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“Fourth Generation Warfare in Which At Least One Side Uses Non – Traditional Tac and its Composed Of a Non Govt Mil Force”...
Armament :
      30 mm Cannon
     7.62 mm co –ax
     Weight : 14.3 tons
     Max Rd Speed : 65 kmh
     Afloat : 7 kmh
     Fully Amphibious</li></ul>j.BMP 2 K. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.<br /><ul><li>Same as BMP 2
02 x Addl radio sets
Telescopic Antenna
Portable Power Plant
Navigational Aids
Addl Space</li></ul> k.T 63-II. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.<br /><ul><li>Country: China
Armament : 12.7 mm AAMG
Weight : 13 tons
Crew : 08
Max Rd Speed : 60 kmh
Afloat : 6 kmh
Fuel Consumption : 100  km 80 – 90 ltrs
                                    </li></ul>L.T 89 ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in to Mechanized Inf in year 2...
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
Guerrilla warfare ravi
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Guerrilla warfare ravi

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Guerrilla warfare ravi

  1. 1. “Fourth Generation Warfare in Which At Least One Side Uses Non – Traditional Tac and its Composed Of a Non Govt Mil Force”<br />GUERRILLA WARFARE - DISCUSSING THE USE OF SRI LANKA’S FLEET OF APV’S AND MBT’S<br />INTRODUCTION<br />1.The successful conduct of warfare is a rational exercise that requires from any individual, not only an Intelligence of the enemy, but also the understanding of all assets opens to him. The utilizing of force has diverse results according to the ways that he makes use of the assets. In addition, the array in which these assets are used is a prime importance. Warfare can be conventional or may be guerrilla still the prioritizing of use of force, assets, and when and where has to be deal more realistically and practically.<br /> 2.The common exception in the conventional war is 3:1 ratio. In other way it is proportionately three against one. However in the guerrilla warfare the balanced ratio is 10:1, although at times it’s more than that even. The “tk against guerrilla”, “conventional force against insurgency”, and “insurgents against a conventional force” can be hypothetically described as a civil war. Hence tanks against the guerrilla warfare have created a new chapter in all forms of warfare’s, since the modern day armies find it difficult to curtail or restrict such uprisings. As we have stepped in to the fourth generation warfare it is sensible to appraise the tactics, handling and employment of tks against such outfits. What would be the accurate and balance ratio while employing tanks against insurgents? Is it “one tank against an insurgent” or how many “insurgents against a tk”? Response has to be more theoretical but has to be much practical. <br />3.Present day principle is that an en loc should not be attacked directly by foot inf without the preparatory bombardment of artillery or air strike before inf moves out’. In this context of war comdr has two choices through which he can designate force: inf and artillery. The common practice is that use of artillery and air strikes to soften the tgt and the inf to assault. As of the doctrinal and theoretical practice of an inf attack describe as; the one third of the unit provides a “base of fire” which forces the en to keep his head down, while the maneuvering forces to take the advantage of the obj.<br />4.Thus we are no more in the third generation of war neither a traditional nor a conventional war is in reach of us. The fundamentals have changed; hence in near future the basic for the future generation warfare has to be appraised in order to find exact principles for the new innovation of war. Still any Army in the world may abide by their Doctrinal norms and may exercise their combat power to overcome conventional war sometimes may be for a small war such as an insurgency. Let us see the definition of small wars and insurgencies abound. Almost all of them are descriptive, in other words they focus on the main characteristics of insurgents and of the ways they operate in. The Oxford English Dictionary defines guerrilla warfare as: “an irregular war carried on by small bodies of men acting independently. There are very few analytical definitions, which describe insurgents in context with conventional armies. One of them belongs to T.E. Lawrence “Lawrence of Arabia”. He described guerrilla warfare by using six fundamental principles of Guerrilla War:<br />a. First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.<br />b. Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.<br />c.Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.<br />d.Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.<br />e.Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence.<br /> f. Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities.”<br />AIM<br />5.The Aim of this paper is to discuss the use of Sri Lanka’s fleet of APV’s and MBT’s during guerrilla warfare. <br />SCOPE<br />6.The mech warfare against insurgency and the use of MBT, s and AFV’s are out lined and discuss in general terms. The future employment of MBT’s/ AFV‘s in COIN and the development and changes to the present fleet of veh‘s will be discuss with suggestions and recommendations to suit the future reqmts. <br />7.Chapter One. The whole chapter is focused on to the Tech and Mech data’s of the present fleet of veh’s. <br />8.Chapter Two. The first part describes the background to the conflict and the next part explains the employment of MBT’s in offensive and defensive phases of the war. Further describe the theaters of war including how armr had been used and employed at each theater of war. It then analyzes the conduct of armr during all phases of Elam war in nut shell, the functions and the tactics/skills of en.