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Disruptive innovation

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Disruptive innovation

  1. 1. Disruptive innovation A disruptive innovation is an innovation that helps cre- ate a new market and value network, and eventually dis- rupts an existing market and value network (over a few years or decades), displacing an earlier technology. The term is used in business and technology literature to de- scribe innovations that improve a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, typically first by designing for a different set of consumers in a new mar- ket and later by lowering prices in the existing market. In contrast to disruptive innovation, a sustaining inno- vation does not create new markets or value networks but rather only evolves existing ones with better value, allowing the firms within to compete against each other’s sustaining improvements. Sustaining innovations may be either “discontinuous”[1] (i.e. “transformational” or “rev- olutionary”) or “continuous” (i.e. “evolutionary”). Sustaining innovations are typically innovations in tech- nology, whereas disruptive innovations cause changes to markets. For example, the automobile was a revolution- ary technological innovation, but it was not a disrup- tive innovation, because early automobiles were expen- sive luxury items that did not disrupt the market for horse- drawn vehicles. The market for transportation essentially remained intact until the debut of the lower priced Ford Model T in 1908.[2] The mass-produced automobile was a disruptive innovation, because it changed the transporta- tion market. The automobile, by itself, was not. The current theoretical understanding of disruptive in- novation is different from what might be expected by default, an idea that Clayton M. Christensen called the “technology mudslide hypothesis”. This is the simplis- tic idea that an established firm fails because it does not “keep up technologically” with other firms. In this hypothesis, firms are like climbers scrambling upward on crumbling footing, where it takes constant upward- climbing effort just to stay still, and any break from the effort (such as complacency born of profitability) causes a rapid downhill slide. Christensen and colleagues have shown that this simplistic hypothesis is wrong; it does not model reality. What they have shown is that good firms are usually aware of the innovations, but their business environment does not allow them to pursue them when they first arise, because they are not profitable enough at first and because their development can take scarce re- sources away from that of sustaining innovations (which are needed to compete against current competition). In Christensen’s terms, a firm’s existing value networks place insufficient value on the disruptive innovation to allow its pursuit by that firm. Meanwhile, start-up firms inhabit different value networks, at least until the day that their disruptive innovation is able to invade the older value net- work. At that time, the established firm in that network can at best only fend off the market share attack with a me-too entry, for which survival (not thriving) is the only reward.[3] The work of Christensen and others during the 2000s has addressed the question of what firms can do to avoid dis- placement brought on by technological disruption. 1 History and usage of the term The term disruptive technologies was coined by Clayton M. Christensen and introduced in his 1995 article Dis- ruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,[4] which he co- wrote with Joseph Bower. The article is aimed at man- aging executives who make the funding/purchasing de- cisions in companies rather than the research commu- nity. He describes the term further in his book The In- novator’s Dilemma.[5] Innovator’s Dilemma explored the cases of the disk drive industry (which, with its rapid gen- erational change, is to the study of business what fruit flies are to the study of genetics, as Christensen was ad- vised in the 1990s[6] ) and the excavating equipment in- dustry (where hydraulic actuation slowly displaced cable- actuated movement). In his sequel with Michael E Raynor, The Innovator’s Solution,[7] Christensen replaced the term disruptive technology with disruptive innovation because he recognized that few technologies are intrinsi- cally disruptive or sustaining in character; rather, it is the business model that the technology enables that creates the disruptive impact. However, Christensen’s evolution from a technological focus to a business modelling fo- cus is central to understanding the evolution of business at the market or industry level. Christensen and Mark W. Johnson, who co-founded the management consult- ing firm Innosight, described the dynamics of “business model innovation” in the 2008 Harvard Business Review article “Reinventing Your Business Model”.[8] The con- cept of disruptive technology continues a long tradition of the identification of radical technical change in the study of innovation by economists, and the development of tools for its management at a firm or policy level. In the late 1990s, the automotive sector began to embrace a perspective of “constructive disruptive technology” by working with a consultant David E. O’Ryan, whereby the use of current off-the-shelf technology was integrated with newer innovation to create what he called “an unfair 1
