Advanced Earn-Out Issues

Transaction and Dispute Resolution Perspectives
Oscar A. David & James P. Smith III, Partners
Kr...
Today’s Speakers

Oscar David

Jim Smith

Kristin Wickler

Chair, Mergers &
Acquisitions, Securities, &
Corporate Governan...
Agenda
• Transaction Perspective
–
–
–
–

What is an Earn-Out?
Why Use an Earn-Out?
What is Market?
The Nuts & Bolts of Ea...
Transaction Perspective—Earn-Out
Provisions
Oscar A. David
Kristin D. Wickler
What is an Earn-Out?
• Consideration in an M&A
transaction payable to a
seller which is contingent
upon the future
perform...
What is an Earn-Out?
• Generally structured as payments contingent on
satisfying certain milestones, for example:
– Financ...
Why Earn-Outs?
• Allow a deal to move forward when
the parties cannot agree on the value
of the target
• Buyer Perspective...
Why Earn-Outs?
• Seller Perspective:
– Higher purchase price potential
– Opportunity to benefit from synergies of target a...
Why Earn-Outs?

Source of Price
Uncertainty
Undeveloped
Product

New Market

©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP

Financial Info
Un...
What is Market: ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study*
2012 Deals
No EarnOut
75%

No EarnOut
62%

2010 Deals

Includes
Earn-O...
What is Market: ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study
2012 Deals
No EarnOut
75%

Includes
Earn-Out
25%

Earn-Out Metrics
Earn...
Houlihan Lokey 2013 Purchase Agreement Study*

Earn-Out Included
25%

25%

20%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

5%

5%

0%

0%

E...
2012 SRS M&A Deal Terms Study*
Earn-Out Included
20%
15%
10%

Earn-Out Metrics

5%
0%

2011

2009

2010

2011

2012
64%

R...
Earn-Outs in Life Sciences Deals
• 2012 Shareholder Representative Services Life Sciences
M&A Study*
• Analyzed 47 Life Sc...
SRS 2012 Life Sciences Deal Terms Study
• Strong prevalence of Earn-Outs in Life Sciences Deals
– 82% of Bio/Pharma deals ...
Earn-Outs: The Nuts & Bolts
• Must agree on straightforward metrics to avoid future
litigation and control perverse incent...
Earn-Outs: The Nuts & Bolts
• Agree on the targets
• Measure the targets
• Structure of the payments
• Length of earn-out ...
The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets
• Financial or non-financial
(or a combination)
• Targets must be:
– Objective and ...
The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets
• Incentive issue examples
• Buyer:
– May be less motivated to
improve target
perfo...
The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets
• Incentive issue examples
• Seller:
– Short term target
achievements may trump
lon...
The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets
• Different Perspectives: Financial Targets
• Seller: May prefer revenue-based targ...
Earn-Out Target Examples

Financial Targets

Non-Financial Targets

EBIDTA

Regulatory Approval

Revenue

Minimum # of New...
2012 SRS Life Sciences M&A Study:
Earn-out Targets/Metrics*

©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP

23
The Nuts & Bolts: Measure the Targets
• Most disputes are a result of seller thinking buyer
manipulated measurement of tar...
The Nuts & Bolts: Measure the Targets
• Avoid these disputes through a detailed measurement
plan
– Who prepares the calcul...
The Nuts & Bolts: Structure of the Payments
• All or Nothing vs. Graduated (payment based on the
extent target exceeded)
–...
The Nuts & Bolts: Length of Earn-Out Period
• Periods range from about one to four years, depending
on the target chosen. ...
The Nuts & Bolts: Length of Earn-Out Period
Different Buyer/Seller Perspectives: Can change deal by
deal
• Buyers:
– Typic...
ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study: Earn-Out Period
Period of Earn-Out

Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs*
<12 months

6%

12 m...
ABA 2011 Private Target Deal Study: Earn-Out Period*
Period of Earn-Out

Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs**
<12 months

9%

12...
The Nuts & Bolts: Seller & Buyer Protection
• Sellers seek protective covenants given potentially
perverse earn-out incent...
ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study: Covenants
Buyer’s Covenants as to Acquired Business
Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs

Cove...
ABA 2011 Private Target Deal Study: Covenants
Buyer’s Covenants as to Acquired Business
Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs

