Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

William Hogan, Research Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Harvard University

467 views

Published on

Clean Energy Policy and the Green Agenda

Published in: Environment
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

William Hogan, Research Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Harvard University

  1. 1. CLEAN ENERGY POLICY AND THE GREEN AGENDA William W. Hogan Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Canada-US Climate Policy Forum Ottawa ON June 13, 2016
  2. 2. 1 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green The scale of the climate problem is enormous. Obtaining cooperation across sectors and countries will require transforming the energy system. (King et al., 2015) (p. 12)
  3. 3. 2 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green The costs of going green present a first-order issue in developing the policy. One argument implies that the costs will be minimal. “In remarks on Twitter, Obama said: “This study [“Better Growth, Better Climate”] concludes that no one has to choose between fighting climate change and growing the economy.” (Barak Obama, September 16, 2014.) “This report [“Better Growth, Better Climate”] argues for a new model where economic growth and climate action are mutually reinforcing – and it shows how we can build it. There is no time to lose." (Ban Ki Moon, September 16, 2014.) "It doesn't cost more to deal with climate change; it costs more to ignore it ... and we need to make that clear to people in this country," Kerry told reporters. (John Kerry, New York, September 23, 2014.) (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. (2014). “Better Growth, Better Climate.” Retrieved from http://newclimateeconomy.report/)
  4. 4. 3 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green An alternative argument is that the costs of going green will be significant but worth it. “I am very well aware that these are not easy choices for any country to make – I know that. I’ve been in politics for a while. I know the pull and different powerful political forces. Coal and oil are currently cheap ways to power a society, at least in the near term.” (John Kerry, Jakarata, February 16, 2014.) “Doing what is necessary to achieve the United Nations’ target for reducing emissions would reduce economic growth by about 0.06 percent annually from now through 2100, according to the I.P.C.C. That sounds trivial, but by the end of the century it means a 5 percent loss of worldwide economic activity per year. “And this cost projection assumes optimal conditions — the immediate implementation of a common global price or tax on carbon dioxide emissions, a significant expansion of nuclear power and the advent and wide use of new, low-cost technologies to control emissions and provide cleaner sources of energy. “If the new technologies we hope will be available aren’t, like one that would enable the capture and storage of carbon emissions from power plants, the cost estimates more than double.” (Robert Stavins, NYT, Sep. 20, 2014.)
  5. 5. 4 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green A central debate focuses on policies to deploy clean renewable energy technologies. The German Enrgiewende is the poster child for this discussion. The case for the success of the Enrgiewende emphasizes the reduction in costs for future deployment rather than the immediate environmental benefits. “The German (and Spanish, and several U.S. states) commitments to solar in the early, expensive years were not simply to purchase zero-carbon energy: Their main point was to drive down the price, so that there would be vast amounts of clean energy available at a reasonable price in the future. Looking back at the Energiewende, the proper question is not whether the initial tranche of renewable energy was cost-competitive with other technologies, but whether the investment drove the price down enough to give the world new, affordable, clean technology options.” (emphasis in original) (Hal Harvey. (2013).”A Tale of Two Countries: Renewable Energy in Germany.” Energy Innovation LLC.)
  6. 6. 5 Clean Energy Innovation
  7. 7. 6 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green The costs of clean technologies are high, but declining. Success stimulating the development of less expensive will be crucial in achieving the climate goals.  RE<C. The earlier mantra from Google, where renewable energy (RE) is cheaper than coal (C). This would make adoption of renewables an easy choice even without considering the environmental benefits.  RE<C+Carbon Price. The economic welfare outcome that internalizes the carbon externality. Renewable energy is expensive, but it is worth it. Climate policy includes a mix of mitigation and adaptation.  RE>C+Carbon Price. Renewable energy is too expensive, and climate policy leans heavily towards adaptation. It is important to know where we are and where we are going. The policy prescription depends on the diagnosis. How and how much should we be supporting the development of clean energy technologies?
