Pension Fund Investments in Private Equity: Implications for the Stewardship of Workers’ Capital

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The economic and financial crisis: Elements to construct a new paradigm
8th December 2008, ITUH, Brussels

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  • Pension Fund Investments in Private Equity: Implications for the Stewardship of Workers’ Capital

    1. 1. <ul><li>Pension Fund Investments in </li></ul><ul><li>Private Equity: </li></ul><ul><li>Implications for the </li></ul><ul><li>Stewardship of Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><li>The economic and financial crisis: Elements to construct a new paradigm </li></ul><ul><li>8th December 2008, ITUH, Brussels </li></ul>
    2. 2. <ul><li>I. The Landscape </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006, assessing PE performances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freeing up the investment policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>II. The Arms Race </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based allocation, management and regulation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Single fund, fund-of-funds, strategic partnership or co-investments? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>III. The Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The concept & the new conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to the stone age of governance </li></ul></ul><ul><li>IV Concluding remarks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Trade union and government trustee guidance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Re-regulation in the aftermath of the crisis </li></ul></ul>
    3. 3. Double standard behaviour? <ul><li>British House of Commons, hearings on private equity (2007) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Paul Myners: “ Investors can be quite lethargic … [we] should ask why they invest in private equity with its association with aggressive capital structures, high incentives for management and a minimalist approach to governance … while adopting an entirely different approach when investing in public equity.” </li></ul></ul>Source: Private equity, Treasury Committee, House of Commons, 24 July 2007 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmtreasy/567/567.pdf
    4. 4. I. The Landscape <ul><li>I. The Landscape </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006, assessing PE performances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freeing up the investment policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>II. The Arms Race </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based allocation, management and regulation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Single fund, fund-of-funds, strategic partnership or co-investments? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>III. The Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The concept & the new conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to the stone age of governance </li></ul></ul><ul><li>IV Concluding remarks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Trade union and government trustee guidance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Re-regulation in the aftermath of the crisis </li></ul></ul>
    5. 5. No reliable data on alternative investments <ul><li>Un-regulated industries = no gvt data, just ‘surveys’ </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Pension funds provide at a quarter to a third of PE funding </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>more if PF investments in funds of funds are included </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ad hoc surveys: 3-5% of PF AUM </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>8-10% in the US and Sweden </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mainly in large pension funds , and in DB schemes </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2-digit returns, favourable macro context </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Including public reserve funds (France FRR, Swedish APs, Korean NPS) </li></ul></ul>
    6. 6. Yet, some doubts about performance <ul><li>None of listed equity simplicity applies to PE performance evaluation </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Remaining value </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Exposure: remaining value + un-funded commitment </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Valuation of the remaining value (Phalippou et al 2007) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>End-of-life vs interim fund performance (WSJ) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Abnormal distribution of risk (Aglietta) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Leverage effect (M. Gordon, Fidelity) </li></ul></ul>
    7. 7. CalPERS’ private equity program (since 90, USD Bn) Source: CalPERS website 143% (cash out + remaining value) / cash in Investment Multiple 22.5 (proceeds distributed back to the investors) Cash Out 43.2 (un-funded commitments + remaining value) = Total Exposure 20 (as reported by the General Partner) + Remaining Value of the investments 23.2 (remaining contributions legally due to the fund) = Un-funded capital commitments 29.6 (effective contributions to the fund, including management fees) - Capital contributed (Cash in) 52.8 (legal obligation to the private equity fund over several years) Total capital commitments
    8. 8. Doubts about PE performance Source: JP Morgan Alternative Asset Survey (November 2007)
    9. 9. Loosening or removal of investment restrictions 2002-2006 Source: Source: OECD Survey of Investment Regulations of pension funds, July 2008, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/46/40804056.pdf
    10. 10. In need of harmonisation? 5% max; indirect restriction via caps on fees Spain 0% Prohibited Slovakia 3% 5% max (to be raised to 10%) Portugal 0% 10% max in CIS (incl. HF) Poland Approximately 2-3% Solvency requirements Netherlands Negligible 20% max in CIS (incl. HF); max 1x leverage; short selling, lending & borrowing prohibited. Italy Thought to be extremely low 10% max in unlisted securities (incl. HF) Ireland 0% 5% max Greece 3.10% Authorised since 1 st January 2007 Finland 10% max in unlisted securities (incl. HF); Short selling prohibited Estonia Solvency requirements Denmark Estimated up to 1% 5% max Czech Republic 1% (federally regulated plans) None* Canada 30% max in unlisted securities (incl. HF) Austria Average Exposure (% of AUM) Quantitative restrictions (% of AUM) Country
    11. 11. Indirect restrictions to PE allocation <ul><li>Geographical distinction between foreign assets </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Difference between OECD & non-OECD (ie. countries having signed on the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>In Europe, difference between collective investment funds </li></ul><ul><ul><li>‘ harmonised’ investment funds (subject to EU directive on UCITS) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>‘ non-harmonised’ funds (private equity & HF) </li></ul></ul>
