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               PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH
                        2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines
	
                              Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines
                                          Telephone +632 9946972 Fax: +632 4333870
	
                                                    www.pipvtr.com
	
  
	
  
                CRIME-­TERRORISM-­INSURGENCY	
  NEXUS	
  
                         IN	
  THE	
  PHILIPPINES	
  
                                                                  	
  
                                                        Rommel	
  C.	
  Banlaoi	
  
                                    Chairman	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  and	
  Executive	
  Director	
  
                           Philippine	
  Institute	
  for	
  Peace,	
  Violence	
  and	
  Terrorism	
  Research	
  
                                                Email:	
  rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com	
  
	
  
Presented	
  at	
  the	
  International	
  C onference	
   o n	
   N ational	
   a nd	
   R egional	
   S ecurity:	
   C ountering	
   O rganized	
  
Crime	
  a nd	
  T errorism	
  in	
  t he	
  A SEAN	
  P olitical	
  S ecurity	
  a nd	
  C ommunity	
  ( APSC)	
  o rganized	
  b y	
  t he	
  	
  
German-­Southeast	
  Asian	
  Center	
  of	
  Excellence	
  for	
  Public	
  Policy	
  and	
  Good	
  Governance	
  (CPG),	
  Faculty	
  of	
  
Law,	
   Thammasat	
   University,	
   Bangkok,	
   Thailand	
   on	
   19-­20	
   September	
   2012.	
   Please	
   check	
   against	
  
delivery.	
  
	
  
	
  
I	
   am	
   truly	
   honored	
   to	
   stand	
   before	
   you	
   to	
   candidly	
   discuss	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
   crime-­‐
terrorism-­‐insurgency	
   nexus	
   in	
   the	
   Philippines.	
   	
   This	
   presentation	
   is	
   based	
   on	
   the	
  
various	
   scholarly	
   research	
   works	
   I	
   conducted	
   on	
   the	
   topic	
   over	
   a	
   span	
   of	
   eleven	
  
years	
  after	
  September	
  11,	
  2001	
  (9/11).	
  	
  	
  	
  
In	
   my	
   various	
   publications,	
   I	
   have	
   always	
   argued	
   that	
   terrorist	
   threats	
   in	
   the	
  
Philippines	
   cannot	
   be	
   fully	
   understood	
   if	
   not	
   analyzed	
   in	
   the	
   context	
   of	
   a	
   larger	
  
environment	
   in	
   which	
   we	
   find	
   ourselves.	
   	
   Terrorism	
   in	
   the	
   Philippines	
   has	
   always	
  
been	
   inextricably	
   linked	
   with	
   crime	
   and	
   insurgency	
   problems.	
   	
   In	
   fact,	
   terrorism,	
  
crime	
  and	
  insurgency	
  threats	
  are	
  also	
  deeply	
  enmeshed	
  in	
  panoply	
  of	
  other	
  related	
  
internal	
   security	
   concerns	
   associated	
   with	
   warlordism,	
   violent	
   entrepreneurship,	
  
clan	
  warfare,	
  revenge	
  killing,	
  personal	
  vendetta,	
  and	
  local	
  political	
  dynamics.	
  	
  	
  	
  
So-­‐called	
  terrorist	
  groups	
  in	
  the	
  Philippines	
  are	
  not	
  only	
  parts	
  of	
  larger	
  insurgency	
  
movements	
  from	
  the	
  Moro	
  and	
  Communist	
  fronts.	
  They	
  are	
  also	
  tightly	
  woven	
  in	
  a	
  
complex	
  network	
  of	
  organized	
  criminal	
  activities	
  like	
  trafficking/smuggling	
  of	
  arms,	
  
drugs	
   and	
   humans	
   as	
   well	
   extortion,	
   car	
  napping,	
   kidnapping	
   operations	
   and	
   even	
  
illegal	
   logging.	
   	
   Complicating	
   this	
   dreadful	
   situation	
   is	
   the	
   depressing	
   reality	
   that	
  
these	
  terrorist	
  groups	
  not	
  only	
  have	
  tactical	
  alliances	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  but	
  also	
  have	
  
some	
   “violent	
   entrepreneurial	
   relations”	
   with	
   some	
   corrupt	
   elected	
   local	
   officials	
  
and	
  with	
  a	
  few	
  misfits	
  in	
  the	
  police	
  and	
  the	
  military	
  sectors.	
  	
  	
  	
  These	
  armed	
  groups	
  
and	
  individuals	
  create	
  and	
  perpetuate	
  the	
  violent	
  economy	
  of	
  Mindanao	
  where	
  guns	
  
and	
  goons	
  rule	
  in	
  a	
  semi-­‐anarchic	
  society.	
  




	
                                                                                                                                               1	
  
Without	
  a	
  nuanced	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  whole	
  gamut	
  of	
  these	
  issues,	
  crime-­‐terrorism-­‐
insurgency	
  nexus	
  in	
  the	
  Philippines,	
  therefore,	
  will	
  be	
  very	
  difficult	
  to	
  subdue.	
  	
  The	
  
involvement	
   of	
   children	
   and	
   young	
   people	
   in	
   this	
   nexus	
   exacerbate	
   this	
   bewildering	
  
problem.	
  
