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Contents Page, Overview and Summary

  1. 1. 2001/08 The EU and Crisis Management Development and Prospects Simon Duke © 2002, European Institute of Public Administration / Institut européen d’administration publique Maastricht, the Netherlands / Pays-Bas
  2. 2. Table of Contents Page Glossary ix Overview and Summary xiii – Definitions and terminology xiv – Overview xv – A question of autonomy xvii CHAPTER 1 The Gestation of European Security and Defence 1 – Security and European integration 1 – NATO assumes its defence role with American backing 2 – De Gaulle’s legacy 4 – Security resurfaces through political cooperation 5 – London calling 7 – The Single European Act 8 – NATO flourishes – with no adversary 10 – NATO’s handmaiden 11 – The WEU stirs 12 – Institutional cacophony grows 13 – The camel that would be a horse – CFSP emerges 15 – The Amsterdam modifications 16 – From ESDI to CESDP 16 CHAPTER 2 Visions of Autonomy – From St Malo to Helsinki 23 – ESDI’s last gasp … 23 – … and CESDP’s tentative first steps 25 – St Malo – a revolutionary change? 27 – NATO’s Washington Summit 30 – The institutional structure of CESDP emerges 31 – Operation Allied Force – the allies join a U.S. show 34 – Meanwhile, CESDP shapes up – on paper 35 – Prelude To Helsinki 35 i) The Anglo-Italian Declaration 35 ii) ‘The Wise Men’s Report’ on the Implications of Institutional Enlargement 36 iii) WEU Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations 37 iv) … a second Anglo-French summit 39
  3. 3. CHAPTER 3 The EU’s Technicoloured Dream Coat – Pinstripe, Khaki and Blue 43 – The Helsinki European Council 43 – The interim structures 44 – The devil’s always in the details 45 – The Portuguese Presidency 47 – Which Europe? 48 – Welcome, the men in blue 50 – The French Presidency and progress towards Nice 51 – Openness, transparency and security 52 – The Commission stakes its territory 54 – Chirac on the offensive 55 – Committing capabilities 57 – The demise of the WEU 62 CHAPTER 4 From Nice to Laeken 67 – The Nice Summit 67 – Planning for EU-led operations 68 – Standing arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO 69 – Ankara’s objections 75 – The inclusion into the EU of appropriate functions of the WEU 78 – The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 80 – Conflict prevention as a ‘fixed priority’ 82 – The Treaty of Nice 84 – Improving capabilities 86 CHAPTER 5 The Institutional Structures of EU External Relations 91 – The European Council 94 – The Council (of Ministers) 94 – COREPER 97 – The Presidency 99 – The High Representative and the Council General Secretariat 100 – The establishment of permanent structures 104 i) The Political and Security Committee 104 ii) The Military Committee 109 iii) The EU Military Staff 111 – The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 113 – The Commission 114 – The European Parliament 127 – The Agencies 130 CHAPTER 6 Developing the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Conflict Prevention and Civil Protection 133 – The dominance of the EU’s military mission 133 – Civilian crisis response mechanisms: a retrospective 136
  4. 4. – The German Presidency 136 – The Finnish Presidency 137 – The Portuguese Presidency 137 – The French Presidency 139 – The Swedish Presidency 143 – Civil protection 146 – Exercise programme 146 – Conflict prevention and the future 147 – EU-UN relations 148 – The vox populi 150 CHAPTER 7 Public Support for EU External Relations 151 – An old chestnut … political will 151 – More specific indicators 153 – What do the figures suggest? 159 – The wages of terrorism 161 CHAPTER 8 Three Challenges for Crisis Management 165 – Affording CESDP 165 – EU-U.S. relations: more Washington schizophrenia? 175 – … and 11 September 180 – An extended security community? 182 Conclusions 187 – Consistency 188 – Relations with NATO 190 – The cost of rhetoric 191 – Common Defence? 193 – The question of legitimacy of EU action 191 NOTES 199 INDEX 221
  5. 5. Glossary ABM Anti Ballistic Missile (Treaty) ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries) AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe ARRC Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps BAe British Aerospace Systems CAT Crisis Action Team CC Committee of Contributors CESDP Common European Security and Defence Policy (see ESDP also) CEUMC Commander European Union Military Committee CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHOD Chiefs of Defence Staff CJTF Combined Joint Task Force C2 Command and Control C3 Command, Control and Communication CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management CMC Crisis Management Cell COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (see OSCE also) DASA Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace DCI Defence Capabilities Initiative (NATO) DG Directorate General DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe EAA European Armaments Agency EADC European Aerospace and Defence Company EADS European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company ECHO European Humanitarian Aid Office EDCI European Defence Capabilities Initiative EDIG European Defence Industrial Group EMU European Monetary Union EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy (see CESDP also) EU European Union EU+6 The six non-EU NATO members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey EU+15 The EU+6 and the nine non-NATO EU accession countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission
