Slide 1


Published on

  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide
  • Treating Accord separately from LCA & KP – in all the excitement of the Accord, we shouldn’t forget that LCA & KP groups are still functioning and have the mandate from UNFCCC to continue work…

    Legal Nature of Accord – important to realize the Accord’s limitations in 2010
    … then provide a bigger picture on post-CPH perspectives
  • I’m assuming all are familiar with the Bali Action Plan and work to date under LCA and KP working groups, so I’m skipping to just before Copenhagen…
  • - Multitude of issues and proposals building up to the COP all year, most imm. relevant in BGK & Barcelona…
    MRV: Measurement, reporting & verification

    BARCELONA: Legally binding agreement in Copenhagen deemed no longer possible. Instead , a politically binding agreement….……meaningless in legal terms but key to keep leaders accountable

    Decisions should focus on a timetable for negotiating a legally binding agreement
    - YVO: [per decision btw Secretariat and the Bureau – representing all regions]

  • Worth reviewing what happened (and what went wrong) at CPH

    Southern mistrust: also b/c Annex I pledges far below the 25% min recommended by IPCC; many caveats even to the small #s presented (mechanisms, AAUs, LULUCF)

    - At v. start of COP, China drew ‘red lines’:
    no 2050 goals,
    no MRV for self-financing
    no developing country commitments

  • REDD is the furthest advanced of the LCA drafting groups – greatest consensus

    SBSTA provided methodological guidance – this is an essential 1st step (remember Marrakesh w/r/t LULUCF methodologies)

    Biodiversity co-benefits in REDD+ are essential to ensuring payments balance avoided deforestation with conserving species and habitats

    Including national circumstances means countries with high forest cover and low deforestation rates can be included, helping protect against leakage and potentially changing opportunity costs
  • BAP scope of REDD+: conservation, SFM, increasing carbon stocks
  • Difference between REDD & Adaptation work:
    REDD+ is a more cohesive programme of work, despite differing national circumstances, so easier to define scope + objectives as well as technical details;
    - REDD can draw on pre-existing carbon PES, PA, Afforestation and Reforestation
    -- more work on mitigation already, adaptation is catching up …
    Adaptation (EbA in particular) is a much wider portfolio of approaches, with far greater difference in national and even localized needs and methods
    IUCN is engaged in ensuring ecosystem-based approaches (not just infrastructural fixes) included

    Current text on adaptation:
    encompasses the idea of ecosystem-based adaptation, but IUCN would have preferred keeping direct reference to the role of ecosystem services.
  • Individual/Aggregate Pledges
    Most individual levels far too low; outliers are EU (20-30%) and Norway (40%)
    Conditionality of A-1 pledges (subject to LCA talks & developing country ambition)
    - Still difficult to determine aggregate levels from individual pledges . . .

    Complicating factors:
    Flexibility Mechanisms
    Surplus AAUs
  • improved baselines, monitoring, additionality: could improve chances for Afforestation and Reforestation projects under the CDM (so far these projects have not taken off at all)
    - as of yesterday, only 12 A/R projects at all so far under CDM, (& none in devt.)
    - LESS THAN ½ A PERCENT OF ALL CDM PROJECTS (over 2000 reg’d total)

    Improving regional distribution of CDM: this is a development that should be extended to included afforestation & reforestation projects - in Africa in particular
  • land-based approaches (as opposed to current project-based approach) – thanks to PNG’s insistence, an option is now included in the KP draft text
    - many countries against land-based approach in 2nd CP

    CMP: further work needed in 2010 on forest management caps

    Also, draft decision includes:
    new LULUCF activities to CDM
    revised methodologies for reporting and supplementarity

    Need to reform LULUCF and A/R projects under the CDM:
    ‘Devil is in the details’: despite the sophisticated compliance system and binding agreement of Kyoto, technical loopholes negotiated later in issues like LULUCF, A/R forestry projects, and AAU carryover defeated environmental integrity
  • Both proposal discussions came down to battle over allowing contact groups:
    [China: just work in the AWG-KP, no new CMP contact group]
    Split in G77+China

    Main debate: BASIC/OPEC vs. AOSIS/Vulnerable States:
    BASIC: no consideration of new Protocol, just KP pledges and COP decision to capture new LCA elements
  • Obama announces a deal is done and leaves before many have even heard about it

    - COP President unceremoniously tells Parties ‘take it or leave it’, then as some oppose it, confusion over what to do with it…
  • Annex 1 countries will present their own targets without overall link to what we might need for avoiding an increment in temperature of 2 degrees C. We will have to wait and see

    Non-Annex I countries to inform Parties the results of these actions through their National Communications every 2 years. (Accord refers to NAMAs.)

