Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.
OECD’s 15th Global Forum on
Competition: International
Cartels, 1990-2016
John M. Connor,
Professor Emeritus,
Purdue Unive...
1. Cumulative Corporate Penalties,
Regions or Jurisdictions, Semi-Decades
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
1990-94 1995...
2. Trend in Cumulative Penalties
Projected to Reach $280 billion by 2022
R² = 0.9997
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300....
3. Intl. Cartel Fines Imposed by NCAs
(EU’s National Authorities) 1989-July 2016
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
1989 1992 1995 19...
4. Total Fines in ROW Exploding
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2016
0.003 0.06...
5. Number of Antitrust Jurisdictions Prosecuting
International Cartels Is Climbing
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 1995 2000 2...
6. Corporate Penalties Are Mostly
Imposed on EU & U.S. Companies
0.4
2.1
0.7
1.4
26.3
48.5
71.1
Oceana
Lat. America
Other ...
7. Disposition of Executives Charged
for International Price-Fixing
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Other
Banned or Barred
Acquit...
8. Trend in U.S. Private Recoveries
R² = 0.3285
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
2016-2020 Proj...
9. Mean Severity of Penalties on
662 International Cartels, 1990-2015
12
30
16 15 14
16
10
21
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
EC EU ...
10. U.S. Damages, Penalties, and the
Optimal Penalty: The Lysine Cartel
0
100
200
300
400
500
$2010 Million
Mar 5, 2016 11...
12. Why Over-Deterrence is Rare
• Attorney anecdotes do not give numbers
• Serial collusion and recidivism is high.
• Affe...
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

Sanctions in Anti-trust cases – Prof. John M. Connor – Purdue University, US – November 2016 OECD discussion

4,507 views

Published on

This presentation by Prof. John M. Connor from Purdue University, West Lafayette, US was made during the discussion on "Sanctions in Anti-trust cases" held at the 15th Global Forum on Competition on 2 December 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/competition-and-sanctions-in-antitrust-cases.htm

  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

Sanctions in Anti-trust cases – Prof. John M. Connor – Purdue University, US – November 2016 OECD discussion

  1. 1. OECD’s 15th Global Forum on Competition: International Cartels, 1990-2016 John M. Connor, Professor Emeritus, Purdue University jconnor@purdue.edu Paris, December 2, 2016
  2. 2. 1. Cumulative Corporate Penalties, Regions or Jurisdictions, Semi-Decades 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-15 ROW EU NCAs EC USA & Canada Total $107 billion August 2016 2
  3. 3. 2. Trend in Cumulative Penalties Projected to Reach $280 billion by 2022 R² = 0.9997 0.0 50.0 100.0 150.0 200.0 250.0 300.0 1995.0 2000.0 2005.0 2010.0 2015.0 2020.0 Mar 5, 2016 3J M Connor, Purdue U.
  4. 4. 3. Intl. Cartel Fines Imposed by NCAs (EU’s National Authorities) 1989-July 2016 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Total $23.5 billion Year of Decision August 2016 4J M Connor, Purdue U. $billions
  5. 5. 4. Total Fines in ROW Exploding 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2016 0.003 0.065 Year Cartel Penalized August 2016 5 $billion Total $17.5 billion
  6. 6. 5. Number of Antitrust Jurisdictions Prosecuting International Cartels Is Climbing 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 NumberofJurisdictions Year cartel was investigated August 2016 6J M Connor, Purdue U.
  7. 7. 6. Corporate Penalties Are Mostly Imposed on EU & U.S. Companies 0.4 2.1 0.7 1.4 26.3 48.5 71.1 Oceana Lat. America Other Europe Africa Asia US & Canada W. Europe $ Billion Location of headquarters of company or its ultimate parent group. Mar 5, 2016 7J M Connor, Purdue U.
  8. 8. 7. Disposition of Executives Charged for International Price-Fixing 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Other Banned or Barred Acquitted,… Fugitives Indicted, waiting Guilty, waiting Prison only Fined only Fined & Prison August 2016 8J M Connor, Purdue U.
  9. 9. 8. Trend in U.S. Private Recoveries R² = 0.3285 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2016-2020 Projected Year First Company Settles (Zero Years Omitted) Mar 5, 2016 J M Connor, Purdue U. 9
  10. 10. 9. Mean Severity of Penalties on 662 International Cartels, 1990-2015 12 30 16 15 14 16 10 21 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 EC EU NCAs US Canada Other Nations Private, No. Am. Private, World World Penalties/AffectedSales(%) August 2016 10
  11. 11. 10. U.S. Damages, Penalties, and the Optimal Penalty: The Lysine Cartel 0 100 200 300 400 500 $2010 Million Mar 5, 2016 11 Note: Optimal penalty assumes 30% detection, 80% conviction probability.
  12. 12. 12. Why Over-Deterrence is Rare • Attorney anecdotes do not give numbers • Serial collusion and recidivism is high. • Affected commerce is typically too low. • Prejudgment interest is rarely rewarded, which longevity, slow decisions exacerbate. • No compensation for dead-weight losses • Anecdotes are ex post: fail to consider low probabilities of detection and conviction

×