In	
  the	
  Philippines,	
  it	
  is	
  common	
  to	
  refer	
  to	
  the	
  Abu	
  Sayyaf	
  Group	
  (ASG)	
  when	
  talking	
  
about	
  terrorist	
  threats.	
  	
  	
  	
  
There	
  is	
  a	
  debate	
  on	
  whether	
  the	
  ASG	
  is	
  a	
  rebel,	
  terrorist	
  or	
  a	
  mere	
  bandit	
  group.1	
  	
  
Some	
   carelessly	
   describe	
   the	
   ASG	
   as	
   the	
   Frankenstein	
   monster	
   of	
   the	
   Philippine	
  
military.	
   The	
   media	
   interchangeably	
   describes	
   the	
   ASG	
   as	
   a	
   bandit	
   and	
   a	
   terrorist	
  
group.	
   	
   But	
   the	
   United	
   States	
   decisively	
   classifies	
   the	
   ASG	
   as	
   a	
   foreign	
   terrorist	
  
organization.	
  
In	
  my	
  continuing	
  study	
  of	
  the	
  ASG	
  for	
  more	
  than	
  15	
  years,	
  I	
  have	
  learned	
  that	
  the	
  
ASG	
  has	
  evolved	
  into	
  a	
  non-­‐state	
  armed	
  group	
  with	
  multiple	
  personalities	
  involved	
  
in	
  various	
  acts	
  of	
  violence.2	
  	
  	
  
When	
   Abdurajak	
   Janjalani	
   formed	
   the	
   group	
   in	
   1989,	
   his	
   original	
   intention	
   was	
   to	
  
bridge	
   the	
   divide	
   between	
   the	
   Moro	
   National	
   Liberation	
   Front	
   (MNLF)	
   of	
   Nur	
  
Misuari	
   and	
   the	
   Moro	
   Islamic	
   Liberation	
   Front	
   (MILF)	
   of	
   the	
   late	
   Hashim	
   Salamat.	
  	
  
Thus,	
  Abdurajak	
  recruited	
  followers	
  from	
  the	
  MNLF	
  and	
  the	
  MILF.	
  
But	
  when	
  he	
  died	
  in	
  1998,	
  the	
  ASG	
  rapidly	
  degenerated	
  into	
  a	
  bandit	
  group	
  engaged	
  
in	
   kidnapping,	
   extortion	
   and	
   smuggling	
   activities	
   under	
   the	
   leadership	
   of	
   his	
  
brother,	
  Khadaffy	
  Janjalani.	
  	
  	
  
At	
   present,	
   the	
   ASG	
   has	
   adopted	
   a	
   cellular-­‐type	
   structure	
   led	
   by	
   commanders	
   in	
  
their	
  respective	
  geographical	
  turfs.	
  With	
  many	
  commanders	
  at	
  the	
  helm	
  of	
  a	
  single	
  
group,	
  the	
  ASG	
  has	
  already	
  evolved	
  into	
  a	
  highly	
  promiscuous	
  armed	
  group	
  linked	
  
with	
   other	
   armed	
   groups	
   engaged	
   in	
   terrorism,	
   insurgency,	
   banditry	
   and	
   other	
  
violent	
   acts.	
   	
   It	
   has	
   also	
   become	
   a	
   very	
   resilient	
   armed	
   group	
   having	
   been	
   protected	
  
by	
  some	
  corrupt	
  local	
  politicians	
  and	
  a	
  few	
  scalawags	
  in	
  uniform	
  who	
  benefit	
  from	
  
ASG’s	
   violent	
   activities.3	
   Some	
   ASG	
   members	
   even	
   serve	
   as	
   private	
   armed	
   escorts	
   of	
  
a	
  few	
  local	
  politicians	
  in	
  Sulu,	
  Basilan	
  and	
  Tawi-­‐Tawi,	
  particularly	
  during	
  elections.	
  
	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1Soliman	
   	
   M.	
   Santos,	
   Jr.	
   and	
   Octavio	
   A.	
   Dinampo.	
   “Abu	
   Sayyaf	
   Reloaded:	
   	
   Rebels,	
   Agents,	
   Bandits,	
  

Terrorists	
  (Case	
  Study)	
  in	
  Soliman	
  Santos,	
  et,	
  al.	
  Primed	
  and	
  Purposeful:	
  	
  Armed	
  Groups	
  and	
  Human	
  
Security	
  Efforts	
  in	
  the	
  Philippines	
  (Geneva:	
  Small	
  Arms	
  Survey,	
  2010),	
  pp.	
  115-­‐138.	
  
2For	
   my	
   most	
   updated	
   publication	
   on	
   the	
   ASG,	
   see	
   Rommel	
   C.	
   Banlaoi,	
   Al-­Harakatul	
   Al-­Islamiyyah:	
  	
  

Essays	
   on	
   the	
   Abu	
   Sayyaf	
   Group,	
   3rd	
   edition	
   (Quezon	
   City:	
   	
   Philippine	
   Institute	
   for	
   Peace,	
   Violence	
   and	
  
Terrorism	
  Research,	
  2012).	
  
