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Soraya Ghebleh - Iranian Land Reform and the 1979 Revolution


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This is a paper written by Soraya Ghebleh that examines the role that Iranian Land Reform had in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It delves into the socioeconomic situation of Iran, the land reform polices that were implemented, the impact they had, and the implications these reforms had for the future of Iran.

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Soraya Ghebleh - Iranian Land Reform and the 1979 Revolution

  1. 1. Soraya Ghebleh The Social, Political, and Economic Effects of Iranian Land Reform and its Contribution to the 1979 Revolution Introduction Iran experienced tremendous change in the post-war era that stemmed from both domestic and international catalysts. The Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi, meant to ensure the modernization of Iran by instituting a wide range of reforms, backed by the United States and other international institutions. The largely rural-based economy was ingrained in a system that closely resembled feudalism,which was not conducive to modern agrarian reform. Examination of Iran‟s political economy recommended land reform as a vital centerpiece and starting point to affect change. Land reform was implemented by the Shah‟s government in order to consolidate the power of the government and modernize the economy but instead resulted in irreversible changes in the social, political, and economic structure of the villages and urban centers with adverse consequences that greatly contributed and set the stage for the 1979 Revolution. The Iranian Village Before 1962 Iranian land was divided up into four different kinds of land that included the crown lands, state lands (khalesejat), endowment lands (ouaf), and private lands that were owned by large landowners. The vast lands that were owned by these landlords were farmed by peasants on the basis of the traditional „five-element formula,‟ according to
  2. 2. which labor, land, water, seed, and animals were taken as the basis of the division of the produce with the peasant retaining 1/3rd of the crop.1 In 1956, when the first national census was done, there were approximately 51,300 villages. Approximately 95% of total holdings were less than 20 hectares with decreasing number of holdings as the size of the holding increased.2 Over 62% of all agricultural land was under some system of sharecropping, where peasants tilled land that was not theirs.3 The relationship between the landlord and peasant was complex, serving to the benefit of the landlord and the detriment of the peasant. Lambton describes that the “landowner regards peasants as a drudge whose sole function is to provide him with his profits; education, better hygiene, and improved housing are considered unnecessary.”4 This attitude was prevalent among landlords throughout the country and the relationship between landlord and peasant was often one of tension and mistrust on both sides. Although the landlord was wealthy and powerful, he was constantly fearful of being “despoiled or cheated by a discontented peasantry.”5 There were two types of peasants in the villages, nasaqdars and khoshneshins, both having different roles and creating different classes within the peasants. Nasaqdars were essentially peasants with land-use rights and khoshneshins were peasants without 1Bashiriyeh, 17 2Distribution of Landholdings, by Size, 1960, Source: OAS 1960: vol. 15, table 101 3Distribution of Type of Tenure in Different Categories of Landholding Size, 1960, OAS 1960: vol 15, table 101 4 Lambton, 20 5 Lambton, 24
  3. 3. them.6 Production organized through work units, or cooperative societies that were composed of several peasant households were extremely common because cultivation was difficult alone unless one had the means to support cultivation individually. These societies, however, were able to be function primarily with support from the landlord. The landlords enforced land rotation among the nasaqdars in order to avoid peasant attachment to a specific plot of land. Landlords often had villages that were spread out with fragmented land to cultivate due to the difficult geography that existed in certain areas of Iran and the traditional split of land. Peasants often had many scattered pieces of land for their use, which later had negative implications during the first phase of land redistribution.7 Iran-US Relations and Origins of Modern Land Reform In the post war era, the United States, the United Nations, and other international organizations began to push for the development of the Third World. For the United States, Iran was a strategic country of interest because of its vast resources, geopolitical location, and proximity to the Soviet Union. A UN Resolution recognized that “Unsatisfactory forms of agrarian structure, and in particular systems of land tenure, tend in a variety of ways to impede economic development in underdeveloped countries,” which was the case of Iran in the 1940s and 1950s.”8 Political debates in Iran regarding how to meet the political and economic challenges that the West posed were most commonly seen in two ways. The more 6Najmabadi, 49 7Danesh, Urban Anthropology & Studies of Cultural Systems & World Economic Development, 1992 8 UN 1951b: 15
