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Tristan GL Wicks K.E.
!!!!!!!!!
!
!
Subject and Identity in Conquest: Critognatus,
Hermeneutics and Freudian Psychoanaly...
! of !2 17
literature and which problematise my treatment of the Bellum Gallicum in this way. I have
therefore felt the ne...
! of !3 17
ing emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because
he is reading the text with particular...
! of !4 17
In a sense, Gadamer does not actually solve the problem of the hermeneutic circle with
this view. Instead, he b...
! of !5 17
Pyschoanalysis, critically, allows us to step away from questions of authorial intent, the
importance of which ...
! of !6 17
mourner and the melancholic to be reacting to the loss of a libidinal object. That is to say that, a
person, th...
! of !7 17
Turning to the speech of Critognatus proper, I outline several aspects of the speech
which have a direct bearin...
! of !8 17
message, in fairly explicit terms, is that Caesar’s assassination was equivalent to manumission.20
Yet, whether...
! of !9 17
Earlier on in the speech, at the second mention of servitus, Critognatus develops the idea
of Gaul as connected...
! of !10 17
quently, the subject engages in a kind of joyous self-revilement because they have transferred
their feelings ...
! of !11 17
These are but a few, specific examples of the extent of the divisions among the Gauls but
which are nonetheles...
! of !12 17
wider goal of transforming virtus from a fairly parochial concept which emphasises a kind of
energetic, manly ...
! of !13 17
theories of Heidegger and Gadamer, could be at least accounted for and its effect mitigated
through the use of...
! of !14 17
!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix—The Speech of Critognatus
!At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia s...
! of !15 17
coming from the highest lineage among the Arverni and was held to be of great authority. “Noth-
ing,” he said ...
! of !16 17
!!!!!!!!!!! Bibliography
!Ancient Source
Caesar (1959) Bellum gallicum. In Renatus du Pontet (ed.) C.Iuli Caes...
! of !17 17
— “Society and Religion” 95-112
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Subject and Identity in Conquest-Critognatus, Hermeneutics and Freudian Psychoanalysis in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum

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Subject and Identity in Conquest-Critognatus, Hermeneutics and Freudian Psychoanalysis in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum

  1. 1. ! Tristan GL Wicks K.E. !!!!!!!!! ! ! Subject and Identity in Conquest: Critognatus, Hermeneutics and Freudian Psychoanalysis in Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum !!! Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum traces the Roman general’s conquest of modern France, stop- ping along the way for geography, ethnography and the occasional speech. Though important as a historical document, the work is also a memorable part of the canon of Latin literature and, consequently, demands our attention as a literary achievement. However, such a task is not as simple as it initially appears. For many scholars, the connection of the work with Caesar as a his- torical figure and his central role in the political transformations of his period make the project of understanding the work as ‘simply literature’ an impossible, if not an undesirable task. In ad- dition, generic demands seem to require that the modern interpreter never take Caesar’s literary works too far from their author’s historical aims and context. Nonetheless, this paper will at1 - tempt to do precisely that. That is to say that, rather than attempting to understand Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum as a participant in the political and historical events of the late Republic, I aim to take the idea of Caesar as artist to its fullest extent and approach the work in the same way as one my approach a Greek Tragedy or the poetry of Tibullus. This is not to suggest that Greek Tragedy or Latin elegy are particularly divorced from their political and historical contexts but, instead, that they do not always demand that their interpreters the same kind of representation of truth. In short, we may approach a literary text’s construction of meaning as valuable and possible for its own sake, whereas a historical text demands of us some account of the truthful- ness of the account. Thus, the historical aims of the Bellum Gallicum will be treated as sec- ondary—even irrelevant—facets of a work that is valuable for its expressive force. In order to justify such an approach and to demonstrate its hermeneutic fertility, I have chosen to make use of something of a fringe method, even among literary scholars: Freudian psychoanalysis. That said, adopting Freudian psychoanalysis as an approach to Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum should not be understood as merely an attempt to prove a point by overstatement. That is to say that, as I hope to demonstrate, a Freudian psychoanalytical approach can con- tribute constructively to an understanding of Caesar. However, in the process of justifying this approach, I have found that there are significant difficulties which face even the interpreter of Admittedly, the genre of commentarius is difficult to fully grasp but the work is undoubtedly to be un1 - derstood as a part of the historiographical tradition (cf. Krebs 2009 for a discussion of the difficulties as- sociated with the writing of commentarii).
  2. 2. ! of !2 17 literature and which problematise my treatment of the Bellum Gallicum in this way. I have therefore felt the need to explore these questions and to provide arguments for the degree to which my approach can solve them. Structurally, this paper falls into two major parts. Firstly, I will offer a justification for the use of psychoanalysis on a basic level, focusing on its implications for the so-called hermeneutic circle as implied by Heidegger and articulated fully by Gadamer. Secondly, I will explain the particular psychoanalytic theory I have chosen: Freud’s melancholia. Finally, I will enter into the interpretation of the speech which is itself subdivided into two sections. Organis- ing both of these sections is my exploration of a particularly troubling episode of the Bellum Gallicum: the speech of the Gaul, Critognatus in which he proposes cannibalism. As the longest instance of direct speech in the entire work, it is remarkable in itself. Yet our attention is further drawn to it from a Freudian psychoanalytic perspective on account of the striking tension it ex- presses between the concept of omnis Gallia and libertas. Since so much is attempted in this essay, I have time here to focus on only one part of the speech. Specifically, the degree to which psychoanalysis can help us to see the speech as attempting, and failing to resolve the problems inherent in the textual creation of Gallic identity. !Ia. History and the Hermeneutic Circle—Heidegger and Gadamer The problem of whether or not psychoanalysis can be used to approach a historical text without the epistemological trappings of history requires some justification. While hardly un- controversial, the theoretical problems raised by both Heidegger and continued by Gadamer of- fer us some valuable insight. Heidegger, in his most influential work Being and Time, expresses the core concern of literary hermeneutics when he says, When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something free, as it were, of the “as”, requires a certain readjustment.2 At the core of this statement is Heidegger’s view that it is impossible to simply look at an object. We inevitably bring our own structures of meaning to bear whenever observation of any kind takes place. Observation is, in other words, not simply a fact-finding exercise. Observation is, instead, intimately bound up in our own idiosyncratic systems of meaning developed over a life- time. For example, when we look at an object such as a chair, we are, to some extent, incapable of grasping the object, in Heidegger’s words “free…of the ‘as’”. That is to say that the chair, un- avoidably means something to us. We do not see the object in its contingent and unique being but we see it “as” a chair. Thus, when he says that ‘just to grasp something free…of the ‘as’, re- quires a certain adjustment.” Heidegger refers both to the fact that we see, in our example, the object we call a chair ‘as’ something, but also to the immensely difficult—though, in Heidegger’s view, attainable—goal of observation without the ‘as’ represents. For our purposes, it will be enough to remain on the more superficial, though perhaps more tenable, level and take from Heidegger the view that, it is functionally impossible to understand an object (that is, any object of observation, be it concrete or abstract) on its own terms, rather than imposing our own un- derstandings onto it. In terms of literary hermeneutics, this leads us to what might seem to be a fairly banal conclusion, that any contact with a text will be shaped by our own preconceptions. In Heideg- ger’s terms, we can only see Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum ‘as’ something which is in some way re- lated to our own systems of meaning. The result of this inability to observe, as it were, without observing, is what is referred to as the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer provides a more accessible treatment of the hermeneutic circle and one which is more explicitly concerned with textual hermeneutics: A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial mean- Heidegger,M. (1996) Being and Time. 189-902
