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Oecd independent-regulators-yvrande-billon-dec2019


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This presentation by Yvrande-Billon, Chair of the OECD Network of Economic Regulators and vice-president of the French transport regulator, was made during the discussion “Independent sector regulators and competition” held at the 68th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 2 December 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at

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Oecd independent-regulators-yvrande-billon-dec2019

  1. 1. RoundtableonIndependentSectorRegulatorsandtheir RelationshipwithCompetitionAuthorities Anne Yvrande-Billon OECD Competition Committee Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation 1 Paris, 2 December 2019 Autorité de régulation des transports (since 10/1/19)
  2. 2. Transport regulation in France: The crucial role of ADLC 2009 • Creation of ARAF (Rail regulatory body) – Transposition Directive 2001/14 (ADLC Opinions 08-A-17) • Economic regulation of rail infrastructure managers (fair and non discriminatory access conditions to network) 2014 • Rail Reform Act I  Holding structure IM / RU (ADLC Opinions 11-A-05 on stations management and 13-A-04 on Railway Act) • Additional powers to the RB (e.g. sanction committee, binding opinions on IM’s CEO, SF access charges) 2015 • Liberalization of intercity coach market (ADLC Sector inquiry 04-A-05) • ADLC Opinion 14-A-13 on motorways concessionnaires • Creation of ARAFER  Economic regulation of intercity coach stations and services (prevention of « intermodal cream-skimming ») + Economic monitoring of motorway concessions and control of procurement procedures 2018 • Rail Reform Act II  Liberalization of the domestic rail market • Additional missions to the RB 2019 • Privatization of Aéroport de Paris (ADP) • Creation of ART  Economic regulation of airport charges (ADLC Opinions 10-A-04 & 16-A-10) 2020 • New scope of competence  Parisian rail infrastructure manager + transport data • Data collection powers extended
  3. 3. Legal basis ― L. 1264-15: reciprocal information  ARTADLC : obligation to refer to ADLC if aware of abuse of dominance or any anticompetitive practice in the rail, coach, motorway, airport sectors  ADLCART : communication of any referral related to the regulated sectors + M&A phase 2 ― L. 2133-4: accounting separation  Approval of accounting separation rules of the RU by ART, following ADLC’s opinion ― L. 3114-13, L. 3114-14: market position of coach stations managers  Definition of relevant markets and assessment of market position by ART, following ADLC’s opinion (passengers transport services markets)  Asymetric regulation Ensuring consistency between ART and ADLC Voluntary coordination mechanisms ― Common job vacancy platform & Staff exchange ― Regular meetings of sector regulators and competition authorities (national and European levels) ― Joint publications
  4. 4. ― Proactive role of ADLC  Opinions or investigations on its own initiative (cf. creation of ART)  Injunction powers / commitment procedures ― Access to essential facilities raises classic competition issues  Use of confidential information on competitors or non replicable info obtained from monopoly situation (12-D-25, 14-D-11)  Discriminatory access conditions (12-D-25)  Leverage effects / confusion (15-D-05)  Margin squeeze (15-D-10), cross-subsidies … ― An abuse of dominance may materialize regulatory infringement or unfair treatment (Cf. freight yards) ⇒ Forum shopping? ― ADLC = exclusive remedy for non regulated related markets  Rolling stock, spare parts, certification…  Ticket distribution, information, branding…  Downstream market (transport services) & predatory pricing Complementarity between sector regulators and competition authorities : a perfect division of labour between landscapers and gardeners?