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Cyber security in_next_gen_air_transportation_system_wo_video


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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for overseeing the US National Airspace System, which comprises ATC systems, procedures, facilities, and aircraft, and the people who operate them. FAA is implementing Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) to move the current radar-based air-traffic control (ATC) system to one that is based on satellite navigation and automation. It is essential that FAA ensures effective information-security controls are incorporated in the design of NextGen programs to protect them from threats. This talk discusses the threats FAA faces and the cyber security controls adopted by FAA in implementation of these NextGen Air Transportation System.

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Cyber security in_next_gen_air_transportation_system_wo_video

  1. 1. Cyber Security in NextGen Air Transportation System Dr Vippan Raj Dutt +91-9810297809
  2. 2. Presentation Flow  Introduction  Shortcomings of Existing Systems  NextGen Air Transportation System  NextGen Security Challenges  ATC Information Systems  Aircraft Avionics Systems  Cyber Security Framework for Aviation  Cyber Security Audit of NextGen
  3. 3. Air Transport Industry - Four Partners  Airlines  Ticketing systems  Credit card information  On-board Wi-Fi  Websites  ERP  Airports  Business systems  Airport operation systems  Facilities systems  Terminal and off-site concessions  FAA / DGCA  • Air Traffic control  Aircraft Manufacturers  Avionics  Communication systems
  4. 4. ICT Environment for Aviation
  5. 5. Cyber Threats  ON 7 AUGUST 2015, it was disclosed that the databases of American Airlines (AA) and Sabre Corp., one of the largest clearing houses for travel reservations, were hacked.  On June 21, 2015, LOT Polish Airlines had its flight operations system hacked, resulting in disruption or cancellation of 22 flights. (DDoS attack)  In April, 2015, American security researcher Chris Roberts claims to have accessed flight-critical controls through the in-flight entertainment system  U.S. airport computer and communications systems were among the targets announced by the Tunisian Hackers Team in April 2014.  Miami International Airport (MIA) has experienced almost 20,000 hack attempts per day before investing in training, education, and new hardware to protect itself from cyberattacks.  Istanbul’s Atatürk International Airport had password control systems shut down by what is believed to have been a malware attack resulting in departure delays and extended waiting time for passengers.
  6. 6. Aviation Continuum of Risk
  7. 7. The Sky is Falling ! Next time you are about to board a flight, please consider this  On any given day  More than 85,000 flights are in the skies in the United States  Only 1/3 of those are Commercial Carriers  2/3 are general aviation, private planes  5000 : Average number of aircraft in the skies at any given moment of peak travel time  15,000 : Average number of air traffic controllers required in airport traffic control facilities to guide pilots  Controllers provide Air Navigation Services to aircraft in ALL domestic airspace and to 24.6 million square miles of international oceanic airspace  The flight you’re about to board is 1 of 1,000s of blinking green dots on a radar screen display for busy Air Traffic Controllers, who rely on pilot communication and slips of paper printed from computer terminals to safely coordinate your flight.  1950s : The decade the current Air Traffic Control system was implemented
  8. 8. A Day in the Life of Air Traffic in USA
  9. 9. Shortcomings of the existing ATC system  System handles over 85,000 flights a day on average… all with the best technology the 1950s had to offer.  Technologically, it is outdated and limited in its capabilities.  It relies on ground-based radar for surveillance and navigation, and voice communications to relay instructions between controllers and pilots.  ATC system is slow and cumbersome. These limitations force operational procedures such as separation standards and indirect point-to-point routings that are inefficient because they appropriately put safety first. As civil aviation has grown and become more complex the ATC system has become strained and, in some geographic areas, overwhelmed.
  10. 10. What is NextGen Air Transportation System
  11. 11. NextGen Addresses Critical Needs  Capacity. NextGen will enable more precise spacing of aircraft and flight paths, which will allow FAA to handle safely and efficiently the traffic growth that it forecasts.  Efficiency and Productivity. NextGen will enable more efficient flying by taking full advantage of available and emerging technology.  NextGen will enable: optimized, direct routings between airports; reduced aircraft spacing; continuous descent arrivals, precise arrival and departure routings, and closely spaced approaches on parallel runways in instrument flight rule conditions.  Environmental Benefits, Operational Integrity and Customer Satisfaction, Safety, Scalability  The downside of NextGen technology is the magnitude of air service disruption should the system fail. For example, a computer glitch at an air traffic centre in Virginia caused more than 440 flights to be cancelled along the East Coast of the United States in August 2015. While not a cyberattack, this incident showed the vulnerability of NextGen technology in civil aviation.
  12. 12. Components of NextGen Program
