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The Value of Revolving Doors in Brazilian
Public Procurement
by Klenio Barbosa and Stephane Straub
Questions and Data
Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and
amazing data
The Question
How does the po...
Questions and Data
Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and
amazing data
The Question
How does the po...
Questions and Data
Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and
amazing data
The Question
How does the po...
The Institutional Environment
Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run
invited auctions
Allocation made on...
The Institutional Environment
Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run
invited auctions
Allocation made on...
The Institutional Environment
Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run
invited auctions
Allocation made on...
The Institutional Environment
Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run
invited auctions
Allocation made on...
The Model
single supplier, with cost c ∈ {c, c}
given consumption q, official salary s, transfer t and cost c,
planner gets...
The Model
single supplier, with cost c ∈ {c, c}
given consumption q, official salary s, transfer t and cost c,
planner gets...
Reduced form effect of revolving doors
Anticipation of revolving door affects α:
α (skill signaling)
α (complacency)
Intui...
Reduced form effect of revolving doors
Anticipation of revolving door affects α:
α (skill signaling)
α (complacency)
Intui...
Empirical Results
Questions
More info
magnitude; effect on big supply project
heterogeneity in firm/individual effects (corruptible guys,
cor...
Questions
More info
magnitude; effect on big supply project
heterogeneity in firm/individual effects (corruptible guys,
cor...
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Comments on "The Value of Revolving Doors in Brazilian Public Procurement"

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Comments by Sylvain Chassang on paper "The Value of Revolving Doors in Brazilian Public Procurement" presented by Stephane Straub at the SITE Corruption Conference, 31 August 2015.

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Comments on "The Value of Revolving Doors in Brazilian Public Procurement"

  1. 1. The Value of Revolving Doors in Brazilian Public Procurement by Klenio Barbosa and Stephane Straub
  2. 2. Questions and Data Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and amazing data The Question How does the possibility of a revolving door affect the effectiveness of procurement The Data Procurement and employment panel, 1998 to 2009 2,332,715 contracts; 1,647,105 different products; 40,474 firms and 972 administration Use future/past employment status, prices and quantities Q: other covariates available? Salaries, tenure, taxes...
  3. 3. Questions and Data Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and amazing data The Question How does the possibility of a revolving door affect the effectiveness of procurement The Data Procurement and employment panel, 1998 to 2009 2,332,715 contracts; 1,647,105 different products; 40,474 firms and 972 administration Use future/past employment status, prices and quantities Q: other covariates available? Salaries, tenure, taxes...
  4. 4. Questions and Data Paper still in its early stages, but clearly big question and amazing data The Question How does the possibility of a revolving door affect the effectiveness of procurement The Data Procurement and employment panel, 1998 to 2009 2,332,715 contracts; 1,647,105 different products; 40,474 firms and 972 administration Use future/past employment status, prices and quantities Q: other covariates available? Salaries, tenure, taxes...
  5. 5. The Institutional Environment Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run invited auctions Allocation made on the basis of both price and subjective quality assessment Q: Is this observed in the data? Can one test in which auctions conflicted parties have an effect? Switching behavior: DRijkt = 1{individual i employed in admin k at t, switched to firm j after t} .66% of administration – auction participants pairs (?)
  6. 6. The Institutional Environment Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run invited auctions Allocation made on the basis of both price and subjective quality assessment Q: Is this observed in the data? Can one test in which auctions conflicted parties have an effect? Switching behavior: DRijkt = 1{individual i employed in admin k at t, switched to firm j after t} .66% of administration – auction participants pairs (?)
  7. 7. The Institutional Environment Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run invited auctions Allocation made on the basis of both price and subjective quality assessment Q: Is this observed in the data? Can one test in which auctions conflicted parties have an effect? Switching behavior: DRijkt = 1{individual i employed in admin k at t, switched to firm j after t} .66% of administration – auction participants pairs (?)
  8. 8. The Institutional Environment Large projects run open auctions, small projects can run invited auctions Allocation made on the basis of both price and subjective quality assessment Q: Is this observed in the data? Can one test in which auctions conflicted parties have an effect? Switching behavior: DRijkt = 1{individual i employed in admin k at t, switched to firm j after t} .66% of administration – auction participants pairs (?)
  9. 9. The Model single supplier, with cost c ∈ {c, c} given consumption q, official salary s, transfer t and cost c, planner gets payoff S(q) − λ(s + t) − cq public official observes cost with probability α (hard evidence); can transmit evidence or not Assumption 1. if no information transmitted by public official, goods are procured using optimal mechanism menu {(q, t), (q, t)}
  10. 10. The Model single supplier, with cost c ∈ {c, c} given consumption q, official salary s, transfer t and cost c, planner gets payoff S(q) − λ(s + t) − cq public official observes cost with probability α (hard evidence); can transmit evidence or not Assumption 1. if no information transmitted by public official, goods are procured using optimal mechanism menu {(q, t), (q, t)}
  11. 11. Reduced form effect of revolving doors Anticipation of revolving door affects α: α (skill signaling) α (complacency) Intuitively α brings closer to efficient case removes q distortion on c type; removes rents on c type (higher quantity; lower price)
  12. 12. Reduced form effect of revolving doors Anticipation of revolving door affects α: α (skill signaling) α (complacency) Intuitively α brings closer to efficient case removes q distortion on c type; removes rents on c type (higher quantity; lower price)
  13. 13. Empirical Results
  14. 14. Questions More info magnitude; effect on big supply project heterogeneity in firm/individual effects (corruptible guys, corrupt firms) collusion? Interpretation Revolving door good? Could firms be buying out the incorruptible ones? Other measures of honesty? Measure expectations of revolving door?
  15. 15. Questions More info magnitude; effect on big supply project heterogeneity in firm/individual effects (corruptible guys, corrupt firms) collusion? Interpretation Revolving door good? Could firms be buying out the incorruptible ones? Other measures of honesty? Measure expectations of revolving door?

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