Hout&fischer pew 8 aug

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Hout&fischer pew 8 aug

  1. 1. Americans’ Weakening Ties to Organized Religion, 1973-2012: Generations & Politics Michael Hout New York University Claude S. Fischer University of California, Berkeley Pew Research Centers Religion & Public Life Project 8 August 2013 1
  2. 2. We analyzed the trend 1973–2000 Politics: Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives — increasingly declared no religion Generations: Cohort replacement accounted for 40% of the trend Why do generations differ? American Sociological Review, April 2002 2
  3. 3. Today: Update the trend through 2012 Discuss why cohorts differ 3
  4. 4. Updating the trend 4
  5. 5. Smoother, slower — but sustained — rise 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year Notes: Dots are observed data, vertical lines show 95% confidence interval, and the trend line is estimated using locally estimated (loess) regression. 5
  6. 6. Smoother, slower — but sustained — rise 1991 Hout-Fischer model 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year Notes: Dots are observed data, vertical lines show 95% confidence interval, and the trend line is estimated using locally estimated (loess) regression. 6
  7. 7. 0 10 20 30 40 Noreligion(%) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Liberal Conservative Political gap not only persisted… it got wider 7
  8. 8. Cohort replacement clear then 1900-1915 1916-1925 1926-1935 1936-1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 0 10 20 30 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year 8
  9. 9. Cohort replacement clear then 1900-1915 1916-1925 1926-1935 1936-1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 0 10 20 30 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year Explained 40% of trend 9
  10. 10. 1900-1915 1916-1925 1926-1935 1936-1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 0 10 20 30 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year Cohort replacement clearer now 10
  11. 11. 1900-1915 1916-1925 1926-1935 1936-1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 0 10 20 30 Noreligiouspreference(%) 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 Year Cohort replacement clearer now Explains 60% of trend 11
  12. 12. What explains cohort differences? 12
  13. 13. Politics & cohort differences both rooted in: Culture shock … & two aftershocks 13
  14. 14. The shock Sex Drugs Question authority 14
  15. 15. First aftershock Moral majority Traditional values Church-based 15
  16. 16. Second aftershock AIDS kills sons, brothers, uncles & cousins Gay ➞ normal 16
  17. 17. Two more considerations Many parents emphasize “think for yourself” over obedience Undermines the authority in traditional authority … including the teaching authority of religious leaders Academic literature: Miller & Swanson, Lenski, Kohn, Alwin. 17
  18. 18. … and secularization Heaven Afterlife Miracles Hell God no doubt Bible word-for-word Atheist or Agnostic 0 25 50 75 100 Belief(%) 1900 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990 Year of Birth Source: General Social Surveys, 1988-2010. Boomers skeptical about Bible Recent cohorts have more doubts about God & more agnostic 18
  19. 19. Our statistical test 19
  20. 20. Random effects model of cohort differences Null New Personal characteristics Period: dummies Cohort: random effects Personal characteristics Period: dummies Cohort: random effects Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex & drugs Values independent thinking Secularization index 20
  21. 21. Random effects model of cohort differences Null New Personal characteristics Period: dummies Cohort: random effects Personal characteristics Period: dummies Cohort: random effects Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex & drugs Values independent thinking Secularization index Cohort differences, not personal 21
  22. 22. Cohort differences explained by sex, drugs, and independent thinking (not disbelief) Coefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random Effects Coefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random Effects Coefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random Effects Cohort variable Null New Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex and drugs — 0.36Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex and drugs (0.07) Values independent thinking — 0.24 (0.06) Secularization index — 0.04 (0.03) Cohort: random effects (σ) 0.41 0.08 (0.05) (0.03) Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold. 22
  23. 23. Conclusions Politics: Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives — increasingly declared no religion Generations: Cohort replacement accounted for 40% of the trend American Sociological Review, April 2002 23
  24. 24. Conclusions Politics: Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives — increasingly declared no religion Generations: Cohort replacement accounted for 60% of the trend Baby boom and later generations developed values and attitudes that undermine traditional authority No sign of secularization American Sociological Review, April 2002 Confirmed Extended 24

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