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Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain
Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain   A Case Study of  POLI...
WHAT IS COMMODITY-CHAIN ANALYSIS? <ul><li>A method of analyzing factors shaping the distribution of benefits from a given ...
METHOD OF COMMODITY-CHAIN ANALYSIS <ul><li>Identify actors </li></ul><ul><li>Quantify distribution of profits </li></ul><u...
Senegal  Case 1986 / 2006
Urban population Retailers Urban wholesalers Transporters Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons Migrant  Woodcutters Forest Vil...
 
 
Urban population Retailers Wholesalers Transporters Migrant  Woodcutters Forest Villages Other Institutions - Unions - Rel...
PRICE STRUCTURE AND PROFIT MARGINS  FOR A SACK OF CHARCOAL  (IN 2002 CONSTANT CFA) - [~183] 519 Retailer  +41% 317 225 Urb...
AVERAGE ANNUAL PROFIT OF ACTORS IN CHARCOAL MARKET ??> 180,000  $360 Retailer 1,600,000  $3200 Urban Wholesaler 2.000.000 ...
PROFIT DISTRIBUTION IN MARKET 7% 22% - - 54% 16% 3% Even Skewed - - Skewed Even Skewed Urban population Retailers Urban wh...
Retailers 10,000 Urban Wholesalers 200 Merchants/Patrons 5000-160 active Migrant Woodcutters 18,000 Forest Villages FONT-S...
EXPLAINING DISTRIBUTION:  MECHANISMS OF BENEFIT CONCENTRATION <ul><li>Villagers      Forest access control </li></ul><ul>...
FUNCTIONS OF QUOTAS: CLAIMED FUNCTIONS <ul><li>Ecological </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>No relation with forest potential </li...
FUNCTIONS OF QUOTAS: ACTUAL FUNCTIONS <ul><li>Rent system—how patrons maintain their margin </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Capt...
FUNCTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL CARD <ul><li>Restriction on charcoal market entry </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Contrary to Décret 9...
Functions of other laws and practices—for an other day! <ul><li>Permis de coupe </li></ul><ul><li>Permis de circulation </...
Rural Council President Decision <ul><li>Weexdunx’s Signature </li></ul>
Mechanisms of Benefit Concentration <ul><li>Villagers      Forest access control </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Treats...
<ul><li>CONCLUSIONS </li></ul>
Why Decentralization did not Increase Local Benefits <ul><li>Progressive new laws 1996 & 1998 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Elimin...
Without  dismantling  the “Environmental”  policies  that concentrate market access control with urban merchants, there is...
More Implications  <ul><li>Shift of focus of blame from line ministries to elected local authorities </li></ul><ul><ul><li...
There is plenty of profit in this market. Forestry policies exclude local people from the benefits while enabling urban me...
BROAD POLICY IMPLICATIONS <ul><li>Move away from property land-tenure security as entry point for policy: </li></ul><ul><u...
<ul><li>THE END </li></ul>
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Note: The following section of the power point was not presented at the talk.
 
OBJECTIVES OF RECOMMENDATIONS <ul><li>Maintain  ecosystem services and functions  for local, national and global objective...
1: ELEMENTS FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT <ul><li>Identify   activities to transfer  that do not threaten ecosystem funct...
2 : ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION <ul><li>Transfer of powers  (not just obligations) concerning natur...
3 : ELEMENTS FOR INCREASING LOCAL BENEFITS <ul><li>Transfer of lucrative opportunities to Local Government  </li></ul><ul>...
5 LINKED RECOMMENDATIONS <ul><li>1. Deregulate the market  following laws already legislated : </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>E...
STEPS OF TRANSITION <ul><li>2 Models : </li></ul><ul><li>  Slow [and painful] elimination </li></ul><ul><li>1:  =========...
RISKS TO MANAGE <ul><li>Ecological destruction </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>The fragile Sahel—this discourse is not viable </...
STRATEGY FOR MANAGING RISKS <ul><li>Mettez les risque en perspective  </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Risque écologique pas si g...
