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TrustDavis on ethereum

  1. REPUTATION IN ETHEREUM TRUSTDAVIS Ethereum Meetup 6/18/2014
  2. Overview • Online Trust and Reputation in General • Parts of a Reputation System • Types of Reputation Systems w/ Applications • TrustDavis as Transaction Insurance • TrustDavis on ethereum • Variants & References • Q & A
  3. Cryptocurrency is… • A digital currency made possible by cryptography (duh)… • A digital payment system… • A decentralized application running on a block chain… • A community with a very loose set of common interests, goals and desired behavior (various)
  4. Community Goals? • We want our crypto assets gain in value and adoption • We want to be able to freely and privately transact • We seek to maximize gain through disintermediation (p2p ftw) • We seek to minimize loss & risk of default • We avoid trusting central authorities or other single points of failure
  5. Trust & Reputation • Trust: Firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something. "relations have to be built on trust“ – Synonyms: confidence, belief, faith, certainty, assurance, conviction, credence • Law: Confidence placed in a person by making that person the nominal owner of property to be held or used for the benefit of one or more others • Archaic: To allow credit to (a customer) • Layman: Do what you say you’ll do when you say you’ll do it.
  6. Trust & Reputation • Reputation: The beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something. "his reputation was tarnished by allegations that he had taken bribes" – Synonyms: name, good name, character, repute, standing, stature, status, position, renown, esteem, prestige. • In the absence of firsthand knowledge, we rely on reputation to establish initial trust.
  7. The Need for Trust • It is often said that cryptocurrency technology (bitcoin, ethereum etc.) replaces the need for human trust via self-enforcing smart contracts. • This is simply not the case. In fact we are trading trust in one set of entities for another. We are changing and flattening our “trust stack”. Centralized Decentralized Self Self Trading Partners Math/Code/Developers Trusted Intermediaries Network/Miners Legal Systems Trading Partners Government DAO/DAC (optional)
  8. Shrinking the Community • Taking gov’t and civil institutions out of the mix brings us back to smaller, village like communities • Dunbar number is approx. 150 • You’ll run into approx. 10,000 during your lifetime • Online is pseudonymous with very low identity creation cost • In the cryptocurrency world, traditional legal recourse is difficult. Code is law (Lessig) • Everything on the chain is open and transparent
  9. Parts of a Reputation System (Farmer & Glass, 2010) • A source makes a claim about a target • Explicit (claim) vs. Implicit (behavior) • Global (e.g. FICO) vs. Local (e.g. Yahoo Chess rating) • Reputation is context specific • Claim types: Qualitative, Quantitative, Raw, Normalized, Ranked, Scalar • Roll-Ups: Counters, accumulators, averages, mixes and ratios • Routers: Messages, Decisions and Termination
  10. A slightly-more-evolved model. Now, articles are ranked not only according to endorsements, but also the amount of discussion they generate (Farmer & Glass).
  11. Reputation Models w/ Applications (Farmer & Glass, 2010) • Content: – Favorites & Flags (vote to promote) • Reddit, Digg, StackExchange, various for a – Karma (participation, quality, robust) – This or That voting (was this review helpful?) • Yelp, Yahoo • Transactions: Ratings, Reviews & Points – eBay • Achievements & Badges – Public recognition, Gamification
  12. TrustDavis (DeFigueiredo & Barr) 1. Agents can accurately estimate risk – Third parties provide accurate ratings – Parties are liable for the references they provide 2. Honest buyer/seller avoids risk (if possible) – Insure transactions – Buyers/sellers pay for references to insure their transactions 3. No advantage in obtaining multiple identities – Agents can cope with pseudonym change – References are issued only to trusted identities 4. No need to trust a centralized authority – No centralized service needed – Anyone can issue a reference
  13. (DeFigueiredo & Barr)
  14. Key Ideas (DeFigueiredo & Barr) • Incentive Compatibility – Incentive to accurately rate – Incentive to insure – No incentive to change pseudonym • Saving gains in excess of the opportunity cost to insure future transactions. • Insurers can profit by charging premiums for references. They must estimate risk accurately. • Buyers/Sellers be insured against loss/default/non-performance
  15. TrustDavis on ethereum • Ethereum makes this easier • We don’t need v2 or any other reinsurance agent because they cannot default (they escrow up front). This simplifies things. • We use a factory contract (project Douglas style “form” contract) which has been audited using Mintchalk’s new binary search feature.
  16. A TrustDavis ethereum contract • First Run: – Register the contract – Store the buyer and seller address – Store the amount for the transaction and the expiry date • Subsequent Runs: – Check expiry (blocks or Chronos) – Look for presence of “completed transaction” votes by buyer AND seller – Look for presence of “failed transaction” votes by buyer OR seller – Store escrowed references from insurers • (amount, vs. buyer or seller, premium)
  17. A TrustDavis ethereum contract (2) • If Expired: – Refund the premiums? – Return the escrow to insurers – Return the escrowed buyer’s funds • If Failed: – Transferred claimed amounts to both parties – Transfer premiums to insurers – Transfer agreed funds from buyer to seller – Register failure on Reputation Registry (sendmsg) • If Succeeds: – Transfer premiums to insurers – Transfer agreed funds from buyer to seller – Register success on Reputation Registry (sendmsg)
  18. Variants using ethereum • No False Claim: Either party can declare the transaction defaulted. In this case all insurers must pay. Similar to no fault insurance. • False Claim with Arbitration: Arbiter(s) are jointly chosen and do not hold escrowed funds. Claim is settled based on ruling. • Revocable References: Insurers can withdraw references prior to the transaction moving forward. This may occur due to new knowledge gained or new opportunities. • Invested Escrow: References and other contract balance deposited into an interest bearing account until transaction completion. Withdrawn and redistributed upon completion. • Writing to a Reputation Registry: Upon completion of the transaction, references and disposition are written to a reputation registry. This registry could accumulate a credit score implemented as an uncirculated subcurrency.
  19. Conclusion (DeFigueiredo & Barr) • We can now have an automated, simplified version of TrustDavis on the block chain – Accurate Ratings – Non-Exploitable strategy for honest agents – Pseudonym change tolerance – Decentralized Infrastructure • We are bootstrapping from a “dead money” escrow model to a reputation model
  20. References/Further Reading • DeFigueiredo & Barr. TrustDavis: A Non-Exploitable Online Reputation System (2005). pdf • Farmer & Glass, Building Web Reputation Systems, O’Reilly Press (2010). • Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (1996). • Kamvar, Schlosser & Garcia-Molina. The EigenTrust Algorithm for Reputation Management in P2P Networks. Proceedings of the 12th International WWW Conference (2003).

Editor's Notes

  1. Called “dominant” because the dominant strategy in the Nash equilibrium is to contribute. Solves the free rider problem.
  2. Vb buys watch from Vs valued at $150 Vb obtains a $100 reference from v1 against bad behavior of Vs. Vb obtains a $50 reference from v1 against bad behavior of v2. Vb obtains a $50 reference from v2 against bad behavior of Vs. Vs obtains a $150 reference from v3 against bad behavior of Vb. -If Vs doesn’t deliver then Vb gets the $150 by contacting v1 and v2 -If v2 declines then Vb can recover by asking for an addition $50 from v1. -If v1 doesn’t pay the $150 then Vb should have been more careful and desposited
  3. Microsoft Confidential