  6. 6. EUMS European Union Military Staff EUMCWG European Union Military Committee Working Group EUROFOR European Force EUROMARFOR European Maritime Force FAWEU Forces Answerable to the Western European Union FLA Future Large Aircraft FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GAC General Affairs Council GDP Gross Domestic Product HGTF Headline Goal Task Force iESDA Interim European Security and Defence Assembly iEUMC Interim European Union Military Committee iEUMS Interim European Union Military Staff IGC Intergovernmental Conference iPSC Interim Political and Security Committee KFOR Kosovo Force KPSS Kosovo Police Service School LoI Letter of Intent MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO) MAPE Multinational Advising Police Element (Albania) MD Missile Defence (U.S.) MEP Member of the European Parliament MILREP Military Representatives NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical NGO Non-governmental Organisation OC Operations Commander OCCAR Organisme Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armament ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador OSCE Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe PARP Planning and Review Process PGM Precision-Guided Munitions POCO Political Committee POLARM Working party on European armaments policy (Council) PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC Political and Security Committee PSO Peace Support Operations PSYOPS Psychological Operations QMV Qualified Majority Voting R&D Research and Development REFLEX External Relations Directorate-General (EU Commission) RMA Revolution in Military Affairs RRF Rapid Reaction Force RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism (Commission) SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SAR Search and Rescue SFOR Stabilisation Force (Bosnia) SG/HR Secretary-General/High Representative SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SITCEN Situation Centre
  7. 7. TEU Treaty on European Union UÇK Ushtria e Kosoves Çlirimtare (or Kosovo Liberation Army) UN United Nations UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNSC United Nations Security Council UNTACT UN Transitional Administration in East Timor WEAG Western European Armaments Group WEAO Western European Armaments Organisation WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organisation
  8. 8. Overview and Summary The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects attempts to accomplish three basic tasks. The first is to give the interested reader an insight into the evolution of EU crisis management mechanisms, both civilian and military. Crisis management mechanisms have been developed partly within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within its subset, the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Since crisis management also involves addressing the root causes of conflict, much emphasis is now placed on crisis prevention, which involves the European Community (EC). The New York terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 also highlight the complex nature of the security challenges facing the EU and other regional and international organisations. Within the EU this will obviously reinforce efforts to construct a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy, but it will also put more emphasis on cross border collaboration since none of the three pillars individually can claim a monopoly on the EU’s response to security challenges. Second, the development of the crisis management and conflict prevention aspects of the EU’s external relations have been astonishingly rapid. For this reason there is a need for a tour d’horizon which attempts to explain what progress has been made up to the present, especially the institutional adaptations that have been necessary to accommodate the EU’s growing responsibilities in these areas. Developments in the crisis management and conflict prevention area are generally followed by a fairly small group of practitioners and academics outside the EU institutions themselves. The general media coverage of the development of CFSP and, in particular, CESDP has been fraught with inaccuracies – not necessarily as a result of bad reporting, but because of the inherently political nature of anything that touches on security issues. It is for this reason that it is important to be factually clear about what has evolved and what is evolving. Third, EU crisis management is very much an ongoing project, most notably CESDP. The final section assesses how much progress has been made and, more importantly, what remains to be done. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY Before presenting an overview of the EU and crisis management, it is worth considering what is understood by crisis management The European Commission uses a number of related terms: peace-building, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution.1 Peace-building, which includes post-conflict peace-building, is defined as, ‘actions undertaken over the medium and longer-term to address root-causes of violent conflicts in a targeted manner’.2 Root-causes are considered to be: ヘ Imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities among difference identity groups (ethnic, religious, regional, social etc.); ヘ Lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance; ヘ Absence of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests (including democratic structures), and for bridging dividing lines between different interest groups; ヘ Lack of a vibrant civil society.