  3. 3. ! of !3 17 ing emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning.3 We can readily see Heidegger’s ideas here when Gadamer begins with the problem of ‘projecting’. On the one hand, Gadamer understands ‘projecting’ as the reader’s tendency to make guesses about the overall tenor and meaning of a text from the moment when they begin to read. However, when Gadamer says here “the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning” the echoes of Hei- degger are clear. Indeed, Gadamer suggests that even that initial projection is conditioned by other systems of meaning which, even before projection related to the specific text emerge, colour and, to a great extent, define the reader’s interaction with the text. What is critical about this, is Gadamer’s conclusion about this problem in which he says, “the meaning intended by the author has received no attention at all and it is precisely the ques- tion of authorial intent and ability to convey meaning to the author’s readings that drives the search for a solution to the hermeneutic circle.” For Gadamer, if we always bring our own sys4 - tems of meaning to the text both prior to and during our experience of the text, to what degree can we say that the author’s intended meaning is conveyed? For the average reader, the hermeneutic circle may not be much of a worry. However, for classicists in particular, the assumption that we can gain an understanding of any given work on its own terms forms an almost axiomatic principle of the discipline. And yet, especially for the classics, this project is further compounded by the difficulties of approaching texts written a long time ago, in a language which is no longer spoken and whose authors are unavailable for consultation. Further, the antiquity of the sources and their central importance for the initial articulation and subsequent unfolding of Western identity means that these texts are subject to an almost intractable nebula of conflicting and distinct interpretations and many of which are wrapped up in the Western criticism actually understands itself to function. In the 21st century,5 this is perhaps nowhere felt more strongly than in Roman history’s most famous figure: Julius Caesar. And yet, for Gadamer, this is not as intractable a situation as it might seem and, in fact, it is this very constellation of conflicting interpretations that makes hermeneutic activity both pos- sible and profound. Continuing from the passage cited above, Gadamer says, “Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.” For Gadamer, understanding a text is intimately linked with self-reflection since it is through interpreting a text that interpreters both develop and challenge their understanding both in terms of what preceded interaction with the text and what emerges from that interaction. What is perhaps most striking is that Gadamer seems to affirm that it is the contemplation of this ‘fore-projection’, as he calls it, that is the core of the interpretative act. In this sense, Gadamer still sees the interpreter’s own thoughts to precede in importance those of the author of the text which he is interpreting. Gadamer, H-G.(2006) Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (tr.) Truth and Method. Continuum3 Press. 269 Ibid. 2694 An interesting example of this is the controversy over mythos and logos in the Greek philosophical tradi5 - tion where, particularly during the 19th century, scholars saw the birth of philosophy to be a casting off of the irrational, much like Europe’s more recent, self-styled Enlightenment (cf. Nestle (1941) who epitomis- es this approach to Greek philosophy, drawing primarily on 19th century interpretations in Vom Mythos zum Logos. Stuttgart). The flip-side of this argument is that, throughout the 20th century, an emphasis on the irrational elements of Greek philosophy has led to seeing them as mystics and wizards, particularly in its earlier phases (cf. Marcel Detienne (ed.) Les Savoirs De L’Écriture en Grèce Ancienne. Presses Univer- sitaires de Lille). As more recent scholarship has challenged this idea, we have learnt to view the idea as not completely false but as far more nuanced. cf. a the 1999 Oxford collection essays, From Myth to Rea- son Richard Buxton (ed.).
  4. 4. ! of !4 17 In a sense, Gadamer does not actually solve the problem of the hermeneutic circle with this view. Instead, he brings us to the edge of the problem and offers the possibility of conduct6 - ing interpretation within the constraints of a limited ability to access the intent and meaning of the author. Gadamer summarises his view and offers a way to move forward when he says, All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other per- son or text. But this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it.7 Ultimately, we are bound by our own systems of meaning to impose them onto the subject of our study but Gadamer’s view offers us the opportunity to see the interaction of interpreter and text as far more mutual than it might have been if this were not the case. Interpretation becomes, explicitly, an act of self-analysis as much as it aims at providing a window into the world of the text itself. ! Ib. Psychoanalysis and the Hermeneutic Circle In terms of psychoanalysis, it may still seem like a far off possibility that Freud’s ideas can be productively used in response to the problems of the hermeneutic circle. To demonstrate its use in this way, it will be best to do so through its application to the text itself rather than providing an extensive theoretical justification. Nonetheless, several preliminary remarks are necessary. Oliensis notes the difficulties facing the interpreter as psychoanalyst of Latin poetry. She mentions the heavy, cultural “baggage” that psychoanalytical terms such as Narcissism or Cog- nitive Dissonance possess. From this fact alone, it would seem that psychoanalysis offers us a more entrenched set of preconceptions than an interpreter might otherwise bring to an interpre- tation without psychoanalysis. And yet, if we can overcome the implications of psychoanalytical terminology, it can offer the interpreter, as Oliensis suggests, a particular “orientation toward the unconscious” otherwise left merely implicit, if not avoided altogether. Put simply, psycho8 - analysis channels our investigation toward what is implied by any given text without necessitat- ing awareness of the conclusions of our own interpretation on the part of the author or the fig- ures represented in their work. On one level, psychoanalysis might, by this understanding, seem to satisfy Gadamer’s injunction to remain open to the meaning of the other person or text. Conversely, we might ar- gue that psychoanalysis adopts an unnecessarily circuitous path to the ultimate goal of under- standing the meaning of the text. A philological or narratological approach, for instance, might just as well communicate the underlying, unconscious political implications of a specific turn of phrase in Cicero or the psychological effects of poetic cadence in Homer. And yet, as an inter9 - pretative stance, psychoanalysis aids our investigation in several, important ways. I here present but one. It should be noted that Gadamer sees the literary canon as the solution to the hermeneutic circle (cf. Part6 III.3 “Language as horizon of hermeneutic ontology” in Truth and Method (2006) 435-492). While it may seem that failing to mention this presents a somewhat distorted picture of Gadamer’s theories, it is per- haps forgivable insofar as I have presented his arguments faithfully up to the point at which I disagree with him. Gadamer (2006) 2717 Oliensis, E. (2009) Freud’s Rome: Psychoanalysis and Latin Poetry. Cambridge University Press. 3-4.8 For example, Kraus (2010) goes to some lengths to explain that her own attempts to describe the divi9 - sions of Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum may be the result of generic or psychological factors but sets aside the question to explore both the existence of divisions within the work and the impact of creating these divi- sions, whether recognised by the reader or author or not. It should be noted that, as an interpretative sys- tem of which many naratologists recognise the ancients’ ignorance, naratology shares a fundamental, hermeneutic similarity to psychoanalysis.