<br />9.Chapter Three. Discuss the future use of MBT’s and AFV’s within the Sri Lanka Army. The initial sub headings cover the origin of armr and analysis of the threat perception/challenges in the future. Next part concludes with the possible re grouping of present fleet of MBT’s and AFV’s, while introducing the new concept of mech re structuring.<br /> 10.Chapter Four. The Final part deals with the how the veh will change and developed to cater for future reqmt’s. Second part analyzes the possible tech and mech improvements needed. Finally sum up with the recommendations for re grouping, upgrading of present fleet of veh’s and the most appropriate MBT’s for the future employment.<br />CHAPTER ONE<br />THE CURRENT USE OF SRI LANKAN APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN THE ARMY<br />11.The Sri Lanka Armoured Corps (SLAC) is currently a collection of eight regular regts and a vol regt. It provides the Armr capability of the Sri Lankan Army, with vehicles such as the T-55, T-55AM2, MBT’s, BMP Inf fighting veh and BTR-80, 80A, T86 Chinese APC, WMZ551 APC’s. The list of AFV’s and MBT’s and their tech characteristics are listed as fols:<br />a.BTR 80 APC. Induct in to the fleet of armr in year 1998. <br />(1)Country: Russia<br />(2)Armament: 14.5 mm MG <br />(3)7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 13.6 tons<br />(5)Crew: 02 + 08<br />(6)Rd Speed: 90 kmh<br />(7)Afloat: 9 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 1.0 km/l<br />b.BTR 80 A APC. Induct in to the fleet of armr in year 1998. <br />(1)Country: Russia<br />(2)Armament: 30 mm Cannon <br />(3)7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight : 14.5 tons.<br />c.WNZ 551 B WHEELED AFV .Induct and commissioned as an APC in Armr and Mechanized Inf in year 2007<br />(1)Country: China<br />(2)Armament: 12.7 mm Main <br />(3)Weight: 16 tons<br />(4)Crew: 12<br />(5)Rd Speed: 100 kmh<br />(6)Afloat: 8 kmh<br />(7)Fuel Consumption: 4.5 km/l<br />d.T 85 ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1991.<br />(1)Country: China<br />(2)Armament: 73 mm Main<br /> (3)7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 14.0 tons<br />(5)Crew: 11<br />(6)Rd Speed: 65 kmh<br />(7)Afloat: 6 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 1.5 km/l<br />e.T 86 (W) ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1991.<br />(1)Country: China<br />(2)Armament: 73 mm Main <br />(3) 7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 15 tons<br />(5)Crew: 11<br />(6)Rd Speed: 85 kmh<br />(7)Afloat: 8 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 2.0 km/l<br />f.T 86 (T) ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 2001.<br />(1)Country: China<br />(2)Armament: 73 mm Main <br />(3)7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 15 tons<br />(5)Crew: 11<br />(6)Rd Speed: 85 kmh<br />(7)Afloat: 8 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 2.0 km/l<br />g.T 55 A. Induct and commissioned as an MBT in year 1991<br />(1)Country: Czech Republic<br />(2)Armament: 100 mm Main, <br />(3)12.7 mm AA, 7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 38.5 tons<br />(5)Crew: 04<br />(6)Armour: 203 mm<br />(7)Rd Speed: 50 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 1.9 km/l<br />h. T 55 AM 2. Induct and commissioned as a MBT in year 1998.<br />(1)Country: Czech Republic<br />(2)Armament: 100 mm Main, <br />(3)12.7 mm AA, 7.62 mm co –ax<br />(4)Weight: 41.5 tons<br />(5)Crew: 04<br />(6)Armour: 203 mm + Add-On<br />(7)Rd Speed: 50 kmh<br />(8)Fuel Consumption: 1.9 km/l<br />i.BMP 2. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994<br /><ul><li>Country: Russia
  2. 2. Armament :
  3. 3. 30 mm Cannon
  4. 4. 7.62 mm co –ax
  5. 5. Weight : 14.3 tons
  6. 6. Max Rd Speed : 65 kmh
  7. 7. Afloat : 7 kmh
  8. 8. Fully Amphibious</li></ul>j.BMP 2 K. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.<br /><ul><li>Same as BMP 2
  9. 9. 02 x Addl radio sets
  10. 10. Telescopic Antenna
  11. 11. Portable Power Plant
  12. 12. Navigational Aids
  13. 13. Addl Space</li></ul> k.T 63-II. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in year 1994.<br /><ul><li>Country: China
  14. 14. Armament : 12.7 mm AAMG
  15. 15. Weight : 13 tons
  16. 16. Crew : 08
  17. 17. Max Rd Speed : 60 kmh
  18. 18. Afloat : 6 kmh
  19. 19. Fuel Consumption : 100 km 80 – 90 ltrs
  20. 20. </li></ul>L.T 89 ICV. Induct and commissioned as an AFV in to Mechanized Inf in year 2007.<br />(1)Country: China<br />(2)Armament: Co-ax<br /> (3)Weight: 14.0 tons<br />(4)Crew: 11<br />(5)Rd Speed: 65 kmh<br />(6)Afloat: 6 kmh<br /><ul><li>CHAPTER TWO</li></ul>THE USE OF ARMOUR IN SRI LANKA’S CONFLICT<br />12.Background. For the duration of thirty year old long lasting conflict, Armr had been a decisive arm at all lvls of fighting. During the early days (1980-1989 Elam War I) of the conflict in Sri Lanka, fleet of wh veh consists of SAC’s and SARACEN’s were the aggressor at all phases of the war. With the expansion of the Army and with the change of the battle in to semi conventional lvl, Army had to go for tracked APC’s and AFV’s. In the light of above facts the first bunch of tr/wh APC’s from China arrived in Sri Lanka in year 1991.<br />13.The new era of the cavalry family initiate with the T-85 AFV (Chinese) tr veh in WANNI OPERATION’s in year 1991-92. Concurrently during the battle in WELI OYA (Haye Para) Army empl the Chinese made T-86 wh vehs. Wh APC’s couldn’t prove much of a success during the Op. However the Army quickly realized the disadvantage of employing wh APC’s in close quarter battle. Subsequently Army pulled out all wh veh from the Fwd Zone and empl them as tp carrying veh’s. <br />14.With the demanding situation and with the success of the tr APC’s in North and Wanni Army urgently needed more mobility with added fire power. Since then the Army searched for a better mechanism with additional “Fire Power with Mobility and Shock Action”. Eventually, appropriate mechanism was found in the form of T-55 in late 1991. <br />15.Apparently the first Armoured Regt of Sri Lanka was raised and inducted in to the theater of war in late 1991 and early 1992 in JAFFNA PENINSULA. Thereon this MBT contributed immensely to the success of the war at all levels.