Simu jul dec 12-a

1,904 views

Published on

Published in: Business, Health & Medicine
0 Comments
1 Like
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total views
1,904
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
1
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
13
Comments
0
Likes
1
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Simu jul dec 12-a

  1. 1. A330 SIMULATOR LOFT # 1 JULY-DECEMBER 2012FLT WX PERFORMANCESA MAD-HAV DIVERT LIS/OPO MAD: 280/12 4500M OVCST 500 ZFM 168.0 FUEL 64.7 CGZFM 30% 12/8 1003 LIS: 250/10 5000M OVCST 700 19/17 1017 OPO: VRBL 3 2000M HZ SCT CB 2500 16/12 1015 OVERWEIGHTLANDING OVERWEIGHT LDG ILS APPR. OVERWEIGHT LDG. ICING CONDITIONS APPROACH DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE? DIVERSION TO ENROUTE ALTERNATE? AIR DUAL BLEED FAULT SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE DUE TO SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE DUE TO ELECRICAL SMOKE ENG BLEED 2 LEAK AT CRUISE ELECTRICAL SMOKE CONDUCTING TO ELEC CONDUCTING TO ELEC EMER CONFIG EMER CONFIG TCAS WITH TCASFAULT TCAS WITH TCAS VOICE VOICE NORMAL START FAULT AND T.O. VENT EXTRACT FAULT ON GROUND AFTER ENG. START. RESET AEVC PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCH PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCH MEL DISPATCH WITH ENGINE MEL CHECK CHECK BLEED AIR 1 U/S FLIGHT A FLIGHT B
  2. 2. MANUAL FLIGHT TRAINING JULY/DECEMBER 2012LEMD/LEMD FL ZFM 150 FUEL32.0 ZFM CG 30% A/P OFF SESSION VISUAL TRAFFIC PATTERN LDG. RWY WET CROSS RAW DATA WIND LANDINGS ILS APROACH N-1 GO AROUND ON FINAL XWIND LANDINGS, STALLRECOVERY STALL RECOVERY PRACTICE IMMEDIATE VMC LDG. XWIND LANDINGS,UP TO XWIND GRADUALLY GRADUALLY HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW PRACTICE INMEDIATE VMC LDG. FOLLOWING ENG. FAIL UP TO XWIND LIMIT HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW FOLOWING ENG FAIL ON T.O ON T.O. LIMIT ALTITUDES ALTITUDES XWIND VISUAL LANDINGS REPOSITION IN FLIGHT ENG FLAMEOUT ENG FLAMEOUT WITHWITH (REPOSITION IN DOWNWIND FORCE FCTL ALTN LAW DAMAGE AFTER V1 DAMAGE AFTER V1 AFTER LDG.) (IR 1+3 FAULT , PFD’s & ND’S CONFIGURE) A B C
  3. 3. A330 JAR-FCL 1240 CHECK JULY-DEC 2012 /CAE MOTOR RR-T772B/GE CF6-80E1FLT MAD-MAD WX LOAD SHEET & PERFORMANCESA&B T.O RVR 125M//LDG RVR 200/125/100 ZFM 150 ZFWCG 30% FUEL 30.0/ 60.0 (FLIGHTS C&D) T.O RWY 36L CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND TOGA 1--/--/--C&D SID 280/12 G25 RA 4000M OVC800 CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND F 1--/--/-- LDG RWY 33L/33R MS1/MS5 1022 RWY WET SMOKE CONTINUES SMOKE CONTINUES AFTER LANDING. PAX AFTER LANDING PAX. EVAC. EVAC A/P FAIL G/A VISUAL PATTERN CAT3A ILS APP MANUAL APPROACH TRAFFIC CONDITIONS AUTOLAND AND LANDING VOR DME APPROACH LOW GO AROUND RUNWAY CHANGE ACFT. TOUCHES RUNWAY CARGO SMOKE G/A CARGO SMOKE RTO CAT3 B3 B ILS CAT ILS APP APP AIRCRAFT UPSET SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS ENG FIRE IN FINAL APPROACH EXTING. FIRST AGENT (SEVERE WINDSHEAR) AUTO RELIGHT/ WING BLEED LEAK ENG RELIGHT INFLIGHT MEDIUM TO SEVERE LOW VIS. T.O, 125M RVR T.O LOV VIS SIDE STICK FAULT TURBULENCE ILS APPROACH SIDE ENG FAIL AT V2 STICK FAULT (PITCH FAULT) ENG. FIRE AT ROTATION (PITCH FAULT) AT AT ROTATION APU BLEED FAIL LOW VIS T.O. EXTING. FIRST AGENT -RESTORE- ROTATION FLIGHT A FLIGHT B FLIGHT C FLIGHT D
  4. 4. FLIGHT TO SLCB DIVERTED FROM FL 180 , CLEARED TO VAREB PORKI ZFM 158 FUEL7.0SLVR APPROACH RWY 32 ZFM CG 30%SLCB Wx CALM 9999 OVCST 1500 ILS 4 Rwy 32/ DESCENT LIMA10/04 1026 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 COCHABAMBA PROCEED BACK TO PORKI ENG FAIL AT G/A ENGINE FAIL AFTER G/A GO AROUND AT MDA (9400’) LANDING GO AROUND AT DA (9400’) ILS 4 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32
  5. 5. BRIEF INST
  6. 6. Siempre que tengamos que realizar un aterrizaje con un pesosuperior a nuestra MLM debemos realizar el procedimiento de“OVERWEIGHT LANDING”. (MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).Dicho procedimiento lo podremos encontrar en el QRH. ApartadoABN/EMER PROC sección MISCELLANEUS página 80.06
  7. 7. La aeronave está certificada para aterrizar en automáticohasta el peso máximo al aterrizaje. (MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).De todas formas se han realizado vuelos de pruebasatisfactorios con pesos de hasta 229t. Por lo que estáaprobada para realizar aterrizajes automáticos hasta dichopeso.
