OSINT Social Media Techniques - Macau social mediat lc


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OSINT Social Media Techniques - Macau social mediat lc

  1. 1. Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques:  Big  Data  and   Social  Networks  (OSINT)  and  Mobile  Surveillance   Giuseppe Vaciago Seminar on Cybercrime and Digital Forensics April 8-12th 2014 EU-Macao Co-operation Programme in the Legal Field (2010-2013)
  2. 2. 1.  Introduc,on   q  IP  Address  and  DNS   q   Online  Sources  of  Informa6on   2.  Big   Data   and   Social   Network   (OSINT)   and   mobile   surveillance   q  Big  Data  Defini6on   q  Detec6ng  and  Seizing  Illegal  Contents   q  Valida6ng  Digital  Evidence   q  Chain  of  Custody  aBer  Seizure   q  Analysis  of  Digital  Evidence   q  Repor6ng  of  Digital  Evidence  Findings   3.  Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques   q  Iden6fy  the  Suspect  –  Fake  Profile   q  Evidence  from  SNS   Agenda   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  3. 3. What  is  Digital  Electronic/Evidence?   The   Opte   Project   creates   visualiza/ons   of   the   14   billion   pages   that   make   up   the  network  of  the  web.     Hungarian   physicist   Albert-­‐ László     discovered,   from   every   single   one   of   these   pages   you   can   navigate   to   any  other  in  19  clicks  or  less  
  4. 4. An  IP  address  is  a  numerical  iden/fica/on  code  assigned  to  each  and   every  device  connected  to  a  network,  comparable  to  a  street  address   or  a  telephone  number.       Given  a  specific  IP  address  and  the  exact  ,me  the  net  connec/on  was   established,   an   ISP   can   trace   the   personal   data   of   the   person   who   signed  the  related  connec,vity  service  contract.     IP  Address  could  be  Sta,c  (IP  Address  doesn’t  change)  or  Dynamic  (IP   Address  shared  with  several  other  customers  of  the  same  ISP)     IP  Address   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  5. 5. The  Internet  Assigned  Numbers  Authority  (IANA)  regulates  these  IP   addresses.  through  regional  en//es  located  around  the  world  (RIPE  -­‐   Europe  and  some  parts  of  Asia;  APNIC  -­‐  Asia,  and  the  Pacific  Region;     ARIN   -­‐   North   America;   LACNIC   -­‐   La/n   America   and   the   Caribbean;     AfriNIC  –  Africa.   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   IP  Address:  IANA  
  6. 6. IP  Address:  IPv6   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   IPv6  supports  globally  unique  sta/c  IP  addresses,  which  can  be  used   to  track  a  single  device's  Internet  ac,vity.       Most  devices  are  used  by  a  single  user,  so  a  device's  ac/vity  is  oSen   assumed  to  be  equivalent  to  a  user's  ac/vity.       This  causes  privacy  concerns  in  the  same  way  that  cookies  can  also   track  a  user's  naviga/on  through  sites.  
