Strengths and weaknesses in risk assessments Presentation at Transportforum Linköping, Sweden, 2010-01-14 Markus Lundkvist, Risk analyst Swedish Maritime Administration
Aim <ul><li>To address some inherent strengths and weaknesses in maritime risk assessments </li></ul>
SMA tasks and and budgeted costs 2009 Pilotage 47 M€ Maritime Traffic Information 6 M€ Fairways and Aids to Navigation 30 M€ Icebreaking 25 M€ Cartography 7 M€ Search and Rescue 27 M€ Transport policy and regulations 10 M€ Administration 25 M€ ----------------- Appr 177 M€
Etymology of risk <ul><li>The term risk may be traced back to classical Greek risk, meaning root, stone, cut from firm land , and was later used in Latin for cliff. Latin and vulgar Latin resicum, risicum, riscus: cliff , récif, Felsklippe are the origins of Italian risico, risco, rischio, Spanish riesgo and French risque. </li></ul><ul><li>The original term is used in Homer’s Rhapsody M of Odyssey “Sirens, Scylla, Charybdee and the bulls of Helios (Sun)”. Odysseus tried to save himself from Charybdee at the cliffs of Scylla, where his ship was destroyed by heavy seas generated by Zeus. </li></ul><ul><li>English borrowed the term from Spanish, German from Italian and both were backed up by the French risque of the 18th century. Dictionaries confirm that it was a metaphor for “difficulty to avoid at sea” . These lexical borrowings happened at the end of the Middle Ages, when the Renaissance took place and people dared to discover the world. </li></ul><ul><li>The idea of risk appears to have taken hold in the 16th and 17th centuries, and was first coined by Western explorers as they set off on their voyages to explore the world. The term ‘risk’ has most likely come into English through Spanish or Portuguese, where it was used to refer to sailing into uncharted waters . From the 16th century onwards, the term therefore attained a beneficial meaning, for example in middle-high-German Rysigo was a technical term for business, with the meaning “to dare, to undertake a business and aspire for economic success”. </li></ul><ul><li>Rolf Skjong, DNV , at http://www.dnv.com/resources/publications/dnv_forum/2005/no_3/rizanotquiteGreektoDNV.asp </li></ul>
Early risk assessment / management <ul><li>“ One of the most effective preventive measures was a ban on sailing in winter , putting the seas out of bounds during the worst weather. The ban was not applied uniformly. In Rome, the period during which navigation was permitted lasted only from 27 May to 14 September.” </li></ul><ul><li>“ From the mid-13th century, the maritime authorities in large Mediterranean ports introduced very strict legislation on freeboard , in order to combat the abuses of unscrupulous shipowners and captains who overloaded their ships, at the risk of losing them, in order to earn more from the freight.” </li></ul><ul><li>In 1330, the maritime authorities in Genoa had already laid down not only very precise rules for calculating the maximum draught of certain ships, but also an inspection procedure and a whole range of penalties for anyone contravening the rules.” </li></ul><ul><li>Boisson, P., 1999: Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations and International Law. </li></ul>
Definition of Risk Assessment in this presentation Step 1 Hazard indentification Step 2 Risk assessment Step 3 Risk control options Step 4 Cost benefit assessment Step 5 Decision making recommendations Decision makers
Strategic and operational risk assessment - VTS Risk Control Measures / Options Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Regulation of VTS area and service (Swedish Transport Agency) IMO - Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines Goal Maritime safety VTS provides valuable services to mariners (Swedish Maritime Administration) Collisions, groundings and contacts are avoided Strategic risk assessment Operational risk assessment
HazID Farled/ Hamn Område i farled/hamn Riktning Olyckstyp Bakomliggande orsaker Fartyg som ffa kan vara inblandade (typ, storlek, lots ombord etc) På vad baseras bedömningen (inträffad händelse eller identifierat möjligt scenario) 1 Yttre området Väst/syd på Trubaduren In / ut Kollision / närsituation Osäkerhet vilken bordningsposition som skall användas. Samtliga ftg som är på väg till och från Göteborg eller yttre ankarrutor Inträffad händelse. Utgående ftg kan vara ovetande om inkommande fartygs intentioner. Och/eller anta att ftg är på väg till annan bordningsposition än vad som är tänkt. 2 Yttre området Väst/syd på Trubaduren In / ut Kollision / närsituation Manövrering vid embarkering / debarkering av Lots. Ftg kan göra oväntade manövrar för övrig trafik, nedsaktningar / oväntade girar. Pga. att fokus flyttas från sjövägsreglerna till att ta ombord lots. Samtliga ftg som är på väg till och från Göteborg eller yttre ankarrutor Inträffad händelse. Upphinnande ftg som är under omkörning av lotspliktigt ftg (som här skyldigt att hålla kurs och fart) kan plötsligt göra oväntade manövrar. Dessa situationer uppstår även för utgående trafik, men dock ej lika frekvent. Även lämnandet av lots anses "lindrigare".
