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2018 Youth ResearchEdge Posters from the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum

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To bridge the gap between academic research and policy making and to provide a platform for young researchers to present insights and evidence, the OECD opened a call for papers on topics related to anti-corruption and integrity.

The winners of the ResearchEdge competition presented their research at the Forum, both in the form of a poster at the poster market and as a 5-minute research pitch during a dedicated session.

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2018 Youth ResearchEdge Posters from the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum

  1. 1. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS THE REVOLVING DOOR FOR POLITICAL ELITES: REGULATING OR SERVING FINANCIAL BUSINESSES? ELISA MARIA WIRSCHING, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, EBRD The Revolving Door for Political Elites: Regulating or Serving Financial Businesses? Elisa Maria Wirsching, Office of the Chief Economist, EBRD Table 1: Professional experience of central bank governors and finance ministers Regulatory capture of public policy by financial entities, especially via the revolving door between government and financial services, has increasingly become a subject of intense public scrutiny. Well-known examples of influential policy-makers with experience in private finance, such as Alan Greenspan or Robert Rubin, seem to support the assumption that earlier and prospective employment in the financial sector influences high- ranking government officials in shaping financial regulation. Yet, systematic evidence for the relation between such public- private career linkages and public policy remains scare. Are financial sector veterans in senior government posts in fact more likely to deregulate the financial industry? And are policy- makers rewarded with lucrative future industry employment if they embark on deregulatory reforms during their time in office? CONTEXT HYPOTHESES RESULTS DATA & METHOD Central Bank Governors Finance Ministers Total Total Among left Among right Finance exp. before office 49 (29.7%) 63 (16.1%) 11 (9.0%) 36 (17.7%) Finance exp. after office 44 (26.7%) 42 (10.7%) 12 (9.8%) 22 (10.8%) Finance exp. both before and after office 12 (7.2%) 9 (2.3%) 2 (1.6%) 7 (3.4%) N 165 392 122 203 High-level officials with a professional background in the financial industry are socially conditioned to push for financial deregulation whilst in office due to personal connections with the industry and professional value-socialisation. H1: Central bank governors/finance ministers with past occupational experience in the financial sector pursue stronger deregulatory reforms whilst in office than governors/ministers without such experience (“career socialisation mechanism”). The revolving door in finance encourages public officials to accommodate the strong interests of the industry in order to gain lucrative future careers in the sector.  H2: The more central bank governors/finance ministers deregulate the financial market during their time in office, the more likely they are to gain employment in the industry after their tenure (“career incentive mechanism”). Central bank governors with past experience in the financial services industry are associated with greater financial reform than their peers who have been socialised in different work environments. This effect cannot be demonstrated for finance ministers. Finance ministers, especially from left-leaning parties, are more likely to be hired by financial entities following their tenure if they pursue liberalizing reforms during their time in office. Figure 1: Marginal effects of prior financial sector experience for central bank governors Figure 2: Marginal effects of deregulatory reforms for finance ministers conditional on their partisanship together with the density histogram Data: Newly created dataset on financial regulation and backgrounds of more than 400 central bank governors and finance ministers from 32 OECD countries between 1973-2005. Method: • Career socialisation mechanism: Time-series-cross-sectional approach with country-year observations for annual changes in financial regulation and central bankers’/finance ministers’ professional background • Career incentive mechanism: Linear probability model to estimate propensity that a government official gains lucrative employment in the industry as a function of her policy during office
  2. 2. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS STUDYING BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION WEB APPS BÁRBARA LUIZA COUTINHO DO NASCIMENTO AND PATRÍCIA DO COUTO VILLELA, RIO DE JANEIRO STATE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE STUDYING BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION WEB APPS BÁRBARA LUIZA COUTINHO DO NASCIMENTO AND PATRÍCIA DO COUTO VILLELA, RIO DE JANEIRO STATE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE Introduction The first app lists the lawsuits by municipalities and calculates the total amount of money currently claimed in court by local prosecutors against public and private agents accused of corruption or damaging the treasury. The app allows citizens to simulate how that money could be spent on public policies such as building schools or hospitals, thereby revealing the true cost of corruption. The second app ranks municipalities by the level of internal control maturity. To calculate the level, the elements used are audit, ombudsman, internal affairs, controller, transparency, collaboration with external control, structure, comprehensiveness, autonomy, regulation, budget, planning, evolution, extension, implementation of public policies and praiseworthy initiative. By choosing these as the elements to demand, the project aims to fortify integrity. Together, the two platforms use credible and relevant data to enhance accountability, publicity, and transparency in the public sector, acting as mechanisms to prevent corruption because parties and contracts questioned in court are exposed, as well as the damage caused by them. Governments are also exposed, since the comparison shows the deficiency of each municipality, outlining risks to integrity. It is noteworthy that the platforms tend to show an inversely proportional relation, in such a way that cities ranked lower at Building Internal Control are those exhibiting larger sums of money claimed in court in Citizen-Manager. How can the exercise of citizenship on the Internet go beyond tweeting protest statements? What kind of platform can be built to prevent corruption? Can it engage all stakeholders? The Rio de Janeiro state prosecutor’s office (Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro) has developed two web apps called Citizen-Manager (Cidadão Gestor) and Building Internal Control (Edificando o Controle Interno) intending to be corruption prevention mechanisms. How does e-government enhance good governance? By nature, e-government is a good governance enhancement tool. When correctly used by the public administration, digital technologies add transparency and visibility to the State’s actions and policies because data and information are made more broadly available and accessible with pinpoint searches. What are the advantages of online anti-corruption tools? The web shortens physical distances and, as a consequence, reduces time and costs both for the citizen to report corruption and for the control agencies to exercise their duties, communicating with each other faster, receiving whistleblowing, and finding information not only about contracts and transactions but also about investigated persons and their networks of relations. Besides, when data of public interest are inserted online, allowing immediate, ample, and unrestricted access to them by any person, the principles of transparency and publicity gain effectiveness, and the citizen becomes better informed. Additionally, the user is able to oversee the activities of those institutions that have the task of fighting corruption, fomenting accountability. Therefore, citizenship as a whole is fostered. Why is preventing corruption better than repressing it? It avoids losses and endless lawsuits, enabling the immediate use of public resources. Problem Can web apps be used to effectively curb corruption? Methodolgy Case study Citizen-Manager App Building Internal Control App Findings Enhanced good governance Prevention of Corruption Less Corruption Better Internal Control Cases Studied Citizen-Manager Building Internal Control Combined Analysis - Publicity - Transparency - Accountability - Citizenship - Public trust - Misuse and misappropriation of public resources - Litigation - Distrust of institutions Increased Decreased It is expected that the exposure will generate embarrassment in such a way that politicians will not want to have their images linked to poor governance or corruption. Therefore, they will work to enhance internal control and minimise the bad publicity that comes from the disclosure of the mismanagement of public money. That behaviour will, as a consequence, contribute to preventing corruption from happening. Conclusion http://apps.mprj.mp.br/sistema/eci/ http://cidadaogestor.mprj.mp.br/