  7. 7. Domain  Name  System  (DNS)   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   The   Domain   Name   System   (DNS)   is   a   distributed   system   that   acts   like  a  large  phone  book,  and  keeps  track  about  which  IP  address  (or   addresses)  is  assigned  to  which  “name”,  and  vice  versa.     Apart  from  the  official  channels  to  query  DNS  records  and  resolve   DNS  to  IP  addresses  there  are  plenty  of  tools  and  websites  designed   to  automate  and  help  the  inves/gator  on  this  front:     •  DnsStuff  (www.dnsstuff.com)   •  DomainTools  (www.domaintools.com)   •  CentralOps  (www.centralops.net)    
  8. 8. Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Website   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  The  first  piece  of  evidence  here  is  the  actual  “visible”  content  of   the  web  site.     q  The   second   one   is   the   “invisible”   content   associated   to   these   sites.   Invisible   content   here   is   basically   the   source   code   used   to   create   the   web   page   (i.e   user/developer   comments   such   as   passwords,   iden/ty   or   loca/on   references   or   metadata   such   as   crea/on/last  modifica/on  date)  
  9. 9. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   The  inves/gator  should  watch  for  on  Social  Networking  Sites:     □  User  ID:  it’s  a  valuable  piece  of  evidence   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Social  Networking  Sites  
  10. 10. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Now   there   is   the   possibility   to   personalize   your   user   ID   (h^p:// namechk.com).   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Social  Networking  Sites  
  11. 11. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   □  Picture:  it’s  possible  to  obtain  important  metadata  even  if  the  post   important  SNS  clean  uploaded  user’s  photos   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Social  Networking  Sites   □  Chat:  when  it  is  legally  possible,  chats  on  SNS  contain  fundamental   forma/on  for  the  inves/ga/on  
  12. 12. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   WebMail  Sites    contains  the  following  informa/on  (most  of  the  /me   encrypted):           □  Chat  Subsystem                     □  Voice  Subsystem   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  WebMail  Sites  
  13. 13. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Online   ads   (Google   Adwords/Adsense,   Facebook   Ads,   MicrosoS   Adver/sing,   AdBrite,   BidVer/ser)   are   one   of   those   sources   of   informa/on  that  could  be  used  to  a  follow  the  “money  trail”.   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Ad-­‐Networks  
  14. 14. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Amazon  has  S3,  Google  has  Google  Drive,  MicrosoS  has  Azure.  One   best-­‐known  examples  here  is  DropBox,  which  internally  relies,  with   Amazon  S3.  This  will  be  the  future  of  the  storage  and  consequently   of  the  inves/ga/on.  The  2  main  obstacle  are       q  Jurisdic,on     q  Digital  Forensics  (the  admissibility  of  the  evidence  will  be  on  the   hand  of  the  Cloud  Provider)   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  Cloud  Storage  Services  
  15. 15. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   The  key  concept  regarding  the  acquisi/on  of  evidence  on  files  being   shared   or   downloaded   through   most   P2P   networks   consists   on   simply   joining   the   P2P   network,   if   the   legal   system   admits   this   possibility.   If   logging   is   turned   on   for   this   client,   all   the   details   needed  will  be  obtained  (IP,  ports,  /mestamps,  opera/ons)  logged   straight  into  a  file  in  real-­‐/me.   Online  Sources  of  Informa,on:  P2P  Network  
  16. 16. Mash  UP   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Mash  Up:  A  mash-­‐up,  in  web  development,  is  a  web  page,  or  web   applica/on,   that   uses   and   combines   data,   presenta/on   or   func/onality  from  two  or  more  sources  to  create  new  services.    
  17. 17. Tim  McCormick*  proposed  the   following  classifica/on  of  data:     1. Basic  Pure  Data   2. High  Value  Data   3. Transac/onal   4. High  Value  Transac/onal  data     Tim  McCormick,  “A  Web  Services  Taxonomy”     Big  Data  –  Defini,on   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Big   Data   is   a   collec/on   of   data   sets   so   large   and   complex   that   it   becomes   difficult   to   process   using   tradi/onal   data   processing   applica/ons    
  18. 18. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Big  Data  Defini,on   Social  media  is  transforming  society.  We  are  transferring  more  and  more   of   our   lives   onto   vast   digital   social   commons.   The   emergence   of   these   increasingly  significant  public  spaces  poses  a  dilemma  for  government.    (#Intelligence  –  Demos  Research  –  2012)  
  19. 19. Big  Data  –  SOCMINT  (Social  Media  Intelligence)   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Social   media   is   an   extremely   important   class   of   Big   Data,   and   are   increasingly  subject  to  collec/on  and  analysis.  Measuring  and  understanding   the  visage  of  millions  of  people  digitally  arguing,  talking,  joking,  condemning   and  applauding  is  of  wide  and  tremendous  value.  