<br />16.Employment of Armour in Attack. Empl of Armr in insurgency has to be scrutinized properly. However, counter insurgency Ops may extend into the realm of limited War. Following considerations are based on the need to empl Armr troops so as to allow them to make maximum use of their inherent capabilities in all Ops of war:<br />a.Aggressive and Bold Empl.<br />b.Mobility.<br />c.Flexibility.<br />d.Surprise.<br />e.Corporation.<br />17.Special tasks in Insurgency may be: <br />a. Armr close sp of inf, in cases where our tks cannot be quickly introduced into a theater, or cannot be used effectively due to terrain and the comm sys.<br />b. Fire Support. <br />18.The tasks allotted to the regts are listed on the order as to how the battle develops. Fol are the Roles and Tasks which the Armr Regt was abide throughout:<br />a.Roles<br />(1)Aggressive mobile action to destroy enemy Armr.<br />(2)Close combat in conjunction with inf.<br />(3)Shock action.<br />b.Tasks<br />(1)The adv to contact and the adv in contact.<br />(2)The asslt and destruction of the en.<br />19.Employment of Armour in Defence. The Armr/AFV’s were act as a mobile reserve during all def Ops’s and formed as independent strike force of the Div reserve. Fol are the some of the def tasks performed by the Regt:<br />a.To provide a mobile reserve for counter attack.<br />b.To provide anti – tk def in conjunction with bn wpns.<br />Provide sp to fighting patrols. <br />d.To form part of a screen force. <br />e.Provide Fire Power.<br />f.Rft.<br />20.Use of Tanks/APC’s in FIBUA/Close Quarter Battle. Whilst considering the gr factor, many obvious reasons are there on the subject of the cohesiveness of Armr and Inf. Following are some of the co- issues: <br />a.Close country. <br />b.Less Mob.<br />c.Close Quarter Battle.<br />d.Less Fd of Fire.<br />e.Obs.<br />f.Less space for Dispersion/Empl.<br />g.Hy built up.<br />21.LTTE had made full use of the disadvantages of the attacker in FIBUA and close country, such as limited obs, concealment, reduce fds of fire, cover, protection and restricted space. They exploited these limitations by making max use of RPG mobile teams, snipers and anti – tk ditches across rds to counter the thrust of Armd vehs. Due to mov on rd being restricted, hardly any anti – tk mines were encounter. Aslts and fire sp had to be through built up blocks between rd apprchs as the rd apprchs were obstr by en.<br />22.With all above co- issues Armr –Inf coorp was intro and conducted battle oriented trg. Further, spared several traditional Inf Regt as dedicated tps in sp of Armr. Moreover the terrain factor restricted Armr Ops to certain extend. Careful studies on IPB /estimate process had to carry out in order to cater for large scale Op’s. Fol are some of the successful offensives conducted during Ealam War II where Armr/AFV’s greatly contributed:<br />a.Op Wanni Wickrama -1989<br />b.Op Thrividabalaya-1991<br />c.Op Balawegaya II - 1992<br />d.Op Riviresa I, II, III - 1995<br />23.Terrain. The theater of Op in Sri Lanka can be divided in to 3 different entities. Fol are the terrain imperatives in each theater of war:<br />a.Wanni Theater. <br />b.Eastern Theater.<br />c.Northern Theater.<br />24.Northern Theater. Northern theater is a flat terrain with a buildup. Mainly intersperse with vegetable plots and scrub in certain areas. Maneuverability is not extremely friendly. Large townships with higher population live close to commercial hubs. <br />25.Eastern Theater. This can be divided in to two sectors as inland and coastal line. Inland terrain basically consists with scrub and open intersperse with undulated gr. Traficability is much better when compare with Wanni and Northern theaters. <br />26.Wanni Theater. Flat ground largely covered with secondary jungle and interspersed with vegetations. Less buildup in unless in main comm hubs. Traficabilty is not friendly in certain areas except for open patches in abandon paddy fds and vegetations etc. <br />NOTHERN THEATER<br />27.Use of Armour and AFV’s in Northern Theater. Northern theater is a flat terrain with a buildup. Intersperse with vegetations and scrub jungles in certain areas. Maneuverability is not extremely friendly but committed and dedicated trg be capable of simplify the complexity to some extent. Further the buildup in the city limits may curtails the fd of fire and the obs. By looking at the terrain and the tankabilty in the area it was an extremely difficult terrain to empl Armr. But with all the difficulties MBT’s together with APC’s were tasked to start up its msn oriented trg with model trg etc. Due to vulnerability and exposure the tactics had to re adjust according to the situations. It was comprehended with the past experiences and Armr was utilized as a decisive arm at all phases of the war.<br />28.Elam War II. During Elam War II MBT were empl in JAFNA PENINSULA for few major Ops such as Op Chandamaruthaya, Op Boomi Kampa and many limited Ops in form of quick attcks to cause attrition and as a show up force. The biggest success was achieved during Op Balawegaya II conducted south of JAFFNA to capture VETTALAIKERNI in order to provide a depth to the isolated Elephant pass Div. The MBT’s were more efficient and agile since the fleet was straight away after series of successful Ops in JFN. Two sqns of Armr were engaged throughout the month long battle with many difficulties and with the scarcity of log and spares backing. Since the battle was fought at a place where no rd access, find it difficult in providing constant log sp. But with all these difficulties MBT’s were much aggressive and offered constant close fire sp at all stages of the war. It is significant that MBT’s were in line with foot inf during all asslt phs of the battle. Many vulnerable areas such as open patches/dried lagoon areas were independently negotiated by the armr. <br />29.Elam War III. For