  2. 2. 2 2 THE THEORY advantage”. The process or technology change as a whole had to be “constructive” in improving the current method of manufacturing, yet disruptively impact the whole of the business case model, resulting in a significant reduc- tion of waste, energy, materials, labor or legacy costs to the user. In keeping with the insight that what matters economi- cally is the business model, not the technological sophis- tication itself, Christensen’s theory explains why many disruptive innovations are not “advanced technologies”, which the technology mudslide hypothesis would lead one to expect. Rather, they are often novel combinations of existing off-the-shelf components, applied cleverly to a small, fledgling value network. 2 The theory Christensen defines a disruptive innovation as a product or service designed for a new set of customers. “Generally, disruptive innovations were technologically straightforward, consisting of off-the-shelf components put together in a product architecture that was often simpler than prior approaches. They offered less of what customers in established markets wanted and so could rarely be initially employed there. They offered a different package of attributes valued only in emerging markets remote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream.”[9] Christensen argues that disruptive innovations can hurt successful, well managed companies that are responsive to their customers and have excellent research and de- velopment. These companies tend to ignore the markets most susceptible to disruptive innovations, because the markets have very tight profit margins and are too small to provide a good growth rate to an established (sizable) firm.[10] Thus, disruptive technology provides an exam- ple of when the common business-world advice to "focus on the customer" (“stay close to the customer,” “listen to the customer”) can sometimes be strategically counter- productive. While Christensen argued that disruptive innovations can hurt successful, well managed companies, O’Ryan coun- tered that “constructive” integration of existing, new, and forward thinking innovation could improve the economic benefits of these same well managed companies, once de- cision making management understood the systemic ben- efits as a whole. Christensen distinguishes between “low-end disruption" which targets customers who do not need the full perfor- mance valued by customers at the high end of the mar- ket and “new-market disruption” which targets customers who have needs that were previously unserved by existing incumbents.[11] How low-end disruption occurs over time. “Low-end disruption” occurs when the rate at which products improve exceeds the rate at which customers can adopt the new performance. Therefore, at some point the performance of the product overshoots the needs of cer- tain customer segments. At this point, a disruptive tech- nology may enter the market and provide a product which has lower performance than the incumbent but which ex- ceeds the requirements of certain segments, thereby gain- ing a foothold in the market. In low-end disruption, the disruptor is focused initially on serving the least profitable customer, who is happy with a good enough product. This type of customer is not willing to pay premium for enhancements in product functional- ity. Once the disruptor has gained a foothold in this cus- tomer segment, it seeks to improve its profit margin. To get higher profit margins, the disruptor needs to enter the segment where the customer is willing to pay a little more for higher quality. To ensure this quality in its product, the disruptor needs to innovate. The incumbent will not do much to retain its share in a not so profitable segment, and will move up-market and focus on its more attrac- tive customers. After a number of such encounters, the incumbent is squeezed into smaller markets than it was previously serving. And then finally the disruptive tech- nology meets the demands of the most profitable segment and drives the established company out of the market. “New market disruption” occurs when a product fits a new or emerging market segment that is not being served by existing incumbents in the industry. The extrapolation of the theory to all aspects of life has been challenged,[12] as has the methodology of relying on selected case studies as the principal form of evidence.[12] Jill Lepore points out that some companies identified by the theory as victims of disruption a decade or more ago, rather than being defunct, remain dominant in their in- dustries today (including Seagate Technology, U.S. Steel, and Bucyrus).[12] Lepore questions whether the theory has been oversold and misapplied, as if it were able to explain everything in every sphere of life, including not just business but education and public institutions.[12]