  13. 13. Potential NextGen Vulnerabilities  NextGen rely on satellite-based aircraft navigation and tracking and digital voice and data communications between controllers and pilots, tied together using an integrated information management network called SWIM. This high degree of interconnectivity and access by both FAA employees and airspace users is expected to increase the capacity of the air traffic control system and improve safety, but it raises significant cybersecurity concerns.  The backbone of NextGen is a technology called Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, which is slated to replace radar as the primary means of tracking and monitoring aircraft. ADS-B is inherently vulnerable to hacking, jamming, signal flooding, and spoofing because of its open architecture and unencrypted signals. Government Accountability Office (GAO) cautioned that FAA's current approach to cybersecurity does not adequately address the interdependencies between aircraft and air traffic systems, and consequently may hinder efforts to develop a comprehensive and coordinated strategy.  GAO recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive cybersecurity threat model, better clarify cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, improve management security controls and contractor oversight, and fully incorporate National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) information security guidance throughout the system life cycle.
  14. 14. NextGen Cybersecurity Challenges  Protecting air-traffic control (ATC) information systems  July 2012: ADS-B hack: a security researcher demonstrated how easily an air traffic control tower could be manipulated.  Ruben Santamarta – 2014 Backdoors and remote control of SatCom Military & Civil Aviation radios (Paper)  Protecting aircraft avionics used to operate and guide aircraft  Chris Roberts – 2015 Manipulation of Flight Controls via under-seat entertainment unit (Reuters)  Hugo Teso – 2013 Remote manipulation of Flight Management System through ACARS (Forbes)
  15. 15. ATC Information Systems
  16. 16. Cybersecurity Challenges to Protect ATC Information Systems • ATC-related information systems are currently a mixture of old, legacy systems and new, IP-networked systems. • New information systems for NextGen programs are designed to interoperate with other systems and use IP networking to communicate • New Networking Technologies Expose ATC Systems to New Cybersecurity Risks • If one system connected to an IP network is compromised, damage can potentially spread to other systems on the network, continually expanding the parts of the system at risk. • FAA Is Designing and Deploying an Enterprise Approach Intended to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Its Information Systems
  17. 17. Aircraft Avionics Systems
  18. 18. Cyber Security Risks to Aircraft Avionics  IP networking may allow an attacker to gain remote access to avionics systems and compromise them  If the cabin systems connect to the cockpit avionics systems (e.g., share the same physical wiring harness or router) and use the same networking platform, in this case IP, a user could subvert the firewall and access the cockpit avionics system from the cabin  The presence of personal smartphones and tablets in the cockpit increases the risk of a system’s being compromised by trusted insiders, both malicious and non-malicious, if these devices have the capability to transmit information to aircraft avionics systems  The second source of the problem can come from the internet, since the aircrafts use IP protocols like anyone, meaning that can make the aircraft vulnerable for instance for a hacker to be able to install malware  FAA yet to develop new regulations to certify cybersecurity assurance for avionics systems
  19. 19. Cybersecurity framework for Aviation  Establish common cyber standards for aviation systems  Establish a cybersecurity culture  Understand the threat  Understand the risk  Communicate the threats and assure situational awareness  Provide incident response  Strengthen the defensive system  Define design principles  Define operational principles  Conduct necessary research and development  Ensure that government and industry work together
  20. 20. FAA’s Acquisition Life Cycle
  21. 21. Aviation Continuum of Risk Mitigation
  22. 22. Cyber Security Audit of NextGen  Performance Audit conducted by GAO from Sept 2013 to March 2015  Two key NextGen components, SBSS and Data Comm audited  While FAA has integrated six activities into the AMS lifecycle, audit revealed instances in which some of these activities were not completed properly or were completed in an untimely manner  SBSS was deployed in 2008 with weaknesses in the program’s intrusion detection system, a shortcoming that was still unresolved as of early 2015.  Of 26 SBSS Problem Tickets that were completed during 2014, 25 were at least 6 months late, and 12 of these were more than 1 year late.  As Data Comm is still under development, its security requirements and selected controls continue to evolve. As of October 2014, Data Comm had included approximately 60 percent of the more than 250 controls listed in the third version of the NIST 800-53 guidelines  Delays in adopting the latest standards extend the amount of time that system security requirements may not adequately mitigate system exposure to the newest threats
  23. 23. Security Activity’s Progress
  24. 24. Cyber Security Standards used by Aviation  ISO/IEC 27000 to 27006— Information security management systems  NIST Special Publication 800-53 — Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations  DO-236 Security Assurance and Assessment Processes for Safety-related Aircraft Systems  ICAO Annex 17- Security  ICAO Document 9985- Air Traffic Management Security Manual  NIST SP800-30 — Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems  NIST SP800-53 — Information Security  NIST SP800-82 — Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security  RTCA DO160 – Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment  RTCA DO178 – Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification  RTCA DO-254 – Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware  RTCA DO-233 – Portable Electronic Devices Carried on Board Aircraft
  25. 25. Glossary  ACARS : Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System  ADS-B : Automatic Dependent Surveillance-- ‐Broadcast  ATC : Air Traffic Control  FAA : Federal Aviation Administration  NIST : National Institute of Standards and Technology
  26. 26. Any Queries
  27. 27. Thank You