  8. 8. Configuración FULL es el calaje recomendado para optimizarlas performances al aterrizaje.Por lo tanto, siempre y cuando ECAM o algún abnormal nonos indique lo contrario seleccionaremos FULL.
  9. 9. Si vamos a aterrizar con el flap en FULL antes debemoscomprobar que nuestro peso esté por debajo del peso máximopara go around con conf. 3.Para ello analizamos la tabla que se encuentra al final de laabnormal procedure.
  10. 10. Esta tabla nos indica el peso máximo que es capaz de soportarun solo motor en caso de go around con conf. 3.En el caso de que nuestro peso sea superior deberemos realizarla aproximación con conf. 3.
  11. 11. En caso de go around con overweight y nuestro calaje sea distinto aFull entonces pasaremos los flaps a 1+F.Veamos unos ejemplosAterrizaje con flap full (ej. Emergencia médica) … flap 3 en pull upAterrizaje con flap 3 (ej. Fallo de motor) ……….. flap 1+F en pull upAterrizaje con flap 2 (ej. Rudder Jam) ……………. flap 1+F en pull up
  12. 12. Se recomienda apagar los packs o alimentarlos con el APU. Esto nos dará una potencia extra a la hora de tener que realizar un “go around”También se nos recomienda reducir la velocidad a VLS una veztengamos la toma asegurada, estemos sobre el umbral de pista yaterrizando en manual. En caso de aterrizaje automáticomantendremos VLS + 5.Intentaremos una toma lo más suave posible.
  13. 13. Una vez realizada la toma emplearemos la máxima reversa y sies posible no aplicaremos los frenos a tope para poder disfrutarde toda la pista y evitar altas temperaturas de los mismos.Recordamos que podemos esperar una deflación de losneumáticos a temperaturas a partir de 800 grados. FIN INST
  14. 14. Disponemos de información adicional para el overweight landing enel FCTM, apartado Abnormal Operations y en la secciónMiscellaneus. Página AO-090 4/5. VEAMOSLA CON UN POCO MÁS DE DETALLE.
  15. 15. Debemos tener en cuenta que la decisión de realizar JETTISON escuestión del comandante. Es importante analizar la situación deemergencia, longitud de pista, condición de la aeronave etc.Nuestra función será comprobar que se estudian y analizan lasdistintas situaciones y que se toma la decisión correcta.
  16. 16. Para pesos muy altos podemos tener problemas para ensuciar elavión, al poder estar la velocidad de green dot por encima de VFEpara CONF 1. En este caso seleccionaremos VFE NEXT – 5KT, peronunca por debajo de VLS, y una vez en esta velocidadseleccionamos CONF 1.Para poder sacar flap 2, es posible que tengamos un “flap relief”
  17. 17. Sabemos que, si ECAM no nos dice lo contrario, la configuracióndeseada será CONF FULL. Siempre que empleemos estaconfiguración debemos comprobar la tabla que nos aparece en elQRH. Si nuestro peso está por encima del “maximum weight for goaround” debemos emplear CONF 3 para el aterrizaje.
  18. 18. El approach climb gradient que nos ofrece el QRH comparado conel del FCOM puede variar dependiendo del QNH.
  19. 19. Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en el QRH.
  20. 20. Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en elFCOM.
  21. 21. Los pesos de “Maximum Brake Energy” y de “Maximum TireSpeed”nunca serán limitativos para un overweight.Si la toma es superior a 360 ft/min es obligatorio reportarlo y sedeberá realizar una inspeccion de mantenimiento.