  8. 8. 7 CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green If renewables cost less than coal (RE<C), we could repeat the shale gas miracle with a cleaner energy technology.  Technology Innovation. The development stage would include a focus and R&D and small scale deployment to create and refine the technology.  Market Deployment. Once the technology crossed the market threshold, deployment could be both large and rapid. (MIT Energy Initiative, 2011) (p. 18) http://energy.gov/fe/science-innovation/oil-gas-research/shale-gas-rd
  9. 9. 8 CLEAN ENERGY Social Cost of Carbon Although there is significant uncertainty, the estimates from the U.S. government imply a substantial social cost of carbon dioxide ($/ton CO2) that is not internalized in the market. Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. (2013). Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Order 12866, (Revised, July 2015), p. 13.
  10. 10. 9 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Innovation and Deployment The importance of policy in driving renewables deployment is consistent with the construction history cost in the United States. (Energy Information Administration, 2016) (p. 10)
  11. 11. 10 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Innovation and Deployment The importance of policy in driving renewables deployment is consistent with the EIA analysis of the impact of the Clean Power Plan. (Energy Information Administration, 2016) (p. 6)
  12. 12. 11 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Innovation and Deployment The dependence on policy support for renewables implies a question about the proper focus of that support.  Upstream Support for Research, Development and Demonstration. The focus would be on reducing the costs before large scale deployment. This would mimic the shale gas experience.  Subsidies for Large Scale Deployment. Policy would support deployment to capture the direct benefits of clean energy technologies and the indirect benefits of reducing the cost of meeting the long-term requirements of the green agenda.
  13. 13. 12 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Costs A starting point is an assessment of the current estimates of costs of competing clean energy supply technologies. There is a wide range of views expressed about the costs and cost trends. “One popularized myth about [Renewable Electricity] is that it is simply too expensive.” (Stark, Pless, Logan, Zhou, & Arent, 2015) (p. 7) “Some world leaders, especially in developing countries like India, have long said it’s hard to reduce the emissions that are warming the planet because they need to use relatively inexpensive — but highly carbon-intensive — fuels like coal to keep energy affordable. That argument is losing its salience as the cost of renewable energy sources like wind and solar continue to fall. … Despite increased private investment in renewables, the United States and other industrialized countries have not lived up to their pledge at the Copenhagen conference in 2009 to provide $100 billion a year to underwrite climate projects in poorer countries. Negotiators in Paris gave themselves until 2025 to come up with a new financing goal.” (NYT Editorial, April 4, 2016) “There is no shortage of energy on earth. The sun delivers 5000 times more power to the surface of the earth than humanity needs. The cost of renewables has been falling. But not fast enough.” http://www.globalapolloprogram.org/about/ “In short, we need an energy miracle.” (Bill Gates, https://www.gatesnotes.com/2016-Annual-Letter)
  14. 14. 13 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Cost Benchmarks The Energy Information Administration provides detailed cost estimates for all major sources of energy supply. The estimates and assumptions have been vetted in supporting reports, white papers and conferences. However, the cost and deployment estimates, and the important policy implications, have been controversial. “Several articles, papers, and comments over the past year offered critical views regarding renewable electricity data and projections prepared by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). … EIA re-examines a variety of sources for wind and solar costs every year to ensure that its cost assumptions are as closely aligned with this fast-changing market as possible.” (Energy Information Administration, 2016) (p. 1 & 7, Figures p. 14 & 23)
  15. 15. 14 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Cost Benchmarks The EIA analysis provides the backup for adjusting cost estimates to deal with different subsidies, dispatch requirements and externalities. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) provides one benchmark. This is an apples-to-apples comparison based on the assumptions and input data for the United States.
