1. trenthone.com
@Honer_CUT
Learning to
Win:
The Evolution of U.S. Navy
Tactical Doctrine During the
Solomons Campaign
Trent Hone

2. The Battle of Savo Island – 8-9 Aug 1942
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3. Interwar Experimentation and Learning
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4. • The Objective
• The Offensive
• Superiority
• Security
• Surprise
• Simplicity
• Movement
• Economy of Force
• Cooperation
1919 – Doctrinal Principles
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5. • Aggressive Action to Seize the Initiative
• Quick and Effective Gunfire
(Attack Effectively First)
• Decentralized Command and Control
(and Doctrinal Development)
1930s – Tactical Heuristics
4

6. • Balanced Exploration and Exploitation
• Fleet Problems and exercises
• Variability within the fleet
• No defined approach – little codified “doctrine”
• Hindered by emphasis on “Major Action”
U.S. Navy’s Learning
System
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7. Initial Adaptations (Oct-Nov
1942)
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8. • Compact linear formations
(“double header”)
• Emphasis on gunnery
• Individual heroics
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Initial Adaptations (Oct-Nov
1942)

9. Experiments with Distributed Formations
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10. Experiments with Distributed Formations
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11. Distributed Formations (Nov 1942)
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• Linear formations abandoned
• Destroyers sent ahead
• Reliance on gunfire from heavy ships
• Coordination very difficult

12. • Commanders overwhelmed
• Too much data
• Too little actionable information
• Formations need to be more stable
• ”Minor Tactics” need more emphasis
Lessons from Guadalcanal
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13. Combat Information Center
(CIC)
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14. New Patterns, Old Doctrine (Jan-Jul 1943)
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15. New Patterns, Old Doctrine (Jan-Jul 1943)
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• Tassafaronga used as a model
• Cruiser gunfire emphasized
• Destroyer attacks subordinated
• Imperial Japanese Navy
counters with stealthy torpedo
attacks

16. 15
Evolutionary Tactics (Aug-Oct 1943)

17. Evolutionary Tactics (Aug-Oct 1943)
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• CIC comes into effective use
• Destroyers attack aggressively
• Torpedoes first, then guns
• Burke’s Doctrine; Moosbrugger’s Plan

18. Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)
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19. 18
Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)

20. 19
Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)
• CIC enables true coordination
• Each captain has a shared picture
• Destroyers make surprise torpedo attacks
• Gunfire after torpedoes are launched

21. • “At no time was there
confusion or lack of
knowledge.”
• “… better than most drills.”
• “Track charts... superimposed
one over the other.”
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Results – According to Burke

22. • U.S. Navy surface warfare doctrine evolved
• Two levels of learning (in theater & at fleet level)
• Variability led to experimentation
• Decentralized approach meant rapid exploitation
• Pacific Fleet codified effective approaches
Summary
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