    Jan. 31 date now open until later for parties to associate w/ Accord
    Important to note that not full MRV – no on-the-ground verification
    2 Annexes: differentiation btw North & South continues
  • REDD+ Funding – ALSO: Towards the end of CPH, US, UK, France, Japan, Australia and Norway, pledged US$3.5 billion over the next three years to kick-start REDD.
  • No formal link: (potential for Accord to further confuse 2010 negotiations)
    SHELL GAMES = hütchenspeile’
    - also, could decrease ambition in talks: “we know this is political limit, so don’t try for more”

    NB: Umbrella Group & EU largely supported using Art. 7.2 (c) to reference Accord
    - China: vs. 7.2(c) as relates to measures “adopted by parties” …
    - Saudi Arabia vs. using 7.2 (c) as not on COP agenda; if consensus COP-16 agenda
    Art. 7. 2: The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under
    regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the
    Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary
    to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:

    (c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention.
  • (CPH Accord institutions are analogous to G8 or MEF meeting outcome)
  • Unlikely that new institutions will be set up for Accord in s/term (2 Climate Investment Funds can be used, via the Banks) – Clean Tech Fund, Strategic Climate Fund
  • US legislation seems critical for CPH Accord survival, since Obama was its chief architect and announced its completion before many Parties even knew of its existence!
  • Citizens United v. the Federal Election Commission (U.S. Supreme Court, Jan 21, 2010)

    Also – Obama’s other priorities:
    TERRORISM (after the attempted Christmas bombing)
    - 2 wars

  • REDD+ initiatives would lack predictable financing: especially given the years of initial investment in REDD-readiness forest governance and capacity-building needed to make forest carbon projects reliable enough for direct connection to markets
  • - USA promoting bottom-up as more effective than past MEA top-down regimes, but also can be seen as way of getting ratified in US Congress and getting China and India on board
    EU especially in a tight position (green groups push for env. integrity but Competition concerns w/ USA if it either comes on in less ambitious separate protocol or doesn’t pass own protocol or doesn’t ratify anything at all)
    Kyoto has one of the most advanced & stringent compliance systems of any MEA to date
    Under MRV, this would be lost
  • EU especially in a difficult position in CPH as had to balance competitiveness and environmental integrity concerns
  • Skip 5 to go straight to conclusions!!!
  • CBD is the leader in climate-biodiversity connections

    See CBD Technical Paper No. 42 for overview
  • Newcomers have power … despite their reluctance to address climate and potential for not ratifying a deal
    - Accord has uncertain status: CPH was unlike any other COP to date
    - may be good that public awareness high…
    - but to what extent did all the pressure on leader’s having a paper signed after CPH result in something worse off then no deal at all?
    - will this result in ‘negotiation fatigue’ & increase mistrust of process?

    Despite UNFCCC’s inability to integrate biodiversity issues into climate regime so far, clear need for bio-div research and advocacy