Cove...
2012 SRS Life Sciences Deal Terms Study:
Diligence Requirements*
Developmental/Regulatory Milestones

Commercial/Sales Mil...
SRS Life Sciences Deal Terms Study:
Information Rights*
Progress Reports Due from
Buyer
No Reports,
15%

Annual
Written
Re...
The Nuts & Bolts: Seller & Buyer Protection
• Security for future earn-out
payments
– Security interest: Require buyer
to ...
The Nuts & Bolts: Miscellaneous Points
•
•
•
•
•

Acceleration Upon Change of Control
Offset of Indemnity Payments Against...
Final Thoughts from Transaction Perspectives
•
•
•
•

Recognize potential conflicting incentives
Be specific re milestones...
CLE Presentation Code

©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP

39
Dispute Resolution Perspective—Earn-Out
Provisions
James P. Smith III
Recent Developments in Delaware Law
re Earn-Out Provisions
• “[A]n earn-out provision
often converts today’s
disagreement ...
Two Heavily Litigated Types of Earn-Out Disputes:
• Disputes over post-closing
business operations
– Alleged operation of ...
Two Heavily Litigated Types of Earn-Out Disputes:
• Disputes over post-closing accounting methodologies
– Earn-out provisi...
Disputes Over Post-Closing Business Operations
Practice Pointer:
• Parties should steer clear of “aspirational” statements...
Case Study: LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp., 2007
WL 2565709 (Del. Ch. 2007)
• ABC agreed to pay Bridge stockholders $2...
LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp.
• Chancellor Chandler described these provisions as
“aspirational statements,” “gossame...
LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp.
• The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that ABC breached the
agreement by failing to en...
LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp.
• The court did find that
ABC breached the
agreement by failing to
adequately promote
B...
Practice Pointer:
• Delaware courts enforce the agreement’s “plain
language” and are unlikely to come to the aid of a
soph...
Case Study: Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984
A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 2009)
• Airborne Health acquired Squid Soap’s ...
Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP
• Vice Chancellor Laster held that while a buyer cannot
arbitrarily or in bad fait...
Practice Pointer:
• Parties should be precise when defining the scope of
their respective obligations with respect to earn...
Case Study: Winshall v. Viacom Int’l Inc., 2013 WL
5526290 (Del. Supr. 2013)
• Merger agreement provided that Viacom would...
Winshall v. Viacom Int’l Inc.
• According to plaintiff, Viacom and Harmonix had an
implied duty to negotiate a more favora...
Disputes Over Post-Closing Accounting Methodologies
Practice Pointer:
• Parties should set forth in
detail how earn-outs a...
Case Study: Chambers v. Genesee & Wyoming Inc., 2005
WL 2000765 (Del. Ch. 2005)

• In connection with Genesee’s buyout of ...
Chambers v. Genesee & Wyoming Inc.
• Then-Vice Chancellor Strine, applying the agreements’
“plain language,” held that Gen...
Practice Pointer:
• The agreement should set forth in detail how the earn-out
should be calculated, including how specific...
Case Study: Comet Systems, Inc. Shareholders’ Agent v.
MIVA, Inc., 980 A.2d 1024 (Del. Ch. 2008)
• Pursuant to a merger ag...
Comet Systems, Inc. Shareholders’ Agent
v. MIVA, Inc.
• Vice Chancellor Lamb, applying the agreement’s plain
language, hel...
CLE Presentation Code

©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP

61
Questions?

Oscar David

Jim Smith

Kristin Wickler

Chair, Mergers &
Acquisitions, Securities, &
Corporate Governance

Ch...
THANK YOU
BIOGRAPHIES
Biographies
Oscar David
PARTNER
Chair, Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities, & Corporate
Governance
+1 (312) 558-5745
odavid...
Biographies
James P. Smith
PARTNER
Chair, Securities Litigation
+1 (212) 294-4633
name@winston.com

James P. Smith III is ...
Biographies
Kristin D. Wickler
ASSOCIATE
+1 (312) 558-6450
kwickler@winston.com

Kristin Wickler is an associate in the fi...
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Advanced Earn-Out Issues: Transaction and Dispute Resolution Perspectives

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Are earn-outs a good mechanism to reach agreement in the M&A context or are today’s disagreements over price tomorrow’s litigation over outcome? This presentation addresses what you need to know now about the latest developments in earn-outs.