  9. 9. Conflict prevention is considered as ‘actions undertaken in the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.’ Conflict management is considered to be, ‘actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts’. Lastly, conflict resolution is ‘action undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict’.3 A number of brief comments are appropriate regarding the terminology. The definitions of peace building are logical and consistent with those of other organisations. The examples of ‘root-causes’ give an accurate indication of the kind of conflict indicators that the Commission may be interested in. The definition of conflict prevention remains somewhat mysterious since priority is given to short-term actions, for reasons that are not entirely clear. Similarly, conflict resolution is also seen as action undertaken over the short term. Conflict management refers to existing crises and the need to stop their escalation which seems to accord with the international interpretations of conflict or crisis management. For the sake of simplicity, a similar approach will be adopted to that of the International Crisis Group.4 The main emphasis will be placed on conflict prevention and conflict management or, in other words, the efforts to prevent conflict from breaking out in the first instance or to respond to a crisis if it has erupted and to prevent escalation and to bring it to a halt. However, the phrase crisis management is preferred to conflict management, although both are often used in official EU statements interchangeably. Many contemporary ‘crises’ lack the clarity of a conflict or classical state of armed warfare between clearly identifiable parties. Furthermore, since most ‘conflicts’ have been intra-state in the post-cold war period, their roots are often found in a mixture of social, economic and political factors. Similarly, solutions are often to be found through the application of an increasingly sophisticated array of crisis management tools, not only those employing armed force. The names of some of the newer bodies to have emerged in this area, such as the Committee for the Civilian Aspect of Crisis Management, suggests that the scope of EU activities in this field goes well beyond classical conflict management. Even in inter-organisation relations, such as those between the EU and NATO, consultation procedures are being developed for non-crisis and crisis periods, not non-conflict and conflict periods. By way of contrast, the term conflict prevention is generally used rather consistently by both the Commission and others involved, such as the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana. The study does not however attempt to differentiate between the short term and longer term action to reduce manifest tensions or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. It seems apparent from the various documents emanating from the EU and the Member States that if the EU is serious about conflict prevention, time is a secondary consideration to effectiveness and duration. The remaining terms, peace-building and conflict resolution are not discussed specifically, but are assumed to form an integral part of the EU’s general development of crisis management strategies and tools. Peace-building, as a term, is not especially helpful since much of what the Commission and other EU institutions do in external economic or political relations could fall under this heading. OVERVIEW If we now return to the overview, it is apparent that there are many challenges ahead for EU crisis management but the most obvious involves matching the resolve of the EU Member States with resources. The Union’s credibility depends upon the willingness of the EU Member States to provide the necessary resources; if they fail to, the EU will lack credibility as an international actor since it will be unable to offer a seamless web of responses, ranging from mediation to peacemaking in a variety of crisis scenarios. Currently only the U.S. is in the position to do this but a question mark must be posed regarding Washington’s willingness to actually use force, especially in light of the possible reorientation of U.S. defence policy as
  10. 10. a result of the events of 11 September. The EU must strive to be in a position whereby it can respond at a variety of different levels, ranging from the diplomatic, to different forms of economic leverage (both positive and negative), to the credible threat of military force to, if necessary, the actual use of military force. Reaching this goal will place renewed stress upon the need for better consistency in EU external relations generally. The emphasis put upon crisis management, as well as non-military crisis management, poses a number of awkward questions regarding the ability of the EU to weave the seamless web referred to above. For example, the development of crisis management mechanisms under the second pillar (CFSP) is of questionable utility if the crisis prevention structures, predominantly in the first pillar, do not form a continuum. Structural overlap between the pillars and institutions, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), or the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, may also pose further challenges to consistency. Within the second pillar, consistency will also be a challenge, since the demands of incorporating military structures must be complemented with new civil, or para-military, roles as well as those of the international police missions. The objective of EU crisis