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Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain

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Slides from Copenhagen presentation by Jesse C. Ribot. Full title: Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain - A Case Study of POLICY & PROFIT

Published in: Economy & Finance, Business
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Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain

  1. 1. Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain
  2. 2. Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain A Case Study of POLICY & PROFIT Jesse C. Ribot/ World Resources Institute (WRI) Institutions and Governance Program [email_address]
  3. 3. WHAT IS COMMODITY-CHAIN ANALYSIS? <ul><li>A method of analyzing factors shaping the distribution of benefits from a given product from its origin to end use </li></ul><ul><li>Method of analyzing “ access” </li></ul><ul><li>Who reaps the flow of benefits from things </li></ul><ul><li>[See Peluso and Ribot 2003] </li></ul>
  4. 4. METHOD OF COMMODITY-CHAIN ANALYSIS <ul><li>Identify actors </li></ul><ul><li>Quantify distribution of profits </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Price Margins </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Expenses </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Market Shares </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Identify nodes of concentration </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Explain patterns of profit & concentration </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Conduct, structure, performance—Farruk, Lele, Timmer, Harriss </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Social identities, social relations, social histories </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Policy’s role </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Explore functions of policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Develop Policy Recommendations </li></ul>
  5. 5. Senegal Case 1986 / 2006
  6. 6. Urban population Retailers Urban wholesalers Transporters Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Rural Intermediaries Kontrapalaas Identify Market Actors
  7. 9. Urban population Retailers Wholesalers Transporters Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Other Institutions - Unions - Religious Brotherhoods Ministries National Forest Department Rural Intermeidaries kontrapalaas Regional Forest Service Local Forest Service Elected Regional Council Local Rural Council/PCR Wood & Charcoal Loans Market regulations Unofficial relations Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons
  8. 10. PRICE STRUCTURE AND PROFIT MARGINS FOR A SACK OF CHARCOAL (IN 2002 CONSTANT CFA) - [~183] 519 Retailer +41% 317 225 Urban Wholesalers +29% 774 598 Merchants - 30 - Rural Intermediary -1% 727 734 Woodcutter Profit Margins (all costs deducted) [~4076] 3639 Retailer to Customer in Dakar 3769 3031 Wholesaler price to Retailer 3452 2806 Merchant price to Wholesaler 778 839 Urban Woodcutter price to Merchant Average Prices Change 2002-2003 1987
  9. 11. AVERAGE ANNUAL PROFIT OF ACTORS IN CHARCOAL MARKET ??> 180,000 $360 Retailer 1,600,000 $3200 Urban Wholesaler 2.000.000 $4000 Merchant 236.000 $562 Rural Intermediary 72.000 $144 Woodcutter Annual Average Profit (CFA) Actor
  10. 12. PROFIT DISTRIBUTION IN MARKET 7% 22% - - 54% 16% 3% Even Skewed - - Skewed Even Skewed Urban population Retailers Urban wholesalers Transporters Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Rural Intermediaries
  11. 13. Retailers 10,000 Urban Wholesalers 200 Merchants/Patrons 5000-160 active Migrant Woodcutters 18,000 Forest Villages FONT-SCALED PROFIT DISTRIBUTION
  12. 14. EXPLAINING DISTRIBUTION: MECHANISMS OF BENEFIT CONCENTRATION <ul><li>Villagers  Forest access control </li></ul><ul><li>Woodcutters  Access to merchants </li></ul><ul><li>Merchants  Control of labor opportunities </li></ul><ul><li> Control of access to markets </li></ul><ul><li> Leverage over prices </li></ul><ul><li>Wholesalers  Control of distribution </li></ul><ul><li>Retailers  Maintenance of access to wholesalers </li></ul><ul><li> Leverage over prices </li></ul>
  13. 15. FUNCTIONS OF QUOTAS: CLAIMED FUNCTIONS <ul><li>Ecological </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>No relation with forest potential </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Supplying Dakar </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>No relation with demand [60% of consumption in Dakar] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Gap filled by quittances, overloading, under cover transport, clearing quotas, train, etc. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Equitable Distribution – preventing monopoly </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Effect is the contrary </li></ul></ul></ul>
  14. 16. FUNCTIONS OF QUOTAS: ACTUAL FUNCTIONS <ul><li>Rent system—how patrons maintain their margin </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Capture of the market by patrons [with professional card and quotas] at expense of surga and CR </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Maintenance of price by restricted market entry </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Collusive price fixing by patrons (producer and transport prices) [opposed to Décret 95-77 de 20 janvier 1995] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Secondary market in quotas </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Market in ‘quittances’ </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Reduced competition by forbidding transport by train </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Patronage </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Principal function of quotas et quittances – allocation to clients </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Barrier to decentralization and the transfer of powers </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Usurpation of powers of elected officials right of refusal </li></ul></ul></ul>
  15. 17. FUNCTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL CARD <ul><li>Restriction on charcoal market entry </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Contrary to Décret 95-132 février 1995 </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Restriction on transport market entry </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Via link between card, quota and circulation permits </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Patronage by Forest Service and Minister and the Union (UNCEFS) </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Via distribution of cards to new organizations </li></ul></ul></ul>