  • Slide 1

    1. 1. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE Summary of COP15/CMP5 and evaluating the climate negotiations from a biological diversity perspective John Costenbader, IUCN Environmental Law Centre Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung / Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR) 28. Januar 2010, Bonn
    2. 2. 2 AGENDA 1. Road to Copenhagen 2. Copenhagen: LCA & KP outcomes 3. Copenhagen Accord 4. Legal Nature of CPH Accord 5. Perspectives on climate post-CPH 6. Biodiversity conservation post-CPH 7. Conclusions
    3. 3. 3 I. Road to Copenhagen
    4. 4. 4 Road to Copenhagen • Bangkok, Oct 2009: US proposes new regime – replaces Kyoto Protocol – based on bottom-up pledges from countries (developed and developing), as part of low carbon strategies, to be reviewed at [2?] year intervals – substitutes compliance with core MRV: ‘peer review’ assessment of CC results, with economic considerations • Barcelona, Nov 2009: Low expectations for CPH – still no agreement on US proposal vs. keeping Kyoto – still no usable text(s) from LCA or KP processes – “I don’t think we can get a legally binding agreement by Copenhagen. I think that we can get that within a year after Copenhagen” - Yvo de Boer, 9 Nov 2009
    5. 5. 5 II. Copenhagen: Developments in Working Groups & COP/CMP
    6. 6. 6 Issues in Copenhagen Negotiations • ‘Background noise’ adds tension to process – Southern mistrust of North  “Leak” of a draft text from COP Presidency in first days – Northern mistrust of South  US unlikely to pass climate bill without Chinese agreeing to caps – Top down vs. Bottom Up Strategies  ‘Kyoto II’ or schedules for domestic actions and commitments – Confusion over non/legally-binding outcomes at Copenhagen  Barcelona agreed none, but Tuvalu legal proposals under LCA and KP  Chinese refusal to mention ‘legally-binding’ in CPH Accord text – NGO and outsider impatience with the process  Huge crowds inside & out; protests (resembling WTO & IMF processes) – Rift among the G-77  AOSIS, LDCs, Africa & Vulnerable States disagree with BASIC & OPEC – China joins USA as heavyweight Party
    7. 7. 7 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-LCA: REDD+ • SBSTA decision adopted by COP: –Promotion of co-benefits (including biodiversity) –Requests Parties to identify drivers of deforestation and forest degradation –Encourages guidance on engaging local and indigenous communities –National circumstances to be considered in emissions and forest reference levels
    8. 8. 8 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-LCA: REDD+ • LCA draft text further developed: – Safeguards included – Scope of REDD+ includes scope of Bali Action Plan • But important issues remain… –prior informed consent for indigenous peoples; –predictable, secure long-term finance commitment; –adequate measures to address leakage
    9. 9. 9 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-LCA: Adaptation (& Ecosystem-based Adaptation) • Continued work on draft text – Scope defined somewhat, though still vague:  country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory approaches to adaptation, based on science and traditional knowledge and on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. – Adaptation action:  “building resilience of socio-economic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources”.
    10. 10. 10 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-KP: Flexibility Mechanisms • Some progress in emissions reductions pledges, but still far below IPCC-recommended 25-40% aggregate level • Uncertainty regarding use of the three Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism, International Emissions Trading) complicates aggregating individual A1 pledges – Lack of transparency from Parties re: to what degree their pledges reflect use of mechanisms (and internal LULUCF) results in difficulty in capturing pledges as final ‘QELRO’s – Discussion around requiring supplementarity for use of flexibility mechanisms (either a % cap or text urging domestic action only)
    11. 11. 11 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-KP: Clean Development Mechanism • Agreement on improving baselines, monitoring, additionality – Executive Board to work on improved methodologies – Simplified additionality procedures for small-scale renewable energy • CMP Decision on improving regional distribution of CDM – Countries with <10 projects get fees waived, simplified financing; – Executive Board to devise top-down methodologies • SBSTA to assess forests in exhaustion in 2010
    12. 12. 12 Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups AWG-KP: Land Use, Land Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF) • The importance of LULUCF: – Bad: Current LULUCF rules would add 2.3 GT CO2 to total A1 – Potentially worse: Proposed amendments could add ~7- 10 GT • Draft decision on LULUCF presented to CMP requests SBSTA to begin review of land-based approaches • KP group refined options in draft text, including reference levels or caps on forest management accounting
    13. 13. 13 CMP & COP Architectural Proposals • CMP: Proposals to modify or subsume Kyoto – China (BASIC et al): no revision to Kyoto, only update pledges – Tuvalu (AOSIS et al): Revise Kyoto legal structure and update pledges – NZ, JAP (Umbrella Group): Subsume Kyoto into new Protocol – Result: no agreement  Proposals to be included in COP-16 agenda • COP: Proposals for new protocol under Convention – Tuvalu, Costa Rica: New Protocol (for newcomers) and keep Kyoto – AUS, JAP, USA: New Protocol from LCA text, to subsume Kyoto – Result: no agreement  Proposals to be included in COP-16 agenda
    14. 14. 14 III. The Copenhagen Accord
    15. 15. 15 Copenhagen Accord • In the last 48 hours, a rush to forge a deal: – Heads of State are now in CPH and want ‘results, now!’ – A group, deemed ‘representative’, of 20 HoS plus 9 HoD negotiates an agreement, in parallel to wider negotiations (Group represents 80% of global emissions) – Bilateral and smaller meetings in margins – Endgame is between US and BASIC countries, mainly China – EU sidelined (‘not in the room’ when deal was done) – Chinese concede on transparency - US drops long term global goal, legally-binding agreement, and offers money