  20. 20. SOCMINT  –  Direct  contact  to  the  Public     Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  21. 21. SOCMINT  –  Future  Crime  Predic,on   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  22. 22. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   SOCMINT  –  Future  Crime  Predic,on  -­‐  PredPol  
  23. 23. SOCMINT  –  Future  Crime  Predic,on  -­‐  August  2011  and  London’s  Riot   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  24. 24. SOCMINT  –  Surveillance   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  25. 25. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Adap,ve  Grooming  Policy     (Network  Algorithm)     Facebook   admi^ed   to   monitoring   certain  online  chats  between  minors   and   adults   according   to   certain   k e y w o r d s ,   f o r w a r d i n g   t h i s   informa/on  to  the  law  enforcement   officials   in   order   to   check   whether   there   are   the   grounds   for   inves/ga/ng   whether   “grooming”   has  occurred.   SOCMINT  –  Surveillance  –  Chat  Monitoring  
  26. 26. Mr  Palazzolo  a  treasurer  for  the  mafia,  on  the  run  for  30  years,  was   discovered  by  monitoring  his  Facebook  profile.   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   SOCMINT  –  Surveillance  –  Chat  Monitoring  
  27. 27. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   SOCMINT  –  Mobile  Surveillance  -­‐  Geoloca,on  and  Face  Recogni,on  
  28. 28. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Augmented  Reality  is  a  live,  direct  or  indirect,  view  of  a  physical,  real-­‐ world   environment   whose   elements   are   augmented   by   computer-­‐ generated  sensory  input  such  as  sound,  video,  graphics  or  GPS  data.   SOCMINT  –  Mobile  Surveillance  –  Augmented  Reality  
  29. 29. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   The  research  inves/gated  the  feasibility  of  combining  publicly  available  Web   2.0   data   with   off-­‐the-­‐shelf   face   recogni/on   soSware   for   the   purpose   of   large-­‐scale,   automated   individual   re-­‐iden/fica/on.   Two   experiments   demonstrated   the   ability   of   iden/fying   strangers   online   (on   a   da/ng   site)   and  offline  (in  a  public  space),  based  on  photos  made  publicly  available  on  a   social  network  site.   SOCMINT  –  Mobile  Surveillance  –  Faces  of  Facebook  
  30. 30. Emerging  Inves,ga,ve   Techniques       Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics  
  31. 31. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Communica/ons  sent  over  SNSs,  and  informa/on  uploaded  to  SNS  profiles,   are  normally  saved  only  on  the  SNSs'  servers.                     But…     Some  informa/on  may  also  be  stored  on  the  user's  computer  cache   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  -­‐  Where  the  data  are  stored?  
  32. 32. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Police  also  u/lise  SNSs  in  their  inves/ga/ons  through,  for  example,  senng   up  SNS  profiles  and  reques/ng  informa/on  from  the  public.     Police  in  New  Zealand  have  made  their  first  “Facebook  arrest”  aSer  placing   CCTV  footage  of  a  burglar  removing  his  balaclava  during  the  burglary  on  the   social  networking  site”     An   internet   savvy   police   officer   in   Queenstown,   on   New   Zealand’s   South   Island,   posted   the   footage   on   the   force’s   Facebook   page   and   within   24   hours  of  the  break-­‐in  the  burglar  was  iden/fied.   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  –  Iden,fy  the  Suspects  
  33. 33. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  The  Parson  Cross  Crew  showed  off  guns  and  knives  on  social  networking   sites  aSer  some  were  convicted  for  a  teenager’s  murder.   q  Dale   Robertson,   18,   was   stabbed   to   death   aSer   a   girl’s   16th   birthday   party.   q  A  woman  created  the  Facebook  website  “The  Parson  Cross  Crew  Named   and  Shamed”,  with  picture  of  crew.   q  Police   were   able   to   use   the   photographs   as   evidence   against   four   further   gang   members   at   Sheffield   Crown   Court   for   firearms   offences   (Sheffield  September,  2009)   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  –  Iden,fy  the  Suspects  
  34. 34. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  –  Iden,fy  the  Suspects  
  35. 35. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  The   police   must   create   fake   profiles   if   they   want   to   do   any   more   than   surf   the   general   public  material  on  the  SNSs.     q  In  US,  law  enforcement  agencies  are  openly   engaging   in   these   decep/ve   prac/ces   in   order   to   inves/gate   even   minor   drug   and   alcohol  offences.     q  Befriending  targets  on  SNSs  allows  officers  an   opportunity   to   infiltrate   ongoing   criminal   ac/vity  with  li^le  physical  risk.       q  Examples   include   the   FBI   infiltra/on   of   “Darkmarket”   dubbed   the   “Facebook   for   fraudsters”,  where  users  traded  stolen  credit   card  and  bank  account  details.   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  –  Fake  Profiles  
  36. 36. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  –  Covert  Surveillance   Ar,cle  14    Proposal  for  a  Direc,ve  2010/0064  (C0D)  on  Child  pornography     Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  ensure  that  effec6ve   inves6ga6ve  tools  are  available  to  persons,  units  or  services  responsible  for   inves6ga6ng  or  prosecu6ng  offences  referred  to  in  Ar6cles  3  to  7,  allowing   the  possibility  of  covert  opera*ons  at  least  in  those  cases  where  the  use  of   informa*on  and  communica*on  technology  is  involved.     Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  enable  inves6ga6ve   units  or  services  to  aWempt  to  iden6fy  the  vic6ms  of  the  offences  referred  to   in  Ar6cles  3  to  7,  in  par6cular  by  analysing  child  pornography  material,  such   as  photographs  and  audiovisual  recordings  transmiWed  or  made  available   by  means  of  informa6on  and  communica6on  technology.  
