1.
Russian spring 2017: who protests, where and why
In the spring of 2017 there was a sharp growth of protest activity of the population in Russia, which
became the largest outbreak of civic activity after the “swamp” rallies in 2011-2012. This study is an analysis
of the features of a new wave of Russian protest and its potential in terms of impact on the political system in
the country.
Structure of the study:
Introduction. The economic environment of protest
Part 1. Distinctive features of Russian protest
1.1. Regional intensity
1.2. A high proportion of youth participation in protests
Part 2. Factors determining the nature of modern protests in the spring of 2017
2.1. Social credibility, development of civil society at the local level
2.2. Format of mobilization – new technologies
2.3. Objectivity of the protest agenda and presence of pre-protests tension in the region
Part 3. Factors that reduce the effectiveness of the protest’s potential
3.1. The organization of protest
3.2. Problems of the protest’s agenda
Part 4. Available strategies of the authorities
Conclusions and forecasts

2.
Introduction. The economic environment of protest
Based on data of Federal State Statistics Service (known as Rosstat)1 at the beginning of a new wave of
Russian protest, Russia's consumer economy continued to be in a crisis with negative dynamics. Compared to
the average values of 2014, the retail trade turnover decreased by 15% by February 2017 (Chart 1), while real
disposable incomes of the population have been falling continuously since September 2015 (Chart 2), except
for the “outbreak” of January 2017 (connected with one-time payment of 5,000 rubles to pensioners).
Moreover, the gap2 between salaries and people employed in various sectors continues to grow, suggesting that
on average the fall in real incomes in Russia is even greater. During 2016, the salary arrears also increased by
1.6 times3.
The stated figures give an approximate estimate of the price that the Russian population pays for an
inefficient monopoly-oligarchic economic model and an aggressive foreign policy At the same time, any
attempts of the authorities to give the economy additional incentives for development in the existing semi-
feudal structure of success do not give a proper result. Even large image programs, such as import substitution,
fail (Chart 3).
All of the above mentioned allows to conclude that Russian citizens have rational prerequisites for both,
discontent with the authorities and for socio-economic protest. However, all of the listed prerequisites took
place in 2015 and 2016. Therefore, the economy in general, just like the negative trend of the development of
the country as a whole, can hardly explain the current protest activity, although it is its root motive. At the same
time, the protest of the spring of 2017 has two new features: regionality, rejuvenation, focus on the subject
agenda, and not on general slogans.
1 Information on the social and economic situation in Russia: January-February 2017, access:
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2017/info/oper-02-2017.pdf
2 “In January 2017, the average monthly accrued salaries of employees of organizations engaged in health care and the
provision of social services amounted to 83% in manufacturing industries, 75% workers of education (93% and 84%
respectively in January 2016)” –
3 Ibid.

3.
Part 1. Distinctive features of Russian protest
1.1. Regional intensity
The anti-corruption rally of March 26 was the largest protest action of spring. The first important
difference between the protests on March 26 from their predecessors is a full regional dimension. This was
noted by journalists and experts from the very beginning, but the statistical measurement of the geography of
the protest allows starting a more objective analysis. On the basis of open data, a table “the strength of protest
per capita” region-wise was created4 (Table 1).
Table №1. The relative intensity ofprotests on March 26 region-wise ofRussia(the number ofparticipants in protestactions per 1000 inhabitants)
1 Saratov 3,56 21 Vladimir 1,41 41 Penza 0,76 61 Makhachkala 0,25
2 Ekaterinburg 3,43 22 Krasnoyarsk 1,39 42 Sochi 0,75 62 Omsk 0,17
3 Smolensk 3,03 23 Ufa 1,35 43 Bryansk 0,74 63 Lipetsk 0,10
4 Perm 2,77 24 Tyumen 1,34 44 Kostroma 0,72
5 Tomsk 2,62 25 Syktyvkar 1,23 45 Tambov 0,71
6 Novosibirsk 2,50 26 Kazan 1,22 46 Murmansk 0,66
7 Vladivostok 2,47 27 Komsomolsk-on-Amur 1,20 47 Ryazan 0,65
8 Moscow 2,03 28 Krasnodar 1,18 48 Orel 0,63
9 Ivanovo 1,97 29 Kaliningrad 1,09 49 Volzhsky 0,63
10 Voronezh 1,92 30 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 1,03 50 Kirov 0,60
11 St. Petersburg 1,89 31 Belgorod 1,02 51 Nizhnevartovsk 0,57
12 Izhevsk 1,86 32 Cheboksary 1,02 52 Ukhta 0,50
13 Samara 1,71 33 Volgograd 0,98 53 Stavropol 0,49
14 Chelyabinsk 1,67 34 Tver 0,95 54 Ulyanovsk 0,48
15 Khabarovsk 1,62 35 Kurgan 0,93 55 Pskov 0,48
16 Irkutsk 1,60 36 Kaluga 0,87 56 Naberezhnye Chelny 0,38
17 Volohda 1,60 37 Arkhangelsk 0,85 57 Novokuznetsk 0,36
18 Nizhny Novgorod 1,58 38 Rostov-na-Donu 0,83 58 Orenburg 0,35
19 Cherepovets 1,57 39 Tula 0,82 59 Chita 0,29
20 Petrozavodsk 1,43 40 Barnaul 0,79 60 Kemerovo 0,27
4 The table is compiled on the basis of assessments of participants in rallies on Russian cities in Russian media and the
population of these cities.