    16. 16. 16 CPH Accord on Mitigation • Accord agrees to keep temperature increase below 2o C, with a review by 2015 including that of a 1.5o C goal – No mention of carbon ppm concentration • Annex 1 (developed countries) to commit to “economy- wide” emissions targets for 2020 and to present commitments by 31 Jan. • Non-Annex I (developing) to list mitigation actions (NAMAS – national appropriate mitigations actions) by 31 Jan.
    17. 17. 17 CPH Accord on Mitigation, cont. • Accord refers to REDD+, implying broader definition of REDD since Bali has been accepted • Par. 6 asks for the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD+ • Par. 7 leaves open possible market-based mitigation funding (including REDD+) • Par. 8 mentions “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” (to include REDD+) and developed countries as providing: – 30B USD for 2010-12 for adaptation and mitigation – 100 billion USD/year by 2020 for mitigation only.
    18. 18. 18 CPH Accord on Adaptation • Par. 3 refers to adaptation very generally: – Adaptation definition includes potential impacts of response measures (e.g. to OPEC countries) – Most vulnerable countries defined as: LDCs, SIDS and Africa. – General reference is made to the provision of finance, technology and capacity building to support adaptation.
    19. 19. 19 III. Legal Nature of Copenhagen Accord
    20. 20. 20 Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord • Why ‘taking note’ & not a COP decision? – Draft COP Rules of Procedure require consensus for COP decisions (here, four Parties spoke against Accord) • What does ‘Take note of…’ mean? – Less than ‘endorse’ or ‘decide’ but more than an ‘INF’ or ‘MISC’ from a few parties – “a way of recognizing that something is there, but not going so far as to associate yourself with it.” - Yvo de Boer
    21. 21. 21 Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont. • Accord endorses continued work under LCA and KP, but neither Decision formally recognized Accord – No formal link between processes: can’t assume either body will elaborate the details of Accord in 2010  Lack of formality means Parties’ outside actions under Accord could provide more chances for ‘hütchenspeile’ in KP and LCA negotiations • Look for references to Convention Article 7.2 (c) as mandate to implement Accord in 2010 – (but unclear text) 7.2 (c) [the COP shall] Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects . . .
    22. 22. 22 Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont. • “Immediately operational”: not so ‘immediate’ after all… – Accord is not an official UNFCCC document; – Institutions foreseen lack UNFCCC legal status • Countries can only operationalize parts of Accord not requiring COP decisions (i.e. domestic actions, with GEF, et al. coordination) – Appendix I “economy-wide emissions targets” (Annex I) – Appendix II “mitigation actions” (non-Annex I)
    23. 23. 23 Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont. • Parts of other elements likely must wait for COP-16 Decision: – High Level Panel (par. 9 “. . . under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties . . .”) – Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (par. 10 “. . . as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention . . .”) – Financing promises (par. 8, to extent coordinated by UNFCCC)
    24. 24. 24 II. Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
    25. 25. 25 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • What may the CPH Accord achieve? Provided: 1. Accord is signed by a majority of countries, esp. developed and major emerging economies ... 2. Developed country targets/ developing country action are sufficiently ‘strong’ ... 3. US legislation is passed in 2010 ... 4. Financial promises are fulfilled and are ‘new and additional’ (e.g. to development aid) ...
    26. 26. 26 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen ... Accord may be a first step towards global climate response. 1. The Accord could begin to harness the potential of developed and developing countries to address climate change. 2. It may leverage substantial finance for developing countries, including for halting deforestation and protecting forests. Yvo de Boer, 20 Jan: ‘Political tool that has broad support at highest political level’
    27. 27. 27 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen BUT… Slim chances for US climate legislation in 2010: • Massachusetts elects Republican Senator to replace Ted Kennedy – Ends Obama’s majority needed to pass a long list of legislation • U.S. Supreme Court decides lawmakers may not stop corporations from spending money to influence elections (Jan. 21) – Expected effect: help Republican Party with richest lobbyist friends, many likely opposed to climate legislation  Contentious November 2010 Congressional elections and focus on health care could detract from climate legislation
    28. 28. 28 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen The CPH Accord does not achieve sufficient and rapid response to the climate crisis... In addition: • Business lacks regulatory certainty to drive low-carbon investment • CPH confirmed the ‘new bipolar order’ whereby the US has to share hegemony w China • EU, India, Russia, Japan relegated to ‘second league’ players and lost the initiative • The ‘multilateralist’ approach to climate change and the credibility of the UNFCCC process are damaged ... – What next for climate regime and negotiations?
    29. 29. 29 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • Until CPH, UNFCCC was seen as the main means of addressing climate impacts on biodiversity conservation. Now, UNFCCC may have lost that ability somewhat. – CPH Accord resembles more a political statement than a multilateral, negotiated agreement based on science. – Although intersessionals expected to resume in 2010 in preparation for COP-16, Accord will exist as a “3rd wheel”. – Key question whether Accord will integrate with negotiation tracks, or dominate them and take on life of its own.