  37. 37. Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  -­‐  Problems  of  Undercover  Inves,ga,on   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Exclusionary   Rule   Criminal   Liability  for   LEa   Jurisdic/on   Admissibility   of  digital   evidence   Fake  profiles   are  not   admi^ed     SNS  Terms  of   Service  
  38. 38. Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  -­‐  Monitoring  public  profiles   Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   X1  Social  Discovery  soSware  maps  a  given  loca/on,  such  as  a  certain   block  within  a  city  or  even  an  en/re  par/cular  metropolitan  area,   and   searches   the   en/re   public   Twi^er   feed   to   iden/fy   any   geo-­‐ located   tweets   in   the   past   three   days   (some/mes   longer)   within   that  specific  area.  
  39. 39. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   “Where   someone   does   an   act   in   public,   the   observance   and   recording  of  that  act  will  ordinarily  not  give  rise  to  an  expecta6on  of   privacy”  (A.  Gillespie,  “Regula/on  of  Internet  Surveillance”  -­‐  2009)   “Public  informa6on  can  fall  within  the  scope  of  private  life  where  it   is   systema6cally   collected   and   stored   in   files   held   by   the   authori6es”  (Rotaru  v  Romania,  ECtHR,  (App.  No.  28341/95)  2000)   BUT…   Emerging  Inves,ga,ve  Techniques  -­‐  Monitoring  public  profiles  
  40. 40. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   “Just  as  it  is  easy  to  fake  a  person's  SNS  profile,  it  is  easy  to  alter   informa/on  taken  from  a  SNS  account”.       For   Michael   O’Floinn   and   David   Ormerod   the   challenges   for   SNS   evidence  are:     (i)  evidence    must  represent  what  appeared  on  the  SNS;     (ii)  that  the  evidence  can  be  shown  to  have  originated  from  the   alleged  source,  as  opposed  to  a  hacker  or  someone  with  access   to  the  SNS  account;     (iii)  Admissibility  of  the  evidence   Evidence  from  SNS  –  Digital  Forensics   Source:  *Micheal  O'Floinn  and  David  Ormerod,  Social  networking  sites,  RIPA  and  criminal  inves6ga6ons)  
  41. 41. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  Defendant’s   friend   contacted   a   rape   complainant   on   MSN,   proffering  as  evidence  a  doctored  printout  of  the  conversa/on  to   suggest  that  she  admi^ed  the  sex  was  consensual.  This  led  to  the   jury   being   discharged   pending   analysis   of   the   computers.   Defendant's   friend   was   convicted   of   perver,ng   the   course   of   jus,ce     q  In   of   State   of   Connec/cut   vs.   Eleck,   the   court   rejected   Facebook   evidence  in  the  form  of  a  simple  printout,  for  failure  of  adequate   authen/ca/on.  The  court  noted  that  it  was  incumbent  on  the  party   to   seeking   to   admit   the   social   media   data   to   offer   detailed   “circumstan,al   evidence   that   tends   to   authen,cate”   the   unique   medium  of  social  media  evidence.   Evidence  from  SNS  –  (I)  The  Accuracy  of  evidence  –  Two  examples    
  42. 42. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  US  cases  accept  that  tes,mony  of  a  witness  with  knowledge  or   dis/nc/ve  characteris/cs  within  the  communica/on  unless  there   is  a  specific  allega/on  of  unauthorised  access.       q  MySpace   evidence   was   authen/cated   by   tes/mony   of   par/cipants  in  the  communica/ons   q  Expert  evidence  from  a  official  of  SNS.   q  An  unduly  onerous  authen,ca,on  test  may  induce  prosecutors   to   devote   dispropor/onate   /me   and   (scarce)   resources   to   authen/ca/on,  adding  unnecessarily  to  complexity  and  delay  at   trial.     Evidence  from  SNS  –  (II)  Proof  of  Authorship  