  3. 3. 3 3 Disruptive technology In 2009, Milan Zeleny described the high technology as disruptive technology and raised the question what is be- ing disrupted during this process. The answer, according to Zeleny, is the support network of high technology.[13] For example, introducing electric cars disrupts the sup- port network for gasoline cars (network of gas and service stations). Such disruption is fully expected and therefore effectively resisted by support net owners. In the long run, high (disruptive) technology either bypasses, upgrades or replaces the outdated support network. Technology, being a form of social relationship, always evolves. No technology remains fixed. Technology starts, develops, persists, mutates, stagnates and declines – just like living organisms.[14] The evolutionary life-cycle oc- curs in the use and development of any technology. A new high technology core emerges and challenges ex- isting Technology Support Nets which are thus forced to co-evolve with it. New versions of the core are be- ing designed and fitted into an increasingly appropriate TSN, with smaller and smaller high-technology effects. High technology becomes just regular technology, with more efficient versions fitting the same support net. Fi- nally, even the efficiency gains diminish, emphasis shifts to product tertiary attributes (appearance, style) and tech- nology becomes TSN-preserving appropriate technology. This technological equilibrium state becomes established and fixated, resisting being interrupted by a technological mutation – new high technology appears and the cycle is repeated. Regarding this evolving process of technology, Christensen said: “The technological changes that damage established companies are usually not radically new or difficult from a technological point of view. They do, however, have two important characteristics: First, they typically present a different package of performance attributes— ones that, at least at the outset, are not val- ued by existing customers. Second, the per- formance attributes that existing customers do value improve at such a rapid rate that the new technology can later invade those established markets.”[15] Joseph Bower[16] explained the process of how disruptive technology, through its requisite support net, dramatically transforms a certain industry. “When the technology that has the poten- tial for revolutionizing an industry emerges, established companies typically see it as unattractive: it’s not something their main- stream customers want, and its projected profit margins aren’t sufficient to cover big-company cost structure. As a result, the new technol- ogy tends to get ignored in favor of what’s cur- rently popular with the best customers. But then another company steps in to bring the in- novation to a new market. Once the disruptive technology becomes established there, smaller- scale innovation rapidly raise the technology’s performance on attributes that mainstream cus- tomers’ value.”[17] The automobile was high technology with respect to the horse carriage; however, it evolved into technology and fi- nally into appropriate technology with a stable, unchang- ing TSN. Main high-technology advance in the offing is some form of electric car – whether the energy source is the sun, hydrogen, water, air pressure or traditional charg- ing outlet. Electric cars preceded the gasoline automobile by many decades and now it returns to people’s life to re- place the traditional gasoline automobile. Milan Zeleny described the above phenomenon.[18] He also wrote that: “Implementing high technology is often re- sisted. This resistance is well understood on the part of active participants in the requisite TSN. The electric car will be resisted by gas- station operators in the same way automated teller machines (ATMs) were resisted by bank tellers and automobiles by horsewhip makers. Technology does not qualitatively restructure the TSN and therefore will not be resisted and never has been resisted. Middle management resists business process reengineering because BPR represents a direct assault on the sup- port net (coordinative hierarchy) they thrive on. Teamwork and multi-functionality is re- sisted by those whose TSN provides the com- fort of narrow specialization and command- driven work.”[19] 4 High-technology effects High technology is a technology core that changes the very architecture (structure and organization) of the com- ponents of the technology support net. High technol- ogy therefore transforms the qualitative nature of tasks of TSN and their relations, as well as their requisite physi- cal, energy and information flows. It also affects the skills required, the roles played, the styles of management and coordination – the organizational culture itself. This kind of technology core is different from regular technology core, which preserves the qualitative nature of flows and the structure of the support and only al- lows users to perform the same tasks in the same way, but faster, more reliably, in larger quantities, or more ef- ficiently. It is also different from appropriate technol-