management is to become more proactive, rather than reactive. Arguably, the introduction of a number of new permanent bodies with early warning or monitoring mandates such as the Situation Centre, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the reasonably new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), will facilitate in this regard. However, issues of early warning also raise the question of upon what information and, more specifically, what sources of information early warning assessments are made. The transferral of the WEU Satellite Centre to the EU will give the Union its only indigenous source of intelligence, although the utility of the centre beyond rather general monitoring is questionable. Concerns within the EU about the porosity of its institutions or their leak-prone character mean that any sharing of sensitive information from EU Member States, or other organisations such as NATO, will be tentative. Proposals for new handling and classification rules by Javier Solana in mid 2000 for the second pillar, as well as other areas of EU activity, have proven controversial since they go to the heart of the EU’s self-identity as a ‘civilian power,’ as well as giving rise to issues of openness, transparency and legitimacy. However, the EU is no longer strictly a civilian power and the principles of openness and transparency are in some cases at odds with the sharing of sensitive information, especially in the context of developing EU-NATO relations. The question of the provision of adequate resources for CESDP has a number of aspects to it, all of which are explored in detail in the main text. There is the overriding question of which resources are actually required and whether they should be provided for through EU, or NATO, channels. The need to avoid duplicative efforts on the part of the two organisations is well understood but too little effort has gone into considering how much duplication is actually necessary. The answer to this depends heavily upon the EU Member States’ understanding of the word ‘autonomy’, used in the CESDP context, and how much independence from NATO (and the U.S.) is thought desirable. It is argued that currently the British understanding of autonomy has prevailed, which means that CESDP will remain closely linked to ESDI and sharing arrangements with NATO for particular resources and assets, most notably planning facilities. Whether the British interpretation of autonomy prevails is an open question since the lack of any guaranteed access to NATO planning assets, due primarily to Turkish objections regarding the exclusive nature of CESDP decision making, may usher in a more independent (French) stance. If, due to a combination of internal and external factors, CESDP becomes more autonomous, this will face EU Member States with the consequences of a rhetoric-resources gap even more starkly than at present, where a number of sharing arrangements with NATO are either presumed or thought to be guaranteed. The need to provide for a certain level of necessary duplication with NATO to attain the EU’s Headline Goals will also have a bearing on defence industries. It has long been a horse and cart issue as to whether it is necessary to have a defence-industrial base to support the
  11. 11. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or whether progress on the security and defence aspects of the EU’s activities would generate the impetus for a common European defence industry. It seems clear that developments in CESDP have outstripped the tentative moves towards creating a supporting European defence-industrial base. A number of well- known hurdles remain, not the least of which is the close or direct support of the governments of the EU Member States for their respective defence industries. The time to create a European Armaments Agency is nigh since the EU is in a better position than ever before to communicate to the defence industries its common needs, based on sound military judgement exercised by the EUMC and EUMS. A QUESTION OF AUTONOMY A delicate balancing act will have to be achieved between the EU and NATO, especially the non-EU European NATO members, and the United States. The problem of how to balance the EU’s institutional autonomy with the need to include the EU+15 (the non-EU European NATO members and the EU candidate countries), whilst avoiding exclusivity, is a profoundly difficult problem. A starting point would be to recognise that both institutions have special qualities: the EU in its potential to address a far wider range of soft and hard security challenges; and NATO in its ability to threaten and deliver serious military force. In the NATO context it should be realised that much of what superficially passes for ‘NATO assets’ are in fact under the national command of the individual NATO members and, in some cases, critical assets are held exclusively by the United States. The questions of CESDP’s autonomy, access to suitable force levels and resources, the development or procurement of appropriate technologies and a whole host of non-security issues, are all intimately bound up with the future of transatlantic relations. U.S. plans for Missile Defence (MD) has the potential to become the object of serious transatlantic differences and the negative knock-on effects for CESDP and EU-NATO collaboration could be profound. At the time of writing, the longer-term effects of 11 September are unclear. They may include a reorientation of U.S. defence policy away from existing areas of concentration, such as the