    12. 12. <ul><li>The Anglo-Dutch-Japanese group </li></ul><ul><ul><li>No quantitative restrictions, PP standard applies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AUM, 50-130-25 % GDP </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The Nordics </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Several restrictions, including on alternatives </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AUM: 30-130% of GDP </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Rest of Europe & Korea </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Various scenarii </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AUM: 1-13% of GDP </li></ul></ul>The three families
    13. 13. Asset portfolio composition AUM > 10% GDP Source: OECD Pension Markets in Focus 2007 www.oecd.org/daf/pensions/pensionmarkets & www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/0/39510746.xls
    14. 14. II. The Arms Race <ul><li>I. The Landscape </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006, assessing PE performances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freeing up the investment policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>II. The Arms Race </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based allocation, management and regulation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Single fund, fund-of-funds, strategic partnership or co-investments? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>III. The Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The concept & the new conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to the stone age of governance </li></ul></ul><ul><li>IV Concluding remarks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Trade union and government trustee guidance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Re-regulation in the aftermath of the crisis </li></ul></ul>
    15. 15. The arms race <ul><li>Diversifying portfolio risks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Lessons from the IT bubble in 2001-2002 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Beta (market generic) vs alpha returns (asset specific) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>PE as a return enhancer or a risk diversifier ? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Matching liabilities </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Role/influence of advisers </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Regulators’ reaction </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Regulated funding rules : assets should mach liabilities, market & longevity risks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based regulations (such as Solvency II) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>factor in the ‘riskiness’ of the portfolio </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Only a few countries so far (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden) </li></ul></ul></ul>
    16. 16. Implications for PF risk management <ul><li>Most challenging aspects (JP Morgan) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>selecting & monitoring PE managers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>fees </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Say they will increase their allocation </li></ul><ul><ul><li>50% of those currently investing in PE </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>9% of those not currently investing </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Due diligence procedures (Danish ATP) </li></ul><ul><li>The fees: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2% on annual commitments + 20% on capital gains </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>0,5% max in regulated asset management </li></ul></ul>
    17. 17. Private equity portfolio strategies risk concentration management cost (excl. infrastructure & large buy-outs) 2+20% 2+20% 2+20% 2+20% 1+10% Portfolio companies General Partner Fund-of-funds Investor (limited partner) Investor (direct investment) Investor (limited partner) Portfolio companies General Partner Portfolio companies General Partner Individual company Portfolio companies General Partner (private equity firm)
    18. 18. PF-PE partnerships <ul><li>Strategic partnerships </li></ul><ul><ul><li>OregonPERS & KKR </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AP4 & EQT </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Direct ownership in PE firms </li></ul><ul><ul><li>CalPERS in Carlyle, Silver Lake, Apollo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ABP & PGGM owned Alpinvest </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Australian Supers’ Industry Funds Management </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Mixed strategy </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ontario Teachers’: Teachers Private Capital & KKR </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AP4 & EQT bid over V&S </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Consortiums </li></ul></ul>
    19. 19. Swedish PF investments – diverse portfolio strategies of which €952m in EQT 1624 13% Wallenberg family Investor n. a. n. a. n. a. AMF n. a. 204 n/a Alecta Concentrated 171 4% AP7 Concentrated 242 100% AP6 Highly concentrated (2/3 in EQT) 140 0.6% AP4 Highly diluted (over 50 funds) 685 3% AP3 Concentrated (less than 10 funds) 203 0.9% AP2 Portfolio strategy PE in €m (dec. 06) PE as % of total AUM State & occupational pension funds
    20. 20. III. The Workers’ Capital <ul><li>I. The Landscape </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006, assessing PE performances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freeing up the investment policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>II. The Arms Race </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based allocation, management and regulation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Single fund, fund-of-funds, strategic partnership or co-investments? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>III. The Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The concept & the new conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to the stone age of governance </li></ul></ul><ul><li>IV Concluding remarks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Trade union and government trustee guidance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Re-regulation in the aftermath of the crisis </li></ul></ul>
    21. 21. Workers as employees & as investors <ul><li>Representation of workers « as employees » </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Collective bargaining </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Works councils, EWCs, board representation </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Representation of workers « as investors » </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Worker trustees in pension funds </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>On average 20% of market cap in US, UK & Canada </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Link between capital market regulation, corporate governance and workers’ rights </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Stakeholder corporate governance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Principles for Responsible Investment </li></ul></ul>