  22. 22. Landing distances computation Presented by: Philippe TODINI Performance Programs Manager From normal to overweight landing
  23. 23. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 24
  24. 24. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 25
  25. 25. Regulatory landing distances • For Airbus FBW aircraft, the Flight AIRBUS Manual makes a reference to the A318/A319/A320/A321 AIRCRAFT PEP-FM module for calculation of all FLIGHT MANUAL low speed performance, including landing distances •The first type of landing distance is the actual (or unfactored) landing distance•The actual landing distances (ALD) are certified on : dry and contaminated runway states for EASA regulation dry runway state for FAA regulationApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 26
  26. 26. Regulatory landing distances• Furthermore, required landing distances (RLD) are provided by the PEP-FM module – The RLD is a factored landing distance, based on the ALD, used for dispatch of the aircraft – The factor depends on the runway state Dry ALD dry runway 67% RLD dry = ALD/ 0.6 Wet runway 15% RLD wet = 1.15 x RLD dry Conta ALD contaminated runway 15% RLD conta RLD conta = max of (ALD conta x 1.15 or RLD wet)April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 27
  27. 27. Operational landing distances• The PEP-FM module has the capability to calculate other landing distances, for operational purposes only : – Landing distance with Autobrake – Landing distance with Autoland• These distances are not subject to approval from the Airworthiness Authorities, but are useful for the pilots •They are published in the FCOM and the QRHApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 28
  28. 28. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 29
  29. 29. Normal landing distance computation • The calculation assumptions are based on JAR/FAR 25.125 subpart BDistance measured between a point 50ft above the runway threshold,the aircraft being at a calibrated airspeed not lower than VLS, and the point where the aircraft comes to a complete stop V VLS V=0 50ft ALD April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 30
  30. 30. Normal landing distance computation• Conditions of calculation (dry runway): – Standard temperature (ISA) – Correction factors on the wind (50% of headwind, 150% of tailwind) – Non excessive vertical speed (Vz < 480ft/min) – Level, smooth, hard-surfaced runway – Brakes application after main gear touchdown – Most adverse landing CG – No thrust reversers, but spoilers can be used when they are safe and reliableApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 31
  31. 31. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 32
  32. 32. Overweight landing distance computation• Reminder : An overweight landing is a landing at a weight higher than the maximum structural landing weight•A specific operating procedure is described in the FCOM•2 main elements differ from the standard landing procedureApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 33
  33. 33. Overweight landing distance computation • These 2 elements have an effect on the landing distance Normal V VLS Brakes application Vz = 480 ft/min 50ft ΔTbraking (1s)Overweigh Brakes V VLSt application Vz = 240 ft/min Nosewheel 50ft touchdown April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 34
  34. 34. Comparison normal/overweight landing Normal Overweight Vz 480 ft/min 240 ft/min Procedure Brakes After main gear After nose gear application touchdown touchdown Center of gravity Most forward Most forward at landing at takeoff Calculation assumptions Reversers None Available effectApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 35
  35. 35. Overweight landing - Results • 2 types of overweight landing distances can be calculated with PEP-FM Actual Landing Distance – Same regulatory assumptions as for normal landing – Approved on dry runway only (without thrust reversers effect) Operational Landing Distance – Not approved, but provides results on wet and contaminated runway states (with thrust reversers effect if needed) Both can be combined with in-flight failure coefficientsApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 36
  36. 36. Overweight landing - Results•Example of calculation (sea level), ALD function of weight A380-841/842 - landing distance 2500 2000 Actual Landing Distance [m] 1500 Δ ALD due to the overweight landing 1000 procedure 500 Normal procedure Overweight procedure 0 300000 350000 400000 450000 500000 550000 600000 Aircraft weight [kg]April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 37
  37. 37. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance software  PEP  OISApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 38
  38. 38. Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module – New option “Overweight landing” available in • Landing distance • Operational landing distanceApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 39
  39. 39. Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module – New option “Overweight landing” available in • Landing distance • Operational landing distance•PEP – TLO (Takeoff and Landing Optimization) module New option “Overweight landing”Changes the available in constraint on the landing distance : – Point optimization ALD < LDA – Chart optimization (instead of RLD < LDA)April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 40
  40. 40. Impact on performance software - OIS• OIS – Landing module – A landing weight above the MLW triggers the activation of the overweight modeApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 41
  41. 41. Conclusion• A new type of calculation is available in Airbus software : overweight landing distance•It takes into account a longer flare and a delayed braking action, which leads to longer landing distances•Certified on dry runway, operational results are available for the other runway states•Already available for A380 (in PEP and OIS), will be progressively extended to the other FBW aircraft (in PEP and LPC) April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 42
  42. 42. Proprietary document.By taking delivery of this Presentation (hereafter “Presentation”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following. No otherproperty rights are granted by the delivery of this Presentation than the right to read it, for the sole purpose of information. This Presentation, itscontent, illustrations and photos shall not be modified nor reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This Presentation and thematerials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed to any third party subject to payment or not. This Presentation maycontain market-sensitive or other information that is correct at the time of going to press. This information involves a number of factors which couldchange over time, affecting the true public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document orwith respect to the information described herein. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer or form part of any contract. They arebased on Airbus information and are expressed in good faith but no warranty or representation is given as to their accuracy. When additionalinformation is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to provide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no liability for any damage in connectionwith the use of this Presentation and the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. This licence isgoverned by French law and exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts and tribunals of Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of Airbus tobring proceedings for infringement of copyright or any other intellectual property right in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
  43. 43. El mayor problema que suelen tener las tripulaciones con el“overweight” es en el momento del pull up.Están acostumbrados a realizar el overweight con el fallo de motor,y rara vez con, por ejemplo, una incapacitación. Por lo que engeneral desconocen el sentido de la tabla “GO AROUND IN CONF3”.El briefing debería estar orientado hacia esto último y realizarejercicios en el simulador.También suelen olvidarse de seleccionar VLS con la tomaasegurada sobre el umbral de pista, así como quitar los packs oalimentarlos con el APU. FIN
  44. 44. BRIEF INST SIM
  45. 45. Recall on the Smoke Procedure “AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception Any other Smoke Alert without ECAM Alert ECAM warning SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE47
  46. 46. Smoke Procedure Lay out SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE LAND ASAP •APPLY IMMEDIATELY : - VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD Immediate actions - CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF - GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF - SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON - CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH - CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG • IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE: Diversion / Descent - FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE • IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED: -DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE -DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE •At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT : - SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER “AT ANY TIME” items - ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER •At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE: - IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER •IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED : APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF .. PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER SMOKE SOURCE IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED : EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF Research/Isolation SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED: AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :  …. AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :  …. Electrical Emergency TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG : EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL : .. Configuration ELEC EMER CONFIG APPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET. 54
  47. 47. Smoke Procedure Lay Out Electrical Shedding If unsuccessfull: consider59 elec emer config
  48. 48. “ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY CONFIGURATION SUMMARY”
  49. 49. Los “SUMMARIES” siempre los realiza el PNF.
