References: Council on Foreign Relations Report, (2008) Gambino Young, (2006) The Heart of the African Conflict Zone: democratization, Ethnicity, Civil Conflict and the Great Lakes Crisis , Annual Review of Political science, 9:301-28. Carayannis (2003) p. 238 -242 or details - fill in later for paper. On the fall of Mobutu: Mobutu Flees Zaire In the end, he stole quietly away, not quite like a thief in the night but certainly without the noisy flourish that once trumpeted all the movements of Mobutu Sese Seko. Beset by failing health and fast-approaching rebels, Zaire's 66-year-old president fled Kinshasa last week, meekly abandoning the capital of the country he has misruled for most of the last 31 years. No wailing sirens nor motorcycle escorts, not even the usual long black Cadillac, signaled his progress along the banks of the Congo River shortly after morning dawned last Friday. He travelled anonymously, behind the smoked-glass windows of a Japanese-manufactured sport utility vehicle, from his elegant Kinshasa mansion to the city's airport. There, he boarded a private jet, bound first for an isolated jungle palace, then apparently abroad. And when news of his departure finally reached the streets of Kinshasa, there was widespread rejoicing. &quot;We're very, very happy,&quot; beamed a youthful Blaise Bomba as he celebrated with a cheering crowd of exuberant young men. &quot;It means a new beginning for Zaire.” (From “the Canadian Encyclopedia Online, MacLean’s Magazine, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0011339 accessed April 4, 2009 As Mobutu was seeking aid from US, the US was using diplomatic pressure to get Russia to cooperate in new agreement with NATO and to NATO expansion. A very sensitive issue for Russia was whether or not the US planned to have more troop deployments and/or installations abroad as a result of the new agreement. This was the topic of a discussion on the MacNeil-Leher News Hour May 14, just days before Mobutu departed the country. On that news broadcast, about 95% of the time was devoted to questions regarding Russia/Nato, with a minimal, almost side-bar Q/A on Mobutu and Kabila, with Albright saying only that we supported S. Africa’s attempts to bring the two together, and end the bloodshed. Very Hands=Off.
* Establishes a commission to set up for elections to be held, but elections are never held; argues that there is too much instability Characterized by truculence and ineptitude Primarily supported in the beginning by Uganda and Rwanda, no external support from the West. PBS newshour transcript with Kabila quotes for situation: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june00/congo_1-27.html US Policy: Albright crystallized this position in December. At a press conference following bilateral talks with Kabila, she acknowledged that “there is a long way to go” toward a civil society in Congo. But she praised Kabila for making a “strong start” on economic reforms and naming a commission to draft laws leading to an election. She said she was encouraged by Kabila’s “positive steps” and noted their meeting reflected “shared interests . . . and a joint willingness to solve problems.” Albright pledged $40 million in U.S. aid for health programs and infrastructure projects. Stanford students Kidnapped: http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/1998/julaug/articles/out_of_africa/out_of_africa.html Shadow economy continues Structure of supporters changes rapidly as militia and rebel groups realign Note: Carayyanis and others point out that the lack of inclusion of non-miilitary opponents to Mobutu’s regime reinforced the idea of violent solution and marginalized those who had been working towards political solutions. Mobutu actually died a few months later from prostate cancer – this had all come about as military violence overrunning the country when in time something else might have worked out – especially if West had been engaged.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/351553.stm Reference: Carayanis (2003) or classification of different types of insurgencies (liberation, separatist, reform, or warlord) . Details of actions fill in paper later.
http://news. bbc .co.uk/2/hi/africa/389119. stm References Michael Niemann, “War Making and State Making in Central Africa”, Africa today. Integrated Battalions in DRC – creates problem – requires militias who are locally based and only care about protecting their homelands to leave and join battalion centers far from ancestral homelands. Incentives to join military offered were inadequate offering more to those who returned to civilian life; centers for training lacked food and basic resources- including water (lack of real support by Congolese government) Failure to include Mai Mai had severe consequences - continued fighting in the East, were under no formal obligation to cease fire. Called for UN to enforce cease-fire and disarm foreign militias Carayannis: Called for withdrawal of all foreign forces. Envisioned 6week dialogue between armed and unarmed Congolese groups about future institutions and interim government in parallel process to disarmament and departure of foreign troops. Kabila refused to cooperate.