  16. 16. 15 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Cost Benchmarks The details of the EIA LCOE components appear in the table.   Author’s analysis based pn Energy Information Administration. (2014c). Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources  in the Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (pp. 1–12). Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf  Plant Type  Levelized  Capital Cost  Fixed O&M  Variable  O&M  (including  fuel)  Transmission  Investment  Dispatch  Profile Conventional  Pollutants CO2@$30/t Total System  LCOE  Conventional Coal  44.4 4.2 30.3 1.2 0.7 35 24.6 140.6 Coal‐Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC)  56.3 6.9 31.7 1.2 0.7 2 20.9 119.8 IGCC with CCS  97.8 9.8 38.6 1.2 0.9 2 2.3 152.7  Conventional Gas Combined Cycle  14.3 1.7 49.1 1.2 0 2 10.8 79.2  Advanced Gas Combined Cycle  15.7 2 45.5 1.2 0 2 10.1 76.6  Advanced CC with CCS  30.3 4.2 55.6 1.2 0 2 1.2 94.6 Advanced Nuclear  71.4 11.8 11.8 1.1 1.2 0 0.0 97.3 Geothermal  43.1 12.2 0 1.4 2 2 0.0 60.8 Biomass  57.7 14.5 39.5 1.2 ‐0.4 2 0.0 114.6 Wind  85.4 13 0 3.2 7.2 0 0.0 108.8 Wind – Offshore  231.7 22.8 0 5.8 0.6 0 0.0 260.9 Solar PV  139.6 11.4 0 4.1 ‐10.5 0 0.0 144.6 Solar Thermal  246.5 42.1 0 6 ‐10.4 0 0.0 284.2 Hydroelectric  72.0 4.1 6.4 2 3 0 0.0 87.5 Summary 2019 Levelized Cost of Generation: Year 2019 Entry (2012$/MWh)
  17. 17. 16 Clean Power Plan
  18. 18. 17 CLEAN ENERGY Clean Power Plan The estimates of the cost of renewables have important policy implications. Consider the Clean Power Plan. Under the CPP, states are required to file a State Implementation Plan (SIP) with interim goals for 2022 and a final goal for 2030, or accept EPA’s Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).  Rate-Based Plan o Adopt a program along the lines of the building blocks to demonstrate compliance. o Compliance measured across multiple years. o Creates political economy with a bias towards subsidies and mandates.  Mass-Based Plan o Equivalent limits on total emissions. o Special provisions to avoid “leakage” through emissions from new gas units. o Awards emission allowances assuming maximum emissions feasible under rate-based plan.  Trading Across Like Plans o Allows autarky for production but implicit trading of electricity. o Allows intrastate and interstate trading if proposed by states. o Allows banking but not borrowing. The CPP assumes an integrated market with efficient trading in setting its regional standards, but may not provide the incentives to make efficient trading part of the SIP. It is clear that for the FIP the EPA is leaning towards a mass-based approach with efficient trading.(Environmental Protection Agency, 2015)
  19. 19. 18 CLEAN POWER PLAN Renewable Set-Aside For mass based plans one option is to provide a 5% set-aside for renewables to overcome the incentive to build new NGCC plants. EPA bases the required incentive on its optimistic estimates of the difference in the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) relative to NGCC.
  20. 20. 19 CLEAN ENERGY Clean Power Plan EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) under Sec 111(d) utilizes three building blocks, including changing the dispatch of Electricity Generating Units (EGUs). There is confusion about what this means. Strictly speaking, the CPP is not a plan—it is a rule setting standards. The implementation plans will determine how these standards get translated into action. Building Blocks create something like a ‘Deemed Cleaner Power Plant (DCPP).’  Assume that all existing power plants implement incremental improvements in heat rates and corresponding reduction in emissions.  Assume all increases in the utilization of existing natural gas units result in reduced utilization of existing coal plants and correspondingly reduced emissions.  Assume that all incremental renewables substitute for use of existing coal plants. Energy efficiency not included in final standard but could be used in an implementation plan. The building blocks are based on EPA’s judgement about the Best System of Emission Reductions (BSER). The CPP reaches well beyond the boundaries of individual plants—outside the fence. This raises an issue that will be a centerpiece of litigation about application of the CAA. (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015)
  21. 21. 20 CLEAN ENERGY Clean Power Plan The Clean Power Plan is the subject of extensive litigation. The states are divided, but there is ample opposition. Both sides express confidence in their legal position. “West Virginia Attorney General Patrick Morrisey told reporters on a call that a petition for review asking that the Clean Power Plan be found unlawful had already been filed with the DC Circuit on behalf of a ‘broad, bipartisan coalition of 24 states.’ … ” “The US Chamber of Commerce is also challenging the fairness and legality of the Clean Power Plan in a lawsuit that includes 15 business groups.” (Megawatt Daily, October 26, 2015.) “Such a claim of authority with no limiting principle will naturally expand over time… One irony is that even if EPA weren’t rewriting black-letter law to bullrush the CPP, the rewrite itself would be unconstitutional. ” (WSJ Editorial, “EPA Deserves a Stay,” October 30, 2015) The Supreme Court, in February 2016, issued an unprecedented stay of implementation, even before the case was heard at the DC Circuit Court. This was a surprise. Subsequently, in May 2016, the DC Circuit Court elected to skip the usual three judge panel and skip directly to an “en banc” review. This was a surprise. “Clean Power Plan’s legal future ‘a mess’.” (Richard Lazarus, Harvard Gazette, February 26, 2016)
  22. 22. 21 IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS Clean Power Plan A study by the National Association of Clean Air Agencies addressed options for implementation.