  50. 50. Se inician cuando hemos terminado de realizar las ECAM ACTIONS y hemos leído completamente STATUS. OK. ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM SUMMARY PROCEDURE ACTIONS COMPLETED PF PNF
  51. 51. Lo primero que necesitamos saber, es la distancia requerida a latoma. Para así poder elegir el aeropuerto alternativo más idóneo. PF PNF
  52. 52. Por lo tanto el PNF se irá a la parte final del SUMMARY, y desde allí calculará la distancia que necesitamos. PF PNF
  53. 53. Bien, ya sabemos la distancia requerida y podemos decidir a que aeropuerto proceder. Lo siguiente que necesitamos es saber lavelocidad de aproximación. Para ello el PNF la comprobará en la tabla de la parte de CRUISE del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  54. 54. Ahora el PF ya tiene todos los datos que necesita para poderpreparar la aproximación. Por lo tanto, cede el control al PNF que en ese momento pasa a ser PF. Voy a preparar la aproximación. YOU HAVE I HAVE CONTROLS CONTROL AND AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS PF PNF
  55. 55. Es en este momento, cuando el PNF le lee la parte de “CRUISE” del SUMMARY al PF. Para recordarle los puntos importantes que se deben tener en cuenta en crucero. PNF PF
  56. 56. Una vez el PNF ha terminado de preparar la aproximación, nos dará el briefing. Será como siempre excepto, que nos leerá la parte de LANDING y GO AROUND del SUMMARY. PNF PF
  57. 57. Ya está todo claro por lo que el PNF toma los mandos, pasando a ser PF OK. I HAVE CONTROLS YOU YOU HAVE CONTROLS AND HAVE COMMUNICATIONS I HAVE COMMUNICATIONS PNF PF
  58. 58. Iniciamos el descenso como siempre. Al llegar a FL100 pedimos la“APPROACH CHECKLIST” normal. Cuando terminemos de realizar la APPROACH CHECKLIST, el PNF leerá y hará la parte de APPROACH del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  59. 59. Durante la aproximación el PNF le recordará al PF que es lo quetendremos a la hora de la toma y que nos ocurre en caso de go around leyendo la parte correspondiente del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  60. 60. FIN INST
  61. 61. A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008 Update on SMOKE procedure Review of enhancements on paper and ECAM procedures
  62. 62. Introduction (1/2) – Main Enhancements• On Single Aisle aircraft: Removal of electrical shedding – Because in specific conditions, electrical shedding may lead to an unrecoverable normal electrical configuration for landing On Long Range aircraft: Enhancement of ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAMprocedure With future ECAM, display of a specific procedure taking into account the smoke detection when the flight crew sets the Elec Emer Config following smoke detection in avionic bay: - no generators reset - restore generators before landing - set generators to off when aircraft is stopped78
  63. 63. Introduction (1/2)• Training is not significantly affected since: – The Smoke paper Procedure template and philosophy remain unchanged – Smoke Paper Procedure is not a memory item79
  64. 64. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion80
  65. 65. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion81
  66. 66. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) “AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception other Smoke Any Alert without ECAM Alert ECAM warning SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE82
  67. 67. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE LAND ASAP •APPLY IMMEDIATELY : - VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD Immediate actions - CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF - GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF - SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON - CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH - CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG • IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE: Diversion / Descent - FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE • IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED: -DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE -DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE •At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT : - SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER “AT ANY TIME” items - ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER •At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE: - IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER •IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED : APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF .. PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER SMOKE SOURCE IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED : EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF Research/Isolation SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED: AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :  …. AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :  …. Electrical Emergency TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG : EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL : .. Configuration ELEC EMER CONFIG APPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET. 83
  68. 68. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) – SA example Electrical Shedding If unsuccessfull: consider84 elec emer config
  69. 69. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion85
  70. 70. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical If: Shedding on SA Electrical shedding procedure applied on both sides, and, At least one battery in charge during the shedding The electrical shedding leads to the permanent loss of DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars  DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars cannot be recovered for landing86
  71. 71. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA• TR is MONitored thanks BAT 1 BAT 2to opposite DC bus bar TR2 MON TR1 MON TR 1 TR 2 If TR is inop and GEN 1 GEN 2 opposite DC bus bar is powered TR definitively lost IDG 1 IDG 2 87
  72. 72. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN TR 1 TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 IDG 1 IDG 2 88
  73. 73. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN • GEN 1 to OFF AC 1 bus bar inop TR 1 definitively lost TRESS DC 1 supplied by DC 2 TR 1 TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 OFF IDG 1 IDG 2 89
  74. 74. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN • GEN 1 to OFF AC 1 bus bar inop TR 1 definitively lost TRESS DC 1 supplied by DC 2 TR 1 TR 2 If smoke continues: • GEN 1 back to ON GEN 1 GEN 2 • AC ESS FEED to NORM IDG 1 IDG 2 90
  75. 75. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 If BAT in charge before setting GEN 2 to OFF: • GEN 2 to OFF AC 2 bus bar inop TR 2 is inop DC1/2/BAT bus bars remain TR 1 TRESS TR 2 supplied by batteries during a confirmation time GEN 1 GEN 2 TR 2 monitoring is OFF available for a while (DC1 IDG 1 IDG 2 avail) leading to the lost of TR 2 91
