rfid.ppt

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rfid.ppt

  1. 1. The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy By Hongliang Zhou Instructor: Dr. L. Popyack CSE 758 03/19/04
  2. 2. What is RFID Tag? <ul><li>Radio-Frequency Identification </li></ul><ul><li>A small integrated circuit attached to a small antennae, capable of transmitting a unique serial number a distance of several meters to a reading device in response to a query. </li></ul><ul><li>Serve as an electronic bar-code. </li></ul>
  3. 3. Characteristics of RFID Tags? <ul><li>Passive: batteryless, power from the query signal, from the reader </li></ul><ul><li>Cheap: $0.05 </li></ul><ul><li>Small: 0.4*0.4mm </li></ul><ul><li>Widely used: theft detection tags, EZ pass </li></ul><ul><li>More: Euro notes by 2005, half billion tags for Gillette </li></ul>
  4. 4. Future Implications <ul><li>Supply-Chain Management </li></ul><ul><li>Automated Checkout </li></ul><ul><li>Smart Appliances: Microwave Oven, Refrigerator… </li></ul>
  5. 5. Threat <ul><li>Unique ID Number, 64-128 Bits </li></ul><ul><li>Scannable By Any Tag Reader </li></ul><ul><li>Consumer Privacy </li></ul><ul><li>More </li></ul>
  6. 6. Protection Approaches <ul><li>Kill Tag: a tag can be deactivated by sending it a special “kill” command with a password, permanently. </li></ul><ul><li>Problems: smart appliances, returned items, … </li></ul>
  7. 7. Protection Approaches --cont’d <ul><li>Faraday Cage: shield from radio signals </li></ul><ul><li>Problems: not convenient, shop-lifting, … </li></ul>
  8. 8. Protection Approaches <ul><li>“ Smart Tag”: interact with tag reader with desired functionalities </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ hash-lock”: lock and unlock </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ re-encryption”: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ silent tree walking”: encrypt the tag reader’s transmissions </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Problems: budget constraint for 5 cents… </li></ul>
  9. 9. Protection Approaches <ul><li>Regulation: “RFID bill of rights” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The right of the consumer to know what items possess RFID tags </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The right to have tags removed or deactivated upon purchase of these items </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The right of the consumer to access of the data associated with an RFID tag </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The right to access of services without mandatory use of RFID tags </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The right to know to when, where, and why the data in RFID tags is accessed </li></ul></ul>
  10. 10. Singulation and Tree-Walking Protocols <ul><li>RDID tag reader algorithm: bit-by-bit query process </li></ul>000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 11 10 00 01 1 0
  11. 11. Bloker Tags <ul><li>Simulate the full spectrum of possible serial numbers for tags, which is extremely large </li></ul><ul><li>A reader is incapable of singluating tags </li></ul><ul><li>Bloker Tags can designed to prevent singulation across a desired range, a sub-tree </li></ul>
  12. 12. Bloker Tags Cont’d <ul><li>Double-sided sward </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Privacy Protection Tool </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Denial of Service Attack Tool </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Cost Consideration </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Cost of a few RFID tags </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Selective Bloker Tags <ul><li>Universal Bloker Tags </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Disrupt all reading activity </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Selective Bloker Tags </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Disrupt reading activity in a region identified as a privacy zone </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Dynamic alteration of tag serial numbers </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Malicious Blocker Tags <ul><li>Malicious Blocker Tags </li></ul><ul><ul><li>DoS Attacks: universal, selective </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Detection: Reasonable checkout time </li></ul><ul><li>Filter out blocker tags: multiple readers to identify the tag’s location </li></ul><ul><li>Remaining threats: spoofing… </li></ul>
  15. 15. Conclusions <ul><li>Protect Consumer Privacy </li></ul><ul><li>Remain Reusability of RFID Tags </li></ul><ul><li>More Work Need to Be Done </li></ul>
  16. 16. References <ul><li>http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/JuelsRivestSzydlo-TheBlockerTag.pdf </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.rfid.org </li></ul><ul><li>http://www. google .com/search?hl=en& ie =UTF-8& oe =UTF-8&q= rfid </li></ul>
  17. 17. Questions? Thank you!

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