La PRAC et le Traité de Lisbonne


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this is my joint presentation for Prof.Szapiro course at the College of Europe. thanks to Riccardo for his part of the work.
the views expressed are the full responsibility
of the author alone and do not engage the College of Europe.
les éléments contenus dans cette présentation n'engagent que son auteur et ne peuvent en aucune façon etre attribués au College d'Europe

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  • Good afternoon. As you can see, today we are going to speak about the role of the Parliament in comitology procedure from a very practical point of view.
  • We will proceed as follows: the first two parts are somehow a very short introduction into the topic. The part “la PRAC in practice” is devoted to the casestudies of how they used the procedure introduced by the 2006 reform. And the last part examines the latest developments brought by the Reform treaty.
  • Here it is the history scheme of how the Parliament gradually expanded its powers in comitology. Basically, the most important thing with this history is that during two last decades the pressure, both formal and informal (click), from the Parliament to give it more powers in the procedure was constant and severe. But at the same time the usage of the powers gained by the EP in each reform round was more then modest (click). In between 1999 and 2006 the EP used its right of scrutiny only 6 times and after the 2006 reform and until the Lisbon treaty there were only 7 attempts to adopt opposing resolutions under the PRAC. Maybe this is the result of inability of the EP to exercise its powers or its unwillingness to do so or maybe the Commission just does its work very well and doesn’t provoke disputes.
  • I’m sure you all know how the PRAC works in theory. In a nutshell, it is a right of veto on the substance of the quisi-legislative acts adopted under the co-decision. But the exercise of veto by the EP must be justified. Here it is three conditions allowing the EP to oppose. The presence of one of these conditions is already enough to adopt an opposing resolution.
  • Here it is the scheme of how the PRAC works. The only interesting thing for us here is (click) that the EP votes under absolute majority to adopt resolution in the plenary session. Yet, before this stage the committee responsible for the draft-measure votes the draft-resolution under simple majority. And this has the potential of failure of the draft-resolution in the plenary though it could have passed the committee because it is easier to find simple majority then absolute one. And you will see that there was one such case.
  • As you can see the PRAC is not that frequently used. Though, as our contact person said in 2009 there had been an increase of usage of the PRAC and he estimated a number of about 200 usages but no precise number is now available.
  • So, this is a table which sums up all the controversial cases for the EP where the PRAC was to be applied. Despite the fact that there were only 7 not 8 attempts to adopt opposing resolution under the PRAC the table consists of 8 cases and as you will see is not a mistake. Due to the time constrains I’m going to speak only about three cases (click) which are representative and at the same time the most interesting ones.
  • The first two cases I’m going to speak about are the most recent ones – new ‘energy labelling for TV sets measure’ and new ’energy labelling for fridges measure’. For both measures proposed by the Commission the EP committee responsible for consideration of these measures successfully voted two draft-resolutions referring to the fact that the proposed measures are not compatible with the aim of the legislative act and that new proposed classes such as A-20% or A-40% only add to confusion about whether class 'A' represents an efficient or an inefficient product. But when it came to voting in the plenary session only one opposing resolution was finally adopted – concerning TV-sets. As the EP Press-release states opposing resolution for fridges was not backed by the necessary majority of MEPs. So, basically, this is an example of the failure-in-the-plenary potential I was speaking about two slides ago which shows that only measure which doesn’t satisfy a wide number of MEPs would be opposed.
  • Another two cases represent a very interesting practice which was not even foreseen in the procedure. Two draft-resolutions were withdrawn by the EP committee even before voting in the committee. That was done after the Commission indicated in the letters to the EP that the modifications required by the EP would be taken into account in a subsequent revision of the implementing measure. So, Hardacre and Damen argue that this communication exercise between two institutions could have appeared to be a ‘de facto right’ of amendment for the EP. But it wouldn’t be the case as the Lisbon treaty changes things with comitology drastically. But still this example shows the very loyal cooperation between institutions involved.
  • The last case is a famous body scanners case. The zest of this case is that the resolution adopted against the measure proposed by the Commission was not an opposing resolution under the PRAC, but was ordinary parliament resolution which is not legally binding for the Commission. Moreover, this resolution was initiated by LIBE committee not by the Transport and tourism committee which was formally responsible to consider the issue. And the most interesting thing here is that when the resolution was adopted in the plenary the Commission and, personally Mister Tajani, decided to withdraw the measure because of the mass media critics which supported the idea of LIBE committee about the violation of the private life by examining people with body scanners. So, this case shows how the EP can force the Commission to withdraw the measure using public opinion and mass media without even exercising its formal right under the PRAC.
  • La PRAC et le Traité de Lisbonne

    1. 1. Intervention du Parlementeuropéen encomitologie<br />les casd’application de la réforme de 2006 et leTraité de Lisbonne<br />Anna Dekalchuk & RiccardoMezzasalma,<br />le 12 mars 2010<br />
    2. 2. Sommaire<br /><ul><li>Avant la réforme 2006: quelrôle pour le Parlement?
    3. 3. La réforme 2006: comment la PRAC doit-ellefonctionner en théorie?