  76. 76. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus bars are no longer supplied by batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost TR 1 TRESS TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 OFF IDG 1 IDG 2 92
  77. 77. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus bars are no longer supplied by batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost TR 1 TRESS TR 2 If smoke continues: - GEN 2 back to ON GEN 1 GEN 2 - Consider elec emer config  DC 1/2/BAT bus bars IDG 1 IDG 2 not recoverable for landing 93
  78. 78. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Analysis performed with Airbus Flight Test pilots, Training pilots, and Design Office Keeping or Removing the electrical shedding?  Balance between advantages and drawbacks…94
  79. 79. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Keeping the - In some cases, - Normal electricalelectrical shedding possibility to isolate configuration may be the smoke source unrecoverable for without setting elec landing emer config95
  80. 80. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Keeping the - In some cases, - Normal electricalelectrical shedding possibility to isolate configuration may be the smoke source unrecoverable for without setting elec landing emer config Removing the - Normal electrical - No possibility toelectrical shedding configuration always isolate the smoke recoverable for landing source while keeping a -Straight forward less degraded procedure configuration than elec emer config96
  81. 81. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA It is preferable to keep the normal electrical configurationrecoverable for landing: FCOM/QRH updated since June 08.97
  82. 82. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA because: Electrical shedding is kept on Long Range aircraft • Normal electrical configuration always recoverable for landing (TR cannot be lost when applying the electrical shedding procedure). • More degraded configuration in Elec Emer Config than on A320 Family. •Mission profile is different (A340 vs A320)98
  83. 83. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion99
  84. 84. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements• On Single Aisle aircraft, with current FWC Std: – The ECAM displays 2 different ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure depending on if smoke is detected or not in the avionic bay: Smoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected: - No « avionic smoke » ECAM caution - The AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM caution is displayed displayed -The ECAM requests to reset generators -The ECAM does not request to reset (ELEC EMER CONFIG warning for main generators. It is relevant. generators loss case) – Disregard it - The ECAM requests to restore generators before L/G extension 100
  85. 85. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with current FWC Std:  When in Elec Emer Config following smoke in avionic bay (detected or not detected), the ECAM displays the same ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure as in case of generators loss Smoke NOT Detected and Smoke Detected: -The ECAM requests to reset generators – Disregard it 101
  86. 86. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:  Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraftSmoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected:-The ECAM requests to reset generators – -The ECAM does not request to resetDisregard it generators. It is relevant - The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement) 102
  87. 87. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators 103
  88. 88. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement)To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG(instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION) 104
  89. 89. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement)To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG(instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION)- WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN toOFF 105
  90. 90. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:  Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraftSmoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected:-The ECAM requests to reset generators -The ECAM does not request to reset generators - The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement) To minimize smoke reactivation: - Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG (instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION) - WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN to OFF 106
  91. 91. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements• Enhancements introduced on Long Range aircraft with FWC Standards T2/L11 are reported on Single Aisle aircraft with FWC Standard F5: Restore generators « 3 MIN OR 2000 FT AAL BEFORE LANDING » instead of « BEFORE L/G EXTENSION » Set all generators to OFF, WHEN A/C IS STOPPED 107
  92. 92. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion108
  93. 93. FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionicbay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:Smoke not detected:- Do not reset gen- Restore gen beforelanding (wordingfunction of FWC Std) 109
  94. 94. FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionicbay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:Smoke not detected:- Do not reset gen- Restore gen beforelanding (wordingfunction of FWC Std)Smoke detected:- Apply ECAM 110
  95. 95. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion111
  96. 96. Conclusion Electrical Shedding Single Removed: Aisle - To recover normal elec config for landing, -Straight forward procedure Long Kept because: Range - Normal elec config recoverable - More degraded config in Elec Emer Config, than on SA112 -LR mission profile
  97. 97. Conclusion Electrical ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM Shedding Procedure, when smoke detected Removed: Enhancement (FWC F5):Single ECAM significantly enhanced, particularly on Long -Aisle - To recover normal - Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT Range aircraft for landing, elec config BEFORE LDG instead of BEFORE L/G - Straight forward EXTENSION procedure - Set all generators to OFF when - No significant impact on training (no memory item) aircraft is stoppedLong- Smoke Paper ProcedureNew specificand philosophy Kept because: template ELEC EMER CONFIG - Normal ECAM Procedure (FWC T2/L11): unchanged elec configRange recoverable - No generators reset - More degraded - Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT config in Elec Emer before landing Config, than on SA - Set all generators to OFF when -LR mission profile aircraft is stopped 113
  98. 98. Antes de activar el “Smoke Generator” del simulador debemos avisar al personal demantenimiento para que inutilicen las alarmas y sistemas de emergencia.En la pantalla principal (MASTER INDEX) seleccionamos “SERVICES”
  99. 99. Una vez aquí seleccionamos “SMOKE GENERATOR”. Comenzará a parpadear, en cuantotermine estará listo para ser utilizado. Tarda unos cinco minutos en estar listo.