3Rommel	
  C.	
  Banlaoi,	
  	
  “The	
  Sources	
  of	
  Abu	
  Sayyaf	
  Resilience	
  in	
  the	
  Southern	
  Philippines”.	
   CTC	
  Sentinel	
  

(3	
  May	
  2010).	
  



	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 2	
  
Thus,	
  the	
  ASG	
  of	
  the	
  late	
  80’s	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  the	
  ASG	
  of	
  today.	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  some	
  armed	
  men	
  
who	
  claim	
  to	
  be	
  followers	
  of	
  the	
  ASG	
  are	
  also	
  claiming	
  to	
  be	
  followers	
  of	
  the	
  MNLF	
  
and	
  the	
  MILF,	
  depending	
  on	
  the	
  situation.	
  
	
  
Current	
   remnants	
   still	
   prefer	
   to	
   use	
   the	
   name,	
   ASG,	
   as	
   it	
   has	
   become	
   a	
   very	
  
convenient	
   trademark	
   for	
   their	
   violent	
   activities.	
   	
   	
   Ustadj	
   Abdul	
   Rasul	
   Sayyaf,	
   the	
  
real	
   person	
   whom	
   this	
   trademark	
   is	
   based,	
   is	
   very	
   displeased	
   to	
   see	
   his	
   name	
   being	
  
used	
  in	
  the	
  Philippines	
  for	
  violent	
  purposes.	
  
	
  
Since	
   the	
   global	
   war	
   on	
   terrorism	
   in	
   2001,	
   the	
   Philippine	
   government	
   has	
   already	
  
put	
   to	
   justice	
   many	
   ASG	
   members	
   for	
   committing	
   various	
   crimes	
   associated	
   with	
  
terrorism.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
But	
   the	
   ASG	
   threat	
   persists	
   because	
   the	
   ASG	
   has	
   a	
   survival	
   instinct	
   that	
   is	
   also	
  
shared	
  by	
  some	
  likeminded	
  groups	
  abroad.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
ASG’s	
   staying	
   power	
   comes	
   from	
   the	
   continuous	
   supply	
   of	
   illiterate	
   and	
   out-­‐of-­‐
school	
  youth	
  in	
  Mindanao	
  joining	
  the	
  group	
  for	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  reasons	
  from	
  personal,	
  
economic,	
  social,	
  and	
  political.4	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  the	
  ASG’s	
  rank-­‐and-­‐file	
  is	
  composed	
  of	
  some	
  
young	
   orphans	
   being	
   abused	
   by	
   old	
   commanders	
   to	
   mount	
   various	
   kidnap-­‐for-­‐
ransom	
  and	
  extortion	
  activities.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
The	
   Philippine	
   military	
   says	
   that	
   the	
   ASG	
   has	
   around	
   400-­‐armed	
   members	
   as	
   of	
  
2010.5	
  	
  	
  Most	
  of	
  its	
  members	
  operate	
  mainly	
  in	
  Basilan,	
  Sulu,	
  Zamboaga	
  Sibugay	
  and	
  
Tawi-­‐Tawi.	
  	
  But	
  there	
  are	
  also	
  sightings	
  of	
  ASG	
  followers	
  in	
  Metro	
  Manila.	
  	
  	
  During	
  
the	
   first	
   semester	
   of	
   2012,	
   the	
   Philippine	
   government	
   says	
   that	
   the	
   ASG	
  
membership	
  has	
  declined	
  to	
  around	
  350.	
  
	
  
My	
   independent	
   research	
   on	
   the	
   ASG,	
   however,	
   indicates	
   that	
   the	
   ASG	
   has	
   only	
  
around	
   100	
   regular	
   followers	
   serving	
   six	
   major	
   commanders	
   lording	
   over	
   in	
   only	
  
three	
  major	
  provinces	
  in	
  Mindanao:	
  	
  Basilan,	
  Sulu	
  and	
  Tawi-­‐Tawi	
  (BASULTA).	
  	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   Sulu,	
   which	
   is	
   the	
   epicenter	
   of	
   ASG	
   activities,	
   there	
   are	
   three	
   major	
   commanders:	
  	
  
Commander	
   Radullan	
   Sahiron,	
   Commander	
   Yassir	
   Igasan,	
   and	
   Commander	
   Hajan	
  
Sawadjaan.	
   Sahiron	
   has	
   only	
   around	
   30	
   regular	
   armed	
   followers.	
   He	
   is	
   the	
  
recognized	
   over-­‐all	
   operational	
   commander	
   of	
   the	
   ASG.	
   	
   Igasan,	
   who	
   has	
   been	
  
rumored	
   to	
   be	
   the	
   over-­‐all	
   Amir	
   of	
   the	
   ASG,	
   only	
   has	
   around	
   5	
   regular	
   armed	
  
followers.	
  	
  Sawadjaan	
  only	
  has	
  around	
  10	
  regular	
  armed	
  followers.	
  	
  	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4Rommel	
       C.	
   Banlaoi,	
   “The	
   Pull	
   of	
   Terrorism:	
   	
   A	
   Philippine	
   Case	
   Study”.	
   Youth	
   and	
   Terrorism:	
   	
   A	
  
Selection	
  of	
  Articles	
   (Kuala	
   Lumpur:	
  	
   Southeast	
   Asian	
  Regional	
  Centre	
  for	
  Counter-­‐	
   Terrorism,	
   2011),	
  
pp.	
  39-­‐50.	
  
