Report

EPC CONTRACTOR: ENGINEERING SUB-CONTRACTOR Revision 2
Date: 12-04-2015
ADCO DOC NO. 11.71.97.0622 ADCO PROJ. NO. P90152 FW PROJ. NO. 56140 Page 1 of 17
CONSTRUCTION WORK FOR ASR GAS WELLHEAD
& FLOW LINE INSTALLATION
CONTRACT NO. 15153.01 / EC10782
ADCO PROJECT NO.: P90152
HAZOP REPORT
THIS DOCUMENT IS INTENDED FOR USE BY ADCO AND ITS NOMINATED CONSULTANTS, CONTRACTORS, MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS
2 12.04.2015 AMB STN AVR APPROVED FOR CONSTRUCTION (AFC)
1 31.12.2014 AVR STN GS APPROVED FOR CONSTRUCTION (AFC)
B 24.12.2014 AVR STN GS ISSUED FOR APPROVAL (IFA)
A 16.12.2014 AVR STN GS ISSUED FOR CLIENT REVIEW (ICR)
REV DATE ORIGINATED
BY
REVIEWED BY APPROVED BY DESCRIPTION

DOCUMENT TITLE:
ADCO PROJECT No. P90152
HAZOP REPORT
ADCO DOC. No. 11.71.97.0622
REV. 2 DATE : 12-04-2015
Page 2 of 17
I N D E X
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................3
1.1 General.............................................................................................................3
1.2 Project Scope ..................................................................................................3
1.3 Scope of this Document..................................................................................3
2. ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................4
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................5
4. HAZOP GUIDELINES...................................................................................................6
4.1 Documents Studied.........................................................................................7
4.2 Records and Follow Up...................................................................................8
4.3 Time Schedule.................................................................................................8
4.4 HAZOP Team and Attendance........................................................................8
5. HAZOP METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................9
5.1 Node .................................................................................................................9
5.2 Guide Words....................................................................................................9
5.3 Process Parameters......................................................................................10
5.4 Intention.........................................................................................................11
5.5 Deviations......................................................................................................11
6. HAZOP ROAD MAP...................................................................................................11
7. LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................12
8. ATTACHMENTS.........................................................................................................14
ATTACHMENT-1: HAZOP WORK SHEETS............................................................................15
ATTACHMENT-2: NODE MARKED UP P & IDS .....................................................................16
ATTACHMENT-3: ATTENDANCE SHEET...............................................................................17

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HAZOP REPORT
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
The objective of this project is to tie the well Bb-1047 to RMS-3 in new Arab Zone-D by performing the
necessary survey works, engineering, procurement and construction activities. Also, rerouting of Bb-
428 tie in piping to M-2611 shall be done to provide empty slot for the tie in of Bb-1047 flow line to
Manifold M-2601 at RMS-3.
ADCO has deputed another testing contractor who will execute all the wellhead piping and provide tie
in connections after Test Separator to transfer process gas and liquid to RMS-3 and disposal well
WDW-BB-10XX respectively.
ADCO has awarded ALSA; the EPC Contract for above mentioned scope and ALSA has appointed
Foster Wheeler as their detailed engineering design consultant.
1.2 Project Scope
Project scope is Engineering, Construction & Installation of:
 Well Tie-in Bb-1047 to RMS-3 Manifold M-2601 (Approx. 2400 m) - Two parallel flow lines to
be installed from Wellhead to RMS-3.
 Rerouting flow line including tie in piping of Bb-428 to an empty slot on the manifold M-2611 at
RMS-3.
 Associated civil, electrical & instrument work.
1.3 Scope of this Document
HAZOP workshop was carried out on Dec 08 & 10, 2014, in ADCO Training centre at Abu Dhabi, on
the Project “ tie in if ARAB-D Gas Producer Bb-1047 to RMS-3. This document provides in brief the
methodology adopted, list of recommendations generated in consensus with the forum of participants
and the work sheets of HAZOP study and the P & IDs marked with Nodes. In total 14 Nodes were
identified. However only 8 Nodes were subjected to HAZOP study and the following P & IDs only were
considered for analysis. For completeness of the system, the liquid line from the test separator to the
disposal well is also included in the current scope of HAZOP.
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76_14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76A _14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76B _14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76C _14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76D _14

