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Tianjin Explosions – 12 August 2015
Analysis, Thoughts and What it means for you
Nigel Cann
Associate Principal | Risk & S...
Tianjin Explosions – 12 August 2015
Pictures from the D van Duren video within The Australian newspaper
https://www.youtub...
3
• The events of the night
• Use the crater size to estimate the explosion
• Look at the impacts to fine tune estimate
• ...
4
Before
5
After
6
6
Before…
…After
7
• Ruihai Logistics stores and distributes hazardous chemical in the
Port of Tianjin
• Chemicals include:
- Calcium carbi...
8
• A fire followed by explosions occurred on 12 August 2015.
• The fire started to get “out-of-control” around 22:50 hour...
9
• The US Geological Survey located in Beijing reported the first
large explosion to be 2.3 moment magnitude. This initia...
10
• The report explosion of 21T NEQ appeared to be a low estimate
based on the reported damage.
• Observation of photos o...
11
• AN is a strong oxidant, and is commonly
processed and then used as an explosive in
mining, or as a component in ferti...
12
• Pure, compact AN is stable and very
difficult to ignite.
• AN readily dissolves in water. Hence, water
is an effectiv...
13
The Crater
14
15
Crater – 85m diameter estimated
85m
16
• D = 0.51 * Q1/3
(where D = radius of crater, Q = NEQ)
• Q = (D / 0.51)3
Q = (85/2 / 0.51)3
Q = 580T NEQ
• Calculation...
17
• Man-made, dredged materials
• Mostly wet, silty clay -> this is more likely to have similar
properties to wet clay th...
18
• Data from the US army for the calculation of blast effects, based
on experimental data
• Using crater size of 85m and...
19
• Data from the US army for the calculation of blast effects, based
on experimental data
• On wet clay with asphalt:
Ex...
20
Summary
Calculation Method
Equivalent
TNT (T)
Crater
Diameter (m)
Comments
Reported value from Richter
scale magnitude
...
21
• This means that if we assume a crater diameter of 85m, and the
ground materials are asphalt over wet clay, the explos...
22
Reported Impacts
Ref: The Guardian
23
• The following references were used to determine effect distances
and interpretation of impacts:
- OPSMAN 3 – Departme...
24
Impact distances for 180T NEQ
Note: 180T NEQ of AN equates to between 360T and 720T of
actual AN depending on explosive...
25
Review of published images confirms the analysis
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3199058/China-orders-evacuatio...
26
An explosion of 180T NEQ
on asphalt on wet clay
produces 85m diameter crater
85m
27
Around the crater
Before…
70-170kPa -
Unstrengthened
buildings suffer
complete
destruction
30-39kPa -
House damaged
bey...
28
70-170kPa -
Unstrengthened
buildings suffer
complete
destruction
30-39kPa -
House damaged
beyond repair
Around the crat...
29
Demolished building
– 165m away
No building
here at all! –
65m away
Building –
150m away
30
http://www.smh.com.au/world/tianjin-blast-shock-turns-to-anger-and-distrust-
after-massive-explosions-20150821-gj4eoz.h...
Train Station – 460m away
Donghai Road
Station – 460m
away (21kPa)
460m
21-26kPa -
Reinforced
structures
distort
32
Donghai Road train damage – 460m away (21kPa)
(inside station) blast side
http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-pho...
33
460m away (21kPa) – blast located on the right of
image
http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/subway-train-is...
34
Buses behind
rail station –
550m away
550m
35
Buses behind railway station 550m away –
consistent with 16kPa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Tianjin_explosions#/m...
36
Lattice tower
– 450m away
450m
37
450m from centre
of explosion
(“50m away” from
site boundary) –
major container
distortion on truck
under the bridge
45...
38
Steel frame
builders’ sheds –
500m to 650m
away destroyed
beyond repair
500m
650m
21-26kPa -
Reinforced
structures
dist...
Before
After – 500-650m away, 16-21kPa
Steel frame
builders’ sheds –
500m to 650m
away destroyed
beyond repair
21-26kPa -
Reinfor...
41
Approx. 500m – Structural collapse of
unstrengthened buildings – uninhabitable (21 kPa)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-a...