From BBC news 1999: In the Lusaka Agreement framework, the Dialogue is supposed to prepare for a new political dispensation that liberates the Congolese from external occupation and interference. But neither Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe nor Angola want to see in Kinshasa a regime not under their control. President Kabila and his backers refuse to consider power-sharing through the Dialogue with anti-government rebels without guarantees of Rwanda and Uganda’s full withdrawal. At the same time the rebels and their sponsors, including Rwanda and Uganda, refuse to consider withdrawal until a transition government is established through the Dialogue and their security is guaranteed. As a result of this deadlock, low-intensity conflict remains the most attractive option to most of the external actors, and war grinds on in the Kivus thanks to continued support from Kinshasa and Harare to the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu militias. The states that have intervened in the Congo all have unsatisfied political and security &quot;shopping lists&quot; and want to retain access to the country's resources. This access enables the governments of Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, and Rwanda to reinforce themselves internally at a time of domestic succession or political transition. Since the death of the elder Kabila, the Dialogue has lost much of its attraction for the international community, which strongly supports the son and wishes to push him to resume the democratization process Mobutu abandoned, negotiating directly with Uganda and Rwanda, rather than with the rebels. But the Kinshasa government is too weak to meet international expectations without an external mediator or guarantor. Dialogue finally occurred in South Africa in February 2001, one month after Joseph Kabila taking over leadership. Agreement signed between Government and MLC but not RCD. Ignored inclusiveness of Lusaka, as well as war in East. Failed when Kabila realized he would not be able to have the national unification he wanted, and he walked out. Eventually entered instead into bilateral agreements with Rwanda and Uganda against the rebel groups in East. Withdrawal of foreign troops creates power vacuum in East. Increase in violent, anarchic conflict between ever smaller groups that became significant actors in the more illicit activities in that region. Also paved way for new transitional government modeled after S. Africa - power sharing between Kabila and four VPs - one each from two major rebel groups, the unarmed opposition, and civil society.
Until recently, since the signing of the Lusaka agreement the violence and fighting has been mostly confined to three eastern provinces - N/S Kivu and Ituri. Recent escalation of activity in North by LRA has increased fighting in North on border with Uganda. From Carayannis. Rwanda original motive was security from insurgents; where not engaging in direct combat is exerting control economic domination in east. Has also stationed troops within RDC rebel forces. As troops withdrew, replaced management of primary Congolese companies with Rwandan soldiers. “highly centralized Rwanda war network coordinated out of the Congo desk of the Rwandan army continues to operate largely uninterrupted through the RCD and close commercial ties with the international criminal networks involved in the illicit trafficking of arms, diamonds, coltan, and counterfeit currency. Brought telephone and currency in East into Rwandan networks. The war is increasingly in hands of armed mercenaries. Groups trade with each other and are interdependent. Emerging norm evidenced - coalition of the wiling. Regional “subcontracting” of war fighting. Carayannis calls this Liberal War, analogous to Liberal peace. Wars in which violence is increasingly in the private hands of armed militias, mercenaries and prviate military companies (aquoting singer 2003). Increasingly unregulated global networks of illegal resource extraction and arms trafficking. Nkikumana and Emizet note that where the ethnic conflict was a trigger to start the war; it has also prevented war from coalesing and spreading (hence the splinters and factions). Note that unequal distribution of resources among ethnic groups. The resources are increasingly keeping the war going. Rwanda receipts in taxes on international trade for 1997-1999 averaged a 30% increase over 1996. Discrepancies between exports and production. Rwanda’s export of coltan increased by a factor of 4 from 2000-2001.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/520555.