the first time in history of Sri Lanka Army, Mech column (Armr crew with mounted Foot Inf) was launched at a brief encounter just prior to successful Op RIVIRESA. Op took place in two diff apprch’s, one axis was totally dedicated with mech column while the other axis was dominated by Inf with the sp of MBT’s. Op LEAP FORWARD a Limited Op planned for 72 hrs to see the feasibility of Mech concept and to assess the sustainability and the success. Disparities and past experiences of the Op LEAP FORWARD was carefully scrutinized by the higher lvl while employing AFV’s and MBT’s as a cohesive unit during the Op RIVIRESA. Op RIVIRESA one of the most successful Ops conducted in JAFFNA PENINSULA to capture the heart of JAFFNA City in 1995. The MBT’s and AFV were immensely engaged throughout the whole episode of the battle. During the period Fire Power and Shock Action of Armour provided extra advantage to the foot Infantry. The areas where Armr operated in the battle to capture JFN city was highly built up. There for the movof AFVs were very much restricted to lanes made by Engrs as the main rds and miner rd/lanes were mined and cut off by the LTTE. Although the Armr tps that were made aval for the op were to maintain mutual sp within the tps, due to the density and complexity of the built up, this was newer possible while putting in to practice. Many times a single tk had not provided fire sp to the inf. Due to the built up it was difficult for the main gun of the T 55 to provide fire at the exact point. This was mainly due to the very short ranges where the gun could not be depressed to take the gr lvl bunkers. manoeuvre in to fire posn were also restricted. However utilizing the Dozer tr and other improvised methods fire was directed at vital times in sp of inf maneuvers. <br />30.During the Elam War III Army managed to capture many key terrains of en with the existing eqpt. Meantime the battle was quickly developed in to a fluid battle. The en switched his gears from “Running Battle” to more of a “Stay and Fight Battle”. LTTE’s been more aggressive and acquired many sophisticated items including Artillery, Hy MG’s and Missiles during the above period. Even some of the captured MBT’s were in the charge of the en. During Elam war III Army managed to capture KILINOCHCHI one time LTTE’s strong hold during the Op SATH JAYA III. <br />31.Elam War IV. Elam War IV begun aftermath of the several ceasefire breechings by the LTTE. During the period of time the SF were holding on to the Fwd def lines in MUHAMALAI from the North. Several attempts made by the SF to break away from the def in order to capture Key Terrain of ELEPHANT PASS were successfully denied by the LTTE. Basically the SF were holding on to a narrow strip of a land which bordering the Sea from the East and the Lagoon of KILLALY from the West. <br />32.Employment of Armr was a constrained due to gr restrictions. Thinning out and dispersion was totally limited. Number of occasions 4th Armoured Regiment sustained savior damages whilst trying to breach out. It was realized and comprehends the difficulty in empl Armr with such gr restrictions. <br /> <br />EASTERN THEATER<br />33.Use of Armour and AFV’s in Eastern Theater. As per the terrain comparatives the traficability in the area is not extremely difficult in use of AFV’s and MBT’s. Since the Eastern Theater was not that critical and due to less en resistance, Army hasn’t empl any tr APC’s neither MBT’s in East. But wh veh such as SAC’s /SARACEN’s e were empl in order to cater for convoy protections and tp carrying duties. After the arrival of new BTR 80/80A’s in year 1998, one sqn of BTR’s were empl in Eastern Theater for rft, convoy protection and tp transportation. Subsequently the SAC’s and SARACEN’s were gradually phased out from the fleet. <br />34.During the final battle in WAKARAI and THOPPIGALA in Elam War IV, MBT’s were used to a great extent. Since the final battle in East was a small group Op and the role and the tasks of Armr was bit unorthodox. Since the en in East never posses with tks nor they fought in fortified bunker lines, hence armr was not empl to cater for hy armr asslts. Mainly armr was used for Fire Power and Mobility.<br />WANNI THEATER<br /> <br />35.Use of Armour and AFV’s in Wanni Theater. As it was a flat terrain covered with secondary jungle mobility was restricted and the obs too limited. While empl armr careful studies were made on IPB and many aerial recce’s were carried out in order to finalize the avenues of approaches. It was a huge challenge to use armr during the initial stages of the battle.<br />36.Elam War II. During the late eighties initial empl of tr AFV’s were made at an Op conducted under the name of WANNI WICKRAMA. Many Inf Bn’s and Div’s took part in the offensive. Since the en had never confronted armr thrust before the entire Op was a success. The reqd speed and the momentum was the key to success. Total credit should go to the Chinese T –85 AFV’s and its crew members for the incredible skill lvls that they demonstrated during the entire Op. It is noteworthy that the AFV’s were in total control of the situation and the enthusiasm of the foot Inf was even boosted up with the newly added element. <br />37.Elam War III. The Op JAYASIKURU was the longest and most high intensity battle fought during Elam War III. One Armr Regt and 2x Recce Regts were engaged throughout the Op. 3rd Recce Regt with AFV’s mounted with inherent asslt pers provided reqd fire support while assisting the foot Inf to negotiate obs such as open and vulnerable areas. AFV’s were basically used for swift action when the intensity is so high in the battle in order to gain the momentum; Fire power and Protection for foot inf. The MBT’s were mainly used as an independent entity in sp of AFV’s and ordinary inf. As a whole the MBT’s were in sp of inf in order to provide fire power and to negotiate the fortified bunker lines. <br />38.Elam War IV. The most decisive battle was fought in Wanni in the form