  5. 5. ! of !5 17 Pyschoanalysis, critically, allows us to step away from questions of authorial intent, the importance of which cannot be overstated. Whereas a historical or philological approach is fre- quently required to support their interpretation with reference to the range meanings of which the text’s author is capable, psychoanalysis needs only to demonstrate the degree to which an interpretation aligns with the psychoanalytical system. Admittedly, this could constitute a pow- erful argument against the use of a psychoanalytical approach, insofar as it might be read as wholly divorced from the subject of inquiry. Yet, if we are to take seriously Gadamer’s injunction to ensure that we remain open to the meaning of a text, then we must be open to the possibility that the state of the unconscious mind has some bearing on its character and content. In this sense, if any given application of the psychoanalytical approach can be shown to privilege the integrity of the psychoanalytic system over the subject of inquiry, then we ought to conclude that this, indeed, represents a failure of interpretation. However, a failure of interpretation does not, in itself, indicate the a lack of validity on the part of psychoanalysis itself. Indeed, particularly in the case of Freudian psychoanalysis, the degree to which a rigid structure can be derived from psychoanalytic writings is largely up to the interpreter of the writings themselves and the struc- tural view of psychoanalysis is no way the sine qua non of the method. At its core, psychoanaly- sis is, as Oliensis described it, an “orientation toward the unconscious”. Returning then to the question of authorial intent, by setting aside the need to impute authorial intent, psychoanalysis makes it possible to satisfy the purpose of hermeneutic activity by setting aside the necessity for complete control on the part of the author. This is not to say that psychoanalysis denies the agency of the author in literary expression, but merely that an understanding of authorial intent is not a necessary condition for the presence of meaning in a text. Free from this question, the psychoanalyst is left to ask questions which might have otherwise be impossible. Finally, I will simply say that use of psychoanalysis, if nothing else, can tell a good story. As Oliensis remarked, psychoanalytic terms have a significant degree of “cultural baggage” and this is not necessarily on account of Freud’s rigour but is certainly related to the fact that his work is compelling, shocking and evocative. And so, if Gadamer and Heidegger are correct, and we cannot approach literature without bringing a great deal of our own systems of meaning to the interpretation, then psychoanalysis, above all else, at least makes sure that that system of meaning is an interesting one. ! II. Mourning and Melancholia Let us turn now to Freudian psychoanalysis more directly. To demonstrate the hermeneutic possibilities of this method, I will be applying Freud’s idea of melancholia to the speech of Critognatus in Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum. Firstly, I provide an explanation of the spe- cific theory of Freudian psychoanalysis I intend to use. Beginning with Freud, in this 1917 essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” he begins with a description of mourning which, he says, has the potential to be “so intense that a turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object [of loss occurs] through a medium of hallu- cinating, wishful psychosis.” Critically, however, Freud says that most people get over mourning, that is to say, that it slowly fades and they are, in a sense, cured of their “hallucinating, wishful psychosis.” Freud notes that it is the prevailing opinion that mourning must be allowed to follow its course and the subject must be allowed to resolve their psychological condition without the direct interference of the psychoanalyst.10 And yet, operating similarly to mourning, there is another psychological condition which can be quite damaging and, on account of which, the psychoanalyst may necessarily have to in- terfere. Freud refers to this condition as ‘melancholia’ or melancholy and it is this condition which I argue the speech of Critognatus in the Bellum Gallicum reflects. As I have noted, melancholia is quite similar to mourning, as Freud describes it. Symp- tomatically, Freud argues that the two display the same kind of “hallucinating, wishful psychosis and he explains this on the basis of their similar causes. Specifically, Freud understands the Freud, S. (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia” SE 14: 24410
  6. 6. ! of !6 17 mourner and the melancholic to be reacting to the loss of a libidinal object. That is to say that, a person, thing, or even an abstract notion which the person has developed a strong attachment to, has been lost. Yet, again symptomatically, the main difference, is that the melancholic also develops what Freud calls a “disturbance of self-regard” as a result of this loss. That is to say that the loss of the libidinal object results in a loss of self-esteem and it “finds utterance in self-re- proaches and self-revilings and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment.” For Freud, these self-revilings take a particularly moral tone and the melancholic tends to extend the perception of their moral poverty into the past, imagining that they had always been the way they now perceive themselves. The root cause of these self-revilings, for Freud, is a result of a subtly, but critically, different disposition toward the libidinal object.11 Beginning from these self-revilings, Freud explains that the melancholic identifies their own ego, that is themselves, with the lost, libidinal object, in order to repress their ambivalence toward toward it. Thus, Freud’s theory is that the difference between a mourner and a melan- cholic is that, whereas a mourner effects a “gradual retreat from the libidinal position”, ambiva- lence toward the lost libidinal object can result in an attempt to represses experience of loss.12 Repression is itself a fairly nuanced concept in Freud’s work but for our purposes, it is only nec- essary to understand how repression takes place in this specific circumstance. Freud summarises the psychological condition of the melancholic as, “possible only be- cause the reactions in their behaviour…proceed from a mental constellation of revolt, which has…passed over into a crushed state of melancholia.” That Freud uses the language of13 ‘revolt’ (in German, ‘Revolte’) is significant because, by analogy, the repression is understood as a violent action on the part of the subject undertaken to resist the conditions of their psychologi- cal existence on two, important levels. Firstly, there is the obvious loss of the object which is re- pressed. Secondly, the melancholic resists the normal functioning of the assumption and retreat from libidinal positions. In the latter cases, Freud says that the ego undergoes a substitution of identification for object-love. Essentially, the melancholic, in refusing to retreat from their libid- inal position and, thereafter, take up a new libidinal object, the melancholic transfers all of their emotional ambivalence in on themselves. That is to say that