  4. 4. conservative view maintained that Iran was in no way inferior to the West, no fundamental changes were required in domestic or foreign policy, and that Iran should exploit the bipolar political rivalry that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union for Iran‟s benefit or merely disengage and keep the relationship at a minimum. The alternative view to this was that Iran needed to implement domestic economic, political, and social reforms to essentially modernize the country in order to be globally competitive in the Western world.9 The Shah and his government wanted to maintain close ties with Western nations and achieve the same economic and political success so the orientation was directed towards implementing reform. Iran wanted to industrialize and forming a strategic alliance with the United States could give Iran the means to do so. The Shah developed close ties with the United States as a result of US involvement in the expulsion of Mossadegh and US interest in containment of communism and became one of the greatest recipients of economic and military aid.10 The Point Four Program of aid announced by President Truman that offered “technical, scientific, and managerial knowledge necessary to economic development”marked the beginning of a cooperative program where American experts would consult with the Iranian government in areas of agriculture, health, and education and would work to train thepeasants and villagers of Iran.11 This concept of “give aid and demand reform” was continued through the Kennedy administration and characterized the relationship between the US and Iran at this time.12 9Hooglund, 33 10 Ricks, Land Reform and Social Change in Iran, 1991 11 Truman, Four Points Program, 1949 12Najmabadi, 18
  5. 5. A recurring theme in the reports of the experts sent by the United States as well as within models of development occurring around the Third World was the application of agrarian development and land reform as a precursor to industrialization. It was suggested, initially, that Iran focus on “mechanization of agriculture to increase work output of each peasant family and productivity of lands” rather than changing the land tenure in Iran. The recognition of the archaic nature and the deep-rooted nature of the tenure system indicated that it could not be changed overnight and “to attempt this could result in famine, chaos in agricultural relationship, and in the long run would not benefit the peasant.13 This mentality changed however, and as discussions in the 1950s progressed the change of the system of land tenure became essential to land reform policies for various motivations.14 The Shah’s Vision Reza Shah began his reign as an extremely young and ineffectual ruler who had limited authority over his country and transformed himself politically into an authoritarian figure integral and inseparable from the state.15 Land reform had been a topic of discussion in the 1940s and 1950s but the Shah was reluctant to confront the landed class until he was assured that land reform would be successful.16 He wanted to consolidate his power but was not yet ready or in a position to upset the landlords.17 As his confidence grew in the 1950s and economic crisis shook Iran in the beginning of the 13 Overseas Consultants, 1949: vol. 5, p. 239, the Report on the Seven Year Economic Development Plan 14Najmabadi, 61 15Kamrava, 15 16Araghi and Majd, Land Reform Policies in Iran: Comment and Reply, 1989 17Najmabadi, 32
  6. 6. 1960s, the Shah along with his newly appointed Prime Minister Ali Amini, and Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsanjani became confident that it was time to institute land reform.18 Arsanjani believed that land reform was the absolute key to political and economic reform in Iran. He was convinced that the peasant had great potential to be an independent proprietor of land and was completely capable of running his own affairs. Arsanjani recognized that “although the peasant is uneducated, he still has a long tradition of civilization behind him.”19 Arsanjani believed in profit-oriented farming. He wanted to release the agriculture that was locked up in villages, mechanize farming, and have farmers own the product of his work in order that the agricultural economy would find a more solid basis. The presumed effects of this would be an increase in national income and production, creation of political and social stability, and a rise in economic prosperity from agriculture.20 His convictions along with the information collected in the 1950s convinced the Shah that changes of land tenure must occur in order for the country to move forward and industrialize. Land reform became the centerpiece for his modernization campaign more for political reasons than for the development of the agrarian sector and of the peasantry. This is not to say that the Shah did not care about the actual reform because that would discredit his well-known interest for modernization for which agrarian development was essential. His political gains, however, would be substantial if his programs achieved his 18 Lambton, 64 19 Lambton, 63 20Najmabadi, 93
