Operation Order 01


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Operation Order 01

  1. 1. Copy____of ____ copies D/2-121, TF Warrior FOB Kunduz 03FEB2010OPERATION ORDER 10-002 HALICARNASSUSTime Zone Used Throughout the Order: LocalTask Organization1. Weather and Light Data and General Forecast: FRIDAY 05FEB10 SATURDAY 06FEB10 SUNDAY 07FEB10 62/47 Light rain mostly cloudy 57/42 Few showers mostly cloudy 41/28 Rain change to snow Sunrise:0653 Sunset:1724 Sunrise:0652 Sunset:1725 Sunrise:0651 Sunset:1726 Moonrise: 2336 w/ 60% Illum. Moonrise: 0042 w/ 50% Illum. Moonrise: 0145 w/ 40% Illum.2. Observation and Fields of Fire: Terrain is flat with open fields, which allows the enemy visibility offriendly forces movement. This also allows for the enemy to use the maximum effective range ofweapons systems.Cover and Concealment: There are irrigation ditches which the enemy will use to move within forconcealment. The enemy has limited cover due to the winter period.Obstacle: NoneKey Terrain: Far side of the river embankment, which is at a slightly higher elevation and providesenemy with good over watch of friendly forces movement.AA: Route Plum and tertiary roads. 1. Situation Enemy Forces: Insurgents have recently begun recruiting operations and are trying to influence local militia leaders to be of assistance this spring when requested to attack ANSF/CF. Insurgent forces have taken a serious decline in the last 4 months. Numbers actively involved in insurgent activity has been minimal. When the insurgents have attempted to become active the militia has thwarted these attempts. Recent reports have lead to the following assessment (Annex A): Enemy Composition and disposition: a. Small cells of less than 10 fighters are currently the largest amassable force estimated. b. These fighters are believed to be lead by CDR RAQIB formerly a follower of CDR Norullah who was killed in the village of Chopani Qeshlaq.
  2. 2. c. HIG leaders from PAK have recently visited to solicit the former INS and militia CDRs for support during upcoming spring operations. d. There is recent intelligence reporting of large numbers insurgents in Archi to the north that have been re-supplied and rearmed accordingly. e. TB fighters were engaged in activity to kidnap and take over cell phone towers to the east in the Khona Qala area (WF 124 649). f. Militia in the area is believed to have been formerly associated with INS and have been infighting in the area. Their current makeup consists of approximately 200 fighters in the Aqtash/Khanabad area. These are broken down into 15-25 man cells in several different locations. We currently are tracking militias from a southern most point of Esham Tob to northern most location of Kanam western of Eshanan eastern of Choga Sufla. Their loyalties are questionable and ability to mass is limited. MLCOA: Insurgents with limited capabilities and numbers will most likely execute harassing fire on friendly forces in order to fix friendly forces. This allows insurgent units to maneuver in order to envelope friendly forces. AGF will not attack the friendly forces main body. Insurgents will try to distance themselves from friendly forces crew served weapons. MDCOA: Insurgents with a well-established early warning system, along the friendly forces avenue of approach, will have the time and assets to deploy IEDs, heavy weapons and mortars against friendly forces as they move onto the objective. The terrain gives the insurgents maximum standoff distance from dismounted elements small arms and vehicle crew serve weapons. All the while insurgent maintain observation on friendly forces movement and ability to effectively launch indirect fire and IED capabilities. Insurgents continue harassing fires along the axis of advance and on the objective. g. Friendly Forces: i. PRT ii. ODA iii. ANA iv. ANP2. Mission. Delta Co. 2/121st contains insurgent recruiting efforts and reconnoiters insurgent routes on Objective Myndos NLT 060700FEB10 IOT dissuade military aged males from joining the insurgents.3. End State: Garner local support for GiROA.4. Execution a. Concept of the Operation: Operation Halikarnassus will be conducted in four phases. 1st Platoon will move out from Camp Kunduz and conduct link up with ANP at DHQ. 4th 2