the subject identifies their own ego with the prior love-object to which they felt ambivalence. Thus, the self-revilings are, at their core, actually directed toward the lost, libidinal object which is now identified with the self.14 ! IIIa. The Speech of Critognatus—Servitus, Libertas and Omnis Gallia15 Freud, S. (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia” SE 14: 244-611 Freud, S. (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia” SE 14: 246-912 Freud, S. (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia” SE 14: 24813 I should mention that Freud understands melancholia to be a regression into the ‘cannibalistic’ or ‘oral’14 phase. While this particular terminology may seem to align well with a comparison with Critognatus’ pro- posal for cannibalism, I have deemed it to be an unnecessary distraction from Freud’s overall understand- ing of melancholia. The reason for the name “oral” or “cannibalistic phase” is related to the manner of ob- ject-selection which takes place during this, the first phase of psychosexual development (The three stages of psychosexual development are first outlined by Freud in his groundbreaking “Three Essays of the Theo- ry of Sexuality” (1916) which each consist of heightened libidinal investment in what Freud called “eroto- genic zones”). As Freud explains in this paper, when children first engage in object-selection they do so by putting things in their mouths because, at this stage, a child only understands the libidinal process in nar- cissistic, i.e. self-oriented terms. In effect, the child’s use of libido has been restricted to the self which is to say that the child has yet to fully comprehend that the outside world is not a part of the child’s own body and mind and so libidinal pursuit consists in a kind of metaphor of proximity. In effect, the child pursues its libidinal objects by attempting to consume them. (cf. Sandler et al. 1997) I have provided the text and my own translation of the speech in the appendix of this essay.15
  7. 7. ! of !7 17 Turning to the speech of Critognatus proper, I outline several aspects of the speech which have a direct bearing on a psychoanalytical interepretation. Subsequently, I combine it with Freud’s theory of melancholia, demonstrating the degree to which the theory can deepen our understanding of Critognatus’ speech. The speech itself takes place during the final, climactic siege of Alesia in the seventh book of Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum. It is given by the Gaul, Critognatus whom Caesar introduces as a member of the aristocracy of the tribe of the Arverni and possessed of much authority (Hic, summo in Arvernis ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis BG 7.77.3). It is also the longest instance of direct speech in the entire work. The reason given for reporting the speech is “be16 - cause of its unique and and abominable cruelty” (propter eius singularem et nefariam crudeli- tam BG 7.77.2). The feature of the speech with which I am here interested is Critognatus’ navigation of the problem of universal, Gallic identity. To an extent, it is almost misleading even to call it a ‘navigation’ as such because the concept of omnis Gallia is left, at a basic level, as an abstraction. That is to say that what exactly omnis Gallia is, is never really articulated in any specific detail but is nonetheless, for the preservation of omnis Gallia that Critognatus suggests that the Gauls resort to cannibalism. In psychoanalytic terms, we may understand omnis Gallia as a libidinal object which, as we have seen, is a person, thing, or even an abstract notion to which the subject develops a strong attachment. However, that omnis Gallia is such a libidinal object requires some justifica- tion since, on the surface, it would seem that, rather than omnis Gallia, it is libertas which we might better understand as the libidinal object of the speech. Beginning with libertas, it is important to consider its connection with its opposite, and in that sense complementary concept, which is itself is more frequently mentioned in Critogna- tus’ speech: servitus. Roller, writing about the cultural construction of aristocratic values in late republican and early imperial Rome, provides a valuable description of the connection between libertas and servitus. He argues that “any condition of which servitus can be predicated, literally or metaphorically, is ipso facto not a condition of libertas, and vice versa.” For Roller, the con- cepts of libertas and servitus, occupied a fundamental part of Roman discourse on power and, while their connection underwent significant developments over the course of Roman history, there remained this core identification of servitus and libertas as polar and mutually exclusive opposites. For our purposes, Roller’s view allows us to interpret any reference to either libertas17 or servitus to imply the other as a negation of the other. That is to say that, to indicate the pos- session of libertas, is to negates one’s servitus, or, by suggesting that an act will result in servi- tus, one implicitly suggests the negation of libertas. Another important point which Roller makes regards the invocation of servitus/libertas as a metaphor. Role explains that the dominus and servus relationship was frequently invoked by Roman authors as means of contextualising and articulating their experience of or position in the social hierarchy. We can see this ourselves, for example, in a coin which commemorated18 the assassination of Caesar and which features Brutus’ own head on the obverse with a pair of daggers and the pileus on the reverse with the legend “EID MAR”. The pileus is what is signifi19 - cant for our purposes as a hat which was occasionally worn by manumitted slaves. Thus, the Rigsby (2006) Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words. University of Texas Press. 89.16 Roller, M. (2001) Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome. Princeton17 University Press. 220-21 Roller, M. (2001) Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome. Princeton18 University Press. 218-19 Crawford 1974 no.508/319
  8. 8. ! of !8 17 message, in fairly explicit terms, is that Caesar’s assassination was equivalent to manumission.20 Yet, whether or not Caesar’s assassins imagined themselves to have freed Rome from literal en- slavement, the point is that the concepts of slavery and freedom contextualised their political condition regardless of their strict, factual validity. Lakoff and Johnson argue that experience is always organised through such metaphoric abstractions and that without them we wouldn’t be able to maintain complex relationships between, for example each other, the state or even the past. For our purposes, the use of servitus/libertas as a metaphor for experience of or position21 in the social hierarchy is significant because, while certainly comprehensible to an audience fa- miliar with slavery, it is also both a particularly emotional metaphor and one which is not based on much subtlety at its core. That is to say that, servitus is both, unambiguously, an extremely negative condition and it is also not one which, on the abstract level, permits compromise. In terms of Critognatus’s speech, we should keep in mind these three ideas. Firstly, the virtual