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  1. 1. Market Liquidity & Performance Monitoring Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) By James Song Feb 4, 2007
  2. 2. Introduction – Liquidity vs. Monitoring <ul><li>Firm issue stocks for capital </li></ul><ul><li>Speculators gather info to profit </li></ul><ul><li>Monitoring manager performance based on stock price </li></ul><ul><li>Cost of gathering info makes stock worth less for short term investors </li></ul>
  3. 3. Before we introduce a 3-Period Model <ul><li>A firm would like to issue shares in the capital market because once these shares are publicly traded, speculators will gather information on the firm’s performance, so the stock price will (at least partly) reflect this information. </li></ul><ul><li>The firm would then be able to condition the manager’s compensation on the stock price, thereby providing him with sharper incentives to exert effort and enhance the firm’s performance. </li></ul><ul><li>This information however comes at a cost because the profits that the speculators make come at the expense of other stockholders. </li></ul><ul><li>Realizing that they will lose money on trades with speculators, the stockholders pay less for the shares they buy when the firm issues them. </li></ul><ul><li>At the optimum, the firm trades-off the beneficial impact of the increase in managerial effort against the lower price it gets for its shares when it issues them in the capital market. </li></ul>
  4. 4. Period 0 <ul><li>The firm is established and a fraction 1-δ of the shares are sold to outside equity holders at a price p0. </li></ul><ul><li>The firm signs an incentive contract with the manager. </li></ul>
  5. 5. Period 1 <ul><li>The manager chooses his effort level in periods 1 and 2, e1 and e2. </li></ul><ul><li>The first period earning, π1, are realized. </li></ul><ul><li>The manager gets paid and the rest of the earnings are paid as a dividend. </li></ul><ul><li>Speculators observe (after paying a cost) a signal on the period 2 earnings. </li></ul><ul><li>The firm’s shares are traded in the capital market. </li></ul>
  6. 6. Period 2 <ul><li>The second period earning, π2, are realized. </li></ul><ul><li>The manager gets paid. </li></ul><ul><li>The firm is liquidated. </li></ul>
  7. 7. Model Introduction – total 2 parts <ul><li>Reach the rational expectations equilibrium in the stock market </li></ul><ul><li>Determine the equilibrium contract that insiders will give the manager. </li></ul>
  8. 8. Model part 1 – market <ul><li>In order to reach the rational expectations equilibrium in the stock market, we go through below steps: </li></ul><ul><li>Determine fair price setup by the market maker </li></ul><ul><li>Solve for the equilibrium trading strategy of the speculators. </li></ul><ul><li>Determine the investment level of speculators in information gathering. </li></ul>
  9. 9. Step 1 - trading strategy of speculators
  10. 10. Step 2 – price setup by market maker
  11. 11. Step 3 - investment level of speculators in information gathering
  12. 12. Model part 2 – contract <ul><li>In order to reach the equilibrium contract that insiders will give the manager, we go through below steps: </li></ul><ul><li>Determine whether p1 is an informative signal on π2. Otherwise, the firm may not condition the manager’s compensation on p1. </li></ul><ul><li>Solve insiders’ problem – maximize their value </li></ul>
  13. 13. Step 4 – price contains information on period 2 return <ul><li>Using a univariate projection of π2 on p1 </li></ul>
  14. 14. Step 5. Insiders’ problem
  15. 15. Terminology <ul><li>Insider share holding percentage: </li></ul><ul><li>It will influence liquidity! </li></ul><ul><li>The manager chooses his effort levels in periods 1 and 2 at the outset. These effort levels are denoted e1 and e2. </li></ul><ul><li>The earnings in periods 1 and 2 are as follows: </li></ul>
  16. 17. Terminology <ul><li>Before continuing it is worth mentioning that the variable θ although is seems superfluous actually plays a crucial role in the analysis. The reason is that in equilibrium, the effort level of the manager will be anticipated. Hence the unique information that speculators will have will be about θ. </li></ul>
  17. 19. Terminology <ul><li>The net demand of noise traders is assumed to be normally distributed random variable, y, with zero mean and a variance σy2. </li></ul><ul><li>A rational expectations trading equilibrium is a pair (x, p1) that satisfies the following conditions: </li></ul>
  18. 20. Solve the model <ul><li>There are over 5 steps and numerous details in solving the models. Most of them are optimal control mathematics problems. </li></ul><ul><li>Because of time limit, we will go deeply into detail of couple steps and for the rest please refer to the paper. </li></ul><ul><li>Any questions can be raised in the end of presentation. </li></ul>
  19. 21. Step 2: how market makers determine the price
  20. 25. Step 3. Solve the investment in information gathering
  21. 26. Conclusion <ul><li>Stock market monitors manager performance </li></ul><ul><li>Stock price contains valuable (and accurate) information for insiders to set contracts to managers </li></ul><ul><li>Any optimal compensation scheme will include shares. </li></ul>

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