5General	
   Headquarters	
   of	
   the	
   AFP,	
  Internal	
   Peace	
   and	
   Security	
   Plan,	
   Bayanihan	
   (Quezon	
   City:	
   	
   Armed	
  

Forces	
  of	
  the	
  Philippines	
  Headquarters,	
  2010),	
  p.	
  12.	
  



	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3	
  
 
In	
   Basilan,	
   there	
   are	
   also	
   three	
   major	
   commanders:	
   	
   Commander	
   Isnilon	
   Hapilon,	
  
Commander	
   Khair	
   Mundos,	
   and	
   Commander	
   Puruji	
   Indama.	
   	
   Hapinol	
   has	
   only	
  
around	
   20	
   regular	
   armed	
   followers.	
   	
   Mundos	
   has	
   only	
   around	
   15	
   regular	
   armed	
  
followers	
  while	
  Indama	
  has	
  only	
  around	
  15	
  regular	
  armed	
  followers.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  Tawi-­‐Tawi,	
  the	
  recognized	
  ASG	
  commander	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  is	
  Jul	
  Asman	
  Sawadjaan,	
  
the	
   brother	
   of	
   Hajan	
   Sawadjaan.	
   	
   He	
   is	
   believed	
   to	
   have	
   at	
   least	
   10	
   regular	
   armed	
  
followers.	
  
	
  
There	
   is	
   an	
   emerging	
   young	
   commander	
   of	
   the	
   ASG	
   by	
   the	
   name	
   of	
   Nadzmir	
   Alih.	
  	
  
He	
  is	
  an	
  adopted	
  son	
  of	
  ASG	
  founder,	
  Abdurajak	
  Janjalani.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   his	
   mid-­‐30s,	
   Nadzmir	
   Alih	
   operates	
   in	
   Basilan	
   as	
   a	
   military	
   protégé	
   of	
   Isnilon	
  
Hapilon	
  and	
  in	
  Sulu	
  as	
  spiritual	
  mentee	
  of	
  Yassir	
  Igasan.	
  	
  Nadzmir	
  Allih	
  has	
  around	
  
10	
  regular	
  armed	
  young	
  followers	
  associated	
  with	
  another	
  group	
  called	
  Anak	
  Ilo	
  or	
  
orphaned	
   sons.	
   	
   	
   	
   His	
   group	
   is	
   responsible	
   for	
   a	
   spate	
   of	
   “small-­‐to-­‐medium-­‐scale”	
  
kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom	
  activities	
  in	
  Sulu	
  and	
  Basilan.	
  
	
  
Thus,	
  the	
  ASG	
  is	
  only	
  a	
  very	
  miniscule	
  armed	
  group.	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
But	
   the	
   ASG	
   threat	
   looms	
   large	
   because	
   it	
   wields	
   tremendous	
   strength	
   from	
   its	
  
superb	
   ability	
   to	
   network	
   with	
   countless	
   armed	
   groups	
   in	
   Mindanao	
   engaged	
   in	
  
various	
  criminal,	
  terrorist,	
  insurgent	
  and	
  even	
  partisan	
  political	
  activities.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
While	
   a	
   few	
   ASG	
   commanders	
   still	
   embrace	
   an	
   Islamic	
   ideology	
   that	
   aims	
   to	
  
promote	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   a	
   Islamic	
   State	
   in	
   Mindanao,	
   most	
   followers	
   have	
  
become	
   violent	
   entrepreneurs	
   engaged	
   in	
   predatory	
   economic	
   activities	
   such	
   as	
  
kidnapping,	
   extortion	
   and	
   smuggling	
   of	
   arms	
   and	
   drugs.	
   	
   	
   These	
   violent	
  
entrepreneurs	
  have	
  skills	
  in	
  jungle	
  and	
  urban	
  warfare.	
  Worse,	
  they	
  have	
  the	
  ability	
  
to	
   manufacture	
   improvised	
   explosive	
   devices	
   (IEDs)	
   that	
   they	
   use	
   for	
   criminal,	
  
terrorist	
  and	
  insurgent	
  activities.	
  
	
  
Based	
   on	
   our	
   independent	
   investigative	
   research	
   aided	
   by	
   seasoned	
   intelligence	
  
officers,	
   we	
   discovered	
   that	
   almost	
   90%	
   of	
   the	
   funds	
   of	
   the	
   ASG	
   are	
   derived	
   from	
  
illicit	
  activities,	
  mainly	
  from	
  kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom	
  and	
  extortion.6	
  	
  As	
  a	
  violent	
  group,	
  
the	
  ASG	
  has	
  also	
  demonstrated	
  its	
  inherent	
  capability	
  to	
  conduct	
  acts	
  of	
  piracy	
  for	
  
economic	
  reasons	
  and	
  maritime	
  terrorism	
  for	
  political	
  reasons.7	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6Rodolfo	
  B.	
  Mendoza,	
  Jr.,	
  “The	
  Evolution	
  of	
  Terrorist	
  Financing	
  in	
  the	
  Philippines”	
  (Paper	
  presented	
  

at	
   the	
   International	
   Conference	
   in	
   Countering	
   the	
   Financing	
   of	
   Terrorism	
   at	
   the	
   Sulu	
   Hotel,	
  
Philippines,	
  7-­‐8	
  July	
  2008).	
  