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 11.63.08.0642 P & ID Inlet Manifold M-2601-Remote Manifold Station-3
The following systems were not considered for HAZOP study as per the agreement reached between
ADCO, Al Mansoori and ALSA/Foster Wheeler during HAZOP workshop for the reasons given below.
Node-4: Diesel injection package (P & ID_ ARAB 01_76F _14)
Node-11, 13 & 14: Chemical injection package (P & ID_ ARAB 01_76E _14)
The chemical injection system is typical which is installed in all wellheads of ADCO Facility. Operators
are very familiar with operations of the chemical injection systems and the team observed no Hazards
and operability issues. Hence; excluded from HAZOP study.
Node 5 & 6: Recovered water storage tanks (T-100 to T 400), Water and chemical transfer pumps(P
300A/B) and Re injection pump(P-400) in P & ID_ ARAB 01_76B _14
The above packages are temporary facilities used during only flushing the flow lines under supervision.
These facilities will be kept isolated during normal and continuous operation. Hence the team observed
“No Concerns” and excluded from HAZOP study.
Node- 12: (Partial) DEG package(PK 200) and Acid Neutralization package (PK 300) in P & ID_ ARAB
01_76D _14 were excluded as they are functionally identical to Corrosion inhibitor package (PK 100)
which was included in HAZOP study.
2. ABBREVIATIONS
DEG : Di Ethylene Glycol
ESD : Emergency Shut Down
FAH : Flow Alarm High
FAL : Flow Alarm Low
FALL : Flow Alarm Low Low
FV : Flow control Valve
HAZOP : HAZard & Operability Study
HP : High Pressure
IA : Instrument Air
ILC : Interface Level Controller
KO : Knock Out
LAH : Level Alarm High
LAL : Level Alarm Low
LC : Locked Closed

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LO : Locked Open
LP : Low Pressure
LSHH : Level Shut down High High
LSLL : Level Shutdown Low Low
LV : Level control Valve
MMSCFD : Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day
MOC : Material Of Construction
NACE : National Association of Corrosion Engineers
NC : Normally Closed
NRV : Non Return Valve
PAH : Pressure Alarm High
PAHH : Pressure Alarm High High
PAL : Pressure Alarm Low
PALL : Pressure Alarm Low Low
PDAH : Pressure Differential Alarm High
PDIT : Pressure Differential Indicator Transmitter
PSV : Pressure Safety Valve
PV : Pressure control Valve
RMS : Remote Manifold Station
SDV : Shut Down Valve
SOP : Standard Operating Procedures
TAH : Temperature Alarm High
TAHH : Temperature Alarm High High
TAL : Temperature Alarm Low
TALL : Temperature Alarm Low Low
TV : Temperature control Valve
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The HAZOP workshop on the Project “Tie the well Bb-1047 to RMS-3” was carried out on Dec 08 & 10,
2014 in ADCO Training centre at Abu Dhabi. Main participants were Client ADCO and Contractors
Foster Wheeler, Almansoori and Alsa. Experts from various disciplines like Process, Instrumentation,
Mechanical, HSE, project engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Construction had participated and
contributed to the HAZOP study. The HAZOP workshop was chaired by a Lead Tech safety /Loss