  23. 23. 22 IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS Clean Power Plan The 465 page study by the National Association of Clean Air Agencies described 26 categories of implementation options. (National Association of Clean Air Agencies, 2015) Optimize Power Plant Operations Implement Combined Heat and Power in the Electric Sector Implement Combined Heat and Power in Other Sectors Improve Coal Quality Optimize Grid Operations Increase Generation from Low-Emission Resources Pursue Carbon Capture and Utilization or Sequestration Retire Aging Power Plants Switch Fuels at Existing Power Plants Reduce Losses in the Transmission and Distribution System Establish Energy Savings Targets for Utilities Foster New Markets for Energy Efficiency Pursue Behavioral Efficiency Programs Boost Appliance Efficiency Standards Boost Building Energy Codes Increase Clean Energy Procurement Requirements Encourage Clean Distributed Generation Revise Transmission Pricing and Access Policies Revise Capacity Market Practices and Policies Improve Integration of Renewables into the Grid Change the Dispatch Order of Power Plants Improve Utility Resource Planning Practices Improve Demand Response Policies and Programs Adopt Market-Based Emissions Reduction Programs Tax Carbon Dioxide Emissions Consider Emerging Technologies and Other Important Policies
  24. 24. 23 ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch EPA’s CPP under Sec 111(d) envisions three building blocks, including changing the dispatch of Electricity Generating Units (EGUs). There is confusion about what this means. “Environmental dispatch is a policy in which the system operator explicitly considers environmental criteria (primarily air pollution emissions) when making dispatch decisions, even if the environmental impacts do not lead to an actual regulatory compliance cost.” (National Association of Clean Air Agencies, 2015, p. ES-7) How does EPA address the matter of environmental dispatch? The Clean Power Plan analysis utilizes EPA’s “Integrated Planning Model (IPM) … a multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector. It provides forecasts of least cost capacity expansion, electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies while meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission, dispatch, and reliability constraints.” This is a zonal model built on load duration curves and inter-zonal transmission limits. IPM cannot replicate the impact of transmission constraints in actual dispatch operations. (http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/BaseCasev513.html) “EPA recognizes that the word “dispatch” can be used to describe how balancing authorities conduct real- time selection of specific generation (supply) to meet load (demand), on an hourly or even 15-minute basis. In the context of the proposed CPP and in this [Technical Support Document], the word “dispatch” is intended to refer to broader patterns of generation across different generating technologies over longer periods of time, in keeping with the compliance flexibilities afforded under this rule (e.g., where emission performance can be averaged over multiple years).” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, “Translation of the Clean Power Plan Emission Rate-Based CO2 Goals to Mass- Based Equivalents,” Technical Support Document (TSD) for Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, November 2014, footnote 6. What does all this mean? Why does it matter?