  16. 18. Functions of other laws and practices—for an other day! <ul><li>Permis de coupe </li></ul><ul><li>Permis de circulation </li></ul><ul><li>Permis de défrichement </li></ul><ul><li>Quittances </li></ul><ul><li>Taxe domaniale de deux tires (1200 et 700) </li></ul><ul><li>Plans d’amenagement –the new quota </li></ul><ul><li>ZPC, ZA, ZNC </li></ul><ul><li>Suivi Fiscal (contentieux) </li></ul><ul><li>Droit de signature préalable de PCR [Weexdunx] </li></ul>
  17. 19. Rural Council President Decision <ul><li>Weexdunx’s Signature </li></ul>
  18. 20. Mechanisms of Benefit Concentration <ul><li>Villagers  Forest access control </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Treats of violence </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Village access (wells & housing) </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Woodcutters  Access to merchants </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Social ties  Social identity </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Technical skills </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Merchants  Control of labor opportunities </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Permits </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Credit </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Control of market access </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li> Control of access to markets </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Quotas, licenses </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Cooperative membership </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Social ties with government </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li> Leverage over prices </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Collusive price fixing </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Inter-locking credit-labor arrangements </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Misinformation </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Wholesalers  Control of distribution </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Credit Arrangements/Capital </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Knowledge of demand </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Social ties with vendors & merchants </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Retailers  Maintenance of access to wholesalers </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Relations with wholesalers & clients </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li> Leverage over prices </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Manipulation of Symbols </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Manipulation of Weight </li></ul></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Management plans </li></ul><ul><li>RC right to say no </li></ul><ul><li>RC labor allocation </li></ul><ul><li>Market access control enhanced </li></ul><ul><li>Dominance over RC </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Pressure by SP </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pressure by foresters </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pressure by Union and merchants </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Threats and Payoffs </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Accusation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shift of focus of blame </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Labor access control enhanced </li></ul><ul><li>Management Plans </li></ul><ul><li>Required training </li></ul>
  19. 21. <ul><li>CONCLUSIONS </li></ul>
  20. 22. Why Decentralization did not Increase Local Benefits <ul><li>Progressive new laws 1996 & 1998 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Elimination of quota </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Transfer of decisions to rural council  ’signature prealable’ </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Implementation blocked by foresters and merchants </li></ul><ul><li>National Policy Dialogue </li></ul><ul><ul><li> wrote and produced play </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Made it into film </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Campaign to leverage decentralization. </li></ul>
  21. 23. Without dismantling the “Environmental” policies that concentrate market access control with urban merchants, there is no economic decentralization
  22. 24. More Implications <ul><li>Shift of focus of blame from line ministries to elected local authorities </li></ul><ul><ul><li>[Cameroon; China] </li></ul></ul><ul><li>1993 participatory code created participatory corv é e </li></ul><ul><li>1998 Decentralized code necessitated coercion </li></ul>
  23. 25. There is plenty of profit in this market. Forestry policies exclude local people from the benefits while enabling urban merchants to profit. Without dismantling the policies that concentrate forestry market access control with urban merchants, there is no economic decentralization THE POVERTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
  24. 26. BROAD POLICY IMPLICATIONS <ul><li>Move away from property land-tenure security as entry point for policy: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Toward broader access focus on benefits </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Forest ownership or control does not produce benefits </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Move toward benefit security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Via taxes, stumpage fees, market access, accountable representation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Organizing—E.G. Coalition of Rural Council Environment officers </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Extend concept of ‘public resource’ to ‘profit from public resources’ </li></ul><ul><li>Study policy processes as linked to patronage and commercial resources </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Bates  policy and institutional choice </li></ul></ul>
  25. 27. <ul><li>THE END </li></ul>
  26. 29. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Note: The following section of the power point was not presented at the talk.