  3. 3. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS CORRUPTION, MIGRATION AND GENDER ORTRUN MERKLE, JULIA REINOLD AND MELISSA SIEGEL UNU-MERIT/MAASTRICHT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE Corruption, Migration and Gender Ortrun Merkle, Julia Reinold andMelissa Siegel -UNU-MERIT/Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Methodology and Data esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Country of Origin “If you made a conscious decision to migrate and a conscious decision to use an illegal route then the degree of agency, cooperation, acceptance, indeed the degree of welcoming corruption can be vastly different. There will be people who say I want to migrate from A to B, legal systems don’t allow me to do it. So, I will use illegal systems and I am very grateful that there are corrupt officials that can help me.” (Expert Interview NGO) Corruption can have three kinds of direct and indirect effects on individuals in the country of origin: 1. Corruption in the origin country can lead to migration aspirations through… • … affecting (democratic) institutions and social protection systems; • … leading to unequal opportunities for citizens; • … causing imbalances regarding access to power and resources; • … directly and indirectly affect the seven dimensions of human security. 2. Corruption in the origin country can impede migration… • … through increasing the costs of migration, for instance when high bribes are required to obtain travel documents, thereby making it less affordable; • … and cause involuntary immobility, referring to a situation in which in individual wants to migrate, but is not able to do so. Sextortion and the Role of Patriarchy “The border guards see that there are women in your convoy, they stop the pick-up and take the women. You can wait three or four days, sometimes one week, you never know how long, until the time they can satisfy all their desires [pause] and they come back.” (Male Migrant from Congo) • Abuse of power to obtain a sexual favour • Female bodies instead of or in addition to money and goods can become the means of exchange… • … to organise women’s individual journey; • … to organise the journey of an entire group of migrants; • … to organise the journey of families and secure access to basic services or humanitarian aid. • Intersection of corruption and sexual violence; • Transactional sex can become a survival strategy for migrant women and their families; • Far-reaching consequences on migrants’ mental and physical health. Gender norms and power imbalances shape experiences of corruption during migration: • Patriarchy is a system of social structures in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women; • Access to financial and social capital and information often depends on gender as • Families mostly support the migration of male family members, while women often migrate against the will of their family and consequently lack financial and emotional support; • Women are used to allow family members and groups to get ahead in the migration journey; • This leaves women more vulnerable to sextortion and increases their risk of becoming victims of human trafficking. Explorative research based on qualitative research methods: • Desk research; • 59 semi-structured interviews with experts (e.g. policy makers; representatives of government organizations, IOs & NGOs; practitioners in the field of migration, corruption & gender; academia); • 8 semi-structured interviews with male and female migrants. How are experiences of corruption during migration gendered? Abstract This paper investigates migrants’ gendered experiences of corruption on route to Europe by analysing how corruption can lead to migration and how experiences of corruption during the migration process differ for men and women. The main population of interest are men and women who migrated to Europe using the central Mediterranean route, including both forced and irregular migrants. Research on migration and corruption is still in its infancy. This paper adds to the literature on the migration-corruption nexus in two main ways. First, it furthers the knowledge of gendered experiences during migration, which are still understudied, by investigating in a comprehensive manner how women and men are affected by different forms of corruption throughout the migration process. Second, it advances the small body of literature discussing gendered forms of corruption. 3. Corruption in the origin country can enable internal and international migration… • … through speeding up administrative processes (e.g. issuing travel documents); • … through opening channels for irregular migration where options for regular migration are limited (e.g. obtaining fake travel documents; bribing border officials, etc.), including human smuggling; this can include female migration in patriarchal societies where women cannot travel alone; • … and thereby help overcome involuntary immobility while at the same time increasing the risks of vulnerable populations to become victims of trafficking or other forms of abuse and violence, especially where financial and social capital as well as access to information are lacking. During Transit “There was a lot of police. When you get to the border they say stop. You bring money for them and then if you didn’t give them money they would beat you, they will tell you to sit down in the sun. You will be there until you find something on you or beg someone to just give me some money[…] They will make sure that they will beat you as nastily as possible. Oh god I hated it.” (Female Migrant from Nigeria) • Corruption is a constant throughout transit; • Lack of social networks increase vulnerability to corruption; • Armed state and non-state actors expect corruption to let migrants pass check points in the Sahara desert and cannot be differentiated; • Corruption is necessary to organize the journey and access basic services like health care; • Irregular migrants are most vulnerable to corruption at all stages; • Lack of financial resources and inability to pay for corrupt demands leads to experience of extreme violence, especially for men. Figure: Corruption as a push factor for migration (Merkle, Reinold & Siegel, 2017)
  4. 4. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN EUROPE: SPECIFICS OF POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES KRISTÝNA BAŠNÁ – INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE CZECH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN EUROPE: SPECIFICS OF POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Kristýna Bašná – Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences Abstract This paper analyses the relations between income inequality and corruption (measured by Corruption Perception Index) in Europe and looks specifically on post-communist European countries. It argues that in the case of post communist countries, the associations between corruption and income inequality are more complicated than in the rest of Europe and thus different approach in combatting corruption must be taken. Corruption in European countries is on average on a much lower level compared to most of the world; particularly Scandinavian and Western European countries consistently hold the top places as countries with the lowest levels of corruption. On the other hand, countries with a communist history generally have higher levels of corruption (Shleifer 1997) and political corruption there is certainly a serious problem (Karklins 2005). It is suggested (Rose 2001, 105; Rose-Ackerman 1999) that corruption is the greatest obstacle to progress and to democratization in post-communist societies. Most of researchers agree that there is a very important relation between income inequality and corruption; they