    22. 22. Stewardship of workers’ capital <ul><li>Shareholder activism </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ranging from </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>‘ engagement’ with the management, to </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>hostile resolutions at the AGM. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Aiming at </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>enhanced financial performance </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>enhanced corporate accountability (board composition/remuneration) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Workers’ capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Asset management shareholder accountability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>asset managers exercise AGM votes </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>TU-led (or commissioned) proxy voting surveys </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Issue-specific shareholder campaigns </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Resolution for Wal-Mart ESG disclosure policy </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Burma campaign </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Non-shareholder related </li></ul></ul>
    23. 23. TUAC’s two pillar framework on corporate governance (2005) <ul><li>Stakeholder approach </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholders (AGM) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Board of directors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Senior management </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Workers </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Workers’ capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Workers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Board of trustees </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Asset management </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholders (AGM) </li></ul></ul>ownership control
    24. 24. The stewardship of workers’ capital <ul><li>Conditions to be met </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Relevance of pre-funded schemes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freedom of portfolio investment (no restrictions) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Asset management accountability (AGM) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Member and beneficiary ownership & governance representation (vs employers) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Robust capital market (& TU) infrastructures </li></ul></ul>
    25. 25. Back to the stone age of governance <ul><li>Limited liability partnerships </li></ul><ul><ul><li>virtually all control in the hands of the general partners </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Un-regulated, no standardisation </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Right of the GP </li></ul><ul><ul><li>to keep an investment confidential, should disclosure “cause a risk of jeopardising that investment or the anticipated returns” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>to establish alternative investment vehicles to avoid “tax, legal, business, accounting or regulatory impediments to the making of a potential investment” </li></ul></ul>
    26. 26. Workers’ K does not function correctly under PE <ul><li>Stakeholder approach </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholders (AGM) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Board of directors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Senior management </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Workers </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Workers’ capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Workers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Board of trustees </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Asset management </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholders (AGM) </li></ul></ul>Private equity manager Private equity manager Private equity manager Private equity manager
    27. 27. Double standard behaviour? <ul><li>British House of Commons, hearings on private equity (2007) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Paul Myners: “ Investors can be quite lethargic … [we] should ask why they invest in private equity with its association with aggressive capital structures, high incentives for management and a minimalist approach to governance … while adopting an entirely different approach when investing in public equity.” </li></ul></ul>Source: Private equity, Treasury Committee, House of Commons, 24 July 2007 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmtreasy/567/567.pdf
    28. 28. A return to the 1950s conglomerates ? If so, PE firm and managers’ employer responsibilities could be activated
    29. 29. Impact of PE buy-out on the company’s… PF <ul><li>The case of the UK </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PF funding dependent on the employer covenant </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>High profile cases: Boots, EMI, GMB study </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Survey: ¾ of UK trustees would be “worried” about a possible leveraged buyout of the sponsoring company </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Pensions Act: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Expands the The Pension Regulator enforcement powers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ aggregate resources of a whole group of companies may be considered” (i.e. including those of other portfolio companies in other funds managed by the same private equity firm), in order to judge whether the funding level of the target company’s pension scheme is appropriate” </li></ul></ul>
    30. 30. IV Concluding remarks <ul><li>I. The Landscape </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The boom in 2002-2006, assessing PE performances </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Freeing up the investment policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>II. The Arms Race </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk-based allocation, management and regulation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Single fund, fund-of-funds, strategic partnership or co-investments? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>III. The Workers’ Capital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The concept & the new conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to the stone age of governance </li></ul></ul><ul><li>IV Concluding remarks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Trade union and government trustee guidance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Re-regulation in the aftermath of the crisis </li></ul></ul>
    31. 31. <ul><li>IOPS Guidelines </li></ul><ul><li>ITUC General Council (June 2007) </li></ul><ul><li>FNV & TUC Guidance </li></ul><ul><li>Global Unions (UNI, IUF) </li></ul><ul><li>G8 Trade union statements </li></ul>
    32. 32. Re-regulation in a post-15 September world <ul><ul><li>Unsustainable model of growth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The ‘structured finance’ business and the illusion of risk spreading </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment banks, conglomerates and the cost of regulatory arbitrage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholder value model of corporate governance versus market integrity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Central banks did not foresee the bubble </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak economic & financial governance </li></ul></ul>