42
Apartment block
– 1.2km away
1.2km
43
Apartment block 1.2km away – consistent with
3-5kPa, almost every window broken
5.4kPa -
Unstrengthen
ed buildings
suff...
44 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33998655
Most windows
damaged – 1km away
1km
45
1km standoff approx. – most windows damaged,
consistent with 7kPa
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33998655, Da...
46
Tianjin Stadium –
1.7km away
1.7km
3.5-3.8kPa - 90%
broken windows
1.7-1.8kPa -
Unstrengthened
buildings suffer only
su...
47
Tianjin Stadium – approx. 1.7km away, broken
glass consistent with 2 - 3.5kPa range
3.5-3.8kPa - 90%
broken windows
1.7...
48
• Arup’s UK team also investigated the explosion and performed
analysis on the facades damage to determine the explosiv...
49
Buildings Analysed
Harbour city
residence, 33 storey
building:
600-700m away
Wantong New Town
International residence:
...
50
Harbour City – 600-700m away
• On some buildings, glazing in the
entire façade has broken in a high-
hazard manner.
• O...
51
Wantong New Town – 2km away
• Glazing appeared to be on the break / no break threshold – some
larger panes broken, smal...
52
Explosive Mass Estimates
• Assumptions:
- Glass is assumed to be 4mm annealed
- Blast load is assumed to be a hemispher...
53
Summary of Calculated NEQ
Calculation Method
Equivalent
TNT (T)
Crater
Diameter (m)
Comments
Crater diameter / NEQ equa...
54
• BHP Billiton lost 3 days unloading iron ore shipments even though bulk terminals some way from
the
• John Deere lost ...
55
• The large explosion occurred approximately 30-40 minutes after the fire,
which is consistent with similar explosions ...
56
What are you going to do this afternoon?
57
• How well do we understand the impacts of the Dangerous Goods
we store?
• Are they stored appropriately?
• Do we store...
58
• Do we know the full consequences of incidents from the
hazardous goods on our sites?
• Do we know the impact our neig...
59
Use of Toughened and/or Laminated Glass instead
of Annealed Glass
Toughened glass
Annealed glass
60
• Breaks into large,
jagged shards
• More likely to cause
injury (and fatality)
Annealed Glass
61
• Annealed glass that has been treated to increase its strength
• Breaks into small, granular pieces
• Less likely to c...
62
• Glass can break but laminate stops it flying out and potentially
causing injury
• Laminate will move in blast and abs...
63
• Arup is an employee trust that runs a project
management, built environment and infrastructure
engineering design bus...
64
Questions?
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20150908 Tianjin Explosion Analysis_1st DRAFT_show - Copy

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  • The chinese report is very poor on facts linked to the TNT estimation.One can assume that the ground effects are in the range of 150T of TNT.Obviously this detonation had more surface energy than the standard hemispherical charge on ground.Therefore based on blast effects and limited ground effect the best guess is probably around 300T of TNT.
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  • The official Chinese report of February 2016 states a blast equivalent of 450T TNT, which is within your range of uncertainty. Would you say the 450T figure may be more accurate or how would you reconcile this range of estimates?
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  • Hello, The crater seems to be 80mx80mx6m, Volume 15000m3, asphalt over sediment. Estimation 15 T equivalent TNT for the first detonation (40T AN) and 100T TNT (250T AN) is coherent with the magnitude, crater and your good blast investigation. But where was the first detonation without visible crater? It seems unlikely it happened at the same place, the containers would have been thrown apart.
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  • Thanks for your feedback and link to the Florakis 2011 incident James1er. I agree that the crater volume would have been a good way to confirm the calculations. You and I are at least in the same ballpark. The key issue is that if the explosive material at Tianjin was AN then we have almost all of the reported AN involved in the explosion. As far as I am aware this is unprecedented.
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  • For such a surface detonation the magnitude is related to the charge in TNT by following formula:Mag=0,73xlog(WKg)+log(f),f is the ground coupling factor 0,14 for above surface.That means that the equivalent TNT is in the range of 150T.An other indicator is the crater crater volume.The crater is probably not too deep for a charge gravity center approx 2m.One can estimate the crater volume between 15000 and 20000m3 which is reasonable when using the approximate formula Mag = 0,75xlog(Vcrater in m3).This detonation is in the range of Florakis 2011.