This presentation features a discussion of the following hot button issues:
Market trends in earn-out use
Nuts and bolts of negotiating earn-outs
Seller versus buyer perspectives
Litigation concerns

Published in: Economy & Finance, Business
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Advanced Earn-Out Issues: Transaction and Dispute Resolution Perspectives

  1. 1. Advanced Earn-Out Issues Transaction and Dispute Resolution Perspectives Oscar A. David & James P. Smith III, Partners Kristin D. Wickler, Associate
  2. 2. Today’s Speakers Oscar David Jim Smith Kristin Wickler Chair, Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities, & Corporate Governance Chair, Securities Litigation Corporate Associate +1 (212) 294-4633 +1 (312) 558-6450 jpsmith@winston.com kwickler@winston.com +1 (312) 558-5745 odavid@winston.com ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 2
  3. 3. Agenda • Transaction Perspective – – – – What is an Earn-Out? Why Use an Earn-Out? What is Market? The Nuts & Bolts of Earn-Outs • Dispute Resolution Perspective – Recent Developments in Delaware Law – Case Study ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 3
  4. 4. Transaction Perspective—Earn-Out Provisions Oscar A. David Kristin D. Wickler
  5. 5. What is an Earn-Out? • Consideration in an M&A transaction payable to a seller which is contingent upon the future performance of the target business and/or based on the achievement of certain milestones. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 5
  6. 6. What is an Earn-Out? • Generally structured as payments contingent on satisfying certain milestones, for example: – Financial Targets • EBITDA • Revenue • Net Income – Non-Financial Targets • FDA Approval • Increase in New Customers ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 6
  7. 7. Why Earn-Outs? • Allow a deal to move forward when the parties cannot agree on the value of the target • Buyer Perspective: – Provides additional finance options – Reduces the risk of overpaying – Defers payments ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 7
  8. 8. Why Earn-Outs? • Seller Perspective: – Higher purchase price potential – Opportunity to benefit from synergies of target and buyer business integration ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 8
  9. 9. Why Earn-Outs? Source of Price Uncertainty Undeveloped Product New Market ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP Financial Info Unreliable Limited Historical Operations 9 Uncertain Future Recent Restructuring Small Companies
  10. 10. What is Market: ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study* 2012 Deals No EarnOut 75% No EarnOut 62% 2010 Deals Includes Earn-Out 38% Includes Earn-Out 25% No EarnOut 71% 2008 Deals *Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study (Including Transactions Completed in 2012): Study of publicly available acquisition agreements for transactions completed through 2012 that involved private targets being acquired by public companies. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 10 Includes EarnOut 29%
  11. 11. What is Market: ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study 2012 Deals No EarnOut 75% Includes Earn-Out 25% Earn-Out Metrics Earnings/ EBIDTA 30% Revenue 32% ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 11 Combo 3% Other 30% Not Determinable 5%
  12. 12. Houlihan Lokey 2013 Purchase Agreement Study* Earn-Out Included 25% 25% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 0% Earn-Out as Median % of Purchase Price 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 *Houlihan Lokey Purchase Agreement Study for Transactions Completed in 2012 and Prior Years: Summarizes middle-market change-of-control transactions in which Houlihan Lokey served as the financial advisor to either the buyer or the seller. Study includes public and private transactions. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 12
  13. 13. 2012 SRS M&A Deal Terms Study* Earn-Out Included 20% 15% 10% Earn-Out Metrics 5% 0% 2011 2009 2010 2011 2012 64% Revenue 2012 Earnings/EBIDTA Other** 60% 36% 20% 36% 33% *2012 Shareholder Representative Services M&A Deal Terms Study: SRS analyzed 342 private-target acquisitions on which SRS served as the shareholder representative from 2009 through Q3 of 2012 **E.g., gross margin, meeting certain thresholds under third-party contracts, achievement of sales quotas. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 13
  14. 14. Earn-Outs in Life Sciences Deals • 2012 Shareholder Representative Services Life Sciences M&A Study* • Analyzed 47 Life Sciences Acquisitions – 28 Bio/Pharmaceutical – 19 Medical Devices *Data includes 47 private-target life sciences acquisitions on which SRS served as the shareholder representative from Q3 2008 through Q2 2012. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 14
  15. 15. SRS 2012 Life Sciences Deal Terms Study • Strong prevalence of Earn-Outs in Life Sciences Deals – 82% of Bio/Pharma deals included earn-outs – 84% of Medical Device deals included earn-outs – 15% of Non-Life Sciences deals included earn-outs ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 15
  16. 16. Earn-Outs: The Nuts & Bolts • Must agree on straightforward metrics to avoid future litigation and control perverse incentives ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 16