  27. 31. OBJECTIVES OF RECOMMENDATIONS <ul><li>Maintain ecosystem services and functions for local, national and global objectives </li></ul><ul><li>Establish democratic decentralization in natural resource management </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Establish a space of local discretion </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Produced citizenship </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li> Increase local benefit retention for local development </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Fund the CR </li></ul></ul></ul>
  28. 32. 1: ELEMENTS FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT <ul><li>Identify activities to transfer that do not threaten ecosystem functions </li></ul><ul><li>Identify simple rules (shift to minimum standards approach) to assure ecosystem functions </li></ul><ul><ul><li>This shift eliminates rent-seeking opportunities </li></ul></ul>
  29. 33. 2 : ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION <ul><li>Transfer of powers (not just obligations) concerning natural resources </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Meaningful (relevant to population, lucrative) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Discretionary (giving real alternatives to rural councilors) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Lucrative opportunities </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Accountability of rural councilors to the population </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Secure powers </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Accountability mechanisms </li></ul></ul></ul>
  30. 34. 3 : ELEMENTS FOR INCREASING LOCAL BENEFITS <ul><li>Transfer of lucrative opportunities to Local Government </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Exploitation opportunities </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Transport and trade opportunities/market access </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li> Establish a tax for the Rural Community </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>In a free market benefits will be zero without a tax </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>This tax must be significant </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li> close to magnigude of current oligopsony rents </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>This tax must be set nationally—not council by council </li></ul></ul></ul>
  31. 35. 5 LINKED RECOMMENDATIONS <ul><li>1. Deregulate the market following laws already legislated : </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Eliminate Quota : [see Code Forestière 1998, art R66] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Eliminate Professional Card : [Décret 95-132] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Stop Price Fixing : [Décret 95-77] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>2. Shift to minimum standards approach: </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Identify uses that can occur without management plans or approval by forest service </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Identify exploitation rules/standards </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Reserve plans for production enhancement or problem zones </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>3. Tax on forest products for the CR: </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Fixed at national level </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>At least 500-1000 CFA the sack </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>4. Civic education: </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Population needs to know their rights and the powers of their reps. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Representatives need to know their powers and recourse </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>5. Transparent fiscal management system: </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Public access to revenues and expenditures information </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Experiment with participatory budgeting </li></ul></ul></ul>
  32. 36. STEPS OF TRANSITION <ul><li>2 Models : </li></ul><ul><li> Slow [and painful] elimination </li></ul><ul><li>1:  ================== NON </li></ul><ul><li>==================  </li></ul><ul><li> Slow establishment </li></ul><ul><li> Eliminate old system all at once </li></ul><ul><li>2:  OUI </li></ul><ul><li>===================  </li></ul><ul><li>Establish new system progressively </li></ul>
  33. 37. RISKS TO MANAGE <ul><li>Ecological destruction </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>The fragile Sahel—this discourse is not viable </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Anarchic cutting—nothing worse than present system </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Shortages in Dakar </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Patrons strikes—as their policy leverage </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Political pressure of patrons </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Re-conversion requests </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>UNCEFS </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Votes </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Recentralization </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>With forest classification </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>With management plans </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>With control of former permission </li></ul></ul></ul>
  34. 38. STRATEGY FOR MANAGING RISKS <ul><li>Mettez les risque en perspective </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Risque écologique pas si grave—régénération forte; populations contre </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Risque de pénurie gérable—gaz; appelle de production </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Pénuries a Dakar </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Lancez la reforme quand le charbon est abondant au fin de saison </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Stockage publique de charbon de bois au dépôt a Dakar </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Stockage de gaz butane en surplus [les ruptures en CdB peut promouvoir conversion vers la gaz] </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Éduquer les journalistes pour expliquer que c’est les Exploitants et pas les Eaux et Forets derrière des pénurie </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Libéralisation de marchée de transport vas assurer approvisionnement </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Libéralisation vas diminuer la prix (même avec une taxe pour le CR) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Endommagements Écologique </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Réponse poste hoc  Trouvez les solutions quand les problèmes émerge </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Faire la production (a traverse la mise en défense) dans les zones dégradé en lieu de reforestation </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Nouveau système de gestion vas s’établir a partir des imprévisible dynamiques et problèmes crée par l’élimination de vieux système. </li></ul><ul><li> On droit avancer sans avoir tout les éléments en place. </li></ul><ul><li> Réagir a chaque problème qui émerge </li></ul><ul><li>Contrôler la flux a l’entrée des grandes centres de consommation </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Enregistrement des permis de circulation donnée par les CR </li></ul></ul></ul>

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