  3. 3. Platoon and Cowboy will move out and conduct linkup with 1st platoon and ANP at the DHQ. D Co (-) will move out to OBJ Myndos. Dismounts will move up routes to LOA. 1st Platoon will conduct a KLE in the village (Annex B). 1. Phase I: OOM: 1; 4, D911, D6,C 1st Platoon moves out to ANP DHQ and conducts linkup. 2nd and 4th Platoon will SP 30 minutes after 1st Platoon and will conduct linkup at the district DHQ. Speed is METTC dependant. Speed not to exceed 25K in the city and 55K outside the city. Phase I Ends when Link up of 1st, 2nd, D911, 4th and ANP is conducted. 2. Phase II: OOM: ANP, 1, ANP, 4, D911, D6, C, ANP Movement will begin from the DHQ to OBJ Myndos using route Plum. When OBJ Myndos is reached 1st PLT will dismount the Key Leader Engagement team with the Provincial Chief of Police. 4th PLT with D6 will dismount and begin the reconnoiter of RTE Alexander (Annex C). When LOA is reached the Raven will be launched to provide early warning for oncoming units. O/O 1st Platoon and 4th PLT dismounts will conduct reconnoiter of RTE Persia (Annex D) and RTE Macedonia (Annex E), respectively to LOA Aegean. When platoons reach their LOA the Raven will conduct reconnaissance of the far side of the river. Mounted element will move into position on RTE Plum to provide cover on the flanks. Phase II Ends when 1st and 4th PLT elements begin recon. 3. Phase III Upon reaching LOA dismounted elements will establish OP. O/O platoons will continue to probe past the LOA dependant on intelligence received on the ground. O/O OP’s will be collapsed. 4th platoon will collapse first and O/O and 1st and C PLT. Phase III Ends when all elements are consolidated at the vehicles 4. Phase IV: OOM: ANP, C, D6, 4, ANP, 1, ANP O/O D Co (-) Begins movement to Camp Kunduz. The ANP will continue to DHQ.b. Tasks to maneuver units.CoISTT: Provide Raven supportP: IOT have early warning and reconnaissanceT: Provide Raven support 3
  4. 4. P: IOT conduct reconnaissance of enemy villagesT: Provide Driver and GunnerP: IOT man C2 vehicle1st PlatoonT: Coordinate with ANPP: IOT ensure ANSF are out frontT: Conduct KLEP: IOT ascertain village atmosphericT: Provide dismounted elementP: IOT conduct reconnaissance of RTE Persia4th PLTT: Provide dismounted elementP: IOT conduct reconnaissance of RTE AlexanderT: Conduct SLE’sP: IOT ascertain village atmosphericsCowboyT: Provide dismounted elementP: IOT conduct reconnaissance of RTE MacedoniaT: Conduct SLE’sP: IOT ascertain village atmosphericsRough RiderT: Provide 2 vehicle crews for 1st PlatoonP: IOT plus up dismounted elementsT: Provide 1 vehicle crew for 4th PlatoonP: IOT plus up dismounted elementsT: Provide 1 vehicle crew for CowboyP IOT plus up dismounted elementsc. Coordinating Instructions 1. Time Schedule 030700FEB2010: OPORD Brief 042000FEB2010: Back briefs 051000FEB2010: Company Rehearsals 060700FEB2010: 1st Platoon SP 4
  5. 5. 060730FEB2010: 4th, C, D6, D911 SP 060830FEB2010: DHQ L/U complete 060930FEB2010: OBJ Myndos 06UTCFEB2010: Return to Camp Kunduz 2. CCIR a. FFIR: i. When element is in contact. ii. Any friendlies wounded. iii. Any loss of equipment. iv. Maintenance issues that may stop or slow operation. b. PIR: i. What type of route? Improved, unimproved? ii. What type of vehicle traffic can the route support? iii. What are the local’s feelings toward patrol and GiROA? iv. Has there been any AGF recruiting in the area? v. Has there been AGF activity in the area? vi. What is the sentiment towards the militia? vii. Is there any propaganda that has been distributed or written? viii. What are the MAM’s doing? ix. What are the fording site locations? x. What type of vehicle traffic can the ford support?5. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Recovery assets will be provided by the German PRT. All requests will go through Dakota X-Ray. Teams will ensure that vehicles have at least 3 x ABL on each vehicle. All soldiers will also have a 3-day pack. b. Medical: CCP will be located with 4th Platoon Vic WF 0372 6381 and move as necessary. Wounded personnel will be evaced via ground convoy to the PRT. Cowboy team will conduct MEDEVAC support to the PRT.6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command i. D6 will be with 4th Platoon through phase 1-4. ii. Succession of Command. CPT Wilmore, LT Jones, LT Jamieson b. Signal i. SOI is in effect ii. Methods of Communication: FM, TACSAT, BFT, Sat Phone, Cell Phone 5