of Humanitarian Op and in part of the Eastern Theater of war. During the initial stages of the battle armr was partially used due to boggy and wet conditions in the Mannar and Vedithalativu areas. armr was so decisive during the middle stages of the battle where many open and abandoned paddy fields were supposed to negotiate in general area South East of VEDITHALTHIVU. armr carried out a pivotal role during the latter part of the battle by providing close fire sp to inf. The Mech inf joins the battle from the North East coastal area CHUNDIKULAM where inf move is very vulnerable and restricted. Mech column marches its way up to WELLIMULLIWAIKAL through a narrow strip along the coastal belt encountering series of bunker lines while inflicting hy cas. During the move armr provided intimate fire support using its main armaments to hinder the en resistance towards the advancing mech columns. <br />39.The final phase of the battle obviously reflected the extremely poor military performance of LTTE. LTTE's military weakness has been in striking contrast to the very impressive performance of Sri Lankan Forces. LTTE never had time to equip itself with IEDs/Land mines and to train its new cadres how to use them against the striking armr. Since the battle was so fluid and swift LTTE’s never had their second thoughts. Secondly the battle was conducted in multiple approaches to deceive the en. LTTE would have provided plenty of opportunities to inflict significant casualties on the MBT’s during the early stages of the battle. But till the end LTTE terrorist have had negligible impact on armr. <br />40.LTTE Means of Countering Armd Vehs.The LTTE did its best to counter AFVs/MBT’s, throughout the past battles. Anti – tank ditches were cut across roads at quite a lot of places, mobile RPG teams were deployed to destroy AFVs with special instructions on where to aim so as to destroy an AFV or at least its commander. Anti – tank mines were buried, some of these on the likely approaches, once the general direction of the SF advance was known. Anti – tank mines were effectively placed by en on the edge of rd/track juncs especially where the track leads from the main rd/track to an open patch area, based on the likelihood of AFVs moving into/out of these open patches/areas. <br />41.Additionally the LTTE were resort to the following for further counter action:<br />a.Try to acquire anti – tk missiles.<br />b.Improve the anti – tk capability by concentrating on more RPGs. RPG teams, anti tk mines, ditches and inundations. <br />c.Empl of more tk hunting teams.<br />d.Attempt to infiltrate and destroy as many tanks as possible in the rear areas.<br />ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION<br />42. Even though the main impact of the LTTE was borne by the infantry, if not for the close Armr fire sp and the shocking effect of Arty fire, inf couldn’t keep the tempo as they did to accomplish the objectives. This was very much obvious in the past battles fought since Elam War II till the end of Elam War VI. The LTTE would not have thought that they will have to face this much of fire power from the especially from Armr and as a whole from the SF’s. Therefore Armr become one of the main threats and the decisive arm at all phases of the war. Especially the tactics which Armour was adopted during the Op Riviresa is unique. Fighting in Buit up Areas in Armour has never been in the manuals earlier. Hence with the induction of MBT’s together with AFV’s had proven a point in latest trends in mechanized warfare/FIBUA. <br />CHAPTER THREE<br />THE FUTURE USE OF THE APV’S AND MBT’S WITHIN THE SRI LANKAN ARMY<br />43.The Induction of Armr. The MBT’s were introduced to Sri Lankan Army nearly two decades ago. Hence the wh APC’s such as SAC and Scout Cars were introduced as a recce veh’smuch earlier than the MBT’s. This mechanism was created to save the lives of its unprotected soldier on foot, to defeat the machine gun, barbed wire and the trench, a combination which brought about a virtual stalemate in the Great Wars. Since then this huge machine has immensely contributed to the insurgency in Sri Lanka where no one has made any prediction. <br />44.“Generational warfare is based on technology and tactics”. As off now we have stepped on to the fourth generation warfare and this is defined as; ‘4GW is conflict characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian”. Maneuver and armored warfare was discussed and experienced throughout during the third generation warfare (WW2 and beyond).Sri Lanka as a nation has lot of bitter experiences with regard to bloody civil war within the country for more than 3 decades. It is a must that we should research on the future possible threats while continuing with the long term post insurgency planning. The analytical and probable threats in the future:<br />a.Internal Dispute (Ethnic Crisis).<br />b.Revolution.<br />c.Hostilities between neighboring countries.<br />d.Forceful troop enforcement by any other state.<br />e.Rural base Insurgency.<br />f.Urban base Insurgency.<br />45.Since we are into the 4 GW it is clearly evident that Para c and d of above will not be a possible threat to Sri Lanka in the future. Further with the International relations and the foreign policy which Sri Lanka is adopting at present will not harm the good will between the regional states. Presently Sri Lanka is experiencing the peace after a long lasted civil war. Therefore the main concern should be on to the peacekeeping, such as peacetime military actions to curtail and to prevent the outbreak of a conflict in future. Terrorism can be considered a tactic that can be used in any type of warfare. Peace keeping missions are meant to prevent the eruption of a conflict. The essential difference between war-fighting and peace-keeping missions is that one makes the maximum use of force while the latter is committed to the minimum use of force. Direct action missions tend to be high in intensity but short in duration. Moreover