4.
Such an intensification of a protest
allows drawing several preliminary conclusions.
Firstly, the scale of the rallies on March 26
shows not just the solidarity of the regions with
the capitals – on the contrary, protest moods
in some regions are much stronger than in
Moscow and St. Petersburg, which are
traditional centers of political activity of
Russians, namely: in Saratov,
Yekaterinburg, Smolensk, Perm, Tomsk, Novosibirsk and5 Vladivostok.
This fact refutes the idea of non-capital regions as of exclusively recipients of political meanings
emerging from the capital and denotes possibility of some of them to act as drivers of democratization and / or
other renewal of Russian political life.
Secondly, such a distribution of the intensity of protests indicates the need for a complex explanation
that goes beyond the center-periphery. Not all regions show the same protest potential – most of them remain
largely apolitical.
For the same reason, such narratives as “federal center are feeding regions” (in this case, Tyumen,
Sakhalin and other regions-donors of the Russian budget) or “federal center is separatism” would not be
suitable for explaining the intensity of the protest (in that case Kazan, Yakutsk and other regions with
pronounced applications for national autonomy would become leaders of the list). The author's explanation of
such an unusual protest map will be suggested later.
1.2. A high proportion of youth participation in protests
The protests on March 26 gave rise to a number of interpretations, the main of which was the accent on
mass going out into the street before depoliticized schoolchildren and students. During the weeks that have
passed since the protest, all the Russian-speaking space of the Internet has discussed the “rebellion of children”.
The authorities' response to the protests has also contributed to strengthening this narrative by a series of
searches in schools and calls on the protesters explanatory talks to the directors, who, in turn, being “posted” on
the Internet, caused a stormy discussion and memoization.
In general, it should be noted that the rejuvenation of the protest has really took place. Statistically, only
rough estimates are available to us (Table 2)6.
1 Makhachkala 39% 23 Ekaterinburg 28% 43 Nizhny Novgorod 25%
5 Anticorruption action "He is not Dimon" in Vladivostok on March 26, 2017@Reuters
6 Table 2 is compiled on the basis of the following data:
The share of participants under 20 in groups of rallies in the social network "VKontakte" as of April 1, 2016 from this list:
https://vk.com/wall-55284725_272730