suggest that in countries that have higher corruption there is also higher inequality (Treisman 2007; Husted 1999). Some authors also suggest that containing inequality might be a plausible method for lowering corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2006). Theoretical claims of the influence between the level of corruption and income inequality are tested by conducting a multilevel analysis on the 39 European countries in the period 1995–2016; of the countries included, 19 have a communist past and the rest (20) does not. In addition to corruption and income inequality the model also controls for variables which were hypothesised to influence the level of corruption such as GDP per capita, level of democracy, or share of protestants in a country. Hypotheses: H1: Control of Corruption will be higher in countries with lower income inequalities H1a: In post-communist countries this relation will be weaker Data The findings of the analysis are supported by three types of models; firstly, by analysing the relations between control of corruption and Gini coefficient by time-waves since 1995, then by multilevel analysis (fixed effects and random effects), and finally by analysing the change in these two indicators from 1995 to 2014. Results show that there are huge differences between eastern European countries with communist legacy and countries with a longer history of democracy and rule of law, and that theories pointing out to the strong correlation between corruption and Gini coefficient are not entirely correct. It seems that this correlation is true for European countries, which have not experienced communist rule, but it is not true for post-communist countries. Interestingly, even though post‐communist countries as a group quickly caught up with income inequality levels of the rest of European countries after the end of communism, analysis of changes within the group of post‐communist countries actually shows a contrary, unexpected effect. Countries, which have had the highest change in income inequality towards more unequal societies are today the least corrupt countries among post‐communist countries and vise versa. Analysis Source: World Bank. Note: Indicators varies from -3 to 3 with 3 meaning that the country is successful in controlling corruption Gini coefficient, selected countries Variable Source Control of Corruption World Bank Income Inequality – Gini coefficient UNU Wider, Eurostat GDP per Capita World Bank Democracy Polity IV – Centre for Systemic Peace Share of protestants ARDA Source: World Bank Model 3.2 Ln GDP per capita 0.26 (0.05)* Gini coefficient ‐0.01 (0.004)* Communist history ‐1.47 (0.25)* Communist hist.*Gini coeff. 0.07 (0.006)* Share of protestants 1.06 (0.207)* Democracy 0.04 (0.007)* Intercept ‐1.379 sigma_u 0.4 sigma_e 0.173 rho 0.795 Nb of observations 419 Nb of groups 39 F (Wald chi) 385.12 Prob>F 0.000 corr(u_i, Xb) 0 (assumed) *p<0.05 Control of Corruption in Europe, 2016 Panel data - Determinants of Control of Corruption
  5. 5. Collectivisation of Anti- Corruption Cause: Harnessing structural and functional properties of informal social networks can help change collective attitudes and behaviours vis-à-vis corruption (‘perceptions theory and social norms approach’) Making change visible and palpable: social repercussion for corrupt transgression (‘naming and shaming’), combined with institutional reforms (‘celebrated success stories’) Power of social ties: within-network connectedness and influenceability of social referents acting as anti- corruption champions, opinion leaders and trend setters to spread critical information and new behaviours Social Influence Landscape Social Influence Strategies for Anti-Corruption (‘Peer-Driven Interventions’) HARNESSING SOCIAL NETWORKS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION COSIMO STAHL AND SABA KASSA, BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE, UNIVERSITY OF BASEL, SWITZERLAND What is the problem? (Petty) Corruption persists despite the presence of elaborate legal, institutional and organisational anti-corruption frameworks in many developing countries Ambivalence: Behaviours are infused with ambivalence due to a gap between what the formal legal framework prescribes and the informal social rules dictate (Uganda and Tanzania). Novel behavioural approach: Aims to understand context-specific drivers of corrupt behaviours, focusing on the social fabric, cultural structures and other “non-rational” and “quasi-rational” decision-making factors But social networks are double-edged due to the role of peer pressure: Rwanda - social performance contracts (Imihigo) endorse values of integrity, “naming and shaming” approach to corruption (names of corrupt offender - alongside the names of their parents and community of origin – are publicised) Major finding: Field research conducted on behavioural drivers of corruption in the health sectors of Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda show that informal social networks play a role in spurring petty corrupt practices Opportunities for anti-corruption: Incorporating behavioural insights by harnessing the potential of social networks to promote ant-corruption outcomes by means of social diffusion of critical (normative) behaviours and new attitudinal and behavioural trends.
  6. 6. THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION: EXPLORING MEXICO’S PARADOXICAL CORRUPTION INEQUALITY TREND POSTINEQUALITY-2001 ETIENNE ROSAS, PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL/ RAND CORPORATION THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION : Exploring Mexico’s Paradoxical Corruption-Inequality Trend post-2001 Etienne Rosas, Pardee RAND Graduate School/ RAND Corporation POLICY ISSUE ➢ In OECD, Mexico scores lowest in corruption measures, by far. This is despite transition into democracy in 2000 and repeated policy efforts to curtail corruption since. ➢ Mexico scores worst in measures of inequality in OECD despite a regionwide moderate but constant decrease since 2000. Pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient change for Mexico is negligible. ➢ Studies frequently note a correlation between corruption and inequality, and a mutually- reinforcing dynamic: RESEARCH QUESTIONS ➢ How has this inequality-corruption cycle evolved in Mexico? What role did the end of the 71-year rule of the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) play? ➢ What explains the persistent ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Mexico? PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ➢ Statistically significant inverse relationship between corruption and inequality begins in 2001. A 1 point rise in the CPI, i.e. an improvement in corruption, is associated with a .008 rise in the Gini Index, i.e. a worsening of inequality. ➢ This relationship is not present in the years preceding 2001 but neither do we see any positive relation between corruption improvements and lower inequality as theory would suggest. If we include all data points between 1995-2015, there is no statistically significant relationship between corruption and inequality. ➢ The most important policy shock starting 2001 is the PRI losing its power grip on the political structure and relinquishing the presidency to Vicente Fox of the PAN party. Generally, the shock appears to have reshuffled incentives for corruption in such a way that corrupt practices served to alleviate inequality in many sectors. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ➢ The PRI political-economic structure deeply institutionalized corruption at every level. Decentralization of power in 2000s brought about “competitive corruption” opportunities which distributed wealth more evenly. ➢ “Official” redistributive mechanisms, especially in poorer areas, remain broken; taxes are ineffective, so bribes are de facto form of tax. Unofficial and informal channels for many remain more effective modes of redistribution and progress. ➢ Previous studies like Dobson & Ramlogan, 2009, have observed this phenomenon in other Latin American countries. They attribute it to 1) the large informal sector’s increased transaction cost under corruption- reducing policies, and 2) institutional reforms’ sudden cut back on redistributive measures promoted by corrupt elements. ➢ Mexico seems caught in a structure where redistribution is based on a longstanding network of influence and corruption. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ➢ Dynamic between corruption and inequality is relative to the political structure. Anti- corruption efforts must adapt to address perverse incentives, enhance formal redistribution channels or risk backfiring. ➢ Unraveling of this corruption-based system should focus on pressuring top-level operators. Source: Transparency International THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION : Exploring Mexico’s Paradoxical Corruption-Inequality Trend post-2001 Etienne Rosas, Pardee RAND Graduate School/ RAND Corporation POLICY ISSUE ➢ In OECD, Mexico scores lowest in corruption measures, by far. This is despite transition into democracy in 2000 and repeated policy efforts to curtail corruption since. ➢ Mexico scores worst in measures of inequality in OECD despite a regionwide moderate but constant decrease since 2000. Pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient change for Mexico is negligible. ➢ Studies frequently note a correlation between corruption and inequality, and a mutually- reinforcing dynamic: RESEARCH QUESTIONS ➢ How has this inequality-corruption cycle evolved in Mexico? What role did the end of the 71-year rule of the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) play? ➢ What explains the persistent ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Mexico? PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ➢ Statistically significant inverse relationship between corruption and inequality begins in 2001. A 1 point rise in the CPI, i.e. an improvement in corruption, is associated with a .008 rise in the Gini Index, i.e. a worsening of inequality. ➢ This relationship is not present in the years preceding 2001 but neither do we see any positive relation between corruption improvements and lower inequality as theory would suggest. If we include all data points between 1995-2015, there is no statistically significant relationship between corruption and inequality. ➢ The most important policy shock starting 2001 is the PRI losing its power grip on the political structure and relinquishing the presidency to Vicente Fox of the PAN party. Generally, the shock appears to have reshuffled incentives for corruption in such a way that corrupt practices served to alleviate inequality in many sectors. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ➢ The PRI political-economic structure deeply institutionalized corruption at every level. Decentralization of power in 2000s brought about “competitive corruption” opportunities which distributed wealth more evenly. ➢ “Official” redistributive mechanisms, especially in poorer areas, remain broken; taxes are ineffective, so bribes are de facto form of tax. Unofficial and informal channels for many remain more effective modes of redistribution and progress. ➢ Previous studies like Dobson & Ramlogan, 2009, have observed this phenomenon in other Latin American countries. They attribute it to 1) the large informal sector’s increased transaction cost under corruption- reducing policies, and 2) institutional reforms’ sudden cut back on redistributive measures promoted by corrupt elements. ➢ Mexico seems caught in a structure where redistribution is based on a longstanding network of influence and corruption. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ➢ Dynamic between corruption and inequality is relative to the political structure. Anti- corruption efforts must adapt to address perverse incentives, enhance formal redistribution channels or risk backfiring. ➢ Unraveling of this corruption-based system should focus on pressuring top-level operators. Source: Transparency International THE PYRAMID OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CORRUPTION : Exploring Mexico’s Paradoxical Corruption-Inequality Trend post-2001 Etienne Rosas, Pardee RAND Graduate School/ RAND Corporation POLICY ISSUE ➢ In OECD, Mexico scores lowest in corruption measures, by far. This is despite transition into democracy in 2000 and repeated policy efforts to curtail corruption since. ➢ Mexico scores worst in measures of inequality in OECD despite a regionwide moderate but constant decrease since 2000. Pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient change for Mexico is negligible. ➢ Studies frequently note a correlation between corruption and inequality, and a mutually- reinforcing dynamic: RESEARCH QUESTIONS ➢ How has this inequality-corruption cycle evolved in Mexico? What role did the end of the 71-year rule of the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) play? ➢ What explains the persistent ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Mexico? PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ➢ Statistically significant inverse relationship between corruption and inequality begins in 2001. A 1 point rise in the CPI, i.e. an improvement in corruption, is associated with a .008 rise in the Gini Index, i.e. a worsening of inequality. ➢ This relationship is not present in the years preceding 2001 but neither do we see any positive relation between corruption improvements and lower inequality as theory would suggest. If we include all data points between 1995-2015, there is no statistically significant relationship between corruption and inequality. ➢ The most important policy shock starting 2001 is the PRI losing its power grip on the political structure and relinquishing the presidency to Vicente Fox of the PAN party. Generally, the shock appears to have reshuffled incentives for corruption in such a way that corrupt practices served to alleviate inequality in many sectors. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ➢ The PRI political-economic structure deeply institutionalized corruption at every level. Decentralization of power in 2000s brought about “competitive corruption” opportunities which distributed wealth more evenly. ➢ “Official” redistributive mechanisms, especially in poorer areas, remain broken; taxes are ineffective, so bribes are de facto form of tax. Unofficial and informal channels for many remain more effective modes of redistribution and progress. ➢ Previous studies like Dobson & Ramlogan, 2009, have observed this phenomenon in other Latin American countries. They attribute it to 1) the large informal sector’s increased transaction cost under corruption- reducing policies, and 2) institutional reforms’ sudden cut back on redistributive measures promoted by corrupt elements. ➢ Mexico seems caught in a structure where redistribution is based on a longstanding network of influence and corruption. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ➢ Dynamic between corruption and inequality is relative to the political structure. Anti- corruption efforts must adapt to address perverse incentives, enhance formal redistribution channels or risk backfiring. ➢ Unraveling of this corruption-based system should focus on pressuring top-level operators. Source: Transparency International
  7. 7. TO TOLERATE OR NOT TOLERATE BRIBERY: CAN A LACK OF CONTROL OVER CORRUPTION DETERMINE TOLERANCE LEVELS? PATTY ZAKARIA, PHD This section tested the rule of law hypothesis, which predicted that individuals in countries where the rule of law is strong would have less favorable attitudes towards bribery than those in countries with the weak rule of law. The results regarding the rule of law are presented in table 1 above. In models 2, the rule of law coefficient was found to be negative and statistically significant at the ρ < 0.01 level. This outcome means that as the rule of law becomes stronger in each society; it is expected that individuals will become less tolerant of corruption. On the other hand, when the rule of law weakens in a society, this tends to make individuals more accepting of corruption. Thus, the statistical results support the rule of law hypothesis. Figure 2 presents the relationship between the rule of law and individual-level tolerance for corruption, with a 95% confidence interval. Hypotheses The study tested the following hypotheses: Control of Corruption: When governments have control over corruption, individuals will begin to believe that corruption is less justifiable. Rule of Law: Individuals in countries where the rule of law is strong will have less favorable attitudes towards bribery than those in countries where the rule of law is weak. Results Thisfindingsuggeststhatanegativecausalrelationshipispresentbetweencontrol of corruption and individual-level tolerance for corruption, where greater control over corruption by the government is associated with individuals becoming less accepting of bribery among public officials. What does this all mean? First, these results signify that individual-level justification