7Rommel	
  C.	
  Banlaoi.	
  “The	
  Abu	
  Sayyaf	
  Group:	
  Threat	
  of	
  Maritime	
  Piracy	
  and	
  Terrorism	
  in	
  Peter	
  Lehr	
  

(ed),	
   	
   Violence	
   at	
   Sea.	
   	
   Piracy	
   in	
   the	
   Age	
   of	
   Global	
   Terrorism	
   (New	
   York:	
   Routledge,	
   2007),	
   pp.	
   121-­‐
138.	
  



	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       4	
  
 
The	
   Philippine	
   government	
   has	
   declared	
   a	
   policy	
   of	
   crushing	
   the	
   ASG	
   through	
  
combined	
  police	
  and	
  military	
  efforts.	
  	
  	
  

But	
   it	
   recognizes	
   difficulties	
   in	
   doing	
   so	
   because	
   of	
   the	
   ASG’s	
   complex	
   links	
   with	
  
other	
   armed	
   groups	
   like	
   the	
   lawless	
   elements	
   of	
   the	
   MILF,	
   rouge	
   factions	
   of	
   the	
  
MNLF,	
   remnants	
   of	
   Jemaah	
   Islamiyah	
   (JI)	
   in	
   Mindanao	
   and	
   other	
   violent	
   groups	
  
such	
   as	
   the	
   Al	
   Khobar	
   Group	
   (AKG),	
   the	
   Bangsamoro	
   Islamic	
   Freedom	
   Fighters	
  
(BIFF)	
  and	
  even	
  the	
  New	
  People’s	
  Army	
  (NPA).	
  	
  	
  
The	
   ASG’s	
   links	
   with	
   some	
   local	
   warlords,	
   government	
   militias,	
   and	
   local	
  
communities	
  confound	
  the	
  already	
  convoluted	
  threat	
  it	
  poses	
  to	
  Philippine	
  internal	
  
security.	
  
In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   ASG	
   has	
   become	
   “complex	
   adaptive	
   system”	
   with	
   a	
   superb	
  
survival	
  instinct.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
This	
  instinct	
  to	
  survive	
  is	
  reinforced	
  by	
  their	
  complex	
  linkages	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  as	
  
well	
   as	
   with	
   ordinary	
   organized	
   crimes	
   groups	
   and	
   partisan	
   armed	
   movements.	
  	
  	
  
Underlying	
   issues	
   of	
   abject	
   poverty,	
   inefficient	
   governance,	
   ethnic	
   conflict,	
   clan	
  
feuding	
   and	
   religious/ideological	
   intolerance,	
   among	
   others,	
   also	
   fuel	
   the	
   staying	
  
power	
  of	
  the	
  ASG.	
  	
  
	
  
As	
   such,	
   the	
   U.S.	
   Department	
   of	
   State	
   claims	
   that	
   the	
   Philippines	
   remains	
   as	
   a	
  
“terrorist	
  safe	
  haven”	
  in	
  its	
  Country	
  Reports	
  on	
  Terrorism	
  published	
  in	
  July	
  2012.8	
  	
  
It	
  even	
  warns	
  that	
  through	
  the	
  ASG	
  and	
  the	
  country’s	
  porous	
  border,	
  the	
  Southern	
  
Philippines	
  can	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  transport	
  weapons	
  of	
  mass	
  destruction	
  (WMD).9	
  
	
  
Allow	
   me	
   to	
   conclude	
   by	
   stressing	
   that	
   the	
   ASG	
   is	
   an	
   excellent	
   example	
   of	
   the	
   nexus	
  
of	
   crime,	
   terrorism	
   and	
   insurgency.	
   	
   Countering	
   the	
   threat	
   posed	
   by	
   the	
   ASG	
   is	
   a	
  
formidable	
   challenge	
   not	
   only	
   for	
   law	
   enforcement	
   and	
   other	
   concerned	
  
government	
  agencies	
  but	
  also	
  for	
  the	
  wider	
  society	
  of	
  citizens	
  who	
  are	
  often	
  times	
  
victims,	
   casualties,	
   and	
   collateral	
   damages	
   of	
   criminal,	
   terrorist	
   and	
   insurgent	
  
activities.	
  
	
  
Thank	
  you	
  very	
  much	
  for	
  your	
  attention.	
  
	
  	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8US	
  
    State	
   Department,	
   Country	
   Reports	
   on	
   Terrorism	
   2011	
   (Washington	
   DC:	
   	
   Bureau	
   of	
  
Counterterrorism,	
  July	
  2012),	
  p.	
  181.	
  
9Ibid.                            	
  