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7910081.stm DR Congo outsources its military By Mark Doyle BBC News, DR Congo The Democratic Republic of Congo - a country with the trappings of sovereignty but not much modern government or control outside the main cities - is waking up to its limitations. DR Congo has invited in foreign armies to help deal with its lawless regions. It is a joint military operation that is highly unusual in Africa. The militaries of three foreign countries - Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan - are now operating in or around the edges of DR Congo. But unlike in previous times, the foreign armies have not invaded against the will of the authorities in the capital Kinshasa. They were invited in by the Congolese government to deal with rebel movements that Kinshasa admits it - and the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, in DR Congo - cannot handle. To be accurate, the word &quot;invited&quot; is not quite right. Kinshasa was persuaded by United States pressure to accept the foreigners. The US is allied to Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan - all of which, in various ways, are opposed to the US bogeyman in the region, the Islamist regime based in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. (South Sudan is de facto quasi-independent from Khartoum after winning control of the south after a long war.) The activities of the three African armies in DR Congo can be painted as &quot;African solutions to African problems&quot;. The continent is tired of the UN failing to fix DR Congo. But of course these are also self-interested actions. The foreign armies are dealing with their enemies who have been sucked into the virtual power vacuum in parts of DR Congo - and which therefore threaten stability. The key visiting teams are: RWANDA The Rwandan army went into Congo's North and South Kivu Provinces a few months ago to deal with Rwandan ethnic Hutu rebels, the FDLR, who were chased into Congo after perpetrating the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. (In fact, some of them were certainly involved in the genocide - while a majority of the current fighters are probably new opportunists plundering Congo's gold and other minerals.) The FDLR used to be wartime allies of the Congolese government during the long conflict of the 1990s. That war was so widespread and sucked in so many countries it was dubbed &quot;Africa's First World War&quot;. But Kinshasa has now let the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan army in to deal with the Hutus - despite that army having invaded DR Congo twice in recent years. The quid pro quo for Kinshasa's volte face is that Rwanda should arrest Congolese Tutsi rebel Laurent Nkunda (long considered by many to be a Rwandan puppet) and then &quot;turn&quot; his CNDP militia into Congolese army allies. Rwanda arrested Gen Nkunda and is now twisting arms to make his former fighters less hostile to Kinshasa (but of course not hostile to Rwanda either). The arrest was the easy part. UGANDA The Ugandan army went into the north-eastern DR Congo (Orientale Province) to smash the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army. The LRA is an armed group whose leader Joseph Kony also claims mystical powers. He was chased out of Uganda and has taken refuge in DR Congo and South Sudan. The LRA has been causing widespread terror among Congolese and Sudanese civilians. It exercises control through mass murder, rape and abductions - but it says its basic motivation is the defense of the marginalized northern Ugandan ethnic Acholi population. The United States is widely believed to have helped plan and pay for the Ugandan anti-LRA operation in DR Congo. The LRA is on US proscribed terrorist lists. An early part of the anti-LRA operation, planned for December 14 2008, was to bomb the main LRA base in north-eastern DR Congo. The plan failed to have its full effect, Ugandan officers say privately. Bad weather closed in that day, the officers say, when, it was believed, Joseph Kony and his senior aides were at the base. One version says cloud cover and a botched air transport plan meant noisy helicopters were used for the bombing runs, not high-flying Migs which could have had the element of surprise. Joseph Kony may have heard the choppers coming. Anyway, he seems to have got away from the base just a few minutes before the bombs dropped. SOUTH SUDAN The South Sudanese army (the victorious ex-rebels, not the Khartoum government) is also trying to deal with the LRA. The LRA, despite claiming to want to rule Uganda by the Christian Ten Commandments, was nurtured by the Islamist regime in Khartoum to try to stop the southern Sudanese rebels (Sudan People's Liberation Army - SPLA) from winning the on-off 50 year north-south war. But those southern Sudanese rebels did win against Khartoum. After they had done so they tried negotiating with the LRA for a while to make it go away. The deal was that Mr.. Kony would be shielded from the indictment against him issued by the International Criminal Court in exchange for peace. Mr.. Kony opted to stay in the bush. And now the South Sudanese have mostly given up talking and are going for a military solution against him. The results so far The Rwandans have pushed the Hutu rebels westward, deeper into the Congolese forests, and have also arrested a few middle-ranking rebels. They have persuaded some Hutu camp followers to go home to Rwanda. Rwanda will be quite pleased with this so far. The Congolese are not so