    33. 33. The cost of corporate short-termism *purchased by BoA for 50bn; ** purchased 1.2bn by JP Morgan Chase following offloading of toxic assets valued at 29bn onto US gvt; *** 2007 only; **** entered into bankruptcy on 15 sep 5.3 4 Lehman Brothers**** 7.1 5 Morgan Stanley 1.7 1.7 1 Bear Stearns ** 8.2 12.1 25 JP Morgan Chase 11.8 16.8 10 Goldman Sachs 5 7.8 25 7.5 Citigroup 2.2 14.4 1.2 8 Merril Lynch* 1.3 17.5 25 Bank of America Debts to executives Buy-Backs 2006-07 US gvt injection Other funds Non-OECD SWF
    34. 34. Re-regulation <ul><ul><li>Strengthening financial safeguards & international cooperation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Diversifying finance & Protecting social development goals </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Spreading responsibility throughout the investment chain </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Unsustainable model of growth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The ‘structured finance’ business and the illusion of risk spreading </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment banks, conglomerates and the cost of regulatory arbitrage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholder value model of corporate governance versus market integrity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Central banks did not foresee the bubble </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak economic & financial governance </li></ul></ul>
    35. 35. Re-regulation <ul><ul><li>Unsustainable model of growth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The ‘structured finance’ business and the illusion of risk spreading </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment banks, conglomerates and the cost of regulatory arbitrage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholder value model of corporate governance versus market integrity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Central banks did not foresee the bubble </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak economic & financial governance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Strengthening financial safeguards & int’l cooperation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Bank prudential regulation </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Mandate & public accountability of central banks </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Reign in int’l flows of capital </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Offshore Financial Centres </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Staffing of supervisory and enforcement authorities </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Protecting social development goals) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Spreading responsibility throughout the investment chain) </li></ul></ul>
    36. 36. Re-regulation <ul><ul><li>Unsustainable model of growth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The ‘structured finance’ business and the illusion of risk spreading </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment banks, conglomerates and the cost of regulatory arbitrage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholder value model of corporate governance versus market integrity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Central banks did not foresee the bubble </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak economic & financial governance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Strengthening existing safeguards and international cooperation) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Diversifying finance & protecting social development goals </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Protect households against predatory lending </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Diversifying the financial sector & support community-based financial services </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Protect workers’ pension schemes </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>International taxation </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Spreading responsibility throughout the investment chain) </li></ul></ul>
    37. 37. Re-regulation <ul><ul><li>Unsustainable model of growth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The ‘structured finance’ business and the illusion of risk spreading </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment banks, conglomerates and the cost of regulatory arbitrage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shareholder value model of corporate governance versus market integrity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Central banks did not foresee the bubble </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak economic & financial governance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Strengthening existing safeguards and international cooperation) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Protecting social development goals) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Spreading responsibility throughout the investment chain </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Reform the credit rating industry </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Regulate credit risk transfers and derivatives </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Regulate private investment funds and conglomerates </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Ensure executives’ and intermediaries’ perverse incentives are reversed </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Combat corporate short-termism </li></ul></ul></ul>
    38. 38. Re-regulation & private equity <ul><li>Financial safeguards & int’l cooperation </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Prudential regulation for banks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CB mandate and public accountability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>International flows of capital </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Offshore Financial Centres </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Staffing of financial authorities </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Diversifying finance & social goals </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Protect households </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Community-based financial services </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Protect pensions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>International taxation </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Spreading responsibility </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Credit rating industry </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Credit risk transfers and derivatives </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Private funds & conglomerates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Executive compensations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Corporate short-termism </li></ul></ul>
    39. 39. <ul><li>[email_address] </li></ul><ul><li>+33 (0)1 55 37 37 37 </li></ul>

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