	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 5	
  

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Crime-Terrorism-Insurgency Nexus in the Philippines

  • 1.   PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH 2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines   Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines Telephone +632 9946972 Fax: +632 4333870   www.pipvtr.com     CRIME-­TERRORISM-­INSURGENCY  NEXUS   IN  THE  PHILIPPINES     Rommel  C.  Banlaoi   Chairman  of  the  Board  and  Executive  Director   Philippine  Institute  for  Peace,  Violence  and  Terrorism  Research   Email:  rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com     Presented  at  the  International  C onference   o n   N ational   a nd   R egional   S ecurity:   C ountering   O rganized   Crime  a nd  T errorism  in  t he  A SEAN  P olitical  S ecurity  a nd  C ommunity  ( APSC)  o rganized  b y  t he     German-­Southeast  Asian  Center  of  Excellence  for  Public  Policy  and  Good  Governance  (CPG),  Faculty  of   Law,   Thammasat   University,   Bangkok,   Thailand   on   19-­20   September   2012.   Please   check   against   delivery.       I   am   truly   honored   to   stand   before   you   to   candidly   discuss   the   issue   of   crime-­‐ terrorism-­‐insurgency   nexus   in   the   Philippines.     This   presentation   is   based   on   the   various   scholarly   research   works   I   conducted   on   the   topic   over   a   span   of   eleven   years  after  September  11,  2001  (9/11).         In   my   various   publications,   I   have   always   argued   that   terrorist   threats   in   the   Philippines   cannot   be   fully   understood   if   not   analyzed   in   the   context   of   a   larger   environment   in   which   we   find   ourselves.     Terrorism   in   the   Philippines   has   always   been   inextricably   linked   with   crime   and   insurgency   problems.     In   fact,   terrorism,   crime  and  insurgency  threats  are  also  deeply  enmeshed  in  panoply  of  other  related   internal   security   concerns   associated   with   warlordism,   violent   entrepreneurship,   clan  warfare,  revenge  killing,  personal  vendetta,  and  local  political  dynamics.         So-­‐called  terrorist  groups  in  the  Philippines  are  not  only  parts  of  larger  insurgency   movements  from  the  Moro  and  Communist  fronts.  They  are  also  tightly  woven  in  a   complex  network  of  organized  criminal  activities  like  trafficking/smuggling  of  arms,   drugs   and   humans   as   well   extortion,   car  napping,   kidnapping   operations   and   even   illegal   logging.     Complicating   this   dreadful   situation   is   the   depressing   reality   that   these  terrorist  groups  not  only  have  tactical  alliances  with  each  other  but  also  have   some   “violent   entrepreneurial   relations”   with   some   corrupt   elected   local   officials   and  with  a  few  misfits  in  the  police  and  the  military  sectors.        These  armed  groups   and  individuals  create  and  perpetuate  the  violent  economy  of  Mindanao  where  guns   and  goons  rule  in  a  semi-­‐anarchic  society.     1  
  • 2. Without  a  nuanced  knowledge  of  the  whole  gamut  of  these  issues,  crime-­‐terrorism-­‐ insurgency  nexus  in  the  Philippines,  therefore,  will  be  very  difficult  to  subdue.    The   involvement   of   children   and   young   people   in   this   nexus   exacerbate   this   bewildering   problem.   In  the  Philippines,  it  is  common  to  refer  to  the  Abu  Sayyaf  Group  (ASG)  when  talking   about  terrorist  threats.         There  is  a  debate  on  whether  the  ASG  is  a  rebel,  terrorist  or  a  mere  bandit  group.1     Some   carelessly   describe   the   ASG   as   the   Frankenstein   monster   of   the   Philippine   military.   The   media   interchangeably   describes   the   ASG   as   a   bandit   and   a   terrorist   group.     But   the   United   States   decisively   classifies   the   ASG   as   a   foreign   terrorist   organization.   In  my  continuing  study  of  the  ASG  for  more  than  15  years,  I  have  learned  that  the   ASG  has  evolved  into  a  non-­‐state  armed  group  with  multiple  personalities  involved   in  various  acts  of  violence.2       When   Abdurajak   Janjalani   formed   the   group   in   1989,   his   original   intention   was   to   bridge   the   divide   between   the   Moro   National   Liberation   Front   (MNLF)   of   Nur   Misuari   and   the   Moro   Islamic   Liberation   Front   (MILF)   of   the   late   Hashim   Salamat.     Thus,  Abdurajak  recruited  followers  from  the  MNLF  and  the  MILF.   But  when  he  died  in  1998,  the  ASG  rapidly  degenerated  into  a  bandit  group  engaged   in   kidnapping,   extortion   and   smuggling   activities   under   the   leadership   of   his   brother,  Khadaffy  Janjalani.       At   present,   the   ASG   has   adopted   a   cellular-­‐type   structure   led   by   commanders   in   their  respective  geographical  turfs.  With  many  commanders  at  the  helm  of  a  single   group,  the  ASG  has  already  evolved  into  a  highly  promiscuous  armed  group  linked   with   other   armed   groups   engaged   in   terrorism,   insurgency,   banditry   and   other   violent   acts.     