interchangeability of libertas and virtus, insofar as the presence of one denies the pres- ence of the other and vice versa. Secondly, the degree to which servitus and libertas can be seen as metaphors, organising the comprehension of one’s experience of and position in the social hierarchy. Lastly, that, on the abstract level, libertas and servitus permit no compromise. In Critognatus’ speech, servitus is referred to on four occasions (BG 7.77.3; .9; .15; 16). Rigsby describes servitus as “[t]he key thematic term” and this is certain borne out by the criti- cal moments when it appears. The first appearance of servitus is in the first sentence of the22 speech where Critognatus dismisses the opinions of those who suggest that the besieged Gauls surrender to Caesar equating surrender itself with servitus (turpissimam servitutem BG 7.77.3) . It appears later on when Critognatus suggests that, should the Gauls waste their lives in a sortie, they would condemn all Gaul (omnen Galliam) to unending servitus (perpetuae servi- tuti 7.77.9). Servitus appears again when Critognatus describes the Roman practice of taking the lands and settling the cities of “those whom they think to be noble in reputation and powerful in war” and “yoking them in eternal servitus” (aeternam servitutem). Finally, indicating the politi- cal conditions of the Roman province in Gaul (respicite finitimam Galliam), Critognatus frames servitus as a denial of a people’s own laws (iure et legibus commutatis…perpetua premitur servitute 7.77.16). What stands out about each of these references to servitus is their obvious connection with political bodies. This is clear in the last reference which associates the loss of one’s laws with servitus. For our our purposes, the third invocation is particularly informative for the con- nection it makes between Gallia and laws understood from the contrast drawn between Roman military activity and that of the Cimbri. In the case of the latter, the Cimbri leave Gaul and even though they leave it devastated (Depopulata Gallia), Critognatus frames their departure, in terms of Gaul’s right to laws and lands and freedom (iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reli- querunt 77.14). In contrast, the Roman presence, in the strongest terms, seems to necessitate the imposition of servitus as a fundamental aspect of Roman, military action (Romani vero quid petunt aliud auth quid volunt nisi…. 77.14). Thus, the invocation of servitus is connected to the idea of Gallia as, in a sense, its opposite. Whereas the Cimbri leave a place called Gallia and which is possessed of iura, leges, agros, libertatem, the Romans conquer and enslave unnamed people referred to only by a relative pronoun in the accusative: quos. In terms of libertas and the associated possession of laws and lands, Rigsby makes note of the parallel structure of this part of the speech as participating in a larger oratorical strategy but, for our purposes it is enough to understand the basic message: Gaul is equivalent to libertas where Rome is equivalent to servi- tus.23 Roller, M. (2001) 21520 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press. 106-11421 Rigsby (2006) 112.22 Rigsby (2006) 111-1323
  9. 9. ! of !9 17 Earlier on in the speech, at the second mention of servitus, Critognatus develops the idea of Gaul as connected to libertas but he does so in specifically universal terms—that is, in terms of omnis Gallia. At 77.9 the laying low of all Gaul (omnem Galliam prosternere) and subjection to unending servitus are expressed as equivalent insofar as they are combined consequences of a suicidal sortie. In this alone, Critognatus suggests that omnis Gallia as the necessary condition for libertas (as the implied opposite of servitus). But preceding this equation of libertas and specifically omnis Gallia, Critognatus also develops the idea of a debt on the behalf of the be- sieged toward omnis Gallia in the only other reference in the speech to the concept. He affirms, “In making a decision, we must look to all Gaul which we have stirred up for our aid” (in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus 77.7). In it- self, we might not find this to be particularly strange and yet throughout the Bellum Gallicum the only means of ensuring obedience or loyalty between tribes has been the exchange of hostages. On the one hand, by invoking omnis Gallia in this way, Critognatus positions omnis24 Gallia as an alternative means of ensuring combined action which transcends those predicated on bonds of individual, tribal interest. By extension, deciding to launch a suicidal sortie, while it is consonant with ideas of personal honour which we might see as operating on the same level as hostage exchange, becomes a matter of not only transgressing this higher ideal but also denying its continuation. This we can see clearly when he asks what effect their deaths will have on the morale of omnis Gallia which has come to Alesia to rescue them when they are compelled to fight on top of their corpses (Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis con- sanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? 77.8). I will return to the first and last invocations of servitus below but for now these passages indicate the degree to which the concept of Gallia is connected with libertas in Critognatus’ speech. We should take note of the way that political determinacy is framed in terms of identity in these two examples and also how Critognatus seems to be attempting to replace what else- where in Bellum Gallicum seem to represent the traditional means of inter-tribal connections. It is worth taking note of Rigsby’s comment to this effect we he says, “Critognatus’ speech was to reinforce Gallic identity…at a time when it was clearly threatened in practice. Critognatus is treating Gallic identity as a goal, not a fact.” While it is clear from my conclusions thus far that25 Gallic identity plays a large role the speech and that Critognatus’ omnis Gallia seems to be try- ing to replace more tribe-specific values, psychoanalysis can help us demonstrate that Rigsby’s comment here is, as I will show, not incorrect but misleading: Gallic identity, in the Bellum Gal- licum, exists simultaneously as goal and a fact and this is the tension of the speech. IIIb. The Speech of Critognatus—Ambivalence and Repression Now, at last, we reach the application of psychoanalysis to the speech. We saw with Freud’s theory of melancholia that, as a psychological condition, it originates from the loss of a libidinal object. Whether perceived or actual, the subject feels that a person, thing, or even an abstract notion for which the subject has developed a strong attachment, has been lost. Howev- er, the condition of melancholia does not result from the loss of the libidinal object alone but also from a degree of ambivalence felt toward the libidinal object—though the subject feels strongly about the object, that feeling is, for reasons specific to any given subject, mixed. Conse- Of particular note is 1.2.2 where an oath is taken instead of the exchange of hostages, determined to be24 impossible under the circumstances. Mannetter (1995, 129-130) notes that, while such oaths are generally a sign of obedience between the concerned parties, the Bellum Gallicum emphasises that such oaths as- sume a degree of freedom on the part of the oath-giver which circumstances may not actually bear out, bringing into question both the degree to which any loyalty is affirmed at all. Also, Rigsby (2006, 129) notes the degree to which the giving of hostages or swearing of oaths represents the thematic divisiveness on the part of the Gauls who see the universal identity as predicated on a multitude of individual relations rather than a value which transcends these relations. Rigsby (2006) p.12925