  25. 25. 24 MW ¢ Start up Costs + Generators & Customers ... Financial Transmission T Dispatch Commitments Q Scheduling Settlements P, Q, T Balancing Settlements p, q, Q kWh $ kWh $ Locational P, Q Locational p, q Schedule BidsSchedules Balancing Bids Contract $ Q Q Excess Congestion $ Excess Congestion $ T Imbalance $ Scheduling Transactions Balancing Transactions Settlements A Structure for Forward Market Scheduling, Spot Market Dispatch & Settlements MW ¢ MW ¢ MW ¢ Reliability Commitments Rights ELECTRICITY MARKET A Consistent Framework The example of successful central coordination, CRT, Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) Millennium Order (Order 2000) Standard Market Design (SMD) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), “Successful Market Design” provides a workable market framework that is working in places like New York, PJM in the Mid-Atlantic Region, New England, the Midwest, California, SPP, and Texas. This efficient market design is under (constant) attack. “Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is the electricity spot pricing model that serves as the benchmark for market design – the textbook ideal that should be the target for policy makers. A trading arrangement based on LMP takes all relevant generation and transmission costs appropriately into account and hence supports optimal investments.”(International Energy Agency, Tackling Investment Challenges in Power Generation in IEA Countries: Energy Market Experience, Paris, 2007, p. 16.) Coordinated Spot Market Bid-Based, Security-Constrained, Economic Dispatch with Nodal Prices The RTO NOPR Order SMD NOPR "Successful Market Design" Contains a Consistent Framework 07/05 Bilateral Schedules Financial Transmission Rights LicensePlateAccessCharges Market-DrivenInvestment at Difference in Nodal Prices (TCCs, FTRs, FCRs, CRRs, ...) 5/99 12/99 07/02
  26. 26. 25 ELECTRICITY MARKET A Consistent Framework Why is this important? The basic structure of the organized electricity markets depends on the successful market design framework of economic dispatch and financial transmission rights. This is the only model that can meet the tests of open access and non-discrimination. Anything that upsets this design will unravel the wholesale electricity market. Implementing Open Acess Order 888 Coordinated Spot Market Bid-Based, Security-Constrained, Economic Dispatch with Nodal Prices Bilateral Schedules Financial Transmission Rights LicensePlateAccessCharges Market-DrivenInvestment at Difference in Nodal Prices (TCCs, FTRs, FCRs, CRRs, ...) Open Access Non-Discrimination Coordinated Spot Market Bid-Based, Security-Constrained, Economic Dispatch with Nodal Prices Bilateral Schedules Financial Transmission Rights LicensePlateAccessCharges Market-DrivenInvestment at Difference in Nodal Prices (TCCs, FTRs, FCRs, CRRs, ...) NOT Successful Market Design Not SMD CAISO ... SMD working in Mid-Atlantic, MISO, New York,New England. California, Texas, SPP ... 1997 1998 1999 Failed Zonal Models
  27. 27. 26 ELECTRICITY MARKET A Consistent Framework Why is this important? The basic model now applies in all the organized markets under regional Transmission Organizations in the United States. But not yet in Canada.
  28. 28. 27 ELECTRICITY MARKET A Consistent Framework Why is this important? The basic model is expanding through the Energy Imbalance Market in the western states. (Guillermo Bautista Alderete, CAISO, “Best Practices in Organized Nodal (LMP) Markets,” Nodal Trading Conference, October 2015.)
  29. 29. 28 ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch Mechanisms that put a price on carbon will change the environmental footprint of economic dispatch.  Carbon Tax. The most direct means. The tax becomes part of the marginal cost for carbon emitting plants. There is a seamless integration with short-run economic dispatch.  Cap and Trade. An indirect approach. If the cap and trade system allows for banking and borrowing over any reasonably extended period, the current price of permits operates like a carbon tax. There can be a seamless integration with economic dispatch. o Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). o CARB and CAISO-Pacificorp Energy Imbalance Market. EPA acknowledges the importance of pricing carbon: “… there are a number of different ways that states can design programs that achieve required reductions while working within existing market mechanisms used to dispatch power effectively in the short term and to ensure adequate capacity in the long term. These programs and programs for conventional pollutants, such as the Acid Rain Program under Title IV of the CAA, have demonstrated that compliance with environmental programs can be monetized such that it is factored into power sector economic decision making in ways that reduce the cost of controlling pollution, maintain electricity system reliability and work within the least cost dispatching principles that are key to operation of our electric power grid. The proposal would also allow states to work together with individual companies on potential specific challenges. These and other flexibilities are discussed further in Section VIII of the preamble.” Environmental Protection Agency, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Proposed Rule,” 40 CFR Part 60, June 18, 2014, p. 34834. (emphasis added)
  30. 30. 29 ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch Pricing carbon is the only way to maintain integrity of the electricity market design. Failure to acknowledge this reality can lead to mistaken or unintended consequences. The EPA CPP analysis proceeds as though economic dispatch is not central to the market. Yet, real dispatch results may be different.  Improved efficiency for coal plants can result in more CO2 emissions.  Increased use of gas may substitute for other renewables or nuclear.  New renewable plants may substitute for other renewables or nuclear.  Energy efficiency can interact with grid congestion to cause higher CO2 emissions.