  7. 7. desired goals. The two main political objectives would be to break up the traditional dominance of landlords over rural areas and at the same time create a solid support system of the large rural peasantry for the monarchy and the Shah‟s government.21 By means of land redistribution, the overwhelming power of the landlords would cease and the government would be in a position to present itself as a “progressive advocate of the peasant‟s reform ideas” and win over their support.22 Implementation of Land Reform Laws The first stage of land reform‟s main provision was to limit the amount of land by one individual to one village, irrespective of size. Any land in excess of this should then be transferred to those nasaqdars who were cultivating that land, recognizing that khoshneshin who worked the land would not benefit from land reform directly. The excess land of the landowners was to be sold to the government who then sold it back to the nasaqdars at low-interest rates to be paid back over a long periods of time. Qanats, the archaic but widely ingenious irrigation system prevalent in Iran at the time, were also to be transferred to the peasants along with water rights.23 The responsibility of the upkeep and maintenance of these qanats that were usually built and maintained by the landowners was transferred to the peasants who were to form a cooperative society in charge of the upkeep.24 By the time the rapid redistribution of land had occurred, there was a shift in the attitude of Shah towards the peasantry and how he felt the rest of land and agrarian 21Kazemi, 280 22Hooglund, 42 23Najmabadi, 93 24 Lambton, 66
  8. 8. reform should develop. He feared rural political instability and wanted to regulate relations between the landowners and peasants in a more moderate manner. This was a huge change from the first phase of land reform where the government had embarked on a propaganda campaign against the landowners, viciously attempting to undermine their authority.25 The second stage of land reform in 1963 was intended to improve the situation of peasants who cultivated land in villages not subject to purchase by the government as well as to regulate relations between peasants and landowners. These reforms no longer required landlords to sell their excess land to the government but gave them regulations with how to distribute their land in direct action with peasants. Landlords could rent the land to the peasants working on it, sell the land to the peasants, divide the land between himself and the peasants working on it in proportion to traditional sharecropping divisions, or form a joint stockholding unit in which each would share proportionate to their traditional share of crops.26 The third stage of land reform in 1969 was an extension of the joint agricultural units. This law required landlords who had chosen to rent their lands to set up joint units or divide land according to sharecropping ratios. Membership in cooperatives by the peasants, however, was a precondition to receiving any land. These cooperatives were meant to take over the responsibilities the landowners held that included repair of qanats 25 Lambton, 76 26Najmabadi, 94
  9. 9. and irrigation canals, use of common farm machinery, pesticide operations, and vet services.27 Results of Land Reform The official end of land reform was declared successful and complete in 1971. Only 3,967 whole villages and 10,995 parts of villages out of an estimated total of 60,000 villages had been divided under the first stage of land reform.28 With each progressive stage of land reform there was diminishing success and contentment. The first stage of land reform excluded a very large amount of the rural population to the point where these khoshneshin had extreme difficulty even finding agricultural work in rural areas. There were difficulties of setting up and running cooperative societies due to lack of experience in organization and low rates of literacy so in many places, qanats and other modes of production and upkeep fell into disrepair.29 The disrepair of qanats was also affected by the tense relationships that existed between the landowners and the peasants. The landowners no longer felt obligated to maintain the upkeep of every qanat that had once been in their range of land. Many peasants did not have the means to take this responsibility. The difficulties cooperatives societies faced, inadequate means and lack of real government support and provision of infrastructure exacerbated these problems.30 27Najmabadi, 98 28Statistical Yearbook of Iran(Plan Organization, Statistical Center 1973: chapter 12, table 63) 29Najmabadi, 104 30 Lambton, 98
  10. 10. There was great opposition by small landowners and middle peasants to land reform because they lacked the ability to acquire crops from the peasants working their lands because they did not have the same power and wealth larger landowners did.31 These small landowners and middle peasants felt that the land reform policies discriminated against them unfairly and they were to become the among the greatest peasant supporters of the Revolution in the following decade.32 Iranian agriculture still had very low degrees of productivity by the end of land reform and had not been integrated into the world market. The orientation remained towards internal consumption but with the growing population and deteriorating conditions of the countryside, Iran could not even support the internal market.33 Land fragmentation was a serious problem for peasants who were trying to become self-sufficient and establish agricultural units that could be commercially viable and profitable.34 When the government redistributed land, they gave it according to what the peasant was already working on which often times were difficult pieces of land that were very far apart. Difficulties arose when peasants tried to cultivate these lands with little to no help from anyone based on the geographical distribution. The government had viewed this as pragmatic because division in such a way would not disrupt the usual activity of the village and would encourage small-scale farming, which was initially the promoted mechanism of improving agriculture.35 31 Lambton, 101 32Hooglund, 115 33Najmabadi, 187 34Najmabadi, 97 35Hooglund, 91