  10. 10. ! of !10 17 quently, the subject engages in a kind of joyous self-revilement because they have transferred their feelings for the libidinal object onto their own ego and in punishing themselves, they feel as though they are expressing this ambivalence. Finally, by effecting such a transfer, the subject permits themselves to maintain a kind of warped version of their libidinal position by repressing the loss of the libidinal object. In the case of the speech of Critognatus, I argue that it is best un- derstood as the last gasp of Gallic repression of the loss of the libidinal object of omnis Gallia. I begin by establishing ambivalence toward omnis Gallia through select examples of the incoher- ence of the very notion as it is represented in the narrative. As I have already established, omnis Gallia is deeply connected with the idea of libertas in Critognatus’ speech and yet, throughout the narrative of the Bellum Gallicum, the connection between libertas and omnis Gallia is tenuous at best. The first time we hear of omnis Gallia oc- curs in the famous opening lines of the Bellum Gallicum (Gallia est omnis divisa…BG 1.1.1) but the first time Gaul, in its entirety, it is discussed in the context of the actual disposition of Gallic toward the idea it is as the goal of conquest (perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri. BG 1.2.2). Indeed, this specific example comes from the speech of Orgetorix to the Helvetii (reported in oratio obliqua) who gives the speech only because he is “influenced by a desire for kingship” (regni cupiditate inductus BG 1.2.1). This turn of phrase is of particular importance because, rather than simply describing Orgetorix’s motivations, it in- vokes a familiar formula from Latin literature which condemns, in the strongest terms, those who aspire to kingship. In this way, omnis Gallia is constructed, from its earliest mention, as26 the consequence of the loss of libertas rather than, as we saw in Critognatus’ speech, almost coterminous with libertas. That said, omnis Gallia is also invoked in more positive circumstances such as, again in the first book of the Bellum Gallicum when, upon Caesar’s victory over the Helvetii, Gallic lead- ers from “almost all Gaul” (totius fere Galli legati 1.30.1) request that Caesar permit that a pan- Gallic council be called (concilium totius Galliae 1.30.4). Here however, we have a related obsta- cle to the concept of omnis (or tota) Gallia. On the one hand, the assembly is held in response to the utter defeat of a Gallic tribe described as “foremost in courge” (Helvetii quoque reliquos Gal- los virtute praecedunt 1.1.4). Admittedly, this description does not come from the mouth of a Gaul, but it is clear that, regardless of the status of the Helvetii, the pan-Gallic council was not called in order to make joint decisions as much as it was a response to the direct intervention of of a clearly powerful, new power in the region. Thus, on this level alone, omnis Gallia is once27 more overshadowed by, at the very least, the suggestion of its incompatibility with libertas. Another thematically important facet of the pan-Gallic assembly is the lack of unity among its participants and the references made to the past history of division. In particular, the Sequani are unable to participate fully because of their fear of Ariovistus, the German king who occupies their territory (1.31). In itself, this casts a similar shadow over the meeting as the pres- ence of the Romans as something of a coercive, foreign power and it’s implications for omnis Gallia and libertas. On the one hand, it indicates clearly that, at present, libertas is not a univer- sal condition in Gaul: the Gallic Sequani are, at least, yoked in servitude to the Germans. The passage also highlights the degree to which any concept of omnis Gallia is purely theoretical since the reason why the Germans are occupying Sequani territory at all is because the Gallic tribes having been warring amongst themselves. Liv. 4.15.4 (spem regni concepere); 6.20.5 (cupiditas regni); Val.Max. 5.8.2 (adfectatio regni); Cic.26 dom. 101 (regnum adpetere); Mil. 72 (suspicio regni adpetendi). For a discussion of the legal and moral implications of the perceived threat of pretenders to kingship in Rome, see Francisco Pina Polo (2006) “The Tyrant Must Die: Preventive Tyrranicide in Roman Political Thought” Repúblicas y ciudadanos: modelos de participación cívica en el mundo antiguo.. As I mentioned at the beginning of the paper, I should reiterate that this interpretation is not concerned27 with the degree to which such a picture might be manipulated by the author. Instead, I am still concerned merely with how the narrative characterises the Gauls in relation to the concept of omnis Gallia.
  11. 11. ! of !11 17 These are but a few, specific examples of the extent of the divisions among the Gauls but which are nonetheless reflective of a central, thematic principle of the entire text. Indeed, I have already mentioned the opening line Gallia est omnis divisa which introduces this central theme of the division of Gaul both in terms of political conflict and geography. Indeed, Schadee notes the degree to which divisiveness forms a key representative motif for the Gauls in distinguishing them from the Germans. For our purposes, we should note that, between this picture, not only28 of omnis Gallia as a barely coherent idea but, critically, as a potential locus for the extinction of libertas there is a distinct tension with Critognatus’ omnis Gallia as a source of libertas. Returning to Critognatus’ speech, the contours of Freudian melancholia become clear. Firstly, the speech affirms the strength of the attachment toward the notion of omnis Gallia which I have already explored in its deep connection with the dual concept of servitus and liber- tas. Yet, as we have also seen, the lived experience of the Gauls does not align with a conception of omnis Gallia as a source of the positive libertas as Critognatus seems to suggest but with its opposite, servitus. If, as Freud understands melancholia, a kind of joyous self-revilement is en- acted by the melancholic, and this speech reflects Freud’s principles, then we might expect to find it in this speech. Let us consider Critognatus’ specific instances of criticism of the Gauls. The first criticism which we might take to be self-revilement aims at silencing those who would propose surrender by drawing a line between who is a Gaul and who is not. He begins the speech not by merely refusing to address the views of those who propose surrender to the Ro- mans but by defining those who do as non-members of the community. Strictly speaking, this may not seem to be self-revilement, as Freud understands it, since the message here is that sur- render