5.
2 Vladivostok 36% 24 Novosibirsk 28% 44 Vladimir 25%
3 Barbaul 36% 25 Ivanovo 28% 45 Ufa 25%
4 Tomsk 35% 26 Kazan 28% 46 Tambov 25%
5 Orenburg 35% 27 Cheboksary 28% 47 Ryazan 25%
6 Kurgan 34% 28 Rostov-na-Donu 28% 48 Ulyanovsk 25%
7 Bryansk 34% 29 Tula 28% 49 Lipetsk 24%
8 Moscow 32% 30 Penza 28% 50 Samara 24%
9 Voronezh 31% 31 Stavropol 28% 51 Murmansk 24%
10 Khabarovsk 31% 32 Omsk 27% 52 Kaliningrad 23%
11 Volgograd 31% 33 Chelyabinsk 26% 53 Arkhangelsk 23%
12 Kostroma 31% 34 St. Petersburg 26% 54 Orel 23%
13 Perm 30% 35 Komsomolsk-on-Amur 26% 55 Syktyvkar 21%
14 Izhevsk 30% 36 Krasnodar 26% 56 Tver 21%
15 Krasnoyarsk 30% 37 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 26% 57 Naberezhnye Chelny 20%
16 Chita 30% 38 Belgorod 26% 58 Cherepovets 19%
17 Kemerovo 30% 39 Kaluga 26% 59 Pskov 18%
18 Saratov 29% 40 Kirov 26% 60 Petrozavodsk 16%
19 Irkutsk 29% 41 Nizhnevartovsk 26% 61 Ukhta 14%
20 Tyumen 29% 42 Novokuznetsk 25% 62 Vologda 8%
Nevertheless, we can draw a fundamental conclusion: the youth came out much more than its
proportional share in the population of Russia, which is approximately 22-23%7.
In general, cities-leaders of youth protest are half matched with the centers of regional protest.
Vladivostok, Tomsk, Moscow and Voronezh (in this sequence) are absolute leaders of the rallies on March 26
according to this classification (a combination of a high proportion of protesters in relation to the population
and a high proportion of youth among these protesters).
In other cities-leaders of youth protest, a high proportion of young people is the result of a low absolute
number of the rally per se. As, for example in Makhachkala, which is the leader of the list (39% of youth
among the protesters), only 130 people took part in the action on March 26.
7 Based on Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data for 2016. Access:
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#

6.
Part 2. Factors determining the nature of modern protests in the spring of 2017
2.1. Social credibility, development of civil society at the local level
The nature of the protests of the spring of 2017 allows, at least one of the factors explaining the intensity
of the protest potential in the regions, to recognize social confidence. It is solidarity, not the economic
development of the region, the depth of the economic crisis in it, or the national self-consciousness of different
peoples. The interrelation of trust and protest activity is stronger than it seems at first glance. The level of
confidence, or rather its fall in relation to state institutions is one of the main trends of the last 5 years in the
world8. This is one of the main reasons for the current protests from Occupy Wall Street and the victory of
Donald Trump in the US, Brexit in the UK and the growth of right- and left-populist parties in Europe. What is
more, according to the mentioned study, Russia is a country with one of the lowest levels state institutions’
credibility. In such conditions, protests should have been expected much earlier than on March 26, 2017.
Further still, there is practically no difference in the public institutions’ credibility (government, business,
media and non-governmental organizations) (which distinguishes Russia on the world background) between the
“educated minority” and the “masses” in the country – they equally do not trust traditional institutions9.
Moreover, firstly, distrust among the “masses” is 14% higher than among the “informed public”, and secondly,
in the past year, the distrust of institutions in the country has further increased (Russia fell to the last place in
the general level of credibility among the countries studied).
The answer to this question can be found in the World Values Survey database10. The fact is that in
addition to distrust of the state, Russians tend not to trust each other, thereby weakening their protest potential.
In this respect, they are very different from Ukrainians, who almost do not trust the state, while allowing
support from other people, which has become one of the key factors for the success of the protest. However, the
World Values Survey database does not show in-country differences in the level of credibility, which are more
than significant.
This is evidenced by the data of the “Eurobarometer in Russia”, a sociological study conducted by the
Russian Academy of Science and Technology11. Not being complete in the regional dimension (the study
includes only 10 regions), the latter demonstrates significant regional differences with respect to the level of
credibility. For example, in Yekaterinburg and Tomsk, 45.3% and 41.6% are more likely to trust people,
compared to 38.2% in Moscow and 35.9% in Khabarovsk.
Table 1 shows that the intensity of protest in both Yekaterinburg and Tomsk was in the end significantly
higher than in Moscow. For more detailed verification of the hypothesis of the relationship between the value of
8 Edelman Trust Barometer Global results 2017
Access:http://www.edelman.com/global-results/
9 Ibid.
10 World Values survey Database, parameter «I see myself as part of the local community» (V 213)
Access:http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp
11 Eurobarometer in Russia, Center for Sociological Research ION
Access:http://social.ranepa.ru/tsentr-sotsiologicheskikh-issledovanij-ion/1-evrobarometr-v-rossii