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20150908 Tianjin Explosion Analysis_1st DRAFT_show - Copy

  1. 1. Tianjin Explosions – 12 August 2015 Analysis, Thoughts and What it means for you Nigel Cann Associate Principal | Risk & Security FIChemE RPEQ CEng CEnv GAICD Professional Process Safety Engineer
  2. 2. Tianjin Explosions – 12 August 2015 Pictures from the D van Duren video within The Australian newspaper https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cO1q3HwB0y0
  3. 3. 3 • The events of the night • Use the crater size to estimate the explosion • Look at the impacts to fine tune estimate • Discuss the lessons learned • What are you going to do this afternoon? Agenda
  4. 4. 4 Before
  5. 5. 5 After
  6. 6. 6 6 Before… …After
  7. 7. 7 • Ruihai Logistics stores and distributes hazardous chemical in the Port of Tianjin • Chemicals include: - Calcium carbide (reacts with water to form acetylene – explosive vapour cloud) - Ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate (explosives) - Sodium cyanide (reacts with water to produce toxic gas) Facility Details – Tianjin Dongjiang Port Ruihai International Logistics
  8. 8. 8 • A fire followed by explosions occurred on 12 August 2015. • The fire started to get “out-of-control” around 22:50 hours local time. • The two major explosions occurred within 30 seconds of each other. • Multiple additional explosions occurred over the next few days. • The largest explosion (the second one) occurred at 23:30 local time. Explosions Details
  9. 9. 9 • The US Geological Survey located in Beijing reported the first large explosion to be 2.3 moment magnitude. This initially was estimated as a blast equivalent to 3T TNT (or NEQ). • The second large explosion had a Richter magnitude of 2.9, which was reported as equivalent to 21T TNT. • However, the Richter scale does not accurately portray the mass involved in the explosion, as it only measures the ground vibrations. Much of an on or above ground blast’s energy also travels through the air. • The mass involved in the largest explosion was therefore thought to be greater than 21T NEQ. Explosive Mass
  10. 10. 10 • The report explosion of 21T NEQ appeared to be a low estimate based on the reported damage. • Observation of photos of the crater in particular suggested that the 21T NEQ was a “low” estimate. • Observation of photos during clean-up suggested the smaller explosions occurred in the warehouse obliterating it, and a large Ammonium Nitrate explosion occurred in the container storage area producing the large crater. • The explosion occurred approximately 30-40 minutes after the fire, which is consistent with similar explosions involving AN (e.g. West Texas) and Charleville. Reason for Analysis
  11. 11. 11 • AN is a strong oxidant, and is commonly processed and then used as an explosive in mining, or as a component in fertilizers • There is a lot of guidance on the safe storage, handling and transport of AN. AN should not be stored near combustible materials. • AN has been the cause of multiple large scale explosions in the past: - Truck carrying AN rolled and exploded in rural Queensland (2014) - West Texas fertilizer plant fire and explosion, USA (2013) - AZF fertilizer plant explosion in Toulouse, France (2001) Ammonium Nitrate
  12. 12. 12 • Pure, compact AN is stable and very difficult to ignite. • AN readily dissolves in water. Hence, water is an effective suppression medium for fires involving AN. • When heated, AN first melts and then begins decomposing when heated beyond its melting point. Prolonged heating can lead to an explosive decomposition. • However under certain conditions and when combustible materials are present (the AN continues to heat up), the reactions change and far more gas is produced. • When a fire is spread to AN and it is also confined (e.g. in shipping containers), an explosion can occur. • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxKXAbS7WAo Ammonium Nitrate Explosions
  13. 13. 13 The Crater
  14. 14. 14
  15. 15. 15 Crater – 85m diameter estimated 85m
  16. 16. 16 • D = 0.51 * Q1/3 (where D = radius of crater, Q = NEQ) • Q = (D / 0.51)3 Q = (85/2 / 0.51)3 Q = 580T NEQ • Calculation estimates approximately 580T NEQ (27x more than the reported quantity of 21T NEQ) • For 21T, using the equation gives a crater diameter of 28m • However it does not take into account the geology of the land Explosive Force Calculation – Equations Ref: Ambrosini D, Luccioni B " Craters produced by large scale explosions", Mecanica Computational Vol XXV11, pp1801-1821, 2008
  17. 17. 17 • Man-made, dredged materials • Mostly wet, silty clay -> this is more likely to have similar properties to wet clay than wet sandy clay • Probably a layer of asphalt on top Tianjin Port Geology