  4. 4. 4 8 NOTES ogy core, which preserves the TSN itself with the pur- pose of technology implementation and allows users to do the same thing in the same way at comparable lev- els of efficiency, instead of improving the efficiency of performance.[20] Based on the framework, modern information and knowledge-based technologies currently tend to be high technologies with high-technology effects. They inte- grate task, labor and knowledge, transcend classical sep- aration of mental and manual work, enhance systems aspects, and promote self-reliance, self-service, innova- tion and creativity.[21] In comparison, the “low” technolo- gies, no matter how new, complex or advanced, are those which still require the dividing and splintering of task, la- bor and knowledge, increase specialization, promote di- vision and dependency, sustain intermediaries and dimin- ish initiative. As for the difference between high technology and low technology, Milan Zeleny once said: " The effects of high technology always breaks the direct comparability by changing the system itself, therefore requiring new mea- sures and new assessments of its productivity. High technology cannot be compared and eval- uated with the existing technology purely on the basis of cost, net present value or return on investment. Only within an unchanging and relatively stable TSN would such direct finan- cial comparability be meaningful. For exam- ple, you can directly compare a manual type- writer with an electric typewriter, but not a typewriter with a word processor. Therein lays the management challenge of high technology. "[22] However, not all modern technologies are high technolo- gies. They have to be used as high technologies, function as such, and be embedded in their requisite TSNs. They have to empower the individual because only through the individual can they empower knowledge. Not all infor- mation technologies have integrative effects. Some in- formation systems are still designed to improve the tra- ditional hierarchy of command and thus preserve and entrench the existing TSN. The administrative model of management, for instance, further aggravates division of task and labor, further specializes knowledge, and sepa- rates management from workers and concentrates infor- mation and knowledge in centers. As knowledge surpasses capital, labor and raw materi- als as the dominant economic resource, technologies are also starting to reflect this shift. Technologies are rapidly shifting from centralized hierarchies to distributed net- works. Nowadays knowledge is not residing in a super- mind, super-book or super-database, but a complex re- lational pattern of networks brought forth to coordinate human action. 5 Practical example of disruption In the practical world, the popularization of personal computers illustrates how the knowledge contributes to the ongoing technology innovation. The original cen- tralized concept (one computer, many persons) is a knowledge-defying idea of the computing prehistory and its inadequacies and failures have become clearly ap- parent. The era of personal computing brought power- ful computers “on every desk” (one person, one com- puter). This short and transitional period was necessary for getting used to the new computing environment, but was inadequate from the knowledge-producing vantage point. Adequate knowledge creation and management come mainly from networking and distributed comput- ing: one person, many computers. Each person’s com- puter must form an access to the entire computing land- scape or ecology through the Internet of other comput- ers, databases, mainframes, as well as production, dis- tribution and retailing facilities, etc. For the first time our technology empowers individuals rather than exter- nal hierarchies. It transfers influence and power where it optimally belongs: at the loci of the useful knowledge. Even though hierarchies and bureaucracies do not inno- vate, free and empowered individuals do; knowledge, in- novation, spontaneity and self-reliance are becoming in- creasingly valued and promoted.[23] 6 Examples of disruptive innova- tions 7 See also • Blue Ocean Strategy • Creative destruction • Killer application • Leapfrogging • List of emerging technologies • Obsolescence • Paradigm shift • Technology strategy 8 Notes [1] Christensen 1997, p. xviii. Christensen describes as “rev- olutionary” innovations as “discontinuous” “sustaining in- novations”. [2] Christensen 2003, p. 49. [3] Christensen 1997, p. 47.