is not an option which a Gaul would propose. How can it be revilement of the self, if those who would propose surrender are not the self. And yet, while Critognatus states that he thinks that such men should not be considered citizens(neque hos habendos civium loco 7.77.3), it is also clear that Critognatus’ view does not, as it were, carry the force of law. This perhaps most clearly indicated by the fact that the besieged do not follow his advice, but send those whom he proposes they eat out of the city immediately in the subsequent chapter (Sententiis dictis constituunt ut ei qui valetudine aut aetate inutiles sunt bello oppido excedant 7.78.1). In Freudian terms, though a subject who has experienced the loss of the libidinal object cannot ac- tually reverse the loss, they can repress awareness of the loss. This, I have noted above, is achieved by the subject’s identification of their own ego with the object of loss and which precip- itates self-revilement. Since the Gauls which Critognatus attacks are not stripped of their citi- zenship forthwith they are still, strictly speaking, members of the Gallic community. Thus, by saying that he does not they they should be considered citizens, he allows for and enacts both the objectification and revilement of a portion of the Gallic self. This seems to be a markedly contradictory view within the framework of omnis Gallia which we have seen to be at the core of Critognatus’ purpose in this speech. That is to say that, if he sought to create a sense of identifi- cation with omnis Gallia, then we should expect him to include omnes Galli within that equa- tion. However, as an act of repression, it makes a great deal of sense. Note that Critognatus ex- plicitly identifies surrender with servitus which I have argued is the polar opposite of libertas and which Critognatus sees as connected fundamentally with omnis Gallia. In this way, those who propose surrender can be understood as that part of the psyche which is willing to retreat from the libidinal position of omnis Gallia as libidinal object in the particular way it is under- stood. That is to say that, libertas as identified as a component of omnis Gallia, cannot accom- modate the opposite concept of servitus. We can also see the central role that ambivalence to- ward omnis Gallia plays in the repression of this proposal and which is critical if we are to find that this speech reflects Freud’s theory of melancholia. Once again, Rigsby offers a thought-provoking examination of the representation of Gauls in the Bellum Gallicum when he describes the role of the speech of Critognatus in redraw- ing the coordinates of virtus. Schematically, he argues that the speech participates in Caesar’s Schadee (2008) “Caesar’s Construction of Northern Europe: Inquiry, Contact and Corruption in De Bel28 - lo Gallico,” in Classical Quarterly 58.1: 175-9
  12. 12. ! of !12 17 wider goal of transforming virtus from a fairly parochial concept which emphasises a kind of energetic, manly vigour and which is often realised through acts of individual courage into a more controllable obedience and capacity to endure suffering. The degree to which a psycho29 - analytical approach contributes to this idea can be measured by the degree to which Rigsby ig- nores the dissenting voices I mentioned above. For Rigsby, what is important is the purpose of the speech within the authorial narrative which leads him to gloss over the degree to which it can be demonstrated that Critognatus’ speech has failed. Nevertheless, this failure also supports Rigsby’s thesis insofar as it indicates that, truly, aside from the obvious problem of the proposal itself that the Gauls engage in cannibalism, Critognatus’ speech is an attempt to move away from the traditional conception of virtus. For our purposes, Rigsby’s thesis of the modification of vir- tus helps us understand the role of ambivalence in the repression of the loss of the libidinal ob- ject. Specifically, Rigsby’s thesis indicates the degree to which the notion of omnis Gallia is itself a concept which is developed, coming into sharper focus over the course of the Bellum Gallicum. As we have seen, the first, at least partially positive, physical realisation of omnis Gallia, the pan-Gallic assembly, occurs in response to Caesar’s defeat of the Helvetii (BG 1.30). And so, in- sofar as the Bellum Gallicum is, first and foremost, a narrative of the conquest of Gaul and, thereby, the imposition of Roman rule, it is also a narrative of the realisation of omnis Gallia. Rigsby takes up this facet of the narrative by suggesting that this reflects authorial aim insofar as it prepares the Romans for the integration into the empire of peoples which have hitherto been considered barbarians. For our purposes, it provides us with unambiguously clear evidence for30 the role of ambivalence in the repression of the lost of the libidinal object. Put simply, the con- cept of omnis Gallia, the source of libertas, as per Critognatus, is itself articulated gradually as a consequence of the Roman invasion, the full actualisation of which is incompatible with libertas, insofar as Roman rule is equated with servitus. It is here that the power of psychoanalysis as interpretative method proves most power- ful. Here we can see how repression, as exemplified by the silencing of the Gauls who propose surrender, can be understood as a psychological strategy for resolving the ambivalence of omnis Gallia. And yet, at its core, this ambivalence remains, lurking in the Gallic unconscious through- out the narrative of the Bellum Gallicum. This, we have noted in particular is at the core of the melancholic’s condition. In terms of motivations, this shows us, specifically, how the desire to repress the inconsistencies in the Gallic understanding of their own ideas of self-determina- tion— i.e. libertas—could have provided them with a valid enough reason to become cannibals. It also indicates a condition of the Gallic mindset which may underpin the very revolt of Book VII itself, insofar as Freud described the state of melancholia as “proceed[ing] from a mental constellation of revolt”. While this may seem to be a description which only coincidentally aligns the literal revolt of the narrative, it is worth remembering Lakoff and Johnson’s views about metaphor. That is to say that, for Freud, melancholia proceeds from a psychological condition31 which is analogous to revolt insofar as the mind is pitted against itself. In this same way, the Bel- lum Gallicum tracks emergence and development of the Gallic identity as such and how the emergence of a Gallic identity creates the necessary condition. Firstly, as a reaction to the exter- nal force which both precipitates and maintains by conquest the concept of omnis Gallia but secondly, and perhaps most interestingly, as a unified concept against which its constituent parts can revolt. !V. Conclusion This paper has made arguments on a, perhaps, excessive diversity of fronts. Initially, I argued that, if not entirely resolved, the hermeneutic circle, as understood on the basis of the Rigsby (2006) 73; 89-96. cf.89-90 for the treatment of Critognatus’ speech specifically.29 Rigsby (2006) 129-3230 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press. 106-114. see PAGE #31 in this text.