It   has   also   become   a   very   resilient   armed   group   having   been   protected   by  some  corrupt  local  politicians  and  a  few  scalawags  in  uniform  who  benefit  from   ASG’s   violent   activities.3   Some   ASG   members   even   serve   as   private   armed   escorts   of   a  few  local  politicians  in  Sulu,  Basilan  and  Tawi-­‐Tawi,  particularly  during  elections.                                                                                                                     1Soliman     M.   Santos,   Jr.   and   Octavio   A.   Dinampo.   “Abu   Sayyaf   Reloaded:     Rebels,   Agents,   Bandits,   Terrorists  (Case  Study)  in  Soliman  Santos,  et,  al.  Primed  and  Purposeful:    Armed  Groups  and  Human   Security  Efforts  in  the  Philippines  (Geneva:  Small  Arms  Survey,  2010),  pp.  115-­‐138.   2For   my   most   updated   publication   on   the   ASG,   see   Rommel   C.   Banlaoi,   Al-­Harakatul   Al-­Islamiyyah:     Essays   on   the   Abu   Sayyaf   Group,   3rd   edition   (Quezon   City:     Philippine   Institute   for   Peace,   Violence   and   Terrorism  Research,  2012).   3Rommel  C.  Banlaoi,    “The  Sources  of  Abu  Sayyaf  Resilience  in  the  Southern  Philippines”.   CTC  Sentinel   (3  May  2010).     2  
  • 3. Thus,  the  ASG  of  the  late  80’s  is  no  longer  the  ASG  of  today.    In  fact,  some  armed  men   who  claim  to  be  followers  of  the  ASG  are  also  claiming  to  be  followers  of  the  MNLF   and  the  MILF,  depending  on  the  situation.     Current   remnants   still   prefer   to   use   the   name,   ASG,   as   it   has   become   a   very   convenient   trademark   for   their   violent   activities.       Ustadj   Abdul   Rasul   Sayyaf,   the   real   person   whom   this   trademark   is   based,   is   very   displeased   to   see   his   name   being   used  in  the  Philippines  for  violent  purposes.     Since   the   global   war   on   terrorism   in   2001,   the   Philippine   government   has   already   put   to   justice   many   ASG   members   for   committing   various   crimes   associated   with   terrorism.         But   the   ASG   threat   persists   because   the   ASG   has   a   survival   instinct   that   is   also   shared  by  some  likeminded  groups  abroad.         ASG’s   staying   power   comes   from   the   continuous   supply   of   illiterate   and   out-­‐of-­‐ school  youth  in  Mindanao  joining  the  group  for  a  variety  of  reasons  from  personal,   economic,  social,  and  political.4    In  fact,  the  ASG’s  rank-­‐and-­‐file  is  composed  of  some   young   orphans   being   abused   by   old   commanders   to   mount   various   kidnap-­‐for-­‐ ransom  and  extortion  activities.         The   Philippine   military   says   that   the   ASG   has   around   400-­‐armed   members   as   of   2010.5      Most  of  its  members  operate  mainly  in  Basilan,  Sulu,  Zamboaga  Sibugay  and   Tawi-­‐Tawi.    But  there  are  also  sightings  of  ASG  followers  in  Metro  Manila.      During   the   first   semester   of   2012,   the   Philippine   government   says   that   the   ASG   membership  has  declined  to  around  350.     My   independent   research   on   the   ASG,   however,   indicates   that   the   ASG   has   only   around   100   regular   followers   serving   six   major   commanders   lording   over   in   only   three  major  provinces  in  Mindanao:    Basilan,  Sulu  and  Tawi-­‐Tawi  (BASULTA).         In   Sulu,   which   is   the   epicenter   of   ASG   activities,   there   are   three   major   commanders:     Commander   Radullan   Sahiron,   Commander   Yassir   Igasan,   and   Commander   Hajan   Sawadjaan.   Sahiron   has   only   around   30   regular   armed   followers.   He   is   the   recognized   over-­‐all   operational   commander   of   the   ASG.     Igasan,   who   has   been   rumored   to   be   the   over-­‐all   Amir   of   the   ASG,   only   has   around   5   regular   armed   followers.    Sawadjaan  only  has  around  10  regular  armed  followers.                                                                                                                       4Rommel   C.   Banlaoi,   “The   Pull   of   Terrorism:     A   Philippine   Case   Study”.   Youth   and   Terrorism:     A   Selection  of  Articles   (Kuala   Lumpur:     Southeast   Asian  Regional  Centre  for  Counter-­‐   Terrorism,   2011),   pp.  39-­‐50.   5General   Headquarters   of   the   AFP,  Internal   Peace   and   Security   Plan,   Bayanihan   (Quezon   City:     Armed   Forces  of  the  Philippines  Headquarters,  2010),  p.  12.     3  