for bribery among public officials is dependent on the ability of government to control corruption effectively, thus confirming that individual- level perception is not fixed and can vary. Second, and perhaps most importantly, these results reveal that perception is conditioned by the level of corruption within society. Abstract: Most of the research on corruption has either focused on the impact corruption has on economic growth, development, and investment, or the implications of corruption on governance. However, limited research has focused on the relationship between government control of corruption and individual-level acceptance of bribery within society. This study uses the World Values Survey and other observed data from a total of 55 countries to test whether high levels of corruption cause individuals to be more accepting of bribery among public officials. A Generalized Least Square Model was applied to test the effect of government corruption on control and individual-level tolerance for bribery between 1996 and 2015. Keywords: GLS, Control of corruption, Individual-level tolerance, Bribery, Rule of Law. Research Question What impact can government’s ability to deal with corruption have on individual- level justification of bribery among public officials? The literature argues, and the empirical literature finds that robust and durable political institutions are associated with low levels of corruption. Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005), for example, found that a country with political stability, a free and independent press, and a democratic system tended to have a lower level of corruption. By extending the above logic, a reduction in corruption is associated with robust control of corruption by the government, which in turn leads individuals to become less tolerant of bribery in society. When individuals are accustomed to a transparent and corruption-free (limited corruption) society, they are unlikely to be comfortable with bribery; rather, they will have been conditioned by their corruption-free environment to reject this behavior. If corruption is high and control of corruption by the government is weak, then it can be assumed that individuals will be more tolerant of bribery. In this case, individuals are consistently experiencing corruption or hearing about corruption scandals in the media, and so they, like their counterparts in corruption-free societies, will also be conditioned by their environment. However, in this scenario, individuals will become desensitized to corruption and its negative attributes, pushing them to become more tolerant of bribery among public officials. The argument made here is akin to Wroe, Allen, and Birch’s (2013) assumption and empirical test of how distrust can condition individual-level responses to corruption in the United Kingdom. The authors confirm that “less trusting individuals are always more likely than their more trusting counterparts to judge politicians’ behavior as corrupt” (Wroe, Allen, & Birch, 2013, p. 13). This supports the notion that certain factors in society can condition individual-level tolerance for corruption. Government Control of Corruption & Tolerance Rule of Law & Tolerance
  8. 8. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS’FINANCIAL DONATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POLITICAL PARTIES & FOUNDATIONS ALEXANDER KATSAITIS ARENA CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Research Premise Financial links between interest groups and policy-makers reveal strategic choice, influence, and socio-political cleavages. Significantly, they provide measures of integrity for the policy-making environment and its democratic credentials. Since 2008, the European Union’s (EU) political parties and foundations can receive private financial donations as a part of their annual budget, which raises two questions. Are the EU’s political organizations receiving donations from interest groups? How does the party agenda impact donations? Top 20 Interest Group Donors, total amount of donations in euros (2008-2015). Methodology This is the first study that systematically maps and analyses the private financial donations received by EU level political parties and foundations. It does so by assesing their budgets, available online, from 2008 to 2015. Donations received by EU level political foundations, political parties, and total, per year (amounts in euros). Main Results ● Donations are progressively playing a greater role in EU level party financing. ● Business organizations outspend all other donors. ● Donations are highly skewed to the right side of the political spectrum, and are concentrated among a few political parties and affiliated foundations; including Eurosceptic parties. Donations and membership fees received by EU level political foundations per year (amounts in euros). Implications ● The plethora of donors and the increasing amounts of donations, create the need for additional clarity over the sources channelling money in EU politics and its impact. ● We are likely to observe donations’ further institutionalization, normalizing the process while crystalizing cleavages at the EU level. ● The EU’s parties, at least a part of them, seem to be moving away from the European‘public utility paradigm’. ● Donations provide an alternative conceptual frame for EU lobbying beyond information-exchange models, moving closer to US hybrid-resource models. Distribution of total amount of donations received by EU level political foundations (2008-2015). ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS’ FINANCIAL DONATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POLITICAL PARTIES & FOUNDATIONS ALEXANDER KATSAITIS ARENA CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Association pour la fondation pour l'Europe des Libertes et de la Democratie 0% Centre for European Studies 0% Institute for European Democrats 0% Transform Europe 0% Green European Foundation 0% Centre Maurits Coppieters 0% Foundation Politique Europeene pour la democratie 0% Foundation for European Progressive Studies 1% Europa Osservatorio sulle politiche dell'unione 1% Fondation pour une Europe des Nations et des Libertes 1%Foundation for EU Democracy 4% European Liberal Forum 5% Christian Political Foundation for Europe 5% Organization for European Interstate Cooperation 5% European Identity & Traditions 7% Institute for Direct Democracy 9%European Foundation for Freedom 14% New Direction - Foundation for European Reform 47% 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000 AT&T Cassae & Schembri Ltd. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Bayer Notat Food World Ltd Open Europe Triple A Analytics The Atlas Economic Harmonies Economiques Uscom Ltd Jalte Holding BV CI Consult & Research The A Partners German Marshall Fund Arx Studios s.r.o. European Institute of Healthcare Medaf Ltd. Pershing LLC Syngenta CBI of Turkey Ocean & Sky Logistic 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Donations to Foundations Membership Fees Foundations 0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Donations to Foundations Donations to Parties Donations Total
  9. 9. EMBRACING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CROSS- JURISDICTIONAL WHISTLEBLOWING DR ASHLEY SAVAGE, LECTURER IN LAW, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, UK A lives and works in a jurisdiction which has a whistleblowing law allowing him to obtain protection if he raises a concern to the anti- corruption agency. A’s company, however, is based at the other side of the globe, in a country without similar protection. The anti-corruption agency in A’s jurisdiction lacks the resources to mount a joint investigation on a matter not affecting their home jurisdiction. The best place for A to raise his concern so that it may be acted upon is to the anti-corruption agency in the jurisdiction where the company is based, but if he does so he loses the right to whistleblower protection. Despite the rapid rise in whistleblower protection laws there is no universally accepted definition of the term ‘whistleblower.’ Different national approaches make it difficult for whistleblowers to navigate a fractured and uncertain landscape. Whistleblower protection laws most often apply when the individual needs to obtain legal protection for suffering some form of detrimental treatment or dismissal. Whistleblowers often not need to use these laws unless things go wrong. Anti-corruption bodies can utilise practical steps to help ensure that things do not. Here are some suggestions: Provide clear practical guidance to whistleblowers: Explain how concerns may be raised, what will happen to the information and any legal protection which may apply. Exercise caution in providing advice or instructions which only apply to individuals raising concerns domestically. Consider providing different advice where concerns are received from outside of the jurisdiction. Provide a range of communication methods but also advise of the risks: Secure drop-boxes may offer a good way of obtaining disclosed documents and may be consistent with the national law of that jurisdiction, but they may also place whisleblowers raising concerns from other jurisdictions at risk of prosecution. Clear and prominent guidance should be issued to warn of potential risks. Be pro-active and prudent with the information: Reduce risks by not requiring whistleblowers to disclose documents where to do so may render the individual in breach of the law. Consider whether it is more appropriate to obtain the documents through co-operation with anti-corruption bodies based in the other jurisdiction. Use investigatory tactics to shield the whistleblower: Avoid disclosing the identity of the whistleblower unless authorised to do so. Exercise caution when acting on information which is only known by a small number of individuals so as not to expose the whistleblower’s position. Investigators could deliberately widen the scope of the investigation and/ or include the whistleblower as one of those investigated in order to shield the individual from exposure as the source. Sharing good practice: Work towards a shared understanding on how to deal with whistleblower concerns. Aim to develop base-line standards which acknowledge international good practice but also allow for differences in legal institutional frameworks. A lives and works in a jurisdiction which has a whistleblowing law allowing him to obtain protection if he raises a concern to the anti- corruption agency. A’s company, however, is based at the other side of the globe, in a country without similar protection. The anti-corruption agency in A’s jurisdiction lacks the resources to mount a joint investigation on a matter not affecting their home jurisdiction. The best place for A to raise his concern so that it may be acted upon is to the anti-corruption agency in the jurisdiction where the company is based, but if he does so he loses the right to whistleblower protection. Despite the rapid rise in whistleblower protection laws there is no universally accepted definition of the term ‘whistleblower.’ Different national approaches make it difficult for whistleblowers to navigate a fractured and uncertain landscape. Whistleblower protection laws most often apply when the individual needs to obtain legal protection for suffering some form of detrimental treatment or dismissal. Whistleblowers often not need to use these laws unless things go wrong. Anti-corruption bodies can utilise practical steps to help ensure that things do not. Here are some suggestions: Provide clear practical guidance to whistleblowers: Explain how concerns may be raised, what will happen to the information and any legal protection which may apply. Exercise caution in providing advice or instructions which only apply to individuals raising concerns domestically. Consider providing different advice where concerns are received from outside of the jurisdiction. Provide a range of communication methods but also advise of the risks: Secure drop-boxes may offer a good way of obtaining disclosed documents and may be consistent with the national law of that jurisdiction, but they may also place whisleblowers raising concerns from other jurisdictions at risk of prosecution. Clear and prominent guidance should be issued to warn of potential risks. Be pro-active and prudent with the information: Reduce risks by not requiring whistleblowers to disclose documents where to do so may render the individual in breach of the law. Consider whether it is more appropriate to obtain the documents through co-operation with anti-corruption bodies based in the other jurisdiction. Use investigatory tactics to shield the whistleblower: Avoid disclosing the identity of the whistleblower unless authorised to do so. Exercise caution when acting on information which is only known by a small number of individuals so as not to expose the whistleblower’s position. Investigators could deliberately widen the scope of the investigation and/ or include the whistleblower as one of those investigated in order to shield the individual from exposure as the source. Sharing good practice: Work towards a shared understanding on how to deal with whistleblower concerns. Aim to develop base-line standards which acknowledge international good practice but also allow for differences in legal institutional frameworks.
  10. 10. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE BRIBERY CASES KASPER VAGLE, PHD CANDIDATE, NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (NHH),BERGEN, NORWAY KASPER.VAGLE@NHH.NO Context The opportunity to offer accused corporations a negotiated settlement implies a broadening of prosecutors’ range of tools available for acting on complex forms of corruption. Negotiated settlements change the structure of criminal enforcement and can be used in ways that reward corporations for their self-policing and self-reporting initiatives (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997). The increased use of negotiated settlements can encourage remedial actions, compensation of victims and efficient compliance programs, depending on the principles, predictability and aims behind enforcement. Research Goal The purpose of this article is to investigate the level of prosecutor’s discretion in negotiated settlements of corporate bribery cases in 62 countries, and examine the level of discretion among countries that have similar performance on development indices. The further aim of the research project is to understand the drivers of discretion, and what degree of discretion for prosecutors can be associated with efficient and legitimate law enforcement systems Findings The study finds that different countries apply very different degrees of prosecutorial discretion, and there is no clear trend that countries are moving in the direction of United States practices and regulations regarding settlements when it comes to prosecutorial discretion (Fig. 1-4). However, we see some indications that more discretion and independence is given to countries that have a stronger rule of law more generally (Fig. 1-2). More discretion is also given to prosecutors in countries that do well on other good governance indicators, including on corruption, business regulations, and democracy (Fig. 3-4). The survey results reveal a difference between de jure and de facto discretion for prosecutors who negotiate settlements with corporations. Most jurisdictions with high de jure discretion also have high de facto discretion. However, there are some countries that have low de jure discretion combined with high de facto discretion. Which means that there is significant deviation between the written law and practice. Data This study applies data provided by Makinwa and Søreide (2018). The data was collected with the help of the Structured Criminal Settlements Subcommittee (SCSS) of the International Bar Association (IBA), and is the result of a survey among its members conducted in 2017. The survey is part of the project Towards Global Standards in Structured Criminal Settlements for Corruption Offences. Lawyers from 62 different countries contributed with insights about how negotiated settlements are regulated and the prosecutor’s degree of discretion in their jurisdiction. Figure 1: De jure discretion vs. Rule of law Figure 2: De facto independence vs. Rule of law Figure 3: De jure discretion vs. Ease of doing business Figure 4: De facto independence vs. Ease of doing business
