Managing Repression - Dr. Erica Chenoweth (FSI2013)

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n this session, Dr. Erica Chenoweth discusses how repression affects nonviolent campaigns. She provides empirical evidence that nonviolent movements are still effective even against brutally oppressive opponents. She discusses how movements "manage" repression through the promotion of backfire, as well as the strategic options movements have in dealing with repression. She also provides evidence suggesting that nonviolent movements that adopt violence or develop armed wings are not usually advantaged relative to nonviolent movements. This is because using violence against the regime, even when provoked, can undermine the necessary public participation that nonviolent campaigns enjoy, and can also undermine the backfiring of regime repression.

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Managing Repression - Dr. Erica Chenoweth (FSI2013)

  1. 1. Presentation  prepared  for  the  2013  Fletcher  Summer  Institute   
  2. 2. ¡  Nonviolent  resistance  cannot  succeed  against  very  repressive  or  brutal  opponents.    ¡  Repression  or  violence  forces  nonviolent  movements  to  adopt  counter-­‐violence.    
  3. 3.  “Ruling  people  in  the  conquered  regions  is,  I  might  say,  of  course  a  psychological  problem.  One  cannot  rule  by  force  alone….For,  in  the  long  run,  government  systems  are  not  held  together  by  the  pressure  of  force,  but  rather  by  the  belief  in  the  quality  and  the  truthfulness  with  which  they  represent  and  promote  the  interests  of  the  people.”      ~  ???  
  4. 4.  “Ruling  people  in  the  conquered  regions  is,  I  might  say,  of  course  a  psychological  problem.  One  cannot  rule  by  force  alone….For,  in  the  long  run,  government  systems  are  not  held  together  by  the  pressure  of  force,  but  rather  by  the  belief  in  the  quality  and  the  truthfulness  with  which  they  represent  and  promote  the  interests  of  the  people.”      ~  Adolph  Hitler,  1943  
  5. 5. ¡  Power  is  based  on  obedience  and  consent,  not  on  monopoly  of  force.  ¡  The  use  of  violence  demonstrates  weakness,  since  it  demonstrates  a  the  loss  of  voluntary  compliance.  ¡  Regimes  are  not  monolithic.  ¡  Power  is  never  permanent.  All  powerholders  must  constantly  replenish  their  power.    
  6. 6. Regime LeadershipPillars of SupportCivilians
  7. 7. Figure 2. The Effects of Campaign Participation on theProbability of Successp=.02
  8. 8. Figure 3. The Effects of Campaign Participation on theProbability of Security Force Defections, by Campaign Typep=.07
  9. 9. Source: Lee Smithey, 2011 (used with permission)
  10. 10. HighLowLowHighMobilizationRepression
  11. 11. ¡  Do  not  assess  the  strategic  position  and  asymmetries  between  campaign  and  opponent.  ¡  Assume  power  is  permanent  and  monolithic.    ¡  Do  not  differentiate  between  methods  of  struggle.  ¡  Do  not  incorporate  the  strategy  or  choices  available  to  campaign  participants.  
  12. 12. ¡  Summy  1994:  nonviolent  resistance  can  work  against  extremely  brutal  opponents  when  §  A  dependency  relationship  exists  ▪  The  opponent’s  survival  depends  squarely  on  the  obedience  of  the  people  ▪  Iran,  Norway  &  Denmark,  Chile,  Serbia  §  An  indirect  dependency  relationship  exists  or  is  produced  ▪  Intervention  of  a  third  party  that  has  linkages  to  movement  and  to  the  opponent  ▪  United  States  civil  rights  movement,  1943  Rosenstraβe  protests,  East  Timor,  Tibet,  Refusenick  movement  
  13. 13. ¡  Chenoweth  &  Stephan  2011    §  Repression  reduces  the  chances  of  success  for  nonviolent  and  violent  campaigns,  BUT  §  When  faced  with  violent  repression,  nonviolent  campaigns  have  a  46%  success  rate,  compared  with  only  20%  for  violent  campaigns.  ▪  Size  =>  tactical  innovation  &  resilience  (Schock  2005)  ▪  Repression  against  NV  campaigns  more  likely  to  backfire  