Defective radio watch Too late radio call Pomerania Rio Grande Poor cooperation Fear for engine alarm? Too late speed reduction Acceptance of a too narrow margin in distance Causes/factors Neglecting the AB´s warnings Too vague change of course All steering gears were not running Concentration on telephone call Limited experience? High confidence in the radar COLLISION Vessel on starboard? Limited education? Nonchalance? Wrong radio channel ? Nonchalance? ? Too much respect Too much respect Routine/ Obligation? ? ? ? Poor cooperation Neglecting the AB´s warnings ? Act/Event Act/Event Causes/factors
1. Anomaly in ship position, draught, course, speed, (or in waterway) 2. Anomaly becomes observable for VTSO 3. VTSO becomes aware of the situation 4. VTSO calls ship to inform or to ask about intention 5. Bridge team understands the question/information 6. Bridge team undertakes appropriate measures 7. Anomaly is corrected with sufficient marginal to avoid accident 2. Slight delay in radar, AIS, information from mariners 3. Workload, experience, operational procedures 4. Communication means 5. Workload, status 6. Situational awareness and correct action 7. Ship manoeuvrability , fairway size and configuration
Event tree 1. Anomaly in ship position, draught, course, speed, (or in waterway) 2. Anomaly becomes observable for VTSO 3. VTSO becomes aware of the situation 4. VTSO calls ship to inform or to ask about intention 5. Bridge team understands the question/information 6. Bridge team undertakes appropriate measures 7. Anomaly is corrected with sufficient marginal to avoid accident Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? No p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? No p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? No p=? Yes p=? Yes p=? No p=? Yes p=? No p=? No p=?
Evaluation VTS –accident investigation reports, the Sound
Claims data 2000-2009 H&M, LoH Swedish Club Probability: 1 SAFEDOR (2007) Swedish data Probability: Sw. Accident dbase ASEK 4 (SIKA, 2009) Probability: 1 Assumption of average delay ASEK 4 (SIKA, 2009) FSA Guidelines Probability: Sw. Accident dbase Claims data 2000-2009 (contact, P&I) Swedish Club Probability: 1 (contact) Negligible in most cases . Estimation approach CASUALTYID SUBCLASS CATEGORY DATEOFLOSS TOTAL _100_USD MAINDEDUCT_USD CLAIMDETAILS VESSELTYPE 20000001 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 01-jan-00 75265 41088 C/W BERGEN ARROW AT DURBAN ROAD Container 20000004 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 04-jan-00 2526 100000 COLLISION WITH PORT ARTHUR AT NEW ORLEANS Bulker 20000005 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 07-jan-00 2332 75000 C/W NEW HAI HUNG AT HONG KONG Bulker 20000008 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 11-jan-00 2474 100000 COLLISION WITH ATLAS AT CADIZ Dry Cargo 20000009 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 12-jan-00 326009 35000 C/W PASADENA UNIVERSAL Bulker 20000013 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 20-jan-00 266221 70000 ENTANGLED PROPELLER AND C/W VENTO DE MELTIMI AT ALEXANDRIA Dry Cargo 20000046 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 21-feb-00 4262 67500 STRUCK BULKWAYU AT MARACAIBO Dry Cargo 20000062 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 09-feb-00 60397 45000 C/W TUG PIONEER AND BARGE AT SEMARANG Container 20000108 Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 16-mar-00 493 39807 COLLISION WITH MAERSK CASTRIES AT FREEPORT BAHAMAS Container
Human factor in risk assessment Strategic risk assessment Operational risk assessment
Hazard identification Human factor (based on STA report ” Summary of reported marine casualties”, 2008) <ul><li>Alcohol or other intoxicants </li></ul><ul><li>Alternative navigation aid was not used </li></ul><ul><li>Other circumstances influenced by the human factor </li></ul><ul><li>Misjudgement of other ship’s movement </li></ul><ul><li>Misjudgement of own ship’s movement </li></ul><ul><li>Too high speed </li></ul><ul><li>Attempt to carry out the operation in spite of unfavourable circumstances </li></ul><ul><li>Did not keep to starboard in the fairway </li></ul><ul><li>Position of own ship not good enough. “Dead reckoning” not noted in the chart </li></ul><ul><li>Inadequate competence for the task </li></ul><ul><li>Slept while on watch </li></ul><ul><li>Special circumstances (sickness, lack of sleep, too long working hours) </li></ul><ul><li>Available warning systems were not adequately used </li></ul><ul><li>Available navigation aid was not used </li></ul><ul><li>Poor planning of the operation </li></ul><ul><li>Source: Swedish Transport Agency, 2008: Summary of reported marine casualties, near-accidents and accidents to persons, Swedish merchant and fishing vessels 2008 </li></ul>
Frequency assessment - models? RCMs impact on: Lateral distribution Grounding candidates Causation factor
Frequency assessment – Reported accidents involving Swedish and foreign ships per port call in Sweden Sources: Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate, 2002 /Swedish Transport Agency, 2008: Sjöolyckor i svenska farvatten. Swedish Maritime Administration, 2008: Sektorrapport.Sjöfartens utveckling 2008.
Consequence assessment - Source : ITOPF, 2009: Oil tanker spill statistics 2008. Spills over 700 tonnes. Oil transported and number of oil spills > 7 tonnes.
Some strengths and weaknesses in FSA FSA step Strengths Weaknesses Hazard identification Widened knowledge of accident scenarios Structured identification Limited insight Simplification of causal chains Risk Assessment (Frequency, probability) Estimation of probability – good decision Changing system (rules, technology, traffic regime) Geographically (and poor) statistics Risk assessment (Consequences) Impact distribution on different values Monetary value Limit of accident impact Risk Control Options Limited Limited insight in combinations Limited number of RCMs evaluated Limited insight in effect Cost-Benefit Assessment Effectiveness approach Rough costs, poor data, sensitive to state of market
Final questions When are collisions and groundings predictable? For whom are they predictable? When is the accident probability 1? Differences - operational and strategic risk assessments? What strengths and weaknesses in risk assessments have You identified? What are the similarities and differences compared to medievial risk assessment?
Final message <ul><li>Use risk assessment but use them carefully </li></ul><ul><li>It is a strength to acknowledge the weaknesses in the assessment </li></ul><ul><li>What it the option to risk-based approach? </li></ul>Thank You for Your attention!