    4. 4. LaPRACinpractice: études des cas 2006-2009
    5. 5. La législation déléguée après Lisbonne?</li></li></ul><li>1:1/1<br />Avant la réforme 2006: quelrôle pour le Parlement?<br />La decision du Conseil 87/373/CEE<br />le Traité d’Amsterdam et l’extension de codécision (II)<br />la décision du Conseil 2006/513/CE et l’introduction de la PRAC<br />les premiers comités<br />1994<br />l’accord ‘Modus Vivendi’<br />6 fois<br />1 novembre 1993<br />28 juin 1999<br />1 décembre 2009<br />1 juillet 1987<br />les années 60<br />13 juillet 1987<br />1 mai 1999<br />17 juillet 2006<br />1988<br />2002<br />7 fois<br />l’accord Plumb-Delors: l’information pour le PE <br />le processus Lamfalussy<br />la décision du Conseil 1999/486/CE et le ‘droit de regard’ et d’information<br />l’Acte unique euro-<br />péen et le changement de l’Article 145<br />le Traité de Maastricht et l’introduction de codécision<br />le Traité de Lisbonne et la législationdéléguée<br />“Le Parlementeuropéen, traditionnellement laissé pour compte” (Szapiro, 2006a: 559)<br />
    6. 6. 2:1/2<br />La réforme 2006: comment la PRAC doit-ellefonctionneren théorie?<br />La décision2006/513/CE (l’Article 5 bis)<br />“droit de veto sur la substance de certainesmesures [quasi législatives] qui mettent en œure les actesadoptés en codécision”<br />La base de l’opposition:<br /><ul><li>les mesures proposées excèdent les compétences d’exécution prévues dans l’act de base (droit de regard)
    7. 7. les mesures ne sont pas compatibles avec le but ou le contenu de l’act de base
    8. 8. les mesures ne respectent pas les principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité</li></ul>Pas de droit de disposer d’observateurs du PE dans les comités comitologie<br />
    9. 9. 2:2/2<br />Pas de pouvoirs pour le PE<br /><ul><li>à la majorité absolue de ses membres – la séance plénière
    10. 10. à la majorité simple de ses membres – le comité responsable du PE</li></ul>(Source: Szapiro, 2006b: 577)<br />
    11. 11. 3:1/5<br />LaPRACinpractice: études des cas 2006-2009<br />
    12. 12. 3:2/5<br />LaPRACinpractice: études des cas 2006-2009<br />Les cas contradictoires pour le PE (l’informationjusqu‘aumai 2009)<br />
    13. 13. 3:3/5<br />LaPRACinpractice: étudesdes cas 2006-2009<br /><ul><li>21 avril 2009 – la vote au comité ITRE : deuxprojets de résolution
    14. 14. 6 mai 2009 – la résolution ‘P6_TA-PROV(2009)0357’: pas de classes 'A-20%', 'A-40%', 'A-60%' pour les télés
    15. 15. mais les réfrigérateurs?</li></li></ul><li>3:4/5<br />LaPRACinpractice: études des cas 2006-2009<br />+<br />=<br />!<br />‘animal testing’ case and ‘use of seat-belts for children in airplanes’ case – “ a sort of ‘de facto right of amendment’ ”? (Hardacre & Damen: 16) <br />
    16. 16. 3:5/5<br />LaPRACinpractice: études des cas 2006-2009<br />
    17. 17. 4:1/7<br />La législationdéléguée après Lisbonne<br /><ul><li>Le mot “comitologie” vadisparaître
    18. 18. Legislation déléguée:
    19. 19. Actesdélégués
    20. 20. Actesd'exécution
    21. 21. Cequel'onsait avec certitude...</li></li></ul><li>4:2/7<br />…c'estdans lestraités<br />Ne peutjamaiss'appliquer à unemesure<br />de nature individuelle<br />L'absence de l'une des 2 conditions exclut <br />l'application de l'art 290<br /><ul><li>ART. 290 – ACTES DELEGUEES
    22. 22. “acte de portéegénérale qui complèteoumodifie des élements non essentiels” d'un actelègislatif
    23. 23. ART. 291 – ACTES D'EXECUTION
    24. 24. Compétence aux EtatsMembres pour la mise en oeuvre des actesjuridiquementcontraignants de l'Union</li></ul>Doit changer le cadre de l'acte législatif<br />
    25. 25. 4:3/7<br />...qui établissentque:<br />ART. 290<br /><ul><li>Autorisationdonnée à la COMM estfacultative -> PE et CONS se déprivent du pouvoirlégislatif à cause d'un “souci d'éfficacité”
    26. 26. Le Législateurpeut re-saisir son pouvoirlègislatif par:
    27. 27. révocation de la délegation
    28. 28. opposition à l'actedéléguéadopté par la COMM</li></ul> ART. 291<br /><ul><li>La COMM intervient en cas de nécessité de conditions uniformes et sousdèlégationdansactes de base
    29. 29. La COMM peutaussi adopter des actesd'exécution de portéegénérale</li></li></ul><li>4:4/7<br />Quelpouvoir pour le PE dans la législationdéléguée?<br />Pas de sûreté -> accord sur les procéduresd'application des artt. 290 et 291 pas encore atteints<br />Art. 290<br /><ul><li>COMM -> 9.12.2009: Communication COMM(2009)637
    30. 30. PE -> 8.3.2010: vote du “Rapport Szájersur le pouvoir de délégationlégislative” (2010/2021(INI))
    31. 31. COMM+PE+CONS -> Negotiation interinstitutionnelle (entente commune)</li></li></ul><li>Etablie par législateurdansl'acte de base<br />Iterlégislatif d'un actedéléguéd'aprèsle Traité de Lisbonne(art. 290)<br />DELEGATION<br />Groupesd'expérts des autoritéesnationales<br />Droit de revocation<br />TRAVAUX <br />PREPARATOIRES<br />NOTIFICATION<br />Déclenchedélaid'opposition<br />2 mois (renouvelables de 2 mois plus)<br />Procedure d'urgence<br />TRAVAUX <br />PREPARATOIRES<br />DELAI DE<br />OPPOSITION<br />En casd'absenced'opposition<br />ENTREE EN VIGUEUR<br />
    32. 32. 4:6/7<br />Quelpouvoir pour le PE dans la législationd'exécution?<br /><ul><li>Art. 291(3) ->PE et CONS établissent au préalable les règles et principesgénérauxrelatifs aux modalités de contrôle par les Étatsmembres de l'exercice des compétencesd'exécution par la Commission.