  18. 18. 18 • Data from the US army for the calculation of blast effects, based on experimental data • Using crater size of 85m and on wet clay: - Explosive quantity: 130T (6x more than the reported quantity of 21T NEQ) • For 21T on wet clay, gives a crater diameter of 50m • What about the asphalt? Explosive Force Calculation – Conwep 1
  19. 19. 19 • Data from the US army for the calculation of blast effects, based on experimental data • On wet clay with asphalt: Explosive Force Calculation – Conwep 2 Equivalent TNT (T) Crater Diameter (m) Comments 130 76 ± 28 Calculated quantity on wet clay only 180 85 ± 31 Wet clay under asphalt
  20. 20. 20 Summary Calculation Method Equivalent TNT (T) Crater Diameter (m) Comments Reported value from Richter scale magnitude 21 Calculated value from satellite images 85 Crater diameter / NEQ equation 580 85 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter Crater diameter / NEQ equation 21 28 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Conwep – wet clay 130 85 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter Conwep – wet clay 21 50 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 72 63 ± 23 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter – lower limit Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 720 135 ± 50 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter – upper limit Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 21 42 ± 15 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 580 126 ± 46 Calculated crater diameter based on quantity calculated using equations Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 130 76 ± 28 Calculated crater diameter based on quantity calculated on wet clay Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 180 85 ± 31 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter
  21. 21. 21 • This means that if we assume a crater diameter of 85m, and the ground materials are asphalt over wet clay, the explosive quantity could be between 72T and 720T -> a very wide range! • The report explosion of 21T NEQ is a very low estimate. • It is likely the explosive quantity is of the order of 180T NEQ. Explosives Quantity Summary
  22. 22. 22 Reported Impacts Ref: The Guardian
  23. 23. 23 • The following references were used to determine effect distances and interpretation of impacts: - OPSMAN 3 – Department of Defence, Australia, EO safety principals (now DEOP 101) - Lees, Loss prevention in the process industries – 2nd edition 2001 - New South Wales Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No 6 (2011) - Queensland Explosives Inspectorate, Information Bulletin 53, 2008 - AS2187.1 1998 – Explosives – storage, transport and use, Part1:storage References for Effect Distances
  24. 24. 24 Impact distances for 180T NEQ Note: 180T NEQ of AN equates to between 360T and 720T of actual AN depending on explosive efficiency. 70-170kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer complete destruction 30-39kPa - House damaged beyond repair 21-26kPa - Reinforced structures distort 14-16kPa - Buildings uninhabitable 10kPa - Unstrengthened buildings will suffer average damage costing in the range of 10% of the total replacement cost to repair 7kPa - Damage to internal partitions and joinery work 5.4kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer minor damage 3.5-3.8kPa - 90% broken windows 1.7-1.8kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer only superficial damage
  25. 25. 25 Review of published images confirms the analysis http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3199058/China-orders-evacuation-residents-two- mile-radius-Tianjin-blast-site-police-confirm-area-contaminated-deadly-CYANIDE.html
  26. 26. 26 An explosion of 180T NEQ on asphalt on wet clay produces 85m diameter crater 85m
  27. 27. 27 Around the crater Before… 70-170kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer complete destruction 30-39kPa - House damaged beyond repair Building – 150m away Building – 165m away Building – 65m away
  28. 28. 28 70-170kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer complete destruction 30-39kPa - House damaged beyond repair Around the crater After… Brick Building – 150m away, gutted, barely standing Steel framed building – 165m away, totally destroyed Building eliminated! – 65m away
  29. 29. 29 Demolished building – 165m away No building here at all! – 65m away Building – 150m away
  30. 30. 30 http://www.smh.com.au/world/tianjin-blast-shock-turns-to-anger-and-distrust- after-massive-explosions-20150821-gj4eoz.html Unstrengthened buildings suffer severe damage – 150m away (100kPa)
  31. 31. Train Station – 460m away Donghai Road Station – 460m away (21kPa) 460m 21-26kPa - Reinforced structures distort