  11. 11. Consequences of Land Reform Policies When land reform was first implemented, there was meant to be a “push to employ mechanized means and modern farming, become a progressive society, strengthen and develop agriculture along with agriculturally related industries first then move to heavy industries who will need experienced workers that can be provided by the growing population in the villages.”36 This was the image of the realization of what successful land reform was to look like but the reality was far removed from this image because in many cases the villagers and villages were not better off in any way and in many cases were worse off.37 The Shah was successful in realizing his political goal of removal of the landed class. After land reform was complete the political and economic power of the landed class was essentially destroyed.38 He also greatly increased the amount of actual landowners but the unfortunate reality was many of these plots of land were completely insufficient to provide any kind of standard of living and landed peasants were often left even more destitute than they had been before. The amount of rural families who owned land increased but the amount of landless migrants to urban sectors may have also accounted for what seemed like a huge percentage increase of the rural population.39 These adverse consequences affected those nasaqdars who were eligible to receive land but the khoshneshins were left out of land reform completely and rendered ineligible to ever become a landowner. Once this exclusion occurred, the hope and 36 Ministry of Agriculture 1962: 98 37Najmabadi, 112 38Majd, Land reform policies in Iran, 1987 39Najmabadi, 124
  12. 12. possibility of access to land diminished forever and in the time period of 1961 to 1980 the amount of khoshneshin who remained in the countryside deteriorated sharply.40 This migration, however, was not seen in a negative light by the government. Consultants in the 1950s calculated that approximately 50% of the workers could be “removed from the land without adverse effect on the level of agricultural production and productivity” but there was no way to remove this “surplus population.”41 By excluding the khoshneshin, an urban labor force ready to engage in the processes of industrialization would easily come to place. The problem, however, lied within the fact that the agricultural sector of Iran never completed its transition. The government focused on land reform for its political motivations and assumed that agriculture would fall into place as a result of a stronger peasant class but without providing strong agrarian reforms, education, and maintenance of infrastructure the shift would be next to impossible. To a certain degree, the urban sector was able to provide industrial and manufacturing jobs but because the level of income among the rural population was still low, they did not have the purchasing power to maintain domestic industrial markets.42 The foundation was laid for the emergence of a “self-reliant and independent peasantry” but this could not occur without increases and investments in the standard of living of peasants and implementation of a national solution to the problem of low productivity.43 This lack of follow through on the promises of reform, despite minor 40Najmabadi, 135 41Najmabadi, 33 42Farazmand, 94 43 Lambton, 69
  13. 13. successes it may have had in improving the lot of those peasants who did in fact enhance their situations, led to disappointment and disillusionment among the peasantry. Iranian Agriculture, Imports, and Oil Rent In the years before land reform, total agricultural production grew very slowly and agricultural production per capita declined with the average yields of all major crops remaining rather low.44 The Shah‟s land reform had succeeded at weakening the landlords‟ political and economic goal in favor of a capitalist system; the land reform also caused “lasting stagnation in the agricultural sector.”45 Obstacles that were in the way of Iranian agriculture included lack of strong water and irrigation systems, lack of seeds and fertilizers, increasing rural-urban migration that caused a decline in the amount of rural cultivators, improper allocation of investments and loans, and depletion of expertise and managerial resources.46 Iran was unique in the early 1970s, however, in its position as a developing nation of the third world due to its ability to obtain income from oil rents. Most developing nations could not ignore their agricultural development because if their economy was undergoing a demographic transition from rural to industrialized they most likely had no other source of income. Iran, however, was receiving exorbitant amounts of income due to its geopolitical position, allowing Iran to spend on importing food rather than developing agriculture.47 Iran‟s oil revenues increased from 5 billion to 20 million in the 44 Table 11, Source F. Khamsi, 1969 45Parvin, 170 46Parvin, 176 47Parvin, 173