7.
credibility between people in the region against a background of distrust of on the one hand, and protest
activity, on the other, a separate study is of course needed, however, the available data rather support the thesis
that greater credibility between people in the region creates conditions for a stronger protest.
2.2. Format of mobilization – new technologies
Regional peculiarities of the protest potential, noted above, make sense only in the event of a situation
of general Russian outrage with a political event. Therefore, it is impossible not to note the media campaign of
Alexei Navalny, who radical changed the form of submitting the material, turning his investigation into a video
clip on you-tube.
Especially the new format was important for a young audience. For its tentative evaluation, a mini-study
was conducted with a focus group of young Moscow residents (under the age of 20)12, to whose results this
study will be addressed several times. According to the focus group, there were three main to the question
“How did the story about Dmitry Medvedev “strike” you more than other anti-corruption investigations?” First,
the purpose of the investigation: the prime minister is the second person in the state. For this group it was a kind
of shock: “It is an open secret that corruption in Russia is particularly flourishing, but I have never thought that
this is done with such a colossal scale,” one of the respondents replied. Secondly, the very form of the material
submission.
It has been described “with evidence and in details”: “the validity of the data, a strong evidence base –
everything has been told in a simple and understandable for people language”. This point is interesting,
because, for example, the majority of the respondents had heard about the Panama offshore, but, apparently,
because of the form of submission of materials in independent media, this news did not draw such a response.
Thirdly, the silence of the authorities. The latter confirms the earlier assumption of credibility and its
absence as the main driving force for future protests. The silence of the authorities in response to allegations of
corruption by the Prime Minister destroyed the remnants of credibility that groups who have become the
driving force behind the protest, in relation to the bodies of government could have. Other results of our survey
further clarify the phenomenon of the so-called “rebellion of children”. According to the respondents' answers,
the first contact with the video was either via a blog or via the channel of Navalny; another third of the video
was shown by friends, and 1 person saw a link on the opposition news resource. This refutes the thesis of the
“suddenness” of the arrival of young people in Moscow. As can be seen, the majority of the audience of this
part of the rally participants was initially open to politicization, but prior to this investigation, discrepancies
between the form/language of the appeal to this audience took place.
2.3. Objectivity of the protest agenda and presence of pre-protests tension in the region
Up to this point, the report has mainly discussed the rallies on March 26, as the most powerful outbreak
of civil activity among Russians. However, in addition to rallies on March 26, over the past months, several
12 The focus group was compiled by random sampling of 20 Moscow residents up to the age of 20 who took part in the rally on Ma rch
26 by means of the VKontakte network

8.
more major actions, which deserve attention, were held. All of them can be combined according to one
principle: the objectivity of the agenda. The rally against the transfer of St. Isaac's Cathedral of the ROC
(Russian Orthodox Church) in St. Petersburg on the Field of Mars (Marsovo Polye), a long-distance truck strike
in April, a rally against renovation in Moscow on May 14. All of them are united by a subject agenda and
depoliticization. However, their very appearance creates a political environment favorable for all-Russian
rallies.
This hypothesis is confirmed by the interrelationship between the rallies of March 26 and the seemingly
unrelated social and political actions in the regions. Let’s consider three cities that are in the top 6 leaders of the
rating (Table 1): Samara, Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk. In each of them, before March 26, protests took
place, which gathered several thousand people each. In Samara on February 18 and March 19 local pensioners
rallied against the policy of the local governor N.I. Merkushkin, who at the beginning of the year adopted a
series of measures that reduce the amount of social support13. At the same time, the rally on March 19 became
the largest protest in the region since 2011, bringing in between 2.5 and 3 thousand people. In addition to the
above, Nikolai Merkushin, the governor of the region, is one of the “brightest” figures among the Russian
governor's corps, famous among other things for a private mansion, which costs 800 million rubles and a wall
of honor on the Volga bank (which aroused indignation among the citizens who opposed the construction in the
embankment zone that destroyed the panoramic view On the city). Also, in due time the governor answered the
question of the worker “AvtoVAZagregat” about the terms of repayment of debts on salary: “Never”14.
Separate strengthening of the Samara protest is given by the presence in the city of a bright local political force
in the form of Vyacheslav Maltsev and his supporters.
In Novosibirsk on March 19 a rally (the fifth in a row) against the increase of the utility tariffs by 15%
since July 2017 brought together 3000 people. In Yekaterinburg on January 31 a rally took place against the
reform of the urban transport network, which involved reducing the transport network in the city.
Summarizing the combination of ineffective management and complete silence in dialogue with the
society, one can speak of the transformation of certain Russian cities and regions into potential centers of all-
Russian protests that lead to an increase in politicization, however much the organizers of many rallies would
like to avoid it (in Novosibirsk on March 19, in Moscow on May 14, between the organizers of the rallies,
disputes and conflicts arose over the admission / non-admission of federal and local politicians to the scene).
Part 3. Factors that reduce the effectiveness of the protest’s potential
3.1. The organization of protest
13 There was introduced a limit of travel on public transport limited to 50 trips, monthly cash payments to 175,000 working pens ioners
were terminated, housing and utilities benefits were abolished, and so on.
14 Natalia Fomina "Will it really remain? For the last year Samara has been waiting for the resignation of Governor Merkushkin,
Novaya Gazeta April 14, 2017
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/14/72148-neuzheli-ostanetsya

