ITSELF OUT OF THE POLITICALEQUATION, REDUCING THE FIGHTING TO A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THEGOVERNMENT, THE GIA, AND THE VARIOUS SPLINTER GROUPS THATWERE INCREASINGLY BREAKING AWAY FROM THE GIA.• ALI BENHADJARS FIS-LOYALIST ISLAMIC LEAGUE FOR DAWA ANDJIHAD (LIDD), FORMED IN FEBRUARY 1997, ALLIED ITSELF WITH THEAIS AND OBSERVED THE SAME CEASEFIRE.• OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS, THE AIS WOULD GRADUALLYNEGOTIATE AN AMNESTY FOR ITS MEMBERS.
  25. 25. PART IVTHE START OF THE CHANGE
  26. 26. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• AFTER RECEIVING MUCH INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO ACT,THE EU SENT TWO DELEGATIONS, ONE OF THEM LED BY MÁRIOSOARES, TO VISIT ALGERIA AND INVESTIGATE THE MASSACRESIN THE FIRST HALF OF 1998.• THE REPORTS CONDEMNED THE ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS.TOWNS SOON BECAME SAFER, ALTHOUGH MASSACRESCONTINUED IN RURAL AREAS.• THE GIAS POLICY OF MASSACRING CIVILIANS HAD ALREADYCAUSED A SPLIT AMONG ITS COMMANDERS, WITH SOMEREJECTING THE POLICY.• ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1998, THIS DISAGREEMENT WASFORMALIZED WITH THE FORMATION OF THE SALAFIST GROUPFOR PREACHING AND COMBAT (GSPC), BASED IN THEMOUNTAINS WEST OF KABYLIE AND LED BY HASSAN HATTAB.
  27. 27. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• ELECTIONS WERE ARRANGED, AND ON APRIL 15, 1999, THEARMY-BACKED EX-INDEPENDENCE-FIGHTER ABDELAZIZBOUTEFLIKA WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT.• BOUTEFLIKA CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIS,AND ON JUNE 5 THE AIS AGREED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO DISBAND.• BOUTEFLIKA FOLLOWED UP THIS SUCCESS FOR THEGOVERNMENT BY PARDONING A NUMBER OF ISLAMISTPRISONERS CONVICTED OF MINOR OFFENSES AND PUSHINGTHE CIVIL HARMONY ACT THROUGH PARLIAMENT, A LAWALLOWING ISLAMIST FIGHTERS NOT GUILTY OF MURDER ORRAPE TO ESCAPE ALL PROSECUTION IF THEY TURNTHEMSELVES IN.
  28. 28. GIA DESTROYED, GSPC CONTINUES• THIS LAW WAS FINALLY APPROVED BY REFERENDUM ON16 SEPTEMBER 1999, AND A NUMBER OF FIGHTERS,INCLUDING MUSTAPHA KARTALI, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF ITTO GIVE THEMSELVES UP AND RESUME NORMAL LIFE—SOMETIMES ANGERING THOSE WHO HAD SUFFERED AT THEHANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS.• FIS LEADERSHIP EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THERESULTS, FEELING THAT THE AIS HAD STOPPED FIGHTINGWITHOUT SOLVING ANY OF THE ISSUES; BUT THEIR MAINVOICE OUTSIDE OF PRISON, ABDELKADER HACHANI, WASASSASSINATED ON NOVEMBER 22.• VIOLENCE DECLINED, THOUGH NOT STOPPINGALTOGETHER, AND A SENSE OF NORMALITY STARTED
  29. 29. PART VTHE FINAL ROAD TO PEACE
  30. 30. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• WITH THE GIAS DECLINE, THE GSPC WAS LEFT AS THE MOSTACTIVE REBEL GROUP, WITH ABOUT 300 FIGHTERS IN 2003.• IT CONTINUED A CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSINATIONS OF POLICEAND ARMY PERSONNEL IN ITS AREA, AND ALSO MANAGED TOEXPAND INTO THE SAHARA, WHERE ITS SOUTHERN DIVISION, LEDBY AMARI SAIFI. HE KIDNAPPED A NUMBER OF GERMAN TOURISTSIN 2003, BEFORE BEING FORCED TO FLEE TO SPARSELY POPULATEDAREAS OF MALI, AND LATER NIGER AND CHAD, WHERE HE WASCAPTURED.• BY LATE 2003, THE GROUPS FOUNDER HAD BEEN SUPPLANTEDBY THE EVEN MORE RADICAL NABIL SAHRAOUI, WHOANNOUNCED HIS OPEN SUPPORT FOR AL-QAEDA, THUSSTRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. ANDALGERIA.
  31. 31. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• THE RELEASE OF FIS LEADERS MADANI AND BELHADJ IN 2003 HADNO OBSERVABLE EFFECT ON THE SITUATION, ILLUSTRATING ANEWFOUND GOVERNMENTAL CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD BEDEEPENED BY THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION .• THE VOTE WAS SEEN AS CONFIRMING STRONG POPULAR SUPPORTFOR BOUTEFLIKAS POLICY TOWARDS THE GUERRILLAS AND THESUCCESSFUL TERMINATION OF LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE• IN SEPTEMBER 2005 A NATIONAL REFERENDUM WAS HELD ONAN AMNESTY PROPOSAL BY BOUTEFLIKAS GOVERNMENT, SIMILAR TOTHE 1999 LAW, TO END LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INDIVIDUALSWHO WERE NO LONGER FIGHTING, AND TO PROVIDE COMPENSATIONTO FAMILIES OF PEOPLE KILLED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.
  32. 32. THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE• THE PROPOSAL WAS IMPLEMENTED BY PRESIDENTIALDECREE IN FEBRUARY 2006, AND ADOPTED ON SEPTEMBER29, 2006. PARTICULARLY CONTROVERSIAL WAS ITS PROVISIONOF IMMUNITY AGAINST PROSECUTION TO SURRENDERED EX-GUERRILLAS AND ARMY PERSONNEL.• OVER 400 GSPC GUERRILLAS SURRENDERED UNDER ITSTERMS; ESTIMATES OF THE GSPCS SIZE IN 2005 HAD RANGEDFROM 300 TO 1000• THE FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED TO DIE DOWN BUT ASTATE OF EMERGENCY REMAINED IN PLACE.• THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS LIFTED IN FEBRUARY2011.
  33. 33. CONCLUSION

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