  31. 31. 30 ELECTRICITY MARKET Organized Electricity Markets The first responsibility of RTOs is to operate the electricity system to maintain reliability. Within that mandate is the objective to operate an efficient and open market under the principles of open access and non-discrimination. RTOs should support initiatives that put an explicit price on carbon and avoid activities that undermine the basic purposes of RTOs and put them on a slippery slope towards unravelling the market design. The possible implementation details range from those consistent with efficient electricity markets to those that would destroy the necessary market fundamentals. For details, see (Hogan, 2015).  Good o Carbon Tax o Cap-and-Trade  Bad o Restricted Offers o Self-Scheduling  Ugly o Cumulative Constrained Dispatch o Deemed Cost-Adders o Proliferating Subsidies o Capacity Market Tranches o Environmental Dispatch
  32. 32. 31 CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Dirty Taxes and Green Subsidies The EPA analysis implicitly assumes that there is one-for-one substitution between green energy and fossil fuels. This is not true. “Subsidies pose a more general problem in this context. They attempt to discourage carbon- intensive activities by making other activities more attractive. One difficulty with subsidies is identifying the eligible low-carbon activities. Why subsidize hybrid cars (which we do) and not biking (which we do not)? Is the answer to subsidize all low carbon activities? Of course, that is impossible because there are just too many low-carbon activities, and it would prove astronomically expensive. Another problem is that subsidies are so uneven in their impact. A recent study by the National Academy of Sciences looked at the impact of several subsidies on GHG emissions. It found a vast difference in their effectiveness in terms of CO2 removed per dollar of subsidy. None of the subsidies were efficient; some were horribly inefficient; and others such as the ethanol subsidy were perverse and actually increased GHG emissions. The net effect of all the subsidies taken together was effectively zero! So in the end, it is much more effective to penalize carbon emissions than to subsidize everything else.” (Nordhaus, 2013) (p. 266)
  33. 33. 32 ELECTRICITY MARKET State Implementation Plans The CPP embeds contradictions of the Clean Air Act, carbon policy, and a collision with electricity market design. States will have to sort out these issues in their implementation plans.  Wholesale power markets depend on the economic dispatch framework.  Monetizing carbon is the key to meshing environmental goals and electricity market design.  National carbon policy rejects a carbon tax (so far).  EPAs Clean Power Plan does not require monetizing carbon.  The Clean Power Plan proceeds with CAA supported rate-based standards and new ad hoc “building blocks” that are only loosely connected to the underlying social cost of carbon or the workings of electricity markets. Will state implementation plans thread the needle to meet environmental goals? Will the necessary electricity market design survive the regulatory gauntlet? Would implementation plans create perverse outcomes and arbitrage opportunities? Will the future be the RGGI or CARB-CAISO-Pacificorp models, meshing carbon pricing and economic dispatch? Or will the future repeat the fiasco of the California-Enron electricity market design that prohibited economic dispatch? And how will we coordinate with Canada?