  5. 5. 5 [4] Bower, Joseph L. & Christensen, Clayton M. (1995). However the concept of new technologies leading to wholesale economic change is not a new idea since Joseph Schumpeter adapted the idea of creative destruction from Karl Marx. Schumpeter (1949) in one of his examples used “the railroadization of the Middle West as it was ini- tiated by the Illinois Central”. He wrote, “The Illinois Central not only meant very good business whilst it was built and whilst new cities were built around it and land was cultivated, but it spelled the death sentence for the [old] agriculture of the West."["Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave” Harvard Business Review, January– February 1995 [5] Christensen 1997. [6] Christensen 1997, p. 3. [7] Christensen 2003. [8] Johnson, Mark, Christensen, Clayton, et al., 2008, “Rein- venting Your Business Model, Harvard Business Review, December 2008. [9] Christensen 1997, p. 15. [10] Christensen 1997, p. i-iii. [11] Christensen 2003, p. 23-45. [12] Lepore, Jill (2014-06-23), “Annals of enterprise: The disruption machine: What the gospel of innovation gets wrong.”, The New Yorker. Published online 2014-06-17 under the headline 'What the Theory of “Disruptive Inno- vation” Gets Wrong'. [13] Zeleny, Milan. “High Technology and Barriers to Innova- tion: From Globalization to Localization”. International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making (World Scientific) 11: P 441. [14] Oliver, Gassmann (May 2006). “Opening up the innova- tion process: towards an agenda”. R&D Management 36 (03): P 223–366. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9310.2006.00437. [15] Christensen, Clayton (January 1995). “Disruptive Tech- nologies Catching the Wave”. Harvard Business Review: P 3. [16] “HBS Faculty & Research”. [17] Bower, Joseph (May 2002). “Disruptive Change”. Har- vard Business Review 80 (05): P 95–101. [18] Zeleny, Milan (January 2009). “Technology and High Technology: Support Net and Barriers to Innovation”. Advanced Management Systems 01 (01): P 8–21. [19] Zeleny, Milan (September 2009). “Technology and High Technology: Support Net and Barriers to Innovation”. Acta Mechanica Slovaca 36 (01): P 6–19. [20] Masaaki, Kotabe; Scott Swan (January 2007). “The role of strategic alliances in high-technology new prod- uct development”. Strategic Management Journal 16 (08). doi:10.1002/smj.4250160804. [21] Manyika, James (May 2013). “Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and the global economy”. McKinsey Global Institute. [22] Zeleny, Milan (2006). “Knowledge-information autopoi- etic cycle: towards the wisdom systems”. International Journal of Management and Decision Making 7 (1): P 3– 18. doi:10.1504/IJMDM.2006.008168. [23] Brown, Brad (March 2014). “Views from the front lines of the data-analytics revolution”. McKinsey Quarterly. [24] Bosman, Julie (13 March 2012). “After 244 Years, En- cyclopaedia Britannica Stops the Presses”. The New York Times. Retrieved 1 April 2012. [25] Tartakoff, Joseph. “Victim Of Wikipedia: Microsoft To Shut Down Encarta”. paidContent. Retrieved 1 April 2012. [26] Sandström, Christian G. (2010). “A revised perspective on Disruptive Innovation – Exploring Value, Networks and Business models (Theisis submitted to Chalmers Uni- versity of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden)" (PDF). Re- trieved 2010-11-22. [27] Christensen 1997, p. 3-28. [28] Christensen 1997, pp. 61–76. [29] Christensen 2003, pp. 37–39. [30] Christensen 2003, p. 64. [31] Knopper, Steve (2009). Appetite for self-destruction : the spectacular crash of the record industry in the digital age. New York: Free Press. ISBN 1-4165-5215-4. [32] “Concorde grounded for good”. BBC News, 10 April 2003. 10 April 2003. Retrieved 4 May 2012. 9 References • Anthony, Scott D.; Johnson, Mark W.; Sinfield, Joseph V.; Altman, Elizabeth J. (2008). Innovator’s Guide to Growth - Putting Disruptive Innovation to Work. Harvard Business School Press. ISBN 978- 1-59139-846-2. • How to Identify and Build Disruptive New Busi- nesses, MIT Sloan Management Review Spring 2002 • Christensen, Clayton M. (1997), The innovator’s dilemma: when new technologies cause great firms to fail, Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard Busi- ness School Press, ISBN 978-0-87584-585-2. (edit) • Christensen, Clayton M. & Overdorf, Michael. (2000). “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change” Harvard Business Review, March–April 2000.