9.
The main weakness of the spring protests in 2017 was the weak organization of their participants and
the lack of solidarity after March 26 between the regions. The most characteristic story is a long-distance
truckers’ strike. It began extremely intensively: 50 regions took part in the protests. The greatest intensity was
observed in Dagestan, where 97% of carriers participated in the strike against “Platon”. However, by April 28
the strike had stopped, not having reached its main purpose. The disunity of truckers from different regions
became decisive in this issue: while the Dagestani drivers were on strike for as long as possible, even in the
conditions of encirclement of their camps by Rosgvardia, their colleagues from Stavropol and Rostov stopped
the strike, nullifying its significance.
Similarly, the rally of Moscow residents against the renovation on May 14 was not supported by other
regions, although the text of the law passed by the State Duma extends not only to Moscow, but to all of Russia,
and allows taking property from citizens for urban needs in extrajudicial order.

10.
3.2. Problems of the protest’s agenda
The second factor, which does not lead to the success of protest activity, is the liberal agenda as such. So
the “Fed up with!” action, organized by “Open Russia” by Mikhail Khodorkovsky on April 2, failed in terms of
the number of participants, despite the fact that it was held just a week after the highly successful March 26
action.
The data I received in the focus group of Moscow youth also confirm this observation. In addition to
corruption, great deal of youth is ready to protest against censorship and for freedom of speech, as well as for
the social agenda. At the same time, foreign policy became the main irritative factor of the policy of the
authorities, but not from the point of view of liberal, right or humanistic discourse (condemnation of Russia's
actions), but in terms of the expenditures for war. Foreign policy is perceived as unnecessary waste and
annoys, but the very fact of aggression does not cause indignation. The fact that such views are observed
among young people indicates the need for restraint in assessing the possibility of democratic protests in
themselves to drastically change the foreign policy approach of the Russian state – especially in relation to its
immediate neighbors. Also the irritation of the Moscow youth was caused by the activities of the Russian
Orthodox Church and the courts. Against the background of these prerequisites, Navalny's appeal to go to the
rally played a mobilizing role for one half, the rest of the people had desire to go to the rally before the appeal.
Another statistical description of the ideological content of the Russian protest in the spring of 2017 can
be found on the “VKontakte” network. There since 2014 there is an appendix “Test of political views”15 and
over three years more than 992 thousand Russians passed it. The application is valuable for the fact that out of
this million 78.3% are people up to the age of 25. Confirming my first hypothesis for credibility as a key
characteristic in the description of the protest, the Test data indicate that 80.3% of respondents do not trust the
Russian authorities, and 33.5% believe that under Vladimir Putin's regime “the game is against the interests of
Russia and (or) the Russian people”.
Accepting the fact that these young people become the main driving force of protest in Russia, it is
necessary to note their political preferences. More than half of them (52%) refer themselves to the left-centrist,
89% are extremely negative about privatization, 58% are support nationalization of large enterprises and the oil
industry. They consider as the problems of modern Russia: corruption (88%), collapse of education and
medicine (71%), low salaries (69%) and low social security (63.7%).
These data allow us to state that in order to mobilize the protest and become its leader, opposition
politicians will include in their theses a left and left-populist agenda. In this regard, the evolution of Alexei
Navalny as a politician is interesting. In the mid-2000s, he worked closely with the nationalists, founded the
movement “People” and taking part in the “Russian marches”. After the Swamp protests, and especially during
the election of the Mayor of Moscow in 2013, he positioned himself as a liberal-democratic candidate. And
now, in 2017, the basis of his agenda was precisely the left-populism: the subject of anti-corruption videos
finally took a character aimed at creating hatred for the elite's over-consumption in combination with the
15 Access:https://vk.com/app3801470