keen; the Hutus can still live off Congo - mining illegally, mounting roadblocks for taxes etc. But Kinshasa will at least be satisfied that Mr.. Nkunda has been neutralized, for now. The Ugandans, meanwhile, are continuing their 20-year hunt for Mr.. Kony, this time inside DR Congo's north-eastern Orientale Province. The Congolese army is supposed to hold the southern parts of Orientale and the Sudanese are supposed to block the possible escape of Mr. Kony's men through their border to the north. The Ugandan army and air force do their business in between the two. No great results here so far. In fact, some negative ones. Hundreds of Congolese were massacred by the LRA over the Christmas period in reprisal for the hunt against the rebels. But even the UN humanitarian supremo John Holmes, decrying the massacres as a &quot;catastrophic&quot; result of the offensive, said the military operations have to be pressed home. In the long run this sort of inter-African cooperation will certainly be necessary to counter cross border rebels. The governments of Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan and DR Congo all have some legitimacy (and are all backed by, for example, the US and the UK). Both of the rebel groups concerned are reviled by most of the governments in the region and most of the rest of the world. For this reason, any talk of all these operations being &quot;over by the end of February&quot; - as Kinshasa has said publically - should be taken with a large pinch of salt. Everyone in the region knows that DR Congo can't cope with these lawless regions. Much of the Congolese army is dysfunctional. Everyone also knows that, for all the decent things it may have done in DR Congo, the UN has failed to pacify the eastern part of the country. Kinshasa has to say it wants the operations over because it is politically embarrassing for President Joseph Kabila to be seen to allow countries which once invaded DR Congo to stomp all over eastern regions. But President Kabila is politically weak. Rwanda and Uganda, by contrast, are relatively are strong. The fighting will continue. There may be some positive results in the long-term. Or it could all go horribly wrong. Nieman goes on to say &quot;the parties in the conflict in the DRC have engaged and continue to engage in attempts to eliminate rivals outside their respective territories that actively obstruct efforts at statemaking. In the case of Uganda and the genocidairies and former Rwanda Army remnants in the case of Rwanda. To achieve this goal, they have attempted to extend state control and a monopoly over the means of violence beyond their own territory, thus ignoring existing borders. The Kabila government (both father and son), in turn, has tried, and continues to try, to eliminate its internal and external rivals and establish its position as a dominant wielder of force in the territory formerly designated as the DRC. All parties have engaged in protecting clients, be they private business interests, leaders of rebel forces, or agents from other governments, and all have engaged in extraction in order to be able to finance the other activities. Ag the core of this conflict, then, is the struggle over the extent of state control, the elimination of rival sources of violence, and the protection of commercial clients - in short, the process of statemaking.“ http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/maps_and_graphs/2008/05/15/CongoMap.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/16/congo&usg=__GUSMYmQVjX6WqwfoR3BHsc6o3OY=&h=521&w=460&sz=57&hl=en&start=4&sig2=HmwJuA242c_GAwSNnJIN1w&tbnid=tPubHD242jfJaM:&tbnh=131&tbnw=116&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dcongo%2Bwar%2Bmilitary%2Bpresence%2Bmap%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den&ei=6YzOSaT7DoH8nQfAyKDwCQ
October 2008: According to the International Rescue Committee, more than 5,400,000 Congolese civilians have died due to war during the last ten years. Most of these deaths have occurred in eastern Congo where rebel leader Laurent Nkunda continues to wage a resources war against a democratically elected and internationally recognized government. Laurent Nkunda alleges that he is protecting the minority Tutsi ethnic group against remnants of the Rwandan Hutu army that fled to Congo after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Get some of Adam’s email numbers) A study by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of nearly half the health centers in the country found that 50,000 rape cases had been reported. However, UNFPA acknowledged that the numbers reflect a fraction of the total, as many cases of sexual violence are not reported13. In 2008, MSF alone treated 6,700 victims of sexual violence in North and South Kivu. “Rape is widespread, practiced by all sides of the conflict”, said Dr. Bertrand Draguez, MSF medical director. “The collapse of all legal structures makes any prosecution impossible”. Cutting off hands and feet of enemies common practice. Hacking up bodies and disposing makes accurate dead counts hard.