  6. 6. 6 11 EXTERNAL LINKS • Christensen, Clayton M., Bohmer, Richard, & Kenagy, John. (2000). “Will Disruptive Innova- tions Cure Health Care?" Harvard Business Review, September 2000. • Christensen, Clayton M. (2003). The innovator’s solution : creating and sustaining successful growth. Harvard Business Press. ISBN 978-1-57851-852-4. • Christensen, Clayton M.; Anthony, Scott D.; Roth, Erik A. (2004). Seeing What’s Next. Harvard Busi- ness School Press. ISBN 978-1-59139-185-2. • Christensen, Clayton M., Baumann, Heiner, Rug- gles, Rudy, & Sadtler, Thomas M. (2006). “Disrup- tive Innovation for Social Change” Harvard Business Review, December 2006. • Mountain, Darryl R., Could New Technologies Cause Great Law Firms to Fail? • Mountain, Darryl R. (2006). Disrupting conven- tional law firm business models using document as- sembly, International Journal of Law and Informa- tion Technology 2006; doi:10.1093/ijlit/eal019 • Tushman, M.L.; Anderson, P. (1986). “Techno- logical Discontinuities and Organizational Environ- ments”. Administrative Science Quarterly 31: 439– 465. doi:10.2307/2392832. • Eric Chaniot (2007). “The Red Pill of Technology Innovation” Red Pill, October 2007. 10 Further reading • Danneels, Erwin (2004). “Disruptive Technology Reconsidered: A Critique and Research Agenda” (PDF). Journal of Product Innovation Manage- ment 21 (4): 246–258. doi:10.1111/j.0737- 6782.2004.00076.x. • Danneels, Erwin (2006). “From the Guest Edi- tor: Dialogue on The Effects of Disruptive Tech- nology on Firms and Industries”. Journal of Product Innovation Management 23 (1): 2–4. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5885.2005.00174.x. • Roy, Raja (2014). “Exploring the Boundary Condi- tions of Disruption: Large Firms and New Product Introduction With a Potentially Disruptive Technol- ogy in the Industrial Robotics Industry,” Engineer- ing Management, IEEE Transactions on, vol.61, no.1, pp. 90,100. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/ abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6578147 11 External links • Peer-reviewed chapter on Disruptive Innovation by Clayton Christensen with public commentaries by notable designers like Donald Norman • The Myth of Disruptive Technologies. Note that Dvorák’s definition of disruptive technology de- scribes the low cost disruption model, above. He reveals the overuse of the term and shows how many disruptive technologies are not truly disruptive. • “The Disruptive Potential of Game Technolo- gies: Lessons Learned from its Impact on the Military Simulation Industry”, by Roger Smith in Research Technology Management (Septem- ber/October 2006) • Disruptive Innovation Theory • Bibliography of Christensen’s “Theory of Disruptive Innovation” as it relates to higher education • Disruptive Technology Portfolio by Information- Week and Credit Suisse • Diffusion of Innovations, Strategy and Innova- tions The D.S.I Framework by Francisco Rodrigues Gomes, Academia.edu share research • CREATING THE FUTURE: Building Tomorrow’s World • Lecture (video), VoIP as an example of disruptive technology