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prevention Engineer from AMEC Foster Wheeler Sharjah Branch who had no involvement in this
project. The scribe was from Foster Wheeler –Abu Dhabi.
Total 14 Nodes were proposed for the HAZOP, however the scope was restricted to only 8 nodes on
the grounds as defined in clause 1.3 Scope of the document. In Total 38 recommendations were
proposed by the team.
One recommendation was for information purpose.
Following four recommendations were for study purpose and to implement the outcome of the study in
detailed design.
1. Study the requirement of check valve at the inlet of test separator
2. Study the set points of PSV's on the test separator
3. Study the way to alert the operator to shut down AP-1 In case of few wells shut-in in RMS-3
4. Study MDMT due to depressurization of the gas line from RMS to flare KO drum & ensure that
material is capable to handle calculated temp.
Three recommendations were for P & ID corrections and SOP requirement. Remaining Thirty
recommendations were for improvements in design related.
Al Mansoori has been assigned as Action Party for Thirty Four recommendations. ADCO and
ALSA/Foster Wheeler has been assigned as Action Party for Two (Study) recommendations. However,
ALSA/Foster Wheeler has informed that the action on recommendation of depressurising study was not
envisaged in the scope, therefore can be performed with ADCO’s concurrence of additional man
hours/variation. ADCO and Al Mansoori are assigned as Action party for one item. The date of
completion of Action items has been tentatively marked as Jan 01, 2015 which may be altered on
mutual agreement between Client ADCO and the Contractor.
4. HAZOP GUIDELINES
The following guidelines were agreed and used by the HAZOP Team during the HAZOP review
 As far as possible, causes were identified within the node, defined in the NODE identified.
 Likely causes outside the defined node were considered as “Upstream disturbance” and
“Downstream disturbance” without necessarily going into the details of likely causes of
developing such failures.
 Consequences were defined anywhere in the plant facility assuming that the safeguards were
not in place.
 Simultaneous failure of unconnected events or double jeopardy (unless common cause and
common mode of failure is possible) was not evaluated.

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 Design basis was not questioned.
 Whenever the HAZOP team could not arrive at a specific recommendation after discussing the
matter, a REVIEW/STUDY recommendation was given for that scenario.
 Operator error of inadvertent opening / closing of isolation valves were considered as a CAUSE
in the HAZOP only in specific cases. Inadvertent opening of the control valve bypass valves
should not be considered as a credible cause.
 ESDVs can fail CLOSED and BDVs can fail OPEN.
 Control valves were considered to fail in OPEN or CLOSED position.
 Damaged check valve was not considered as a failure as it was considered as a result of bad
inspection or material selection or maintenance.
 The access for operation and maintenance was not reviewed.
 A PSV was considered as a SAFEGUARD only when it was confirmed that the relevant load
case was included in its sizing basis.
 As far as possible, the equipment were identified by their TAG No. without providing the
description.
 It was considered that all NRVs would be fitted correctly.
 In case of identical systems, only ONE system was HAZOPed and it was agreed by the
HAZOP Team that the findings would be equally applicable to the other identical system also.
 NOISE was not considered as a deviation during the HAZOP study as it was confirmed by the
design team that NOISE level for all relevant equipment and control valves were specified as
per applicable code permissible value.
 HUMAN ERROR was not reviewed as a separate deviation. It was reviewed as OPERATOR
ERROR where considered applicable by the HAZOP Team.
 Recommendation was made to mitigate the HAZARD. Risk ranking was deemed as subjective
and the same has not been done as agreed by the forum and recommendations were made for
all identified HAZARDS conservatively.
4.1 Documents Studied
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76_14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76A _14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76B _14

