Successfully reported this slideshow.
Your SlideShare is downloading. ×

megaprojects, SPUR 2022.pdf

More Related Content

megaprojects, SPUR 2022.pdf

  1. 1. Transportation Megaprojects Unpacking Key Characteristics & Confronting Challenges Karen Trapenberg Frick City & Regional Planning, UC Berkeley Photo: Barrie Rokeach
  2. 2. “Construction Guide” 1. Megaproject Overview & Key Characteristics 2. Confronting Challenges Research Basis Photo: Barrie Rokeach 2
  3. 3. Major Infrastructure Projects • “megaprojects” • high-profile projects – Long term and often fraught with schedule delays & high cost – ”mini” projects can become mega – Stadiums, olympic venues, Sydney Opera House; Transport examples: New road & rail construction, extensions; bridges
  4. 4. Key Megaproject Characteristics (7 “C”s) 1. Colossal 2. Captivating 3. Costly 4. Controversial 5. Complex 6. Control (lack of) 7. Communications (K. Trapenberg Frick, 2016) 4
  5. 5. Cost Estimates: Overruns on Average - International • 9 out of 10 projects have overruns study based on 20 nations over a 70 year period; estimates have not improved over time Flyvbjerg 2009, p. 350; B. Flyvbjerg, 2007 5
  6. 6. Forecasts of Projected Facility Use 84% of rail passenger & 50% of road traffic forecasts wrong by approx 20% Result: “…costs are underestimated and benefits overestimated” Flyvbjerg 2009, p. 350 Directly from Flybjerg, Concept Report, 2007
  7. 7. 1) Optimism Bias underestimation of cost and time for projects (initial research by D. Kahneman et al) 2) Strategic Misrepresentation inaccurate reporting of project budgets and/or travel demand forecasts (Flyvbjerg -- deception) 6 Root Issues to Consider 7
  8. 8. 3) Transaction Costs § often the unreported and underestimated costs throughout project lifecycle § Examples: § Financing, on-going legal and staff costs (ex: associated with change orders), legislative hearings § Years of pre-planning/design work such as engineering and environmental that may not factor into construction costs– additional commissioned studies 8
  9. 9. 4) Lock in & Path Dependence § Lock-in: “escalating commitment of decision makers to an ineffective course of action”; sunk costs; inflexibility § Occurs at: § the decision-making level -- before the decision to build § the project level -- after the decision to build & during process 9 (Cantarelli et al, 2010)
  10. 10. Indicators of Lock-in: • Sunk costs -- in terms of both time and money (ex: funds have already been set aside or spent) • The on-going need for justification, escalating commitment • Inflexibility and closure of alternatives 10
  11. 11. “…is about repeated experiences of awe and wonder, often tinged with an element of terror, which people have had when confronted with particular natural sites, architectural forms and technological achievements.” David Nye 5) Technological Sublime 11
  12. 12. 12
  13. 13. 6) Policy Windows of Opportunity & Problem Definition Policy windows of opportunity—focusing events— crises, natural or other disasters/hazards, evolving policy circumstances that allow other related to quasi- related issues to connect to the main policy issue How problems are defined sets the stage for pathways followed in search of solutions
  14. 14. Key Megaproject Characteristics (7 “C”s) 1. Colossal 2. Captivating 3. Costly 4. Controversial 5. Complex 6. Control (lack of) 7. Communications Photo: Barrie Rokeach 14
  15. 15. Confronting Challenges to improve accountability, transparency, cost estimating & project management & delivery 15
  16. 16. 1) Cost Estimating § transaction cost analysis – long term – before & after construction § full public disclosure and discussion on tradeoffs with financing – often only capital & some support costs published; opportunity costs/benefits with financing one project over others 16
  17. 17. (Cost Estimating) § rigorous risk analysis and reference class forecasting (“outside view”) – cost and schedule uplift; including sufficient contingency budget—include resiliency needs; lifecycle operations & maintenance costs too § Provide ranges for cost estimates and schedule instead of specific numbers (ex. $1.436 billion) to remove appearance of precision and manage expectations given history of poor cost estimating 17
  18. 18. 2) Project Management & Delivery from the Onset § Institute better REGULAR external oversight and independent peer review BEFORE the project begins § Increase public sector capacity to oversee projects so it does not just rely on contracted third-party assistance § Ex: improve skills and understanding with contract writing, oversight and finance; change orders § Look for and critically assess successes within government so we can learn from these on which the megaproject scholarship is sparse 18
  19. 19. Also a “schedule bias uplift” to manage expectations about project completion KTF 2008 in Flyvbjerg et al
  20. 20. 3) Process and Project History § Project sponsors need to consider path dependence and project histories and social and structural inequities § Include space for the technological sublime and consider the legitimacy and role that public funds play in aesthetics and “amenities” § one day’s amenities may be a future generation’s perceived necessities § Build in time for collaborative public processes on problem definition and direct focus on structural inequities and justice § On-going multi-way communications is key (one of the 7C’s) 20
  21. 21. Many thanks and looking forward to the discussion! 21 2015

×