  7. 7. 7 12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses 12.1 Text • Disruptive innovation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disruptive_innovation?oldid=663864982 Contributors: The Anome, Freck- lefoot, Edward, Michael Hardy, Pekkapihlajasaari, Nixdorf, Karada, (, Ahoerstemeier, Ronz, Baylink, Arteitle, Mydogategodshat, Timwi, Dcoetzee, Radiojon, Furrykef, Grendelkhan, Topbanana, Pakaran, Ldo, Phil Boswell, R3m0t, RedWolf, Altenmann, Pengo, Alexwcoving- ton, Sj, Wolfkeeper, HangingCurve, Zsweden, Brequinda, Niteowlneils, Leonard G., Andre Riemann, AlistairMcMillan, Khalid hassani, Matthäus Wander, Tagishsimon, Neilc, Ehusman, Toytoy, Yufufi, Piotrus, Kegill, Grstain, Bender235, Kjoonlee, Chairboy, Cmdrjame- son, Maurreen, Fritz freiheit, Mdd, Turbotas, Anthony Appleyard, Keenan Pepper, Goodoldpolonius2, Oleg Alexandrov, DanielVonEhren, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Mindmatrix, Dandv, Jersyko, Jfr26, BillC, Pol098, Dodiad, KingsleyIdehen, Trilussa, Mandarax, Gra- ham87, ConradKilroy, Ilyak, Rjwilmsi, Hulagutten, ElKevbo, Dmccreary, Imperdimper, FlaBot, Ian Pitchford, Kammerbulle, AndriuZ, Si- monpockley, Manscher, Rada, Gaius Cornelius, Welsh, Megapixie, Jorowi~enwiki, Daniel C, Paul Magnussen, Gorgonzilla, Arthur Rubin, Loffy, Spikespeigel42, Spon, DVD R W, Yvwv, SmackBot, PaulWay, Maestro44, Jtneill, Anastrophe, Brianski, Oli Filth, Frap, Rrburke, Gavin Moodie, EVula, Lhadnus, Ligulembot, Lunarbunny, Nakamura2828, Guyjohnston, Rexhammock, Kuru, Robofish, Blueprint18, Slakr, Sucker pvn, Kvng, Jc37, DabMachine, PaulGS, Kencf0618, Tosenton, CmdrObot, Tanthalas39, Erik Kennedy, ZsinjBot, Anil Kumar Kartham, TheRegicider, Cydebot, JPalonus, Frzl, Pdxuser, Kozuch, UberScienceNerd, JamesBrownJr, Letranova, Thijs!bot, Rkr- ish67, Electron9, AgentPeppermint, Escarbot, AntiVandalBot, Gioto, CZmarlin, Manushand, Dylan Lake, AOB, Greensburger, SteveS- ims, Gamaroff, Eltener, KConWiki, DataGazetteer, Mmoitzh, Elinruby, Gwern, CommonsDelinker, Jayantaism, Crakkpot, Iiaiialover, Largoplazo, Elkadi, TopGun, Sford, JDS2005, Joeinwap, Ddd1600, Malik Shabazz, VolkovBot, Seattle Skier, Bernium, Lradrama, Haseo9999, Valkyryn, Feudonym, Rainier3, Logan, Stambi, Speedclimb, EverGreg, Debgall, Ravensfire, Manway, CharlesGillingham, Nezavisim~enwiki, Mcorson, IPAddressConflict, Binksternet, Rilak, Eddroid, Sbolat, OccamzRazor, Stefanbcn, BigChilli, Three-quarter- ten, PixelBot, Frozen4322, Fryn, Tathurst, MystBot, Addbot, Disruptivetechnologyllc, Poco a poco, ContiAWB, Brice07~enwiki, MrOllie, Download, Guffydrawers, Stidmatt, Lightbot, Zorrobot, SasiSasi, WikiDreamer Bot, Yobot, ClockwerkMao, Bruce404, AnomieBOT, Two Companions, Citation bot, Marshallsumter, Mdawes2, Xqbot, Vik2, Krbolen, Anna Frodesiak, Cs82, Shadowzone1001, Vladimir.frolov, Fit, Sanpitch, Mondoblu, Khertko, Louperibot, Citation bot 1, HRoestBot, Tom.Reding, Fadm. 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