  43. 43. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   The  disputed  SNS  evidence  must  have  logical  relevance,  and  this  is   sa/sfied  when  it  is:     (a)  possibly  authen/c     (b)  bears  on  the  probabili/es  of  a  contested  issue.     The   SNS   evidence   must   be   legally   relevant,   and   this   is   sa/sfied   if   there  is  “some  admissible  evidence  [...]  of  provenance,  con/nuity  (if   relevant)  and  integrity”   Evidence  from  SNS  –  (III)  Admissibility  of  the  evidence  to  the  Court  
  44. 44. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  In   October   2008,   in   Edmonton,   Alberta,   it   was   revealed   that   filmmaker  Mark  Twitchell,  who  was  facing  first  degree  murder   charges,  had  posted  as  his  Facebook  status  in  August  that  "he   had  a  lot  in  common  with  Dexter  Morgan".  This  proved  to  be  a   key   piece   of   evidence   in   the   missing   person   case   of   John   Al/nger,  as  Twitchell  was  a  fan  of  the  television  series  "Dexter"   and   it   is   believed   that   he   murdered   Al/nger   in   the   style   of   Dexter's  clandes/ne  murders.     q  In  September  2009,  In  Mar/nsburg,  West  Virginia,  Burglar  leaves   his  Facebook  page  on  vic/m’s  computer.  ASer  he  stopped  check   his   account   on   the   vic/m's   computer,   but   forgot   to   log   out   before  leaving  the  home  with  two  diamond  rings.   q  In  November  2009,  two  women  charged  with  robbing  a  home  in   Ontario.  The  two  women,  both  in  their  early  20s,  decide  to  post   a  photo  of  themselves  with  the  stolen  goods  online.   Evidence  from  SNS  -­‐  Confession  
  45. 45. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   Misuse  of  Social  Network  –  Lawyer  and  Judges   q  Legal   prac//oners   searching   SNS:   lawyers   may   be   tempted   to   create  fake  profiles  and  befriending  witnesses  or  their  friends.       q  It  is  not  only  lawyers  who  can  fall  vic/m  to  SNS  misuse.  There  are   reported  instances  from  other  jurisdic/ons  where  judges  have  used   SNSs  to  inves/gate  witnesses,  and  to  converse  with  counsel  about   the   case.   See,   for   example,   Public   Reprimand   of   Carlton   Terry   J.   Judicial  Standards  Commission,  Inquiry  No.08-­‐234,  April  1,  2009  
  46. 46. Macau,  April  8-­‐12,  2013  -­‐  Seminar  on  Cybercrime  and  Digital  Forensics   q  More   jurors   said   they   saw   informa/on   about   the   case   on   the   internet.  In  high  profile  cases  26%  said  they  saw  informa/on  on   the  internet.  In  standard  cases  13%  said  they  saw  informa/on.   q  In  June  2011,  Joanne  Fraill,  40,  a  juror  in  a  Manchester  case,  was   sentenced   to   eight   months   in   jail   for   contempt   of   court   aSer   using  Facebook  to  exchange  messages  with  Jamie  Sewart,  34,  a   defendant  already  acqui^ed  in  a  mul/million-­‐pound  drug  trial.   Misuse  of  Social  Network  –  Jurors  
  47. 47. Thanks  for  your  a^en/on   Giuseppe  Vaciago     Mail:  vaciago@htlaw.it   Web:  hWp://www.techandlaw.net     TwiWer:  hWps://twiWer.com/giuseppevaciago   Linkedin:  hWp://it.linkedin.com/in/vaciago