April 7, 2009 Adam Berg Nancy Hayden Michael Kniss
<ul><li>Country Overview and Background </li></ul><ul><li>Conflict in the Congo </li></ul><ul><li>Intervention </li></ul><ul><li>Current Situation </li></ul><ul><li>Lessons Learned </li></ul>
<ul><li>Size </li></ul><ul><li>3 rd largest population in Africa (66 million) </li></ul><ul><li>About the size of Western Europe </li></ul><ul><li>Over 200 ethnic groups </li></ul><ul><li>Potential </li></ul><ul><li>2 nd largest rainforest in the world </li></ul><ul><li>Large areas of fertile land, temperate climate, and plentiful rainfall </li></ul><ul><li>Rivers and lakes with potential for hydroelectric power </li></ul><ul><li>Resources: cobalt, coltan, gold, diamonds, zinc, iron ore, copper </li></ul>
<ul><li>Death </li></ul><ul><li>5.4 million deaths since 1998 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>45,000 deaths a month </li></ul></ul><ul><li>National mortality rate is 60% higher than the sub-Saharan average </li></ul><ul><li>Rape </li></ul><ul><li>300,000 rapes in the past decade </li></ul><ul><li>Corruption </li></ul><ul><li>Highly corrupt: ranked 168 out of 179 by Transparency International </li></ul><ul><li>Poverty </li></ul><ul><li>GNI per capita: $130, 2 nd lowest in the world </li></ul><ul><li>74% of the population is undernourished </li></ul><ul><li>Infrastructure </li></ul><ul><li>1,500 miles of paved roads (in a country the size of Western Europe) </li></ul><ul><li>Failing Grade </li></ul><ul><li>Congo is one of three countries listed as “failed” by the Brookings Institution’s 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World </li></ul><ul><li>How and why did the state collapse? </li></ul>
<ul><li>Belgian Rule </li></ul><ul><li>Created by Belgian King Leopold as a personal colony in 1885 </li></ul><ul><li>Resources </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ivory </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Rubber </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gold </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Brutal style of rule </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Estimated 5-10 million deaths </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Belgian government took control in 1907 </li></ul>
<ul><li>Post-Colonial History </li></ul><ul><li>1960 – Independence </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Democratic Republic of Congo created </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>DRC’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, is assassinated </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>5 years of chaos </li></ul></ul><ul><li>1965 – Colonel Mobutu takes over </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu becomes a Cold War client of the U.S. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Instills sense of national identity – yet Mobutu does little to develop anything except his personal wealth </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Authoritarian and repressive regime </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Renames the country Republic of Zaire </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Changes his name to Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga (“The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”). </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>Cold War </li></ul><ul><li>Mobutu is propped up by aid from the U.S. </li></ul><ul><li>U.S. interested in anti-communist stance and resources: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Copper </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gold </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Diamonds </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Cobalt </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Zaire’s income and services decline, but Mobutu is able to hold onto power. </li></ul><ul><li>Post-Cold War </li></ul><ul><li>Nation slips further into decline as the West loses interest in Zaire </li></ul><ul><li>Already notoriously inept army goes unpaid </li></ul><ul><li>Ungoverned east </li></ul>
<ul><li>RPF Ends the Genocide </li></ul><ul><li>Hutu civilians, interahamwe, and defeated Rwandan soldiers flee to Kivu provinces in Eastern Congo </li></ul><ul><li>UNHCR sets up refugee camps </li></ul><ul><li>Interahamwe ran many of the refugee camps and refused to allow people to repatriate </li></ul><ul><li>Mobutu had strong ties to the deceased Habyarimana regime and saw the refugees as a way to control Eastern Congo and act as a conduit for aid </li></ul><ul><li>Rwandan Outrage </li></ul><ul><li>Interahamwe launch offensives into Rwanda </li></ul><ul><li>International community did not intervene to stop genocide, but is now spending millions to shelter perpetrators </li></ul><ul><li>Rwandan desire for reconciliation with citizens and justice for killers </li></ul>