  14. 14. time period of 1972 – 1973.48 This quickly led to a huge budget deficit by 1975, which affected the Iranian economy and those at the bottom of it greatly. The share of agriculture‟s contribution to the GDP declined drastically dropping from 35% in 1955 to 24% in 1967 all the way down to an extreme low of 9% in 1976.49 This great decrease in agriculture‟s contribution was not a direct result of land redistribution but a result of many of the consequences of land redistribution. Migration of agricultural workers to urban centers, higher wage earnings in urban vs. rural areas, difficulties in maintenance of small land holdings and in the upkeep of technology needed to support farming, disillusionment of the peasantry, combined with all of the unsuccessful aspects of the land reform in the 1960s were factors in agricultural stagnation.50 Rural-Urban Migration Land reform did not benefit all peasants equally and the khoshneshin along with peasants who received insufficient land holdings were in more poverty than before, becoming a “push” factor towards urban migration. Rural-urban migration accelerated rapidly from the onset of land reform with over 2 million people migrating from the countryside to the cities from 1962 to 1971.51 The failure of land reform and the deterioration of agriculture were push actors that were prevalent throughout the entire 48Bashiriyeh, 67 49 Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports for 1968-1976 (Teheran); Plan Organization of Iran, Statistical Center, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1968-1976 50Hooglund, 108 51Bashiriyeh, 58
  15. 15. country.52 Landlessness among the khoshneshin with the removal of the hope to ever improve their situation caused a drastic migration from rural areas. The standard of living and the amount of wages earned in the 1970s far exceeded those of rural Iran, which served as one of the “pull” factors of rural-urban migration. Whereas rural “push factors” were predominant in the 1960s when land reform was taking place, the economic boom coupled with dramatic increases in industrialization and manufacturing became the major “pull factors” that took precedent in the 1970s.53 Industrial expansion that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved labor-intensive projects like construction as well as manufacturing jobs. The difficulty rural migrant workers had with much of the labor needed was its inconsistency. They were often hired on a daily wage basis with termination upon completion of the project.54 An increasing majority of these migrant workers or commuters were young males between the ages of 15 to 29. This particular population of migrants posed a problem when extensive out-migration occurred causing many villages to be devoid of young men. It is also important to note that unlike most situations of migration, villagers who had family members working in the cities did not benefit from “remittances.” Because so many of the migrant workers were young men, whatever surplus income they had needed to be saved for marriage.55 Social Unrest, Mobilization and Revolution 52Aghajanian, 154 53Araghi and Majd, Land Reform Policies in Iran: Comment and Reply, 1989 54Hooglund, 113 55Hooglund, 116
  16. 16. Social consequences of land reform were reflected in the mass of urban dwellers of rural origin and commuting youth of villages involved in demonstration as well as peasants bursting out onto the political scene. Iranian peasants had long been known for their tranquility but after the land reforms gave peasants their own land and they had a taste of what ownership and relative social freedom felt like, it was very difficult for them to turn back and sit voiceless.56 By the middle of the 1970s, the economic boom gained from oil was no longer able to provide for the great amount of imports being brought into the country. Price increases surpassed wage increases, which led to labor unrest, unemployment, and further disillusionment and disappointment among both peasants who remained in the villages but especially those who commuted or migrated to urban centers.57 Rural-urban migration played a huge role in mobilizing the peasant population towards revolution. The young men who worked in urban centers either as commuters or migrant workers were imbued with new political ideas and for the first time were becoming involved in politics. The rural economy of the 1970s in Iran was not isolated as a result, with land reform linking the Iranian village more closely than ever to urban centers.“58 Migration” did not mean an “uprooting,” with migrants most often continuing regular contact with relatives and friends in their native villages.59 The movements against the Shah occurred nationally in virtually all major cities and towns and much of these 56Araghi and Majd, Land Reform Policies in Iran: Comment and Reply, 1989 57Bashiriyeh, 112 58Najmabadi, 154 59Hooglund, 147
  17. 17. movements began with information and ideas disseminated by the young migrant population.60 From the beginning of land reform, there was great opposition towards the Shah‟s shift in policies by the ulama, or clergy. The generalization can be made that the ulama did not want their endowed lands, or oufs, redistributed by the Shah but this is an oversimplification. The ulama greatly disagreed with the Shah‟s reforms, particularly those of his “White Revolution,” that included universal suffrage and local elections. They viewed these reforms as an “assault on Islam.”61 The ulama were of the mindset that the government should have consulted the ulama before instituting such reforms. It is also historically known that the ulama were often closely tied to the landowning class with many landowners having relatives in the ulama. The landowning class also