  14. 14. ¡  Repression  can  produce  “moral  shock”  and  paradoxically  backfire  by:  §  Empowering  a  movement    ▪  Can  generate  icons  and  martyrs.    ▪  Movement  participants  increase  the  intensity  of  their  attachments.    §  Enhancing  recruitment  among  sympathetic  publics  ▪  Third  parties  may  offer  support.    §  Weakening  a  regime    ▪  Turn  public  opinion  and  undermine  legitimacy.    ▪  Create  internal  dissent  and  divisions  among  elites,  functionaries,  and  security  forces.  ¡  Hess  &  Martin  2006:  movements  can  “manage”  repression  by:  §  Portraying  the  act  as  unjust,  unfair,  excessive  or  disproportional.  §  Communicating  information  about  the  action  to  relevant  audiences.  §  Possessing  a  plan  to  counter  censorship  and  regime  propaganda.  
  15. 15. Shift  Nonviolent  Methods  Methods  of  concentration  Methods  of  dispersion  Maintain  Status  Quo  Try  to  manage  effects  of  repression  Cross  your  fingers  and  hope  for  a  lucky  break!  Retreat  Respond  with  Violence  
  16. 16.  “[The  Nazis]  were  experts  in  violence,  and  had  been  trained  to  deal  with  opponents  who  used  that  method.  But  other  forms  of  resistance  baffled  them—and  all  the  more  in  proportion  as  the  methods  were  subtle  and  concealed.  It  was  a  relief  to  them  when  resistance  became  violent  and  when  nonviolent  forms  were  mixed  with  guerrilla  action,  thus  making  it  easier  to  combine  drastic  repressive  action  against  both  at  the  same  time.”  ~  Basel  H.  Liddell-­‐Hart  
  17. 17. ¡  Violence  is  typical  against  nonviolent  campaigns  that  threaten  the  status  quo.  ¡  Repression  can  hurt  campaigns  and  should  be  avoided  or  evaded  whenever  possible.    ¡  But  repression  does  not  necessarily  doom  a  campaign,  and  nonviolent  campaigns  are  still  more  effect  than  violent    or  mixed  campaigns  under  repressive  conditions.  ¡  There  are  strategic  choices  and  ways  to  prepare  for  &  “manage”  the  effects  of  repression.  
  18. 18.      “Courage is not absence of fear; itis control of fear, mastery of fear.”~ Mark Twain
  19. 19.        Blogs:  rationalinsurgent.wordpress.com  politicalviolenceataglance.org    Email:  Erica.Chenoweth@du.edu    On  Twitter:  @EricaChenoweth  
  20. 20. The Effects of Radical Flank on Campaign Participationp=.05 Source: Chenoweth & Shock 2013
  21. 21. ¡  May  apply  to  a  situation  in  which  there  are  two  or  more  groups  challenging  the  same  opponent  ¡  “Radicals”  are  conceptualized  as  those  with  more  extreme  methods  or  more  extreme  demands  relative  to  other  opposition  groups  §  My  usage  is  more  extreme  methods  =  violence  ¡  Radical  flank  effects  may  be  intra-­‐movement  or  inter-­‐movement    ¡  Radical  flank  effects  may  be  positive,  negative,  or  null  
  22. 22. ¡  A  radical  flank  may  increase  the  leverage  of  the  nonviolent  campaign  by:    §  Raising  the  profile  of  the  movement  &  its  demands  (Haines  1984)  §  Making  the  nonviolent  movement  seem  less  threatening  and  therefore  a  better  alternative  §   Creating  a  political  crisis  that  is  resolved  in  favor  of  the  nonviolent  movement  &  more  moderate  voices    §  Protecting  participants  and  civilians  (Jouejati  2012)  §  Empowering  participants  &  severing  links  to  existing  order  (Fanon  1964)    ¡  It  may  also  encourage  citizen  engagement  in  the  workplace,  society,  etc.  (Isaac,  et  al  2006)  
  23. 23. ¡  A  violent  campaign  may  decrease  the  leverage  of  the  nonviolent  campaign  by:    §  Discrediting  all  regime  opponents  (Pearlman  2011)  §  Providing  justification  for  widespread  repression  against  all  opponents  (Carey  2010;  Moore  &  Conrad  2012)  §   Reducing  widespread  popular  participation    §  Shifting  the  struggle  to  a  domain  in  which  the  regime  has  the  clear  advantage  (Pearlman  2011)  §  Decreasing  the  likelihood  of  backfire    
  24. 24. ¡  Bob  &  Nepstad:  movements  can  survive  the  assassination  of  their  leader  under  four  conditions  §  Leader  is  administrative  rather  than  prophetic  §  Movement  has  a  martyrdom  ideology  §  The  leader  shares  group’s  guiding  identity  §  The  movement  was  unified  prior  to  repression    ¡  Examples  §  El  Salvador  (Romero)  §  Nigerian  (Saro-­‐Wiwa)  

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