S12h oxford geoengineering

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S12h oxford geoengineering

  1. 1. Knowing Knowledge and Innovation:some key implications for climate geo-engineering presentation to the Third Transdisciplinary Summer School on Climate Geo-Engineering Queens College University of Oxford 21st August 2012 Andy Stirling SPRU & STEPS Centre
  2. 2. Geoengineering Challenges‘Governance’? Know Thyself! Question content and processes of knowledge production Learn from studies of innovation and social choice Appreciate Diversity of Methods, Principles and Procedures Understand Key General Lessons
  3. 3. Knowledge in Policyon zoonotic pandemics:“… sound science … science-based decisions” - UN WHO DG Margaret Chanon genetic modification:“… this governments approach is to make decisions … on the basis of sound science” - former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blairon chemicals:“ …sound science will be the basis of theCommissions legislative proposal…” - EC RTD Commissioner, Philippe Busquinon energy:“[n]ow is the right time for a cool-headed,evidence based assessment … I want tosweep away historic prejudice and put in itsplace evidence and science” former UK Energy Minister Malcolm WicksJustification: move from political ‘problems’ to technical ‘puzzles’
  4. 4. Ambiguity in EvidenceEnergy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
  5. 5. Ambiguity in EvidenceEnergy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…coaloilgasnuclearhydrowindsolarbiomass 0.001 0.1 10 1000 low RISK high externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)
  6. 6. Ambiguity in EvidenceEnergy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis… n=coaloilgas minimum 25% 75% maximumnuclear 21hydrowindsolarbiomass 0.001 0.1 10 1000 low RISK high ‘externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)
  7. 7. Ambiguity in EvidenceEnergy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis… n=coal 36oil 20gas 31nuclear 21hydro 16wind 18solar 11biomass 22
  8. 8. Knowing KnowledgeConventional ‘risk practices’ suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
  9. 9. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores, (often) denies radical openness of ‘incertitude’:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action . Aristotle, Kant, Habermas know-how is less important than know-why – eg: how to apply neuroscience?
  10. 10. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects . Lao Tzu, Socrates, Keynes ‘unknowns’ as important as ‘knowns’ – eg: unexpected mechanisms in nanohealth technologies
  11. 11. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise. Gödel, Dosi, Collingridge ”known knowns” foster hubris – eg: dangers of thinking we know halogenated hydrocarbons, CFCs and the ozone hole endocrine disruptors methyl tertbutyl ether
  12. 12. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increaseignorance . Einstein, Ravetz, Beck… area / perimeter of known – nonlinear dynamics of climate and oceans
  13. 13. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action- indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability . Ellul, Wynne, Tenner not existence but exposure to unknown eg: nuclear dependency
  14. 14. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action- indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and oftenconflicting . Kuhn, Arrow, Jasanoff… knowledge often not linear / additive - eg: agronomy, ecology, soil science, molecular biology on GM
  15. 15. Knowing KnowledgeConventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and often conflictingrepresenting incomplete knowledge as expert ‘risk’ is deeply problematic
  16. 16. Science in Policy“you can’t stop progress” … - The Economist PROGRESS“well restore science to its rightful place”… ` - President Obama“Our hope … relies on scientific andtechnological progress” - Premier Wen Jiabao“One can not impede scientific progress.” SCIENCE - President Ahmadinejad
  17. 17. Innovation in PolicyLord Alec Broers, President, RAEng PROGRESS…“history is a race to advance technology”Technology:“will determine the future of the human race’”The challenge of government: TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE“to strive to stay in the race”…The role of the public:“to give technology the status it deserves”…
  18. 18. Innovation Governanceall innovation is progress…Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action” PROGRESS - EU Council of Ministers“we need more pro-innovation policies” - PM Gordon Brown“… the Government’s strategy is … pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron TECHNOLOGY
  19. 19. Innovation Governanceall innovation is progress…Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action” PROGRESS - EU Council of Ministers“we need more pro-innovation policies” - PM Gordon Brown“… the Government’s strategy is … pro-innovation” - PM David Cameronall technology is progress… TECHNOLOGY“a pro- technology culture must be created…” - Council for Science and Technology GM critics are “anti-technology … members of the flat earth society’, opposed to modern economics, modern technology, modern science, modern life itself” - UN DDG Malloch-Brown
  20. 20. Conventional Innovation Governance PROGRESS TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … noalternatives… no politics … no choice!
  21. 21. Conventional Innovation Governance PROGRESS TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast? … who leads?
  22. 22. Conventional Innovation Governance PROGRESS TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast?’ … who leads?Seriously neglects questions over: which way? …what alternatives? says who? …why?
  23. 23. Inevitability of Pathways? space of pathway configurations directionThe example of the bicycle… … early designs took many exotic forms
  24. 24. Inevitability of Pathways? space of pathway configurations directionConventional idea: eccentric configurations converge to ‘optimality’… …but ‘optimality’ depends on context, moment and perspective
  25. 25. Contingency of Pathways multiple diverging directions time directionSo… … the ‘big picture’ is more the other way around!each starting point yields many feasible, viable innovation pathways‘best path’ not just about determining necessity or ‘optimising’ markets …deliberately or blindly societies close down the pathways they pursue
  26. 26. Realities of InnovationFor instance... “sustainable energy”Not all that is conceivable, feasible, viable – will be fully realisable
  27. 27. Realities of InnovationIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayssocial shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03)studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)
  28. 28. Realities of InnovationIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayshistory: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83) path-dependence (David, 85) path creation(Karnoe, 01)
  29. 29. Realities of InnovationIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwaysphilosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)
  30. 30. Realities of InnovationIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayseconomics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89) regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,82)
  31. 31. Beyond Riskcontrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’ unproblematic RISK engineered components closed deterministic systems high frequency incidents knowledge familiar contexts about INCERTITUDE likelihoods open dynamic systems low frequency events human factors changing contexts problematic UNCERTAINTY - Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...
  32. 32. Beyond Riskcontrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’ knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY engineered components defining pros & cons closed deterministic systems contrasting impacts high frequency incidents diverse perspectives knowledge familiar contexts alternative options about INCERTITUDE likelihoods open dynamic systems novel agents or vectors low frequency events surprising conditions human factors new alternatives changing contexts wilful blinkers problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE - Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...