a high intensity combat cannot be ruled out; moreover with the prevailing situation in the country a high intensity war is more unlikely. The level of intensity is usually associated with the probability of occurrence of a certain level of conflict. Terrorism is at one end of the spectrum and is slightly probable while high intensity hostilities are at the other end and is least likely. <br />46.Moreover coordinated national plan should cover the entire political, economic, administrative, and operational and intelligence fields based on the analysis of the type of insurgency expecting. Thus it can be urban base insurgency, rural base insurgency or any other mean. Once it has been assessed that an insurgency has or could be developed, the govt should move rapidly to provide an analysis of the type of insurgency it faces and its subsequent implications: At the same time the govt and its agencies with armed forces have to respond positively to the violence and intimidation generated by the insurgency.<br />47.Military Planning. The military comd will adopt a similar approach to making his campaign estimate for a COIN campaign as he would go for a more conventional war .Ideally starts with the issue of strategic directives, precisely the govt strategic goals desired national aims. The probable’s and likely threats can expect in future will be between soldier and the civilian. The aim can be achieved using all of the conventional methods: narrowing of boundaries, grouping, CS and CSS allocation etc. To these can be added specific COIN aspects like reorganization and distribution of staff effort, intelligence, PSYOPS etc. The Comd can utilize Maneuver Resources to concentrate force against insurgents, unhinging him by means of Surprise, Speed and Fire Power. <br />48.Since this is the threat perception, carful study has to carryout to perceive the practicability of employing tanks in the future generation warfare moreover on low intensity conflict. If so what is the role of armour, what will be the task, what will be the most appropriate machine, what are the upgrades, and do we need any sophisticated technology, do we need to emphasize more on light veh; these are the questions that we have to look ahead. Still the Armour has a role to play, armoured recce veh and tracked APC’s may be useful in strictly controlled Ops. In certain circumstances they are likely to be described as Tanks in Sensational Journalism, with the implications that the SF’s are over-reaching. However recce veh have an essential role to play in patrolling, convoy and VIP protections and for estb a cordon quickly. Wheeled APC’s are useful carrying additional troops and, on occasions for re sup, in areas where stoning, small arms fire bombs and grenades may be used. If there is a serious mining threat, especially constructed (HAPC) APC hull may be needed to deflect blast. As in conventional war, Armour can be vulnerable to close range attacks in built up areas and close country unless supported.<br />49.Future Challenges. The peacetime emphasis has to move from fighting skills to procurement and the management of technology. The best way to a promotion is through running a successful procurement program in the NSC. Leadership in the field is a secondary consideration. As a force we have to develop the sense of priorities to increase a passion for hardware and work for it. Further we should not neglect our strategy, tactics, and the intangibles of warfare. <br />ASSESSMENT<br />50.In spite of all this modern-technology, it has never been the decisive factor in the past wars fought against rebellion. The struggle to exercise technology and to deal with the enemy’s skills has been much more important. Using history as a guide, as a proud Army we should mixed the latest trends of Armour and concepts more suited to our own scenario of war. <br />51.Grouping. Let’s consider the present fleet of MBT’s and AFV’s within the Army. With the aval assets of 2 x AR and 3 x Recce Regt’s the best possible grouping could be Combat Team concept. While considering the newly formed mechanized Bde we are capable of regrouping the mech column with the existing fleet of Armour as an alternative. Hence the lack of AR within the Army will not sustain the issue. Therefore the no of Regts has to increase in the form of AR’s to cater for the reqmt. While considering the re grouping/re organizing and induction of new MBT’s should deem on the compatibility with the present fleet of veh and the concept of Op. <br />52.At present, almost all infantry units from industrialized nations are provided with some type of motor transport. Infantry units equipped with IFVs rather than lighter vehicles are commonly designated as "heavy", indicating more combat power but also more costly long-range transportation requirements. In certain countries the concept is different, the units consist of wheeled APC’s are called as "Mechanized Infantry" and the units with tracked AFV’s are called as “Armored Infantry”.Since the Mechanized Infantry Bde in Sri Lanka is motorized with track and wheeled both, it is high time to reform the structure of Armour, Armoured Infantry and Mechanized Infantry as per the latest trends of mechanized warfare. <br />53.Deployment. Future deployments must cater for decentralized comd structure incorporated with combined arm concept. While looking at the threat perception, it is noticeable that urban base or rural base insurgency is more fragile. Since we are experiencing the fragile peace after a conflict and the possibilities are there for an outbreak for a fresh insurgency. Hence we have the knowledge and the understanding of the situation and state of the conflict; it is more practicable in deploying the fleet according to its capability, potential and the reqmt. <br />54.As a matter of priority the deployment plan must cater for an island wide strategic positioning. Since the state of veh and the no requisite is not meeting with the reqmt for a wide range