  100. 100. Una vez que tengamos listo el “smoke Generator” seleccionamos “MALFUNCTIONS”
  101. 101. Dentro de “MALFUNCTIONS” nos vamos al apartado “ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION / SMOKE”
  102. 102. Aquí escogeremos la emergencia “Avionic Smoke”, y que termine en un “electricalemergency configuration” FIN
  103. 103. BRIEF INST SIM
  104. 104. TRAFFIC!!! TRAFFIC!!!TCAS I HAVE CONTROLS
  105. 105. CLIMB!!! CLIMB NOW!!!AUTOPILOT OFF, FLIGHT MADRID AEA123 TCAS DIRECTORS OFF RESOLUTION
  106. 106. CLEAR OF CONFLICTFLIGHT DIRECTORS ON, MADRID AEA123 FLXXX AUTOPILOT ON RESUME FIN
  107. 107. OLM FBW 2006 Presented by Yves LEMELLE Director of A320/A330/A340 Operational Standards TCAS Recommendations
  108. 108. BackgroundEach year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are avoided by a whisker.Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularly in case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect. TCAS Recommendations 127 OLM FBW 2006
  109. 109. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 128 OLM FBW 2006
  110. 110. Background Resolution Advisory AP1• TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA): – Preventive Advisory ( “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED – MONITOR”) • Red sector appears on V/S scale, the V/S needle is in the grey area. • The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display. • No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain the current vertical speed). TCAS Recommendations 129 OLM FBW 2006
  111. 111. Background Resolution Advisory TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA):  Corrective Advisory: – The vertical speed needle is in the red area. – The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display  Follow aural warnings.  Follow vertical speed green sector on the PFD. TCAS Recommendations 130 OLM FBW 2006
  112. 112. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory (e.g. “DESCENT, DESCENT”): – TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model: – Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with 0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached – V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict. Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within 5 seconds TCAS Recommendations 131 OLM FBW 2006
  113. 113. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory TAU TAU Vertical miss distance « DESCENT, DESCENT » CPA (Closest Point of Approach) Generally: – Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft – Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft TCAS Recommendations 132 OLM FBW 2006
  114. 114. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory TAU TAU Relative altitude « DESCENT, DESCENT » CPA (Closest Point of Approach) Do not overreact Do not disregard a weakening RA It could create another conflict with another aircraft TCAS Recommendations 133 OLM FBW 2006
  115. 115. Background Resolution Advisory Additional Corrective Advisory (E.g.: “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT”)  TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:  Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with 0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached  V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict. Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds TCAS Recommendations 134 OLM FBW 2006
  116. 116. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 135 OLM FBW 2006
  117. 117. Review instruction opposite to RA …Event N° 1 : ATC avoiding of TCAS Events « CLIMB, CLIMB » RA FL 70 AIRCRAFT 1 « DESCEND, DESCEND » RA AIRCRAFT 2 « INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT » RA FL 50 AIRCRAFT 3 AIRCRAFT 2Simultaneous descend FL 60. vertical and horizontal crossing at less than 1 NM TCAS Recommendations 136 OLM FBW 2006
  118. 118. Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 3.04.34TCAS Recommendations 137 OLM FBW 2006
  119. 119. Review of of “Adjust Vertical Speed” RAEvent N°2 : Misinterpretation TCAS Events … « CLIMB, CLIMB » RA FL 270 AIRCRAFT 2 AIRCRAFT 1« ADJUST VERTICALSPEED, FL 260ADJUST » RA Minimum crossing margin: 300 feet, 0.8 NM TCAS Recommendations 138 OLM FBW 2006
  120. 120. Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 1.34.80TCAS Recommendations 139 OLM FBW 2006
  121. 121. Review of TCAS Events …Event N°3 : Inefficient visual avoiding maneuver FL 370 « CLIMB, « DESCEND, CLIMB » RA DESCEND » RA AIRCRAFT 2 Order incorrectly interpreted by AIRCRAFT 1 AIRCRAFT 1 AIRCRAFT 2 Descend to FL 350. AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral separation !!! TCAS Recommendations 140 OLM FBW 2006
  122. 122. Review of TCAS Events …• Do not base the maneuver on visual acquisition of the intruder: FCOM 3.04.34 : TCAS Recommendations 141 OLM FBW 2006
  123. 123. Review of TCAS Events …Additional informationATC versus TCAS information:• ATC Radar: – An update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10). – Altitude data in 100-foot increments. – Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed. TCAS:  Interrogates all surrounded transponders every second.  Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot increments. TCAS Information is: - Updated 4 to 10 times faster TCAS Recommendations - 4 times more accurate 142 OLM FBW 2006
  124. 124. Review … TCAS Events …Additional information ofVisual acquisition limitations:• At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess: – The range – The heading – The relative height At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :  Whether the aircraft is climbing or descending. The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes the RA to trigger. TCAS Recommendations 143 OLM FBW 2006
  125. 125. Review of TCAS Events …Lessons learnt - Always follow TCAS RA orders: - In the correct direction - Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction - Even at max ceiling altitude - Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector. - Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders. TCAS Recommendations 144 OLM FBW 2006
  126. 126. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 145 OLM FBW 2006
  127. 127. New change in TCAS procedureCurrent QRH AP/ FD ……… OFF Only for corrective RA TCAS Recommendations 146 OLM FBW 2006
  128. 128. New change in TCAS procedureFuture QRH (July 2006) AP/ FD …..OFF for any RA TCAS Recommendations 147 OLM FBW 2006
  129. 129. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent :Should we select TA not to reduce the rate of descent? Airbus recommend RA mode.• Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.• Temporarily reducing the rate of descent is not a concern.• A “CLIMB, CLIMB” RA order is not always requested: – An “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST” RA TCAS Recommendations 148 OLM FBW 2006 can be triggered (decrease the V/S).