11.
discourse "to take away and divide" as a way of solving national problems, and the 2nd central point of his
program was the point on the introduction of a minimum wage of 25,000 rubles.
At the same time, it is obvious that the important for Russia’s neighbors de-imperialization of foreign
policy, return of the Crimea, compensation of damage and right as the main instrument of domestic and foreign
policy are not an integral part of a new wave of Russian protest. Similarly, it is unlikely that these principles
will be key to those politicians who will come to power on the basis of this protest.
Part 4. Available strategies of the authorities
Informally, the government is helpless against a new wave of protests. To meet the demands of the
protesters and restore their trust in relation to the authorities, a change in the entire political and economic
model that has emerged in Russia is needed: a reduction in elite consumption, federalization, demonopolization,
and so on. At the moment, it is extremely unlikely that the authorities’ credibility will be restored among active
social and political groups, credibility between which is likely to increase, thereby widening the gap between
power and society.
Nevertheless, two mechanisms remain at the disposal of the authorities to influence the protest: violence
against the political part of the protest – participants on March 26 rally and Khodorkovsky's “Fed up with!” and
imitation of a dialogue with a substantive and non-political protest. Violence can be of two types. First is direct
violence, in relation to the protesters. So, after the rallies on
March 26, more than 1,000 people were detained in Moscow
alone, four of them were opened to criminal cases, with 1
sentence already pronounced: Yuri Kuliy was sentenced to 8
months of the colony-settlement. And, for example, in
relation to the coordinator of the action of truckers in
Krasnodar, Sergei Gritsenko, the police distributed
orientation and compelled blocking16 of bank cards.
Indirect violence is even greater unwinding of the map of the “terrorist threat” for the sake of greater
securitization of society and direct violent suppression of protests. So, on May 9, Vladimir Putin signed a
decree on special security measures during the Confederations Cup in 2017 (from June 1 to July 12, 2017 and
the World Cup in 2018 (from May 25 to July 25, 2018) in several Regions, primarily in Moscow, St.
Petersburg, Tatarstan and the Krasnodar Territory, where all civilian actions (rallies, marches, demonstrations)
should be conducted only by agreement with the FSB.
Imitation of dialogue is also part of the strategy of the authorities. So, in Novosibirsk, the increase in
tariffs for housing and communal services, which caused the rally on March 19, was cancelled. A number of
alterations that mitigated the provisions that had caused the largest irritation of Moscow residents were
16 Detention for the action “He is not Dimon” in Moscow on March 26, 2017@REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

12.
introduced after the rally in the law on the Moscow renovation, but the very rule of taking property off is
preserved. And the operators of the “Platon” system refused to participate in the creation of an automatic
weight control system for trucks.
This strategy of the authorities has three key drawbacks. Firstly, non-massive violence does not frighten
protesters, especially young people. Even after the severe detentions of the demonstrators and 1000 detainees
none of the Moscow residents interviewed by me had feeling of fear after the rally – all of them said that they
were ready to continue rallies. At the same time, observations of Russian sociologists engaged in in-depth youth
surveys show that “teens, when discussing politics among themselves, among equals, and not with older ones,
often turn out to be more radical than the latter, for example, they decide to act collectively quicker”17. This
observation correlates with our thesis on social credibility as a key factor of protest. As among modern
teenagers it is higher – their taking action in public is a logical consequence of a greater belief in the ability to
achieve alteration by collective action. For the authorities, this means a problem: either to refuse violence, or,
on the contrary, to make it truly massive – to decide to put in prison thousands of people for political reasons,
not just activists, but ordinary citizens. Such a solution has obvious side effects in terms of rapid radicalization
of society with unpredictable consequences.
Secondly, the dialogue with the protest and even partial concessions give the public a clear signal:
rallies are a way to achieve their demands. In the conditions of the collapse of other state institutions, this
approach can further catalyze the protest.
Thirdly, such a policy is reactive. It does not allow us to impose our discourse and our agenda on
society. But the authorities do not have other strategy. Attempt to interact with youth through video clips of
pro-government bloggers and black PR at the feet of Navalny on the Internet lead to the opposite result:
derision of power among the youth, and most importantly its (power) desacralization, which, in turn, is the
basis of the authoritarian regime.
17 Svetlana Yerpyleva “From the pupil-2011 to the pupil-2017”, Colta Ru
Access: http://www.colta.ru/articles/society/14344