deployment, it is suggest accommodating most intimidated areas initially. The best possible employment will enhance the usage and the economical factor up to certain extent. When considering the present theaters of war, it will be more feasible to deploy wheeled type veh in the southern most theater of Ops. Since this will improve the flexibility in shifting assets from one theater of Op to another in a crisis situation. Consequently the tr type veh can be deploy according to the viability of the gr ,terrain and the threat levels in other remaining theaters of war. <br />CHAPTER FOUR<br />DETERMINING HOW THESE VEHICLES WILL CHANGE/BE DEVELOPED TO CATER FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS<br />55.The changes and development of the current fleet of veh must be a concurrent activity in parallel to the grouping process. The scope and the vision of the Army for the future reqmts and employment have to be in similar lines and ought to be compatible. What would be the scope of Sri Lankan Army in future generation of War? Hence the requirement of making changes, modifications and regrouping of own assets be obliged with the accordance of the intended scope. What are the areas to be address when making changes or any development to a subject which generate strategic value? Further it should be in the lines of National interest and requirement of the nation.<br />56.National requirement would be to maintain the normalcy within the country without hindering the economical and political will of the state. The interest would be the socio economic development within the country in order to stand tall against any foreign/local threats in the future. Whilst considering the changes and development economic factor has to be address. Changes /Development should be very lucrative and cost-effective. Beyond economical changes should not encourage. Only upgrading, improvement and enhancing could be possible as per the economic disparity in the country. At present many Armies in the world in the verge of replacing, developing and upgrading current stocks of obsolete MBT’s /AFV’s. Many concern about the economy, robustness and compatibility of the mechanism while making changes. <br />57.As an example the transport and other logistic requirements have led many armies to adopt wheeled APCs when their existing stocks of tracked APCs require replacement. A recent trend seen in the Israel Defense Forces, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the development and introduction of exceptionally well-armored APCs (HAPC) such as the IDF ACHZARIT which are converted from obsolete Main Battle Tanks (such as the Russian T-55). Such vehicles are usually expedients, and lack of space prevents the armament of an IFV being carried in addition to an infantry section or squad. In the Russian Army, such vehicles were introduced for fighting in urban areas, where the risk from short range infantry anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7 is highest. <br />58.Many APCs and IFVs currently under development are intended for rapid deployment by aircraft. New technologies which promise reduction in weight, such as electric drive, may be incorporated. However, facing a similar threat in Post-invasion Iraq to that which prompted the Russians to convert tanks to APCs, the occupying armies have found it necessary to apply extra armr to existing APCs and IFVs, which adds to the overall size and weight. Some of the latest designs (such as the German Puma) are intended to allow a light, basic model vehicle which is air-transportable to be fitted in the field with additional protection, thereby ensuring both strategic flexibility and survivability.<br />59.Many countries look for light and well protected veh which can carry at least a section of men. All these trends are always changing with the skill levels of the en that we are facing in the future. Several Armies in the world are gearing up to face the next generation of war. As an Army and as a nation we have the experience of beating the most ruthless guerilla organization in the world. With all the past experiences it is evident that small group Ops in the form of maneuverist approach brought us the glory. Future threat can be in the form of insurgency and may be in the form of low intensity conflict. Anyhow the conflict moreover will be restricted on to urban fighting. By looking at the future Armies and the future generation war it is explicable that small group Op with speed and flexibility will accomplish the requisite. <br />60Technical Improvements. Future tank gun has to be replaced and upgrade as 120 mm/125mm smooth bore fitted with auto loader. This will enabled the crew to be reduced to three, commander, gunner and driver. Further this will restrain the crew fatigue and additional man power reqmt as well. Other major improvements required are as fols: <br />a.Original diesel engine to be replaced with a new higher performance diesel engine to give a much higher power-to-weight ratio and therefore greater acceleration on the battlefield. <br />b.APFSDS ammunition for the 120 mm gun.<br />c.NBC sys. <br />d.Gun stabilization in elevation and traverse, simplified fire-control sys and a laser rangefinder. <br /> e.New radios and comm sys.<br />f.Add-on armr.<br />61.With the above all Improvements the veh will enhanced with greater survivability and lethality. While considering the advantages in improving the present fleet of MBT’s it is notice that the time factor and the financial issue has to be carefully analyze. <br />SUGGESTIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS<br />REGROUPING<br />62.The ratio of mech inf in most combined arms formations was increased by many armies as the war progressed. Fol proportional bodies to be consider in re grouping and re structuring of different entities in simplifying the mech warfare to enhance far more combat capability in future empl: <br />a.Forming of additional Armoured Regts.<br />b.Stream lining the Mech Inf Regts.