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 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76C _14
 P & ID_ ARAB 01_76D _14
 11.63.08.0642 P & ID Inlet Manifold M-2601-Remote Manifold Station-3
 Process Cause & Effect Diagram
4.2 Records and Follow Up
For recording the proceedings of HAZOP meetings, Excel spread sheet was used. Full recording for
the HAZOP was done online based on HAZOP Team members’ consensus. All recording was
projected onto a large screen to allow all team members to view the recording and agree on the same.
A complete set of HAZOP worksheets is presented in Section-8 of this report.
4.3 Time Schedule
HAZOP workshop was carried out in ADCO Training Centre on Dec 08, 2014 in Room No.M3 and on
Dec 10, 2014 in Room No. M4 from 08:00 hrs to 15:00 hrs with intermittent breaks and lunch break.
4.4 HAZOP Team and Attendance
The HAZOP proceedings were Chaired by Mr. A.V. Ravichandran, Lead Technical Safety/ Loss
prevention Engineer of AMEC Foster wheeler – Sharjah Branch, who is an independent chairperson
having no involvement in this project. The Participants were from ADCO, Al Mansoori and AMEC
FOSTER WHEELER and ALSA.
Sr. no. Name Company Designation
1 M. Tawfikk Gozzi ADCO Sr. Process Engineer
2 Ananta Bhat ADCO Sr. Control Engineer
3 Aija Jundi ADCO Sr. Project Engineer
4 Khalid Al Hamamy ADCO Construction Engineer
5 Viswasari Pendyala ADCO T/L Tech Safety
6 Abdulkarim Younis ADCO Sr. Mechanical
Engineer
7 Ehab Elmantawi Al Mansoori Engineering Manager
8 Wahid Samy Al Mansoori Project Manager
9 Roger Stopleta Babgas-Shell Well Test Engineer

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10 Titto Joseph ALSA Construction Manager
11 Stanly Thomas Amec Foster Wheeler Project Manager
12 Surya Ganduri Amec Foster Wheeler Sr. Process Engineer
13 Satis Viswanathan Sr. Instrumentation
Engineer
14 Ambarish Chintakunta Amec Foster Wheeler Scribe
Attendance list is included in Attachment-3.
5. HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies are undertaken by the application of a formal, systematic, and
critical approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of process design. The potential
for hazard is thus assessed, and the chances of malfunction of individual equipment or instrument and
its consequences for the whole system, are identified. The examination of the design is structured
around a specific set of guidewords, which ensures complete coverage and examination of all possible
problems while allowing sufficient flexibility for an imaginative approach. The project facility P & IDs
were divided into several sections, and each section is called NODE (Refer the P & IDs marked with
nodes in Attachment-2 ). Each NODE was separately examined by the HAZOP Team in details as per
the procedure outlined hereunder
5.1 Node
A node is a location on a process diagram (usually P&ID’s) at which process parameters are
investigated for deviations. Nodes are points where the process parameters have an identified design
intent.
5.2 Guide Words
Guide words are simple words or phrases used to qualify or quantify the intention and associated
parameters in order to discover deviations. Following are the standard guide words and their respective
meanings.
 No Negation of the design intent
 More (High) Quantitative increase
 Less (Low) Quantitative decrease
 As well as Qualitative increase
 Part of Qualitative decrease

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 Reverse Logical opposite of the intent
 Other than Complete substitution
5.3 Process Parameters
Following are the Process Parameters. They are divided into two categories as follows.
Specific
 Flow
 Temperature
 Pressure
 Composition
 Phase
 Level
General
 Addition
 Reaction
 Maintenance
 Instrumentation
 Sampling
 Relief
 Corrosion
 Erosion
 Contamination
 Safety
 Start up and Shutdown

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5.4 Intention
The intention defines how the system is expected to operate at the nodes. It thus provides a point of
reference for developing deviations.
5.5 Deviations
Deviations are departures from the design intention that are discovered by systematically applying the
guidewords to each parameter at each node.
E.g. “more” + “temperature” = “higher temperature”
6. HAZOP ROAD MAP
The study team considered part of a process design for a number of deviations and guide words and
followed through a series of steps repeatedly. The sequence of action for the HAZOP can be
represented as below:
There are eight stages that were repeated many times during the HAZOP as shown in the figure given
below.