Balkans, based on the expectation that the European allies will assume more of the responsibilities for regional (and maybe international) security. In short, the events of 11 September have the potential to speed up what was developing anyway – a new transatlantic relationship. Prior to the development of CESDP it was often remarked that the EU lacked the ‘political will’ to create a common security or defence. The question has not disappeared, particularly with reference to whether the EU Member States will actually provide an adequate level of funding for the resources that CESDP needs, to bring it to fruition in a long- term sense. One aspect of political will that is often overlooked is the considerable level of EU public support for CESDP. The moves towards less transparency, as part of the EU’s emerging security culture, will have to avoid the risk of alienating public opinion, especially in light of the increased public access and involvement advocated by the current Commission. Better communication to the EU citizens about the aims and requirements and challenges of EU crisis management and prevention, is a necessity. Finally, the Nice IGC was held mainly to prepare the EU institutions for the enlargement of the EU. The prospect of the enlargement of the EU from its current membership to twenty- seven, or even more, has a number of consequences for CESDP. The positive consequences include access to greater manpower and resources for non-military and military crisis management and, with this, greater political support and hence legitimacy in the international arena. The challenges that already exist amongst the European NATO members regarding military interoperability will only be magnified in an enlarged EU. The accession of a number of smaller countries, such and the Baltic states, Cyprus or Malta, will not add much to the
  12. 12. military resources but may add to the political sensitivity of CFSP. Russia has stated on a number of occasions that it views the Baltic states as a legitimate security concern and this includes the continuation of access to the Kaliningrad oblast. It is not the suggestion that this should be an impediment for the accession of any Baltic state to the EU, or their full participation in the second pillar, including CESDP. Rather, the suggestion is that Russia is critical for Europe’s security and this will involve greater efforts in the second pillar area to do more than pay mere lip service to the common strategy between the EU and Russia. The prospects for this seem positive since the development of closer security linkages between the EU and Russia since 11 September. However, the enhanced linkages also have the potential to cause further rifts in EU-Turkish relations since, presumably, this is exactly the type of relationship that Ankara has been striving for and, so far, denied. Cyprus also poses an extremely delicate problem for the EU and although the continued division of the island is not an impediment to the Republic of Cyprus’ accession, it remains to be seen whether the EU will be willing to assume the consequences of imminent accession. It is partly, although not exclusively, with the Cyprus case in mind that the argument is made that the ‘D’ in CESDP is unlikely to amount to much. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the development of a defence policy and common EU defence would not only cause political and constitutional problems for the neutral and non-aligned members of the EU, but also does not command strong support from some of the larger EU Member States where defence has traditionally been guaranteed by NATO with U.S. backing. Second, the prevalence of intra-state conflict in post-cold war Europe makes defence less of a priority, especially when no current EU Member State faces any obvious military threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty (the same may not however be claimed by all of the candidate countries). This does not make defence completely irrelevant, but it does imply that crisis prevention, non-military and military crisis management should be accorded far higher priority. It is unlikely, for a combination of political and practical reasons, that the EU will develop a common defence policy or common defence in the foreseeable future and the prospect of enlargement makes it even more unlikely. In effect, what has been created over the last few years is a ‘CESP’. The ‘D’, such as it is, exists at the European level in the vestigial WEU and in Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty with its mutual defence guarantees. It also exists, as the events following September 11 2001 reminded us, in the NATO context with the historical invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In conclusion, the prospects for CESDP depend very much upon the resolve of the EU Member States and other interested parties, such as Turkey, the U.S. and NATO, to address the challenges outlined above. It also depends upon the ingenuity with which the hard working EU officials involved can weave together an increasingly complicated network of institutions across the pillars, to lead to an effective and timely response to a number of crisis scenarios. The progress made in the last two years since the enunciation of CESDP has been rapid and impressive. The construction of the institutional underpinnings for CESDP is a vital aspect of the EU’s evolving crisis management role, yet it represents the easier part of the task. The hard work must now begin and real problems grappled with.