  34. 34. 33 Sources. Energy Information Administration. (2016). Wind and Solar Data and Projections from the U. S. Energy Information Administration: Past Performance and Ongoing Enhancements, (March). Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/supplement/renewable/pdf/projections.pdf Environmental Protection Agency. (2015). Clean Power Plan (Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units). Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan- existing-power-plants#CPP-final Hogan, W. W. (2015). Electricity Markets and the Clean Power Plan. The Electricity Journal, 28(9), 9–32. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040619015002006 King, D., Browne, J., Layard, R., Donnell, G. O., Rees, M., Stern, N., & Turner, A. (2015). A Global Apollo Programme To Combat Climate Change, 38. Retrieved from http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/Global_Apollo_Programme_Report.pdf MIT Energy Initiative. (2011). The Future of Natural Gas. doi:10.2118/3271-PA National Association of Clean Air Agencies. (2015). Implementing EPA’s Clean Power Plan: A Menu of Options. Retrieved from http://www.4cleanair.org/sites/default/files/Documents/NACAA_Menu_of_Options_HR.pdf Nordhaus, W. (2013). The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World. New Haven: Yale University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YfzYAQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=The+Climate+Casino:+Risk,+Uncertainty, +and+Economics+for+a+Warming+World&ots=g2lR0lTh_s&sig=FMS8QxAOSGvw7pfCZugeOwjoX-E Stark, C., Pless, J., Logan, J., Zhou, E., & Arent, D. J. (2015). Renewable Electricity: Insights for the Coming Decade (No. NREL/TP- 6A50-63604). Retrieved from http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63604.pdf
  35. 35. 34 William W. Hogan is the Raymond Plank Professor of Global Energy Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This paper draws on research for the Harvard Electricity Policy Group and for the Harvard-Japan Project on Energy and the Environment. The author is or has been a consultant on electric market reform and transmission issues for Allegheny Electric Global Market, American Electric Power, American National Power, Aquila, Atlantic Wind Connection, Australian Gas Light Company, Avista Corporation, Avista Utilities, Avista Energy, Barclays Bank PLC, Brazil Power Exchange Administrator (ASMAE), British National Grid Company, California Independent Energy Producers Association, California Independent System Operator, California Suppliers Group, Calpine Corporation, CAM Energy, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Centerpoint Energy, Central Maine Power Company, Chubu Electric Power Company, Citigroup, City Power Marketing LLC, Cobalt Capital Management LLC, Comision Reguladora De Energia (CRE, Mexico), Commonwealth Edison Company, COMPETE Coalition, Conectiv, Constellation Energy, Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Constellation Power Source, Coral Power, Credit First Suisse Boston, DC Energy, Detroit Edison Company, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank Energy Trading LLC, Duquesne Light Company, Dyon LLC, Dynegy, Edison Electric Institute, Edison Mission Energy, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, Electric Power Supply Association, El Paso Electric, Energy Endeavors LP, Exelon, Financial Marketers Coalition, FirstEnergy Corporation, FTI Consulting, GenOn Energy, GPU Inc. (and the Supporting Companies of PJM), GPU PowerNet Pty Ltd., GDF SUEZ Energy Resources NA, Great Bay Energy LLC, GWF Energy, Independent Energy Producers Assn, ISO New England, Koch Energy Trading, Inc., JP Morgan, LECG LLC, Luz del Sur, Maine Public Advocate, Maine Public Utilities Commission, Merrill Lynch, Midwest ISO, Mirant Corporation, MIT Grid Study, Monterey Enterprises LLC, MPS Merchant Services, Inc. (f/k/a Aquila Power Corporation), JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Morrison & Foerster LLP, National Independent Energy Producers, New England Power Company, New York Independent System Operator, New York Power Pool, New York Utilities Collaborative, Niagara Mohawk Corporation, NRG Energy, Inc., Ontario Attorney General, Ontario IMO, Ontario Ministries of Energy and Infrastructure, Pepco, Pinpoint Power, PJM Office of Interconnection, PJM Power Provider (P3) Group, Powerex Corp., Powhatan Energy Fund LLC, PPL Corporation, PPL Montana LLC, PPL EnergyPlus LLC, Public Service Company of Colorado, Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Public Service New Mexico, PSEG Companies, Red Wolf Energy Trading, Reliant Energy, Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, Round Rock Energy LP, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Secretaría de Energía (SENER, Mexico), Sempra Energy, SESCO LLC, Shell Energy North America (U.S.) L.P., SPP, Texas Genco, Texas Utilities Co, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Toronto Dominion Bank, Transalta, TransAlta Energy Marketing (California), TransAlta Energy Marketing (U.S.) Inc., Transcanada, TransCanada Energy LTD., TransÉnergie, Transpower of New Zealand, Tucson Electric Power, Twin Cities Power LLC, Vitol Inc., Westbrook Power, Western Power Trading Forum, Williams Energy Group, Wisconsin Electric Power Company, and XO Energy. The views presented here are not necessarily attributable to any of those mentioned, and any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the author. (Related papers can be found on the web at www.whogan.com ).

×