  32. 32. 32 Donghai Road train damage – 460m away (21kPa) (inside station) blast side http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/subway-train-is-damaged-at- donghai-road-subway-station-news-photo/485074894
  33. 33. 33 460m away (21kPa) – blast located on the right of image http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/subway-train-is-damaged-at- donghai-road-subway-station-news-photo/485074894
  34. 34. 34 Buses behind rail station – 550m away 550m
  35. 35. 35 Buses behind railway station 550m away – consistent with 16kPa https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Tianjin_explosions#/media/File:Tianjin_explo sion_destroyed_buses_(5).jpg
  36. 36. 36 Lattice tower – 450m away 450m
  37. 37. 37 450m from centre of explosion (“50m away” from site boundary) – major container distortion on truck under the bridge 450m from centre of explosion (“50m away” from site boundary) – lattice tower still standing
  38. 38. 38 Steel frame builders’ sheds – 500m to 650m away destroyed beyond repair 500m 650m 21-26kPa - Reinforced structures distort 14-16kPa - Buildings uninhabitable
  39. 39. Before
  40. 40. After – 500-650m away, 16-21kPa Steel frame builders’ sheds – 500m to 650m away destroyed beyond repair 21-26kPa - Reinforced structures distort 14-16kPa - Buildings uninhabitable
  41. 41. 41 Approx. 500m – Structural collapse of unstrengthened buildings – uninhabitable (21 kPa) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33844084 21-26kPa - Reinforced structures distort 14-16kPa - Buildings uninhabitable
  42. 42. 42 Apartment block – 1.2km away 1.2km
  43. 43. 43 Apartment block 1.2km away – consistent with 3-5kPa, almost every window broken 5.4kPa - Unstrengthen ed buildings suffer minor damage 3.5-3.8kPa - 90% broken windows
  44. 44. 44 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33998655 Most windows damaged – 1km away 1km
  45. 45. 45 1km standoff approx. – most windows damaged, consistent with 7kPa http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33998655, Dan der Duren video
  46. 46. 46 Tianjin Stadium – 1.7km away 1.7km 3.5-3.8kPa - 90% broken windows 1.7-1.8kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer only superficial damage
  47. 47. 47 Tianjin Stadium – approx. 1.7km away, broken glass consistent with 2 - 3.5kPa range 3.5-3.8kPa - 90% broken windows 1.7-1.8kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer only superficial damage
  48. 48. 48 • Arup’s UK team also investigated the explosion and performed analysis on the facades damage to determine the explosive quantities Detailed Facades Analysis
  49. 49. 49 Buildings Analysed Harbour city residence, 33 storey building: 600-700m away Wantong New Town International residence: 17-33 storey building: 2km away
  50. 50. 50 Harbour City – 600-700m away • On some buildings, glazing in the entire façade has broken in a high- hazard manner. • Other buildings had glazing failure at all levels of hazard: no-break, low hazard, and high hazard. 14-16kPa - Buildings uninhabitable 10kPa - Unstrengthened buildings will suffer average damage costing in the range of 10% of the total replacement cost to repair
  51. 51. 51 Wantong New Town – 2km away • Glazing appeared to be on the break / no break threshold – some larger panes broken, smaller panes unbroken. 3.5-3.8kPa - 90% broken windows (1650m) 1.7-1.8kPa - Unstrengthened buildings suffer only superficial damage (2500m)
  52. 52. 52 Explosive Mass Estimates • Assumptions: - Glass is assumed to be 4mm annealed - Blast load is assumed to be a hemispherical, reflected blast wave. Effects such as confinement or shielding are not considered • Blast charge weight in the order of 30-50T TNT, with an upper mass of 100T TNT • However, as there are many uncertainties in the analysis, the charge weight upper bound could be in the order of 800-1000T TNT
  53. 53. 53 Summary of Calculated NEQ Calculation Method Equivalent TNT (T) Crater Diameter (m) Comments Crater diameter / NEQ equation 21 28 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Conwep – wet clay 21 50 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 21 42 ± 15 Calculated crater diameter based on reported quantity Facades analysis 30-50 Calculated quantity based on observed facades damage Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 72 63 ± 23 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter – lower limit OPSMAN 3 / NEQ equation 91 Calculated quantity based on observed damage effects in a 2km radius D = 44.4*Q1/3 Facades analysis – upper limit 100 Calculated quantity based on observed facades damage Conwep – wet clay 130 85 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 