    30. 30. 30 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • Potential effects of Accord on REDD+ and Adaptation: – CPH Accord envisions biannual pledges of emissions reductions subject only to MRV: this undercuts a long-term global carbon cap and international carbon market. – Some potential outcomes:  smaller C-markets would occur with multiple C-prices  ‘race to bottom’ could hamper carbon trading, as businesses could move where no/lower carbon price  without stable prices, REDD+ initiatives would lack predictable, high-volume, long-term financing – Similarly, adaptation programs may not see the volume of financing needed from intermittent pledges.
    31. 31. 31 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • Legal form of commitments: Top-down v. bottom-up – Kyoto is top-down: parties agree to binding actions (e.g. emissions targets) at international negotiations, locked in for agreed time period. – Under USA proposed bottom-up structure, now in CPH Accord: general framework agreed at top, later parties submit actions and commitments to include in global registry. • Consequences of Legal Form Decisions: – How to ensure environmental integrity if pledges not connected to science? – What role for UNFCCC in bottom-up / MRV system? – Will 2-year ad-hoc funding and reduction pledges be predictable enough for adaptation activities and carbon market?
    32. 32. 32 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • Future of compliance regime: Compliance vs. MRV – Traditional for MEAs to use compliance system – carrots and sticks for compelling each other to complete agreed targets and actions.  Compliance not actually legally-binding (since only passed by COP decision), but has strong political force and doubtful Parties would ignore it. – MRV is largely a ‘peer review’-type process with no sanctions foreseen.  How to know if Parties will fulfill pledges under MRV?  What if any future remains for compliance after MRV?
    33. 33. 33 Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen • What future for Kyoto and its work to date? – Push to bring on new Parties (USA and China), but USA won’t ratify Kyoto or a Kyoto-clone – A two-protocol system would be complicated, but one-protocol bottom-up/MRV system has environmental integrity concerns  Without Kyoto, no way to ensure USA et al. will ratify a new agreement: progress under KP could be lost despite a weaker system in the end • How to integrate work across Kyoto and LCA tracks: – REDD+ and LULUCF  Architectural relation to NAMAs? – Mechanisms  Opened up to developing countries?  Any place in penalties in a future MRV system?
    34. 34. 34 IV. Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen REDD+ EbA CDM Reform LULUCF Reform Biodiversity Considerations
    35. 35. 35 Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen • Given difficulties of post-Copenhagen situation, potential to look for climate solutions for biodiversity from other MEAs, inter alia:  Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  Ramsar Convention on Wetlands  Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD) • In theory, strong scientific basis for biodiversity-climate connections  Impacts, feedbacks, synergies  Ecosystem-based Adaptation  Carbon sequestration • In practice, weak connections to date between biodiversity and climate MEAs and institutions –
    36. 36. 36 Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen • UNFCCC – UNFCCC has been far too busy with its own issues and negotiations to assimilate biodiversity concerns to date:  Climate is a universal issue, cross-cutting economic development sectors (energy, transport, industry, housing) as well as human survival issues (water, food security)  Addressing climate will impose deep economic costs (far greater than ozone et al. single-pollutant issues) in short- and long-term (even if far less than costs of inaction), and require societies to reshape infrastructure and lifestyles  By including use of market-based mechanisms, low-carbon energy, new technologies, and large financing streams, climate draws far greater public attention and special interests than biodiversity MEAs
    37. 37. 37 Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen • CBD: – Since COP 9 (2008) CBD has assembled working groups to assess biodiversity and climate connections, and begun integrating climate considerations into all of its work programmes:  Ensuring sound scientific basis before Parties implement ocean fertilization to sequester carbon  Co-benefits for biodiversity in REDD+ activities  Ad-Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change  More work expected on addressing conservation of wetlands and peatlands especially
    38. 38. 38 Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen • Ramsar: – Ramsar has begun providing guidance on climate concerns in wetlands management. High potential for linking wetlands biodiversity conservation with forest carbon mitigation (e.g. peatlands) as well as climate adaptation activities (e.g. mangrove forests). • UNCCD: – UNCCD work may help fine-tune climate mitigation and response measures in dry lands, as temperature increases and feedbacks are likely to severely impact dry areas and exacerbate pre-existing water shortages, food security and biodiversity losses (Africa in particular).
    39. 39. 39 Conclusions • China & USA: new power dynamic – Greatest power to influence rests with newcomers • Accord has uncertain status; a small step but also potential to complicate and detract from future talks • Future legal architecture likely to be complicated or only politically-binding • Unclear whether Copenhagen Accord provided a ‘net benefit’ for climate and biodiversity • Need to analyze the conservation and livelihood implications of proposed new climate regime structures
    40. 40. 40 THANKS FOR LISTENING!