  130. 130. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent … ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST DESCEND, DESCEND TCAS Recommendations 149 OLM FBW 2006
  131. 131. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent … TCAS Recommendations 150 OLM FBW 2006
  132. 132. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure• In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA mode to comply with AC 20-131:  After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded.  When TA is selected:  Affected aircraft is not requested to perform an RA maneuver. TCAS Recommendations 151 OLM FBW 2006
  133. 133. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure …• The ECAM’s ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests the crew to select TA TCAS mode. TCAS Recommendations 152 OLM FBW 2006
  134. 134. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure … Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode, in case of an engine failure. – To avoid entering in angle of attack protection at low altitude. In addition, subsequent loss of altitude could lead to reversal RA orders. – To have a common procedure for all aircraft – If the intruder is TCAS-equipped: • The intruder TCAS will detect that you are in TA mode. • The intruder TCAS will perform an RA maneuver. TCAS Recommendations 153 OLM FBW 2006
  135. 135. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude• AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the aircraft must be able to perform.• In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even when it is at its maximum altitude. TCAS Recommendations 154 OLM FBW 2006
  136. 136. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude … Speed (knots) Time (s) Time (s) V/S (feet/minute) TCAS Recommendations Time (s) 155 OLM FBW 2006
  137. 137. Recurrent TCAS Altitude …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Questions …• These graphs show that the aircraft can follow: –A “CLIMB, CLIMB” TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute) –An “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” TCAS RA order (2500 feet/minute).• Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS: –A330 aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243 knots) The maximum weight is 177 tons. –The Final Speed is 228 knots RA climb orders can be followed. (Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet) Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode, TCAS Recommendations 156 OLM FBW 2006 when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.
  138. 138. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 157 OLM FBW 2006
  139. 139. Future TCAS DevelopmentsBackground• Overreaction: –Most vertical deviations for each aircraft (following a TCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet. – Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict with other aircraft in a busy airspace. – Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable load factors are reached.• Cases of reaction in the wrong sense. TCAS Recommendations 158 OLM FBW 2006
  140. 140. Future TCAS Developments …Developments status – Keep the current Vertical Speed indicator • Allow to check the result of pilot action on V/S raw data • Constitute a back up indication – Display must be reactive enough to avoid any over-reaction • Fast interpretation is necessary – RA order with AP engaged • Procedure should be intuitive TCAS Recommendations 159 OLM FBW 2006
  141. 141. Future TCAS Developments …Developments status… Concept: new AFS “TCAS RA” longitudinal mode that would allow an automatic reaction. Symbology: no specific symbology (except new mode on FMA), the FD follows the TCAS order and the pilot cross-checks the VSI raw data. SPEED TCAS NAV AP FD ATHR Law: new AFS “TCAS” law, based on V/S law with increased authority Computation of Outer loop ControlTCAS the V/S target TCAS law Inner surfaces V/S target NZ loop deflectionComputer orders TCAS Recommendations 160 OLM FBW 2006
  142. 142. Future TCAS Developments …• AP/FD behaviour in case of TCAS RA alert: – If AP/FD not engaged: • Automatic engagement of FD in TCAS mode – If AP Off but FD already engaged: • Automatic reversion of FD to TCAS mode – If AP already engaged: • Automatic reversion of AP to TCAS modeTCAS Recommendations 161 OLM FBW 2006
  143. 143. Future TCAS Developments …:SPEED ALTexample of Corrective RA CRZ NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Climb, Climb”SPEED TCAS NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust”SPEED TCAS NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Clear Of Conflict”SPEED V/S-1000 NAV AP1 ALT 1FD2 ATHR TCAS Recommendations 162 OLM FBW 2006
  144. 144. Future TCAS Developments …• Expected definition for flight test by second half of 2008TCAS Recommendations 163 OLM FBW 2006
  145. 145. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 164 OLM FBW 2006
  146. 146. Conclusion - Always follow TCAS RA orders: - In the correct direction - Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction - Even at max ceiling altitude - Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector. - Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders.  Some improvements are being developed to further assist pilots in effectively responding to TCAS warnings.TCAS Recommendations 165 OLM FBW 2006
  147. 147. Conclusion Upcoming FOBN « Response to TCAS Alerts »TCAS Recommendations 166 OLM FBW 2006
  148. 148. Eurocontrol ACAS II BulletinEUROCONTROL is publishing a series of ACAS II Bulletins, each with adifferent safety related theme. http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa TCAS Recommendations 167 OLM FBW 2006
  149. 149. FIN
  150. 150. Solo para el SIM ISeleccionamos la opción TCAS / desde el MASTER INDEX
  151. 151. Este fallo consiste en que el TCAS carece de aviso acústicoNo tendremos ningún aviso ECAM.Debemos emplearlo cuando los dos alumnos esténdespistados por ejemplo cargando la aproximación.Recordamos “allways one head up at all time”.