13.
Conclusions and forecasts
1) The key reason for the current wave of protest is the crisis of public credibility towards the state
authorities: meanwhile towards local authorities and government, but in perspective also towards the
president.
2) To analyze the success / failure of the protest potential in a particular region, I propose to take into
account a combination of three factors: the level of credibility in the region between residents (the
strength of their social capital), the effectiveness of media communication between political forces
seeking to lead a protest and the general population on the Internet, as well as the existence of a strong
local regional problematic agenda, since they determine the strength of the protest by regions.
3) Without the appeal of Navalny and his company, the most powerful protests would not have occurred.
However, really strong rallies were in those regions and among those social groups where such a call
was not the cause of the protest, but a cause for it. The cause for open consolidation based on the
dichotomy between fellow citizens’ credibility / distrust of power, on the one hand, and strong local
problems / agenda, on the other.
4) Navalny's ability to consolidate the protest around him, providing him with an organizational
structure and a powerful federal agenda, will determine the nature of street politics in Russia in the
fall of 2017. Meanwhile he is the only political force that creates in the regions headquarters and a
system of coordination between opposition-minded citizens from various subjects of Russia. In the case
of success, his chances of turning from a virtual one into a real leader of the Russian opposition will
increase. But at the same time, the protest is not oriented towards Navalny, if in the regions or in the
country as a whole another politician will appear, who will assume the function of organizing protest
networks.
5) If we take as the main explanatory factor the differences in the intensity of the Russian protest across the
regions, questions of credibility between its residents, it is important to state the absence at the moment
of a strong “national liberation” agenda in the Russian regions and the greater stability of the Russian
Federation as a unified state entity, in the case of absence of interference of other factors / forces.
6) The Russian protest, first of all, is socially oriented, and even foreign policy is viewed by protest groups
as social expenses spent, but not as a means of achieving national pride. Therefore, the Russian protest
will rather become “left” than “right”, and the agenda, important for international actors, especially
those bordering on Russia, will be on the periphery of protest activity.

14.
Forecast for June 12
1) The strongest protests per capita will be in Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Moscow, Tomsk, Saratov,
Samara, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk and, probably, in Dagestan (if the protests of truckers unite with the
youth's request for justice).
2) In some regions, the authorities will use violence against protesters, and probably stronger than during
March 26. Moscow and St. Petersburg are in the risk zone, as in these cities the protest can take the
most massive character (in absolute numbers).
3) The protest is likely to be more massive in all regions, both in absolute and relative numbers. The reason
is the discovery by Navalny’s supporters of electoral headquarters throughout the whole country. As of
March 26, there were 13 such staffs, and there will be at least 50 of them on June 12. Thus, the
condition for creating an organizational network is met.
4) 4) The slogans of the protest will focus on the following discourses: “We demand respect”, “Wealth is
for all, but not for 1%”, “It is enough to lie to us” – that is, on the left-liberal discourse.

15.
Chart 1
Dynamics of retail trade turnover1)
In % to the average monthly value of 2014
By total turnover
Excluding the seasonal factor
Trend
Chart 2
Real disposable incomes of the population1)
In % to the average monthly value of 2014
According to actual data
Excluding the seasonal factor
Trend
1) Data estimates with the exception of seasonal and calendar factors were carried out using the
program “DEMRTRA 2.2”. When new statistical observations are received, the dynamics can be refined

16.
Chart 3
Agricultural production index 1)
In % to the average monthly value of 2014
According to actual data
Excluding the seasonal factor
Trend