  11. 11. Behavioral Results Physiological Results Summary and conclusions People employ cheating in strategic ways to justify their self-interests and promote their goals - Increase cheating to benefit close others Altruistic Justifications increase dishonesty and diffuse its associated psychologicaltension(ethicaldissonance),thusallowingguilt-freedishonesty War against corruption must focus on identifying and preventing different types of justifications Introduction • According to the psychological model of dishonesty, cheating behavior creates a psychological tension termed ETHICAL DISSONANCE • This tension stems from the conflict between the desire to be honest and the competing desire to increase (material) gain. • The tension is resolved if the level of unethicality is restricted, or alternatively, if cheating behavior is justified Research question Does Altruistic cheating (cheating to benefit others) serves as a justification to cheat, and how it effects the physiological tension associated with cheating behavior Method 1. The Flexible dots task Which side has more dots? Would you choose the correct side or the highest paying side? 2. Lie-detector test Physiologicalarousalmeasurestonegativeresponses on the question: “Did you cheat in the dots task”? Conditions: IDEOLOGICAL-ALTRUISTIC CHEATING - TESTING ROBIN HOOD IN A LIE DETECTOR DAR PELEG¹, GUY HOCHMAN², SHAHAR AYAL², DAN ARIELY³ 1 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY ISRAEL. 2 INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER (IDC) HERZLIYA ISRAEL. 3 DUKE UNIVERSITY U.S.A. 3 ag 30 ag
  12. 12. STAGE 2 VETTING POTENTIAL POSITIVE OUTLIERS Puzzle: Are the cases identified in stage 1 reflections of real-world success? Desk research was used to vet 5 cases to assess whether the positive performance picked up statistically reflected reality. This is important as errors may cause the analyses to identify false-positives. We reviewed the literature and conducted telephone interviews with people familiar with the cases to vet them. STAGE 3 UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION REDUCTION Puzzle: What processes are responsible for corruption reduction? In-depth qualitative fieldwork was conducted in 2 cases: Uganda’s health care sector and South Africa’s police sector. Field research assessed what factors most likely encouraged bribery reduction. WHAT WORKED? LEADERSHIP DISRUPTION UGANDA: HEALTH CARE Strengthened accountability mechanisms. Through a highly visible fight against corruption in the sector,therelativelyrecentlyestablishedHMUlikelyreduced bribery by making health workers especially cautious. SOUTH AFRICA: POLICE A shock to the system. BriberyreducedmostinLimpopo.Thenationalgovernment’s intervention into the province, which targeted high level corruption,likelyinadvertently changedlocalpolice’sbribery patterns by making them more cautious. “SUCCESS” STORIES? NOT SO FAST. UNEXPECTED, VALUABLE LESSONS FROM OUR POSITIVE OUTLIERS. UGANDA: HEALTH CARE Bribery reduction has not strengthened the sector. The ‘effective’ anticorruption approach may be (unintentionally) weakening the sector by making the working conditions of health workers even more challenging. SOUTH AFRICA: POLICE The national government stopped its intervention in Limpopo, and bribery seems to be on the rise again in the sector. Something else will need to be done to ensure sustained progress. STAGE 1 STATISTICAL IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL POSITIVE OUTLIERS Puzzle: Which sectors have surprisingly reduced corruption? Potential positive outliers are identified as statistically significant outliers using simple regression analyses. Positive outliers are sectors wherein the bribery rate reduced far more than what was predicted, given how bribery changed in other sectors in the same country over the same period of time. We identified 18 potential positive outliers SEARCHING FOR SUCCESS: SUMMARISING A MIXED METHODS APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING POSITIVE OUTLIERS IN BRIBERY REDUCTION CARYN PEIFFER, SCHOOL FOR POLICY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 6.3% 7.7% 9.3% 10.0% 16.2% Mongolia (land) Indonesia (health) Sierra Leone (education) South Africa (police) Uganda (health) What is the difference? (predicted - actual change in bribery) † < 5% chance of occurring; * < 1% chance of occurring   FEAR WHY POSITIVE OUTLIERS? Learning what contextual factors promote success can inspire new thinking about how to best tackle corruption. We focus on potential success stories in anticorruption. We develop and use a novel 3-stage approach to identify and examine sectors in otherwise systemically corrupt countries that beat the odds by successfully reducing bribery. http://www.dlprog.org/research/islands-of-integrity-understanding-the-politics-of-corruption-reduction.php
  13. 13. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS A TWO-FACTOR MODEL FOR ETHICAL CULTURE AZISH FILABI AND CATERINA BULGARELLA, ETHICAL SYSTEMS A Two-Factor Model for Ethical Culture Azish Filabi and Caterina Bulgarella Outcomes • These are the organization’s goals – to increase ethical behavior, improve ethical decision- making and employee commitment to the organization • They are influenced by the opposing forces of the negative and positive elements of culture. These outcomes are likely to be observed when a company scores low on the Disqualifiers (left side) and high on the Qualifiers (right side) Qualifiers • The Qualifiers embody the active investments organizations need to make to build ethical assets • The higher a company scores on these components, the stronger its ethical focus Disqualifiers • Disqualifiers can also be thought of as minimum requirements. They rep- resent the ethical debt companies must pay off in order to create the foundations for a strong ethical focus • Companies that score high on these five areas present foundational weaknesses that should be addressed thoroughly and before any other type of culture work is started The Five Dimensions of Culture Social Contract The set of shared perceptions about how the organization relates to people and people relate to each other Leadership Behaviour The influence of leadership and management on the org- anization’s ethics Organizational Ethos Deep-rooted beliefs that people hold about themselves and others, such as basic assumptions about bene- volence Individual Perceptiveness Awareness of ethical issues is a necessary precondition of ethical decision-making. Each individual brings a level of insight to bear on their day-to- day choices Response to Misconduct Highlights how people react when they observe unethical behavior. It’s immediately relevant to ethical outcomes, so it can be viewed as an acid test of a company’s ethical focus
  14. 14. NATURAL RESOURCES AND MONEY LAUNDERING DAVID MÜHLEMANN AND STEFAN MBIYAVANGA, UNIVERSITY OF BASEL Despite its scarcity of natural resources, Switzerland is one of the world’s largest trading hubs for commodities and precious metals. This, however, brings along considerable exposure to the many risks associated with natural resource extraction. Several traders domiciled in Switzerland have been alleged to have engaged in illegal practices at the place of mining. However, while the flow of commodities – at least on paper – continues to stream through Switzerland, there have not been any natural resources-related trials for money laundering in Swiss Courts. In addition, the Swiss government, thus far, has been rather unwilling to take progressive steps towards an adequate supervision and regulation of the natural resource trade. Based on the findings of our research, we would like to present the following ideas to legislators and policymakers in Switzerland and elsewhere: Considering the example of gold, a money laundering scenario can arise in the following constellation: (A) a public official or rebel militia corruptly or forcefully acquires control over a gold mine. Then, the gold ore – which now is a proceed of crime – is sold and the earnings are misappropriated. (B) The Swiss refiner acquires the gold and refines it. Thereafter, the gold is no longer traceable to its source. (C) Lastly, the refined gold is sold to banks, investors or jewellers on the international market. Subject commodity traders should be subjected to anti-money laundering law. In comparison to banks, the traders are better positioned to identify money laundering risks in their trades. “Swiss made” should signify good quality, honesty and compliance with the law. This should also apply to the commodity sector. We should protect traders who life up to these ideals and make it more difficult for those who do not. Switzerland can push these topics up the agenda of international policymaking fora, such as the FATF. The international regulators should take the money laundering risks in the commodity sector seriously and improve the regulatory framework. Switzerland should recognize the responsibility and influence that come along with being a market leader for commodities and precious metals: If Switzerland introduces effective AML-regulation in the sector, it could motivate other trading hubs to follow suit.