  17. 17. Earn-Outs: The Nuts & Bolts • Agree on the targets • Measure the targets • Structure of the payments • Length of earn-out period • Seller & buyer contractual protection ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 17
  18. 18. The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets • Financial or non-financial (or a combination) • Targets must be: – Objective and measurable – Plainly defined – Consistent with the character of the target company ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 18
  19. 19. The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets • Incentive issue examples • Buyer: – May be less motivated to improve target performance during earnout period to reduce purchase price – Long-term perspective may over-ride steps necessary to achieve short-term earnout targets ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 19
  20. 20. The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets • Incentive issue examples • Seller: – Short term target achievements may trump long term interests of buyer – If Seller is going to run the target company, it may not be motivated to reach goals if they are set too high ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 20
  21. 21. The Nuts & Bolts: Agree on the Targets • Different Perspectives: Financial Targets • Seller: May prefer revenue-based targets due to decreased chance for manipulation • Buyer: May prefer net income targets and especially resists revenue targets if seller involved in operation as seller may not be motivated to reduce expenses ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 21
  22. 22. Earn-Out Target Examples Financial Targets Non-Financial Targets EBIDTA Regulatory Approval Revenue Minimum # of New Customers Net Income Product Development Milestones Net Equity Number of Products Sold Earnings Per Share Launch of a New Product ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 22
  23. 23. 2012 SRS Life Sciences M&A Study: Earn-out Targets/Metrics* ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 23
  24. 24. The Nuts & Bolts: Measure the Targets • Most disputes are a result of seller thinking buyer manipulated measurement of target’s performance or disagreement over calculations ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 24
  25. 25. The Nuts & Bolts: Measure the Targets • Avoid these disputes through a detailed measurement plan – Who prepares the calculations/financial statements? • Typically buyer, but seller will try to have some control in preparation and a right to review – Accounting principles followed and how applied – What is the dispute resolution process? ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 25
  26. 26. The Nuts & Bolts: Structure of the Payments • All or Nothing vs. Graduated (payment based on the extent target exceeded) – Graduated is more common • Buyer should negotiate a cap amount – Caution: All or nothing may create a strong incentive for the buyer to just miss the target ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 26
  27. 27. The Nuts & Bolts: Length of Earn-Out Period • Periods range from about one to four years, depending on the target chosen. Majority of targets end after three years. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 27
  28. 28. The Nuts & Bolts: Length of Earn-Out Period Different Buyer/Seller Perspectives: Can change deal by deal • Buyers: – Typically prefer shorter periods to minimize the amount of time they are subject to restrictions – May prefer a longer period to have more time to actually make the earn-out payment • Sellers: – Shorter periods mean earlier payments – Longer periods give the buyer more time to achieve targets (thus increasing payment to the seller) ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 28
  29. 29. ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study: Earn-Out Period Period of Earn-Out Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs* <12 months 6% 12 months >12 to <24 months 32% 0% 24 months >24 to <36 months 18% 3% 36 months 48 months 9% 12% Not determinable 21% *Percentages total 101% due to rounding. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 29
  30. 30. ABA 2011 Private Target Deal Study: Earn-Out Period* Period of Earn-Out Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs** <12 months 9% 12 months 18% >12 to <24 months 18% 24 months 12% >24 to <36 months 9% 36 months 24% >36 to <60 months 6% 60 months 6% **2011 Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study: Study of publicly available acquisition agreements for transactions completed through 2010 that involved private targets being acquired by public companies. **Percentages total 102% due to rounding. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 30
  31. 31. The Nuts & Bolts: Seller & Buyer Protection • Sellers seek protective covenants given potentially perverse earn-out incentives – Require target business to operate in the ordinary course of business – Restrictions on disposing a portion of the target business – Run business to maximize earn-out – Good faith and fair dealing – Information rights – Additional protection if change in management (e.g., liquidated damages or acceleration of payments) ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 31