<br />d.Introduction of Armoured Inf Regts.<br />63. If the Army is concern about the combat gr or battle gr concept in the future, all Recce Regts should equip with MBT’s to facilitate the perception of armr bias concept.<br />64. All wh type APC’s/AFV’s should stream line as Mech inf and independent comd responsibility has to be set up.<br />65.All tr APC’s /AFV’s should stream line as Armoured inf and the Comd structure has to be vested on separate entity. <br />66.Combat team / Combat gr concept has to be simplify and the Bde lvl comd composition’s has to be concentrate on the empl basis of each arm ( Armr Hy/Inf Hy).<br />PROPOSED MECHANIZED INF BDE<br />BDE HQ<br />WMZ 551BTR 80/80AWMZ 551<br />PROPOSED ARMOURED INF BDE<br />BDE HQ<br />BMPT-89T-89/85<br />67.The Mechanized and Armoured concept was discussed at Chapter 3 to this paper and the specimen of the ideal mechanized bde and of an ideal Armoured Inf Bde is shown above. <br />PROPOSED ARMOURED BDE<br />BDE HQ<br />3 AR T-554 AR T-555 AR?1 AR ?<br />PROPOSSED BATTLE GROUP SPECIMEN 1<br />BDE HQ<br />Regt of T89Regt of T55Bn of BTR<br />PROPOSSED BATTLE GROUP SPECIMEN 2<br />BDE HQ<br />Bn of T89Regt of BMP<br />Regt of T55<br />68.The above simple diagrams represent combined arms concept, while providing equal distribution of assets to split each Bde with variety. As a model if u closely study the specimen 1 and 2 of the Battle Group concept specimen 1 provides variety in its eqpt and where as the specimen 2 provides parity in each eqpt since all assets are in the form of tr veh’s. The below Armoured Divisional structure caters for 3 different Bde comd structures under an armoured divisional comd. This will enhance the systematic deployment of armoured and mech assets whilst decentralizing the comd. <br />STRUCTURE OF PROPOSSED ARMOUYRED DIVISION<br /> XX<br /> II<br /> <br /> 3MIR DIV RES<br /> x x x<br /> II II II<br /> 4AR 3 AR 1AR <br /> II II II<br /> 5 AR 2 AIR 1 MIR <br />II II II<br /> 1AIR 3AIR 2MIR <br /> <br />EMEEMEEME I I I<br />E<br /> I I I<br />UPGRADING<br />69.Fol are to be consider while developing and making changes to the present fleet of veh in order to curtail the surplus in costs to make it more dynamic and unique. <br />70.Obsolete T-55 MBT’s with defective armaments be capable of transformed in to additionally protected APC’s/AFV’s.<br />71.Converting T-55’s in to AFV (HAPC) Heavy Armoured Personal Carriers will enhance the troop carrying capability, in addition the protection and better x country mobility. <br />IDF ACHZARIT converted Main Battle Tanks (Russian T-55)<br />72.Many SALADIN’s are phrased out due to economical factor and due to engine defects, since the armaments of these veh are in working order, capable of upgrading outdated tracked veh by fitting these canisters to enhance the firepower. <br />76 mm Canister fitted to a T-63 –II chasey- Captured during final battle in Wellamulliwaikal<br />73.Upgrading process and the procedure may take considerable time and considerable amount of monetary reqmt. Further the technical, industrial knowledge and trained labour will be a huge constrains to deal with. Since the course of action is not much favorable, it is suggess purchasing a MBT which has the identical technical data indicated in para 51. The best aval MBT in the current field is the upgraded version of T-59. This particular Tank T-59, which has been in use for over 30 years with Pakistan Armoured Corps, is being upgraded by HIT under a phased pogramme since 1990 with a total of 50 upgraded features giving a quantum technological leap to this old tank.<br /> <br /> . <br />Al-Zarrar MBT<br />PECIFICATIONS (Al-Zarrar MBT) <br />GeneralCombat Weight40 TonCrew4Power to Weight18.3 HP/TonMax Torque/rpm305 kgm/1300-1400rpmRunning Gear SuspensionTrackRubberBump Stop2 each sideSupport Roller3 each sideShock AbsorberFriction TypeTorsion Bars10ArmamentMain Gun125mm Smooth BoreProjectilesAPFSDS, HEAT, HECo-Axial MG7.62 mmAA MG12.7 mmAutoloaderTypeSemi Auto Loading/Ramming SystemFCS/GCSTypeImage Stabilised Fir Control System with LRF and ballistic computerFiring CapabilityS-S, S-M, M-S, M-MProtectionERAOptionalFire Extinguishing & Explosion SuppressionYESThermal Smoke ScreenInstalled<br />74.Apart from the AL-ZARRAR experience showed that, we need and IFV/light tk in the mould of the BMP with a large calibre gun to be used in all types of terrain. It has to be light enough to be maneuverable, agile and capable of destroying en and their strong points. As of the present availability in the world, a BMP III could be ideal. It has a 100 mm gun a 30 mm cannon, a Co – ax MG and an MG for the driver. However the cost could be prohibitive. <br />BMP MK III<br />75.While recommending MBT AL-ZARRAR and BMP MK III as the ideal MBT’s for the 1st and 5th Reconnaissance Regts, It’s reasonable to leave the discussion open for any critics and suggestions. <br />76.With all experience gain out of the armoured and mechanized warfare, it is recommend that to cont with combined Armr – Infantry training with engineers (if possible with Armd Engineers). This will enable us to: <br />Have a better understanding with the other Arms.<br />Minimised eqpt and personnel cas.<br />Impart knowledge on capabilities and limitations of Armr which at the end will save much ammo that is fired unnecessarily.<br />Effectively utilize combined Armr Groups. <br />CONCLUSION<br />77.Nevertheless the tanks have much vulnerability in different aspects of modern ground and guerrilla war, it is impossible to conquer a country, win a full-scale battle or hold occupied hostile territory without them.The striking success of T-55 Main Battle Tanks/AFV’s in the 30 year old conflict proves how crucial tanks remain to the conduct of modern war. Part of the contrast obviously reflects the renewed emphasis on training, cohesion and sheer disciplinary toughness that Sri Lankan Forces and the Formation Comds have had upon the men during the last three decades. <br />