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7. LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Node 1 Recommendation Action Party
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
1.1.1
1. Review the spec break
location & consider to put the
spec break after the isolation
valve in the line D/S of choke
valves. Upgrade the piping &
all the isolation valves on the
heat exchanger inlet & outlet
lines.
2. Consider to provide high
pressure alarm.
3. Provide pressure switch
high upstream of choke
valves to shut down SDV001
ALMANSOORI Jan 01, 2014
1.2.2 4.Provide low pressure alarm ALMANSOORI Jan 01, 2014
1.3.1
5. Provide high temp alarm
upstream of choke
1.4.1
6. Provide low temp alarm
upstream of choke
1.15.1
7. Provide LO for PSV002
isolation valves
1.20.1
8. SOP shall cover flushing
operations procedure & start
up/shutdown procedure
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
2.1.4
9. Provide high pressure
alarm in up stream of choke
manifold.
2.2.2
10. Provide shutting down
steam generator/heat
exchanger at low pressure
PYLL003
2.2.3
11. Provide steam trap to
remove the steam
condensate from shell side.
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
3.1.1
13. Study the requirement of
check valve at the inlet of test
separator
3.1.2
14. Study the set points of
PSV's on the test separator
3.4.1
15. Provide properly sized
RO downstream of blow

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down valve
3.4.2
16. Change the tag name
from SDV002 to BDV002
3.4.3
17. Consider suitable
material for low temp.
3.5.1 18. Provide high flow alarm ALMANSOORI Jan 01, 2014
3.9.2
19. Consider to provide high
level alarm
3.10.1
20. Consider to provide a low
level alarm.
3.13.1
21. Study the way to alert the
operator to shut down AP-1
In case of few wells shut-in in
RMS-3
ADCO/ALMANSOORI Jan 01, 2014
3.19.0
22. Install H2S detector
around separator, F & G
equipment
ADCO/AL ROOMI Jan 01, 2014
3.19.1 23. Provide fire extinguishers ADCO/AL ROOMI Jan 01, 2014
3.20.0
24. Ensure the backup power
supply/UPS for fire & gas
system.
3.22.1
25. Install H2S detectors
around sampling point
3.22.2
26. Connect shrinkage tester
vent line to the relief header
3.22.3
27. Connect all open drains
to surge tank T-500
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
7.4.1
28. Study MDMT due to
depressurization of the gas
line from RMS to flare KO
drum & ensure that material
is capable to handle
calculated temp.
ADCO/FW Jan 01, 2014
7.10
29. Correct the P&ID vent
nozzle size
7.14.1
30. Provide low pressure
alarm/low flow alarm for
purge gas failure
7.15.1
31. Provide cladding (liquid
contact area) in KOD to avoid
corrosion due to sour liquid
hold up
7.20.1
32. Provide CCTV to monitor
pilot flame
Node 8/9 Recommendation Action Party
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
8/.9.1
33. Consider to change the
pressure rating of surge tank
inlet valve from Class- A to

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8. ATTACHMENTS
Attachment Number Title
A1 HAZOP Work Sheets
A2 Node Marked up P & IDs
A3 Attendance Sheet
Class-E
8/9.1.5
34. This equipment is for
calibration purpose & not for
regular operation & hence the
team decided not to consider
other deviation.
INFO Jan 01, 2014
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
10.4
35. Outcome of
depressurization study done
in previous node to be
applicable to burner system
(safety relief valve)
ADCO/FW Jan 01, 2014
10.18
36. Ensure proper air/fuel
ratio to get smoke less flame
in the burner
Action
Completion
Date
(Tentative)
12.2.1
37. Provide Pump failure
Alarm
12.6.1
38. Provide dedicated
pressure regulator for each
pump.
Consider to provide a
calibration cylinder at pump
suction.

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ATTACHMENT-1: HAZOP WORK SHEETS

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ATTACHMENT-2: NODE MARKED UP P & IDS

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ATTACHMENT-3: ATTENDANCE SHEET

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