130 76 ± 28 Calculated crater diameter based on quantity calculated on wet clay Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 180 85 ± 31 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter Crater diameter / NEQ equation 580 85 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 580 126 ± 46 Calculated crater diameter based on quantity calculated using equations Conwep – asphalt on wet clay 720 135 ± 50 Calculated quantity based on crater diameter – upper limit Facades analysis – upper limit given uncertainties 800-1000 Calculated quantity based on observed facades damage CRATER TOO SMALL Likely ground conditions have more clay Likely Range 130-180 T NEQ based on crater and effects
  54. 54. 54 • BHP Billiton lost 3 days unloading iron ore shipments even though bulk terminals some way from the • John Deere lost 5 days of production at their facility in Tianjin. Several workers were injured and needed medical treatment. • Toyota lost 2 weeks of production their local affiliate’s two plants in the Tianjin Economic Technological Development Area. The explosions injured 67 FAW Toyota workers living in the vicinity and about 4,700 Toyota and Lexus vehicles were damaged. The value of the production halted is estimated at $103m a week with a total of over $200m in production losses. • Chinese insurance companies are expecting to face an estimated initial insured loss of about $1bn-$1.5bn. A significant amount of those losses are to be covered by reinsurance. Commercial Implications
  55. 55. 55 • The large explosion occurred approximately 30-40 minutes after the fire, which is consistent with similar explosions involving AN (e.g. West Texas). • It is likely based on the pictures during the clean-up that there was a fire in the warehouse which produced a number of smaller explosions close enough to a large store of Ammonium Nitrate (AN) in the container yard. • The large explosion would appear to be of the order of 130 to 180T TNT equivalent based on the crater size and the photographed damage area, and the assumptions that the ground is asphalt on wet clay. • This would equate to 260 to 720T of AN involved in the explosion (depending on the explosive efficiency assumed). • It was reported that 800T of AN was stored on site. Explosion Conclusions
  56. 56. 56 What are you going to do this afternoon?
  57. 57. 57 • How well do we understand the impacts of the Dangerous Goods we store? • Are they stored appropriately? • Do we store dangerous goods incompatible with water (Class 4.3)? • Do they have the right separation distances from incompatible goods? • Is our fire fighting response and capability appropriate for the goods we handle? • How do we let the fire brigade know where our dangerous goods storages are? Immediate Lessons to Learn (Questions to Answer) STORAGE of Dangerous Goods
  58. 58. 58 • Do we know the full consequences of incidents from the hazardous goods on our sites? • Do we know the impact our neighbours can have on us (consequences)? • Have we informed our surrounding communities? • Do we have emergency response plans and strategies? • When was the last time we tested our emergency response plan? • Was the fire brigade involved? • If you have a building in a 3kPa contour of a potential explosion, think toughened and/or laminated glass ! • Does your Senior Management and Board understand the true picture? Immediate Lessons to Learn (Questions to Answer) All facilities
  59. 59. 59 Use of Toughened and/or Laminated Glass instead of Annealed Glass Toughened glass Annealed glass
  60. 60. 60 • Breaks into large, jagged shards • More likely to cause injury (and fatality) Annealed Glass
  61. 61. 61 • Annealed glass that has been treated to increase its strength • Breaks into small, granular pieces • Less likely to cause injury (and fatality) Toughened Glass
  62. 62. 62 • Glass can break but laminate stops it flying out and potentially causing injury • Laminate will move in blast and absorb energy and keep blast outside of building (assuming frame suitable designed also) Laminated Glass
  63. 63. 63 • Arup is an employee trust that runs a project management, built environment and infrastructure engineering design business around the globe. • In the context of this presentation we help industry, building owners and developers that have dangerous goods storages and operations make appropriate design and operational decisions. • We also help those that may be subject to the consequences (from natural causes, hazardous goods or terrorism activities) design and construct the appropriate resilience into their buildings and structures. ARUP We shape a better world
  64. 64. 64 Questions?

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