  13. 13. ! of !13 17 theories of Heidegger and Gadamer, could be at least accounted for and its effect mitigated through the use of psychoanalysis. I suggested that the use of an interpretative model which was to some extent structred but, critically, independent of the text, could permit a clearer awareness on the part of both interpreter and reader of the exact terms of analysis. Subsequent to this, I laid out Freud’s theory of melancholia, as explained in his essay “Mourning and Melancholia” and then moved into a treatment of servitus and libertas. There, I made use of Roller’s description of the connection between the two concepts as opposites and the use of metaphor in organisation of one’s thoughts as understood by Lakoff and Johnson. Moving into Critognatus’ speech, I argued for the close connection to be found therein between libertas/virtus and the articulation of Gallic identity understood as omnis Gallia. Finally, mov- ing into the psychoanalytic section, I argued for the overall ambivalence toward the concept of omnis Gallia reflected in specific instances of its invocation outside of the speech of Critognatus. I concluded that, for the Gauls, the idea of omnis Gallia is far more complex than the speech at- tempts to make it and that, as a result, we can understand the speech as attempting to repress this complexity because of its threatening to reveal the vanity of the concept. I must admit, that, the arguments contained herein have hardly been pursued to their fullest extent. This paper requires many more pages to treat the subject effectively. As it stands, I hope that I have given some indication that, at the very least, psychoanalysis, insofar as it con- stitutes an openness to the unconsciousness has much to teach us about the meaning of a text. In particular, I have found it to be a valuable exercise simply in attempting to suspend my un- derstanding of the text as strictly a historical work which, at times, proved quite difficult. How- ever, it seems to me that there are important questions yet to be asked of this particular text from a psychoanalytic perspective such as the psychological characteristics of the textual Caesar or the degree to which the omniscient narrator’s focalisation of Gallic thoughts can be seen to align with or depart from other, non-psychological, narrative strategies. Indeed, this speech is far from well-understood from the perspective of psychoanalysis through the conclusions of this paper. It would, for instance, be interesting to treat the speech’s proposal for cannibalism through Freud’s theory of the uncanny. For now, such questions will have to wait. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  14. 14. ! of !14 17 !!!!!!!!!! ! Appendix—The Speech of Critognatus !At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia suorum exspectaverant, consumpto omni frumento, inscii quid in Aeduis gereretur, concilio coacto de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Ac variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et ne- fariam crudelitatem. !Hic summo in Arvernis ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, “Nihil,” inquit, “de eorum sen- tentia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo. Cum his mihi res sit, qui erup- tionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. Atque ego hanc sen- tentiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iac- turam fieri viderem: sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis consan- guineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogen- tur? Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetu- ae servituti subicere. An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepto, his utimini testibus appropin- quare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere versantur. quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt. cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaque illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama no- biles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considere atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in long- inquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute.” !But those who were besieged, when on the previous day they had anticipated the help of their allies, since they had exhausted all the grain, and were unaware of what was happening among the Aedui, with an assembly having been called together, they considered the end of their for- tunes. And, when many opinions had been expressed, some of which recommended surrender, others recommended, while their strength lasted, a sortie. It seems to me that the speech of Critognatus must not be passed over because of its unique and criminal savagery. This man,
  15. 15. ! of !15 17 coming from the highest lineage among the Arverni and was held to be of great authority. “Noth- ing,” he said “shall have been said concerning the their opinions, they who call enslavement by the name of ‘surrender’. Neither am I of the opinion that these men must be considered citizens nor that they must be summoned to this assembly. Let my business be with those who approve a sortie. In all of whose strategy, by your agreement, the memory of former virtus seems to re- main. That is a weakness of resolve, not virtus, to be unable to bear want. And yet the kinds of men who give themselves willingly to death are more readily found than those who bear suffer- ing patiently. And moreover, I would approve the former opinion—so much influence does its worth have with me—if I should see that there would be nothing save the loss of our lives. Yet, in taking up a plan, let us consider all Gaul which we stirred up for our assistance. When eighty- thousand men lay dead, what resolve do you imagine there will be for our friends and our kin, if they are compelled to decide the issue in battle almost on top of their corpses? Do not rob them of your assistance, they who have ignored their own peril for the sake of your safety, nor through your stupidity and rashness or feebleness of resolve, lay all Gaul low and subject it to eternal slavery. Can it be that, because they do not come on this day, that you doubt their trustworthi- ness and perseverance? What then? Do you think that the Romans are daily drilled on the outer fortifications for the sake of their character? If you are unable to be encouraged by their messen- gers, make use of these witnesses that their arrival draws close. Petrified by which, they are turned about in work day and night. What then is my plan? To do what our ancestors did in war, by no means equal, of the Cimbri and the Teutones who, driven together into strongholds and compelled by a similar lack, through the bodies of those who in their age seemed useless for war held up their own life and thereby did not hand themselves over to the enemy. And if we should not have a precedent of which, I would judge that it be instituted for the sake of freedom and that it be handed down as the finest thing for the coming generations. For what has been similar to that war? The Cimbri, although Gaul was ravaged and great harm was brought to our borders, they indeed finally left and attacked other lands: rights, laws, lands—freedom—they left us these. The Romans, what else are they after, what do they want if not, led to it by envy, those whom they have learnt are respected in reputation and capable in battle, to settle in their lands and communities and to yoke them in perpetual slavery. And not, indeed, for any other reason do they wage wars. But if you do not know what is undertaken among distant peoples, look to neighbouring Gaul which, reduced to a province, with its rights and laws replaced, placed under the fasces, it is pressed into unending slavery. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  16. 16. ! of !16 17 !!!!!!!!!!! Bibliography !Ancient Source Caesar (1959) Bellum gallicum. In Renatus du Pontet (ed.) C.Iuli Caesaris Commentariorum Pars Prior Qua Continentur Libri VII De Bello Gallico Cum A. Hirtius Supplemento. Oxford. !!Literary Theory and Philosophy Freud, S. (1911) “Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning” SE 12: 213- 226 — (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia” SE 14: 237-58 — (1923) “The Ego and the Id” SE. 19:1-66 — (1933) “The Dissection of the Psychical Personality” SE 2: 71-100 Gadamer, H-G.(2006) Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (tr.) Truth and Method. Continuum Press. Heidegger, M. (1996) Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit. Joan Stambaugh (tr.) State University of New York Press. !!Secondary Source Bradbury, M. (2001) “Classics Revisited: Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia” in Mortality, vol. 6, no.2: 212-19 de Certeau, M. (2000) “Writings and Histories” In Graham Ward (ed.) The Certeau Reader. Blackwell: 23-36. — “History: Science and Fiction” 37-52 Gay, P. (2006) Freud: A Life for Our Time. W.W. North & co. Georgescu, M. (2011) “Freud’s Theory of the Death Drive” In Review of Contemporary Philosophy. 10: 228-233 Kraus, (2010) “Divide and Conquer: Caesar, De Bello Gallico 7,” in C.S. Kraus, J. Marincola and C.B.R. Pelling, (eds.) Ancient Historiography and its Contexts: Studies in Honor of A. J. Woodman. 40-59. Laplanche, J. (2001) Vie et mort en psychanalyse. Flammarion. Marincola, J. (2008) “Speeches in classical historiography” in John Marincola (ed.) A Compan- ion to Greek and Roman Historiography Vol. I. Blackwell: 118-132. Oliensis, E. (2009) Freud’s Rome: Psychoanalysis and Latin Poetry. Cambridge University Press. Riggsby, A. (2006) Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words. University of Texas Press. Roller, M. (2001) Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome. Princeton University Press. Sandler, J. et al. (1997) Freud’s Models of the Mind. London: Karnac Books. Scott, J. (2012) “The incommensurability of Psychoanalysis and History” in History and Theory 51: 63-83. Thurschwell, P. (2000) “Freud’s Map of the Mind,” In Sigmund Freud. Routledge: 79-94
  17. 17. ! of !17 17 — “Society and Religion” 95-112

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