  32. 32. ABA 2013 Private Target Deal Study: Covenants Buyer’s Covenants as to Acquired Business Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs Covenant to Run Business Consistent with Past Practice Indeterminable 6% Covenant to Run Business to Maximize EarnOut Indeterminable 6% Included 18% (27% in deals in 2010) (29% in deals in 2008) ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP (8% in deals in 2010) (10% in deals in 2008) Not Included 88% Not Included 76% 32 Included 6%
  33. 33. ABA 2011 Private Target Deal Study: Covenants Buyer’s Covenants as to Acquired Business Subset: Deals with Earn-Outs Covenant to Run Business Consistent with Past Practice Indeterminable 14% Covenant to Run Business to Maximize EarnOut Indeterminable 14% Included 8% Included 27% Not Included 59% ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP Not Included 78% 33
  34. 34. 2012 SRS Life Sciences Deal Terms Study: Diligence Requirements* Developmental/Regulatory Milestones Commercial/Sales Milestones 68% 51% 34% 28% 27% 18% 17% 20% 15% 7% 13% 1% Specific Requirements** Commercially Reasonable Efforts Express Good Faith Efforts Express No Bad Faith Actions *Subset of deals with earn-outs (39). **E.g., development or marketing plan, specified expenditures, etc. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 34 No Diligence Requirements Express Buyer Discretion
  35. 35. SRS Life Sciences Deal Terms Study: Information Rights* Progress Reports Due from Buyer No Reports, 15% Annual Written Reports, 26% • 44% of deals with earn-outs expressly provide for in-person meetings; 5% of deals provide for meetings but not for written reports Quarterly Written Reports, 33% • Developmental/regulatory reports are most often quarterly or semiannual • Commercial/sales reports are most often quarterly 6-month Written Reports, 26% *Subset of deals with earn-outs (39). ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 35
  36. 36. The Nuts & Bolts: Seller & Buyer Protection • Security for future earn-out payments – Security interest: Require buyer to grant security interest in target company – Escrow: Require buyer to put potential earn-out payments in escrow ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 36
  37. 37. The Nuts & Bolts: Miscellaneous Points • • • • • Acceleration Upon Change of Control Offset of Indemnity Payments Against Earn-Out Securities Issues Tax Treatment Accounting Issues ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 37
  38. 38. Final Thoughts from Transaction Perspectives • • • • Recognize potential conflicting incentives Be specific re milestones, measuring methods Define clear set of responsibilities/contractual protections Difficult to enforce what is left unsaid ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 38
  39. 39. CLE Presentation Code ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 39
  40. 40. Dispute Resolution Perspective—Earn-Out Provisions James P. Smith III
  41. 41. Recent Developments in Delaware Law re Earn-Out Provisions • “[A]n earn-out provision often converts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s litigation over the outcome.” • Vice Chancellor Laster, Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 41
  42. 42. Two Heavily Litigated Types of Earn-Out Disputes: • Disputes over post-closing business operations – Alleged operation of acquired business in manner aimed at minimizing earn-out. – Alleged failure to adequately invest in acquired business. – Alleged failure to pursue opportunities that would have increased earn-out. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 42
  43. 43. Two Heavily Litigated Types of Earn-Out Disputes: • Disputes over post-closing accounting methodologies – Earn-out provision does not clearly define how earn-out thresholds are to be calculated. – Earn-out provision does not account for treatment of certain expenses and revenues. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 43
  44. 44. Disputes Over Post-Closing Business Operations Practice Pointer: • Parties should steer clear of “aspirational” statements regarding the post-closing conduct of the business and instead draft earn-out provisions with specific guideposts. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 44
  45. 45. Case Study: LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp., 2007 WL 2565709 (Del. Ch. 2007) • ABC agreed to pay Bridge stockholders $27 million, plus earn-out payments for two years following the merger provided certain EBITDA targets were satisfied. • Merger agreement required that ABC: – “Exclusively and actively” promote products and services of Bridge; – Act in “good faith” during earn-out period; and – Not “impede” ability of Bridge stockholders to achieve the earnout payments. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 45
  46. 46. LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp. • Chancellor Chandler described these provisions as “aspirational statements,” “gossamer definitions,” and “nebulous requirements” that were “too fragile to prevent the parties from delving into the present dispute.” ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 46