  15. 15. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY & INTEGRITY IN EUROPEAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CLARA VOLINTIRU (BUCHAREST UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMIC STUDIES), VALENTINA DIMULESCU (ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY), AND MAT TROMME (BINGHAM CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW ) 15.73% 13.95% 15.73% 12.76% 18.69% 23.15% Conflict of interest Decisions contrary to public interest Abuse of Power Clientelistic distribution of goods and services Nepotism Favoritism in public procurement EaP 18.18% 18.18% 15.15% 16.67% 13.64% 18.18% Conflict of interest Decisions contrary to public interest Abuse of Power Clientelistic distribution of goods and services Nepotism Favoritism in public procurement CEE 4.88% 13.01% 17.07% 19.51% 20.33% 25.20% Conflict of interest Decisions contrary to public interest Abuse of Power Clientelistic distribution of goods and services Nepotism Favoritism in public procurement Balkans Figure 2. Types of corruption in the Western Balkans Figure 3. Types of corruption in the Eastern Partnership Figure 4. Types of corruption in the Central and Eastern Europe Figure 5. Administrative capacity at Local Governments’ (LG) level 1.49% 4.80% 5.56% 5.65% 6.30% 6.40% 7.20% 7.46% 7.46% 7.58% 23.88% 29.69% 32.84% 33.60% 33.33% 27.42% 36.22% 13.60% 53.60% 53.73% 53.73% 60.61% 55.22% 42.19% 65.67% 61.60% 61.11% 66.94% 57.48% 80.00% 39.20% 38.81% 38.81% 31.82% 20.90% 28.13% 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% Political Parties - CEE Courts - Balkans Assembly - Balkans Executive - Balkans Bureaucracy - Balkans Political Parties - Balkans Police - Balkans Assembly - CEE Executive - CEE Bureaucracy - CEE Police - CEE Courts - CEE Strong Average Weak Figure 1. Institutional capacity at LG level
  16. 16. Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum ScutariisetGentilibus,etmandabatDomitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Title Subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. Ego vero sic intellego, Patres conscripti, nos hoc tempore in provinciis decernendis perpetuae pacis habere oportere rationem. Nam quis hoc non sentit omnia alia esse nobis vacua ab omni periculo atque etiam suspicione belli? Second subtitle Haec subinde Constantius audiens et quaedam referente Thalassio doctus, quem eum odisse iam conpererat lege communi, scribens ad Caesarem blandius adiumenta paulatim illi subtraxit, sollicitari se simulans ne, uti est militare otium fere tumultuosum, in eius perniciem conspiraret, solisque scholis iussit esse contentum palatinis et protectorum cum Scutariis et Gentilibus, et mandabat Domitiano, ex comite largitionum, praefecto ut cum in Syriam venerit, Gallum, quem crebro acciverat, ad Italiam properare blande hortaretur et verecunde. LOGOS THE WEB OF ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN BRAZIL ANA LUIZA ARANHA, PHD IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, UFMG. RESEARCHER AT FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS AND CONSULTANT AT TRANSPARÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL BRASIL How to Measure Corruption? Corruption as exclusion  There is NO PLAUSIBLE JUSTIFICATION accepted by accountability institutions FOCUS Institutions at anti-corruption agenda in Brazil: Administrative Field  Office of the Comptroller General (CGU); Federal Court of Accounts (TCU); Government Ministries Judicial Field  Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF); Federal Police (PF); Federal Justice (JF) Innovative Theoretical Claim CORRUPTION means failed ACCOUNTABILITY, which means failed DEMOCRACY – “the empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions” Methodology Test claim of “No Interactions”  Inspections from Public Lotteries Programme  CGU randomly monitors federal funds transferred to municipalities Longitudinal approach  followed for 12 years the trajectory of the irregularities Unprecedented Dataset: Random sample from CGU reports: 322 municipalities, 19.177 irregularities Process-tracing  64 semi- structured elite interviews with those who work directly in the control of corruption Main Findings • Did the irregularities generate any reaction (proceedings) from the administrative and/or judicial arenas? Objective For the first time, map out the flux of corruption control in the Brazilian web of accountability institutions: Monitoring  Investigating  Sanctioning Research Questions 1) Do accountability institutions interact in Brazil in order to control corruption cases or the lack of coordination prevails? 2) Which are the interaction patterns? The web is able to coordinate itself in order to hold public officials accountable (something new in the country), but not in a homogeneous way across all institutions (something the literature has missed). The Flux TCU-MPF TCU- Local TCU-PF CGU-PF CGU-MPF CGU-Min MPF-Min Judiciary CGU-TCU MPF-PF I n t e n s i t y Frequency
  17. 17. MODELS AND LESSONS FOR THE MULTIVARIATE ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS BRIBERY RISK ROBERT CLARK AND VIRNA DI PALMA, TRACE INTERNATIONAL Models and Lessons for the Multivariate Assessment of Business Bribery Risk What Contributes to Business Bribery Risk? Is “Bribery Risk” Different than “Corruption”? What Can We Learn from the Underlying Data? • While an index’s top-level scores get the most attention, carefully analysing the underlying inputs can significantly improve our understanding: • clarifying the scores’ meaning; • testing the model’s rigour; • improving the index’s methodology. • Corruption indexes are typically produced by aggregating expert opinions over a range of topics; their aim is to capture an essential quality of society or governance. • The concept of bribery risk is both more specific and more pragmatic: it concerns only the practical danger of encountering bribery demands. • This has an implication for selecting data sources: corruption is manifested in the data, but risk is merely correlated with the data. • Evaluating bribery risk requires a multi-dimensional perspective to capture the full range of contributing factors, including: • the extent of opportunity; • the degree of deterrence; • the amount of transparency; • the robustness of oversight. www.TRACEinternational.org Robert Clark andVirna Di Palma,TRACE International www.TRACEinternational.org

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