  152. 152. Es la página 2 delos fallos denavegación FIN
  153. 153. BRIEF INST SIM
  154. 154. MEL ITEMS
  155. 155. MEL OPERATIONALPROCEDURES
  156. 156. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed failuresHowever, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss  To improve airline operationsBy means of  Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering  Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible)  Use of the APU Bleed (when possible) This QRH Procedure  Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures  Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM 186
  157. 157. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 187
  158. 158. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 188
  159. 159. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT ? - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 189
  160. 160. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 190
  161. 161. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN191
  162. 162. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Attempt recovery of Both packs available the lastly lost bleed system One pack inoperative, or Bleed Recovery unsuccessful192
  163. 163. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 193
  164. 164. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 194
  165. 165. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 195
  166. 166. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 196
  167. 167. DUAL BLEED FAULTOPEN X BLEED procedure In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Failures of the lastly lost Bleed Recovery unsuccessful or bleed system One pack inoperative other than due to excessive demand197
  168. 168. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT Recovery unsuccessful, PACK 1 PACK 2 Or One pack inoperative Use HP IP APU IP HP APU BLEED APU BLEEDOENG 1 BLEED N ENG 2 BLEED DESCEND to FL for APU BLEED use 198
  169. 169. Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• Typical scenario of reported Dual Bleed Loss events – Loss of first BLEED system (overheat or overpressure) – X-BLEED valve open (as per ECAM procedure) – 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration – Loss of second BLEED system (due to excessive demand)199
  170. 170. Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• As failure is not due to  LEAK on side 1 (2)  ENG 1 (2) FIRE  Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open INITIATE DESCENT And both PACKs are available Attempt recovery of the lastly lost BLEED System – If successful Continue flight to destination – If unsuccessful Continue descent to appropriate FL for APU BLEED use200
  171. 171. Conclusion To prevent DUAL BLEED loss events Technical precautionary measures are available Preventive Maintenance actions Component modifications If a DUAL BLEED Loss occurs Applying the DUAL BLEED FAULT QRH procedure may avoid201 In-Flight Turn Back FIN
  172. 172. DUAL BLEED LOSS ON SINGLE AISLE- Meeting 2008 A330/A340 BLEED AIR SYSTEM- Bangkok 2012 A330 DUAL BLEED LOSS- Rome 2011
  173. 173. A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008 DUAL BLEED LOSS on Single Aisle Using the QRH procedure
  174. 174. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion204
  175. 175. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion205
  176. 176. In-Service events description Nearly all reported events  Single Aisle family  bleed overheat after one engine bleed system failure Typical event description  First Engine Bleed system failure  ECAM procedure application – X-BLEED open – 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration Loss of the remaining bleed system due to overheat Most common operational consequence  In-Flight Turn Back  Emergency descent206
  177. 177. Normal Bleed System Operation Normal Operation PRECOOLER Fan Air Valve (FAV) provides TCT cold fan air to the PRECOOLER FAV BLEED upon signal from the VALVE Temperature Control Thermostat (TCT) IP HP207
  178. 178. Bleed System Failure – Identified cause• Hidden failure in the FAV actuation system •TCT drift PRECOOLER •Sense line leakage •FAV cover leakage TCT FAV 1 BLEED / 2 PACKs operation BLEED VALVE Increase of bleed air temperature IP HP FAV actuation system fails to compensate 208
  179. 179. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion209
  180. 180. Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan Preventive Maintenance actions  Temperature Control Thermostat filter cleaning at 6,000 FH mandatory  TCT: Filter cleaning Mandatory MPD task ……………………………………………Available Feb. 2007  New procedures to identify Fan Air Valve malfunction  AMM: Improved FAV leak check procedure (new tooling) ………………Available Feb. 2007 Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) customized Report  Approach developed by Airbus with the cooperation of A320 operators  Define parameters, thresholds and logic for alerts triggering  Monitoring of the BLEED system  Preventive troubleshooting can be launched before BLEED failure 210
  181. 181. Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan Component modification to ensure appropriate FAV operation  Temperature Control Thermostat (Standard 342B05)  Optimization of temperature function reactivity ………………………SB 36-1061 (VSB 342-36-08) Available May 2008  Fan Air Valve  Improvement to avoid early leakage ………………….…………VSB 6730F-36-01 & VSB 6730-36-03 Available Aug. 2007  Temperature Limitation Thermostat  Temperature limitation function shifting at 270°C …………………………………………VSB 341-36-06 Available Nov. 2007 Additional details are available in TFU 36.11.00.059, OIT 999.0061/08, RIL 916.0468/08 211
  182. 182. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion212
  183. 183. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed failuresHowever, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss  To improve airline operationsBy means of  Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering  Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible)  Use of the APU Bleed (when possible) This QRH Procedure  Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures  Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM 213
  184. 184. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 214
  185. 185. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 215
  186. 186. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT ? - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 216
  187. 187. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 217
  188. 188. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a : X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2) CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 218
  189. 189. DUAL BLEED FAULTOPEN X BLEED procedure In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Attempt recovery of Both packs available the lastly lost bleed system One pack inoperative, or Bleed Recovery unsuccessful219
  190. 190. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 220

×