  47. 47. LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp. • The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that ABC breached the agreement by failing to enter into a contract that would have increased likelihood of earn-out payments to plaintiffs. – “Although ABC could not unreasonably withhold consent from a transaction that would allow Bridge shareholders to earn their earnout payments, nothing in the merger agreement obligated ABC to enter into an unprofitable transaction.” ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 47
  48. 48. LaPoint v. AmeriSourceBergen Corp. • The court did find that ABC breached the agreement by failing to adequately promote Bridge’s products. However, plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the earn-out targets would have been satisfied but for the breach. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 48
  49. 49. Practice Pointer: • Delaware courts enforce the agreement’s “plain language” and are unlikely to come to the aid of a sophisticated party that could have, but failed to, negotiate contractual protections. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 49
  50. 50. Case Study: Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) • Airborne Health acquired Squid Soap’s assets for $1 million at closing, with earn-out of additional $26.5 million if company met certain targets. • Acquisition agreement required Airborne to return assets to Squid Soap if Airborne had not spent $1 million on marketing and achieved $5 million in sales in first year after closing. • Shortly after acquisition, Airborne experienced substantial business difficulties due to an unrelated product and was unable to satisfy earn-out targets. • Squid Soap sued Airborne, alleging Airborne breached the merger agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to adequately market Squid Soap’s product. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 50
  51. 51. Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP • Vice Chancellor Laster held that while a buyer cannot arbitrarily or in bad faith refuse to expend resources to deprive seller of benefits of earn-out, Airborne’s failure was not in bad faith but instead due to a “corporate crisis” that restrained its marketing and sales efforts. • The court noted that the $1 million marketing expense was a condition Airborne had to satisfy to retain the assets, not an affirmative obligation to spend that amount. According to the court, “a mandatory commitment by Airborne to expend funds could have easily been drafted.” ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 51
  52. 52. Practice Pointer: • Parties should be precise when defining the scope of their respective obligations with respect to earn-out provisions. A court will not imply a duty on the part of the buyer to maximize the earn-out. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 52 52
  53. 53. Case Study: Winshall v. Viacom Int’l Inc., 2013 WL 5526290 (Del. Supr. 2013) • Merger agreement provided that Viacom would acquire Harmonix for $175 million, plus a contingent earn-out payment to Harmonix shareholders based on multiple gross profits for 2007 and 2008. • Plaintiff argued that Viacom and Harmonix breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by negotiating a distribution agreement in 2008 that resulted in reduced earn-out payments for selling shareholders. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 53
  54. 54. Winshall v. Viacom Int’l Inc. • According to plaintiff, Viacom and Harmonix had an implied duty to negotiate a more favorable distribution agreement that would have resulted in greater earn-out payments. • The Delaware Supreme Court held that the merger agreement’s plain language did not create any obligation to maximize earn-out income. • According to the Court, because neither Viacom nor Harmonix “intentionally pushed revenue out of the earnout period,” there was no breach of the implied duty. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 54
  55. 55. Disputes Over Post-Closing Accounting Methodologies Practice Pointer: • Parties should set forth in detail how earn-outs are to be calculated. In interpreting such provisions, Delaware courts will adhere to the agreement’s plain language even if the outcome is “unfair” or results in a windfall. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 55
  56. 56. Case Study: Chambers v. Genesee & Wyoming Inc., 2005 WL 2000765 (Del. Ch. 2005) • In connection with Genesee’s buyout of plaintiffs’ interest in GRO, Genesee and plaintiffs executed stock option agreements providing that plaintiffs would receive additional compensation if GRO’s EBITDA, as defined in the agreements, exceeded $9 million in any of the following five years. • While GRO’s publicly reported EBITDA exceeded $9 million in four of the five years, Genesee argued it was not obligated to vest the options because EBITDA, as defined in the agreements, had not exceeded $9 million in any year. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 56
  57. 57. Chambers v. Genesee & Wyoming Inc. • Then-Vice Chancellor Strine, applying the agreements’ “plain language,” held that Genesee’s calculation of EBITDA for purposes of the agreements was improper because Genesee made certain adjustments not permitted by the agreements. • The court rejected Genesee’s argument that the adjustments were proper because they were consistent with GAAP. • The court also rejected Genesee’s argument that, absent these adjustments, the calculation of EBITDA pursuant to the agreements would result in a “windfall” for plaintiffs. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 57