  • 4.   In   Basilan,   there   are   also   three   major   commanders:     Commander   Isnilon   Hapilon,   Commander   Khair   Mundos,   and   Commander   Puruji   Indama.     Hapinol   has   only   around   20   regular   armed   followers.     Mundos   has   only   around   15   regular   armed   followers  while  Indama  has  only  around  15  regular  armed  followers.       In  Tawi-­‐Tawi,  the  recognized  ASG  commander  in  the  area  is  Jul  Asman  Sawadjaan,   the   brother   of   Hajan   Sawadjaan.     He   is   believed   to   have   at   least   10   regular   armed   followers.     There   is   an   emerging   young   commander   of   the   ASG   by   the   name   of   Nadzmir   Alih.     He  is  an  adopted  son  of  ASG  founder,  Abdurajak  Janjalani.         In   his   mid-­‐30s,   Nadzmir   Alih   operates   in   Basilan   as   a   military   protégé   of   Isnilon   Hapilon  and  in  Sulu  as  spiritual  mentee  of  Yassir  Igasan.    Nadzmir  Allih  has  around   10  regular  armed  young  followers  associated  with  another  group  called  Anak  Ilo  or   orphaned   sons.         His   group   is   responsible   for   a   spate   of   “small-­‐to-­‐medium-­‐scale”   kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom  activities  in  Sulu  and  Basilan.     Thus,  the  ASG  is  only  a  very  miniscule  armed  group.           But   the   ASG   threat   looms   large   because   it   wields   tremendous   strength   from   its   superb   ability   to   network   with   countless   armed   groups   in   Mindanao   engaged   in   various  criminal,  terrorist,  insurgent  and  even  partisan  political  activities.         While   a   few   ASG   commanders   still   embrace   an   Islamic   ideology   that   aims   to   promote   the   establishment   of   a   Islamic   State   in   Mindanao,   most   followers   have   become   violent   entrepreneurs   engaged   in   predatory   economic   activities   such   as   kidnapping,   extortion   and   smuggling   of   arms   and   drugs.       These   violent   entrepreneurs  have  skills  in  jungle  and  urban  warfare.  Worse,  they  have  the  ability   to   manufacture   improvised   explosive   devices   (IEDs)   that   they   use   for   criminal,   terrorist  and  insurgent  activities.     Based   on   our   independent   investigative   research   aided   by   seasoned   intelligence   officers,   we   discovered   that   almost   90%   of   the   funds   of   the   ASG   are   derived   from   illicit  activities,  mainly  from  kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom  and  extortion.6    As  a  violent  group,   the  ASG  has  also  demonstrated  its  inherent  capability  to  conduct  acts  of  piracy  for   economic  reasons  and  maritime  terrorism  for  political  reasons.7                                                                                                                       6Rodolfo  B.  Mendoza,  Jr.,  “The  Evolution  of  Terrorist  Financing  in  the  Philippines”  (Paper  presented   at   the   International   Conference   in   Countering   the   Financing   of   Terrorism   at   the   Sulu   Hotel,   Philippines,  7-­‐8  July  2008).   7Rommel  C.  Banlaoi.  “The  Abu  Sayyaf  Group:  Threat  of  Maritime  Piracy  and  Terrorism  in  Peter  Lehr   (ed),     Violence   at   Sea.     Piracy   in   the   Age   of   Global   Terrorism   (New   York:   Routledge,   2007),   pp.   121-­‐ 138.     4  
  • 5.   The   Philippine   government   has   declared   a   policy   of   crushing   the   ASG   through   combined  police  and  military  efforts.       But   it   recognizes   difficulties   in   doing   so   because   of   the   ASG’s   complex   links   with   other   armed   groups   like   the   lawless   elements   of   the   MILF,   rouge   factions   of   the   MNLF,   remnants   of   Jemaah   Islamiyah   (JI)   in   Mindanao   and   other   violent   groups   such   as   the   Al   Khobar   Group   (AKG),   the   Bangsamoro   Islamic   Freedom   Fighters   (BIFF)  and  even  the  New  People’s  Army  (NPA).       The   ASG’s   links   with   some   local   warlords,   government   militias,   and   local   communities  confound  the  already  convoluted  threat  it  poses  to  Philippine  internal   security.   In   other   words,   the   ASG   has   become   “complex   adaptive   system”   with   a   superb   survival  instinct.         This  instinct  to  survive  is  reinforced  by  their  complex  linkages  with  one  another  as   well   as   with   ordinary   organized   crimes   groups   and   partisan   armed   movements.       Underlying   issues   of   abject   poverty,   inefficient   governance,   ethnic   conflict,   clan   feuding   and   religious/ideological   intolerance,   among   others,   also   fuel   the   staying   power  of  the  ASG.       As   such,   the   U.S.   Department   of   State   claims   that   the   Philippines   remains   as   a   “terrorist  safe  haven”  in  its  Country  Reports  on  Terrorism  published  in  July  2012.8     It  even  warns  that  through  the  ASG  and  the  country’s  porous  border,  the  Southern   Philippines  can  be  used  to  transport  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD).9     Allow   me   to   conclude   by   stressing   that   the   ASG   is   an   excellent   example   of   the   nexus   of   crime,   terrorism   and   insurgency.     Countering   the   threat   posed   by   the   ASG   is   a   formidable   challenge   not   only   for   law   enforcement   and   other   concerned   government  agencies  but  also  for  the  wider  society  of  citizens  who  are  often  times   victims,   casualties,   and   collateral   damages   of   criminal,   terrorist   and   insurgent   activities.     Thank  you  very  much  for  your  attention.                                                                                                                           8US   State   Department,   Country   Reports   on   Terrorism   2011   (Washington   DC:     Bureau   of   Counterterrorism,  July  2012),  p.  181.   9Ibid.     5