    33. 33. COMMn'a pas encore préparé de communication au sujet
    34. 34. PEappelle “as a matter of urgency” l'application de art. 291(3) et demandeavoir un droit d'être informésur les actesd'exécution pour effectuercontrôle de légitimité</li></li></ul><li>4:7/7<br />Problématiques<br /><ul><li>Urgence pour les “propositions pendantes”
    35. 35. Pas de pouvoird'amendement pour le PE -> droitd'information du PEdans la phase préparatoire
    36. 36. Disparition des Comités de Comitologie avec pouvoir de vote -> pas d'avis du CONS encore
    37. 37. Lecasse-tête du “screening”ou comment répartir les mésuresd'exécution des actesdélégués</li></li></ul><li>Thank you for your attention!<br />
    38. 38. Bibliographie<br />«EU lawmakers reject revised energy labels», EurActiv, 2009, retrieved 8 March 2010,<br />Bradley, Kieran St Clair, “Halfway House: the 2006 ComitologyReformes and the European Parliament”, West EuropeanPolitics, vol. 31, no. 4, 2008, pp. 837-854.<br />Christiansen, Thomas & Beatrice Vaccari, “The 2006 Reform of Comitology: Problem Solved or Dispute Postponed?”, EIPASCOPE, no. 3, 2006, pp. 9-17.<br />Craig, Paul, “The Role of the European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty”, The Lisbon Treaty, EuropeanCommunity Studies Association of Austria Publication Series, 2009, pp. 109-134.<br />Guéguen, Daniel, “Comitologie, le pouvoireuropéenconfisqué”, European Training Institute, Bruxelles, 2010.<br />Hardacre, Alan & Mario Damen, “The European Parliament and Comitology: PRAC in Practice”, EIPASCOPE, no. 1, 2009, pp. 13-18.<br />Molino, Elisa, “Dynamics of Institutional Change in the Case of Legislative-Executive Powers: the Path towards the Reform Treaty and the Formalisation of Inter-Institutional Relations”, in Isabelle Hertner & Julia Osborn, The LisbonTreaty – a New Era?, no. 10, 2008, pp. 15-23.<br />Neuhold, Christine, “Taming the “Throjan Horse” of Comitology? Accountability issues in Comitology and the Role of the European Parliament”, EuropeanIntegrationonline Papers(EIoP), vol. 12, no. 1, 2008. <br />Ponzano, Paolo, “‘Executive’ and ‘Delegated’ Acts: the Situation after the Lisbon Treaty”, in Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller (eds.), The LisbonTreaty: EU Constitutionalismwithouta ConstitutionalTreaty?, Vienna, Springer-Verlag Wien, 2008, pp. 135-141.<br />Szapiro, Manuel, “Comitologie: le Début d’une Nouvelle Ere?”, Revue du Marché Communet de l’UnionEuropéenne, no. 501, 2006(a), pp. 558-562.<br />Szapiro, Manuel, “Comitologie: Rétrospective et prospective après la réforme de 2006”, Revue du Droitde l’UnionEuropéenne, no. 3, 2006(b), pp. 545-586.<br />Szapiro, Manuel, “Comitology: the ongoing reform” in Herwing C.H. Hofmann & Alexander H. Turk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration, Cheltenham, Edward Elgard Publishing Limited, 2009, pp.89-115.<br />
    39. 39. Illustrations<br />‘Hay tantascosas...’ by ..ädri..,<br />‘NoAnimalTesting’, Logo of InternationalerHerstellerverbandgegenTierversuche in derKosmetike.V. (IHTK),<br />‘fasten your seat belts!’, © Scusi,;<br />‘One of the tough moments during Mr Tajani's hearing’ by European Parliament,<br />‘Airport-full-body-scanner-pic’, NEWS,<br />