held great respect for the ulama and allowed their involvement among the peasants that worked on their villages and with secular government interference this sphere of influence could potentially be interrupted. The peasants became great allies for the opposition to the Shah because their lives and situations had been so greatly affected by the policies he implemented. Land reform completely shifted their way of life and while the ideas of the Shah were initially very attractive to those peasants who could benefit, the implementation fell short and caused great disappointment. Those peasants who felt they had suffered as a result of the Shah‟s reforms and had fallen into destitution or despair empathized with the plight of the exiled leader of the opposition, Ayatollah Khomeini and felt shared commonalities. While the 60Najmabadi, 205 61Najmabadi, 206
  18. 18. clergy opposed land reform at a time when peasants were still hopeful for benefit, the ulama made sure to underline that it was the “application and implementation of reform law” they were protesting, not the idea of beneficial reform itself.62 Many peasants felt as though the government had claimed to be progressive but recognized the thinly veiled political goal of asserting government power and had experienced merely a replacement of the landlords with the government.63 Conclusions The effects of land reform were far reaching within the political, social, and economic context of pre-Revolutionary Iran. Reforms intended to bring out modernization, productivity, and a new social class that was a solid base of support for the monarchy did not achieve any of these things. The reforms overall did not benefit the peasant economically but in a certain light they marked the awakening of the social and political consciousness of the peasant population. The land reform laws stimulated a response in this class of people that had never been seen before in centuries. Political involvement became for the first time a part of the life of the peasant who felt they could now make demands for social reform and improvements in their lives. Although the peasant class was disillusioned, poverty-stricken, and overlooked, they were able to mobilize politically to make social demands. Lambton predicted that “Disillusion may well lead to disaster, economically, politically and socially,” and that the “government should give practical reaffirmation to the aims of the first stage of land reform and regain the full confidence of the peasants… 62Najmabadi, 207 63Hooglund, 148
  19. 19. without this there will be no rise in production over the country as a whole.”64 These words written by Lambton well before the major crisis of agricultural stagnation, extreme political unrest, and revolution, recognized how important the role of the peasant was in the Shah‟s aims of transforming Iran. Unfortunately, the Shah did not share this same recognition and haphazardly focused on the peasantry without really implementing institutions that would have carried the peasantry as well as the overall economy of Iran very far. More than half the population of Iran fell into the category of rural peasantry and without developing their potential, great losses ensued in human capital. Works Cited Abrahamian, E., and Kazemi, F. 1978. “The Non-Revolutionary Peasantry of Iran,” Iranian Studies 12: 259-304. Aghajanian, Akbar. "Post-Revolutionary Demographic Trends in Iran." Post- Revolutionary Iran. Ed. HooshangAmirahmadi, ManoucherParvin. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 64 Lambton, 356
  20. 20. Amirahmadi, Parvin, and ManoucherHooshang. Post-Revolutionary Iran. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. Araghi, Farshad A., and M.G. Majd. "Land reform policies in Iran: comment and reply." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71.4 (1989): 1046+ Arjomand, Said Amir. "Land Reform and Social Change in Iran." The American Journal of Sociology 95.2 (1989): 516 Bashiriyeh, Hossein. The State and Revolution in Iran. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Danesh, Abol Hassan. "Land reform, state policy, and social change in Iran." Urban Anthropology & Studies of Cultural Systems & World Economic Development 21.2 (1992) Farazmand, Ali. The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modern Iran: Agrarian Reforms and Regime Politics. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1989. Hooglund, Eric. Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982. Majd, Mohammad G. "Land reform policies in Iran." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69.4 (1987): 845 Kamrava, Mehran. The Political History of Modern Iran. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992.
  21. 21. Khamsi, F. 1969. “Land Reform in Iran.” Monthly Review, no. 21, July, pp. 20-28 Ministry of Agriculture, 1962.Land Reform in Iran (in Persian) Tehran. Lambton, Ann .The Persian Land Reform: 1962-1966. London, England: Oxford University Press, 1969. Najmabadi, Afsaneh. Land Reform and Social Change in Iran. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1987. Parvin, Manoucher and Taghavi, Majid. “A Comparison of Land Tenure in Iran Under Monarchy and Under the Islamic Republic.” Post-Revolutionary Iran. Ed. HooshangAmirahmadi, ManoucherParvin. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. Ricks, Thomas M. "Land Reform and Social Change in Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 23.4 (1991) Siavoshi, Sussan. Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.