  58. 58. Practice Pointer: • The agreement should set forth in detail how the earn-out should be calculated, including how specific expenses and revenues would impact the calculation. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 58
  59. 59. Case Study: Comet Systems, Inc. Shareholders’ Agent v. MIVA, Inc., 980 A.2d 1024 (Del. Ch. 2008) • Pursuant to a merger agreement, MIVA acquired Comet for a cash payment and earn-out of up to $10 million. In connection with the merger, Comet paid a one-time merger bonus of $800,000 to its employees. • In calculating the earn-out amount, MIVA characterized the bonus as an “operating expense,” which reduced the earn-out. ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 59
  60. 60. Comet Systems, Inc. Shareholders’ Agent v. MIVA, Inc. • Vice Chancellor Lamb, applying the agreement’s plain language, held that the bonus constituted a “one-time, non-recurring expense” under the agreement, and thus should have been excluded from the earn-out calculation. • The court noted that because earn-outs are typically utilized when a seller is more optimistic about the future prospects of the business than the buyer, “charges and costs which occur as a result of the merger and are not expected to be representative of future costs in the business are reasonably excluded.” ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 60
  61. 61. CLE Presentation Code ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 61
  62. 62. Questions? Oscar David Jim Smith Kristin Wickler Chair, Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities, & Corporate Governance Chair, Securities Litigation Corporate Associate +1 (212) 294-4633 +1 (312) 558-6450 jpsmith@winston.com kwickler@winston.com +1 (312) 558-5745 odavid@winston.com ©2014 Winston & Strawn LLP 62
  63. 63. THANK YOU
  64. 64. BIOGRAPHIES
  65. 65. Biographies Oscar David PARTNER Chair, Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities, & Corporate Governance +1 (312) 558-5745 odavid@winston.com Oscar David is a partner and chair of Winston & Strawn’s mergers and acquisitions, securities, & corporate governance practice. Mr. David is ranked as a leading Chicago attorney in the Chambers Guide and the firm's practice is also ranked. In addition, the practice is ranked as a “Tier 1” firm in the area of middle market M&A by Legal 500 USA and in the top 20 among law firms for U.S. buyouts (based on volume of deals) by MergerMarket. He concentrates his practice on public and private mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, private equity and venture capital, and corporate finance matters. He regularly advises senior executives on sensitive challenges arising in these matters. His representative clients include Motorola Solutions, Inc., Abbott Laboratories, Activision Blizzard, The Allstate Company, Sony Electronics Inc., Fairfax Media Holdings (based in Sydney), CIVC Partners, BDT Capital Partners, HCI Equity Partners, Sterling Capital Partners, Waud Capital Partners, Fulcrum Strategy Partners, Loop Capital Markets LLC, Hopewell Partners Venture Fund, and MBA IQ.
  66. 66. Biographies James P. Smith PARTNER Chair, Securities Litigation +1 (212) 294-4633 name@winston.com James P. Smith III is a partner in Winston & Strawn’s New York office and chairs the firm’s Securities Litigation practice. His practice areas comprise a broad range of complex commercial litigation, with a focus on M&A-related litigation and contests for corporate control, federal securities fraud class action defense, corporate governance litigation and advice, the defense of shareholder derivative suits, and state deceptive sales practices/consumer fraud class action defense. Mr. Smith is a first-chair trial lawyer and has tried numerous cases (including in the Delaware Court of Chancery) and argued notable appeals before various state and federal appellate courts. He has represented clients in a variety of industries, including technology/ecommerce, commercial and investment banking, private equity, hedge funds, derivatives and securitization, insurance, energy, oil and gas, health care, biotech, semiconductors and telecommunications.
  67. 67. Biographies Kristin D. Wickler ASSOCIATE +1 (312) 558-6450 kwickler@winston.com Kristin Wickler is an associate in the firm’s Chicago office who focuses her practice on corporate and transactional matters. Prior to joining Winston & Strawn, Ms. Wickler completed a Public Interest Law Initiative fellowship at Equip for Equality in the Special Education Clinic. Ms. Wickler received her J.D. from Stanford Law School in 2013, where she served as development editor and symposium editor of Stanford Law and Policy Review. Ms. Wickler co-coordinated the Stanford Social Security Disability Pro Bono Project and graduated with pro bono distinction. She received her B.A., with highest honors, in Psychology from DePaul University in 2005 and her M.S. in Clinical Psychology from the University of WisconsinMadison in 2008.

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