  33. 33. Pressures for Closureinstitutional drivers of risk assessment knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY aggregative analysis patronage, pressure political closure knowledge about insurance limits ` science-based reductive models policy likelihoods stochastic reasoning institutional remits political liability protection culture harm definitions indicators / metrics problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE risk focus is shaped by power – Beck’s “organised irresponsibility”
  34. 34. Methods for ‘Opening Up’precaution and participation are about rigour knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY aggregated probabilities optimisation algorithms synthetic decision trees Delphi / Foresight knowledge predictive modelling about likelihoods problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude
  35. 35. Methods for ‘Opening Up’precaution and participation are about rigour knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY aggregated probabilities optimisation algorithms synthetic decision trees Delphi / Foresight knowledge predictive modelling about likelihoods burden of evidence onus of persuasion uncertainty factors decision heuristics interval analysis sensitivity testing problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude
  36. 36. Methods for ‘Opening Up’precaution and participation are about rigour knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY aggregated probabilities scenarios / backcasting optimisation algorithms interactive modelling synthetic decision trees mapping / Q-methods Delphi / Foresight participatory deliberation knowledge predictive modelling democratic procedures about likelihoods burden of evidence onus of persuasion uncertainty factors decision heuristics interval analysis sensitivity testing problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude
  37. 37. Methods for ‘Opening Up’precaution and participation are about rigour knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY aggregated probabilities scenarios / backcasting optimisation algorithms interactive modelling synthetic decision trees mapping / Q-methods Delphi / Foresight participatory deliberation knowledge predictive modelling democratic procedures about likelihoods burden of evidence responsive civic research onus of persuasion curiosity monitoring, uncertainty factors evidentiary presumptions decision heuristics flexibility, reversibility interval analysis diversity, resilience, sensitivity testing agility, adaptability problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude
  38. 38. ‘Opening Up’ Incertitudeprecaution and participation are about rigour knowledge about possibilities unproblematic problematic unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY definitive participatory prescription deliberation knowledge Options about likelihoods safety humility Options reflexivity precautionary adaptive sustainability appraisal learning problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE ‘opening up’: options, issues, approaches, possibilities, perspectives
  39. 39. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance MTBE PCBs, DES; human systems; experimental lock-in
  40. 40. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance CFCs, EDCs, GMOs: use broader, open methods reviewed,
  41. 41. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorancehumility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation MTBE, CFCs: special vulnerability under known threats
  42. 42. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorancehumility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment TBT, BSE; asbestos, C6H6, PCBs: monitoring over models:
  43. 43. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorancehumility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experimentdeliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion antimicrobials: acknowledge values, conflicts, politics, power
  44. 44. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorancehumility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experimentdeliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasionalternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutes BAT, BPM: note systematic blinkers on superior approaches
  45. 45. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, complianceexplicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorancehumility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experimentdeliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasionalternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutestransdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’ MTBE; BSE: society, humanities, arts, … sceptics
  46. 46. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance ;‘explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance ,humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experimentdeliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasionalternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutestransdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’engage public independence through pluralism and robustness on values not as political correctness, but rigour of framings
  47. 47. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance ;‘explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance ,humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulationpro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experimentdeliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasionalternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutestransdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’engage public independence through pluralism and robustness on values‘open up’ politics ‘plural conditional’ (not unitary definitive) inputs to policy debate from CGE technologies to CGE democracies
  48. 48. Catalysing New Political Spacescombining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy closing down opening up narrow expert / analytic participatory / deliberative broad
  49. 49. Catalysing New Political Spacescombining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy closing down opening up narrow expert / analytic citizen’s juries participatory / deliberative broad
  50. 50. Catalysing New Political Spacescombining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy closing down opening up narrow cost-benefit open analysis hearings expert / analytic risk assessment structured interviews stakeholder negotiation citizen’s juries participatory / deliberative broad
  51. 51. Catalysing New Political Spacescombining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy closing down opening up cost-benefit open multi-site narrow analysis hearings ethnographic- risk methods expert / analytic assessment structured interviews dissenting stakeholder sensitivity opinions negotiation analysis citizen’s juries interactive modelling participatory / consensus decision deliberative conference analysis narrative-based participant broad observation
  52. 52. Catalysing New Political Spacescombining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacyacknowledging inherently politics in geoengineering governance closing down opening up cost-benefit open multi-site narrow analysis hearings ethnographic- risk methods expert / analytic assessment structured interviews dissenting stakeholder sensitivity opinions negotiation analysis citizen’s juries interactive q-method modelling scenario decision workshops participatory / consensus deliberative conference analysis multi-criteria participatory mapping rural appraisal deliberative narrative-based participant do-it-yourself mapping open broad observation panels space
  53. 53. Geoengineering Challenges‘Governance’ – Know Thyself!Question not only Knowledge – but knowledge productionSeriously Explore Choice – branching path-dependenciesBe aware of Power – in subject as well as object of scrutinyFallacies of Control – affect both sides of geoengineering debateRigour of Precaution – not emotive fear; reason under uncertaintyOpen up and Broaden out – inputs and outputs to options appraisalUrgency and Robustness – democracy and science reconciled

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