<ul><li>Foreign Invasion + Insurgency </li></ul><ul><li>Expulsion of Tutsis triggers Congolese to organize under veteran revolutionary Laurent Kabila (AFDL) </li></ul><ul><li>Rwanda leads AFDL against Mobutu, supported by Uganda, Angola </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rwandan objective: secure border </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>800,000 Hutu refugees return to Rwanda </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Hutu “Death March” to Kinshasa </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mobutu regime falls </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Seeks Western aid to no avail </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Kabila proclaimed President </li></ul>
<ul><ul><li>Instability and Despotism Continues… </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Short honeymoon period </li></ul><ul><li>Alienates potential political supporters </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Alienates Mobutu opposition in Kinshasa (NGOs, political parties, civil society) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Refuses to cooperate with international inquiries into fate of Rwandan Hutus in war </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Imposes Marxist-style dictatorship </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Rwandan Tutsi officers offend military </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Fails to provide security </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Ugandan rebels in North </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Militias re-engage and recruit in East </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Fails to establish democratic institutions </li></ul>1997-2001 <ul><li>US Policy </li></ul><ul><li>Bilateral Talks </li></ul><ul><li>Praise for Kabila: “strong start” on reforms </li></ul><ul><li>“ Shared interests and joint willingness to solve problems.” </li></ul><ul><li>$40 million in aid for health programs and infrastructure projects </li></ul>1998 Russia/NATO S&T MOU
July 27, 1998 Rwanda military ousted August 2,1998 Rwanda and Uganda back rebels against Kabila; form RCD and advance to Kinshasa August 23, 1998 Angola intervenes for Kabila to stop advance August 1998-August 1999 Stalemate and proliferating rebellions August 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire Combatants Mai-Mai militia Tutsi-aligned Rebel Forces Hutu-Aligned Forces (RCD-G, RCD-ML, MCL) DRC Uganda Namibia Rwanda Zimbabwe Burundi Angola Chad Strength Tutsi-aligned Rebel Forces: Hutu-Aligned Forces: 10,000 25,000 Mai-Mai: 20-30,000 Rwanda: 8000 Congolese: 30,000 Uganda: 3000 Angola:4000 Zimbabwe:2000 Casualties Civilians Killed: 3,500,000+
<ul><li>Ceasefire negotiated by regional powers to: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Provide UN mandate </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Establish three regions of control </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Demilitarize, disarm, and resettle, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>repatriate, and reintegrate </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>“ Genius” is that it </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Recognized overlapping layers of </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>inter-state and intra-state actors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Recognized security concerns of Rwanda & Uganda </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Runs counter to established rules that allow legitimate governments to seek and receive military assistance but not rebel movements </li></ul><ul><li>Legitimized rebels and sponsors; delegitimized rebels not present at the negotiations </li></ul><ul><li>Lacked real support of parties involved </li></ul>
<ul><li>GLOBAL AND INCLUSIVE AGREEMENT ON TRANSITION IN THE DRC </li></ul><ul><li>Intended to: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>End war </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Facilitate power sharing in transition government </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Rebuild national civil institutions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Establish election process </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Key players </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Five combatants </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Regional facilitator: Botswana </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Failed to achieve results </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rwanda, Uganda withdraw under separate agreements </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Transition government July 2003 </li></ul>Laurent Kabila assassinated 2001 son Joseph installed as president
Motivations Group Leader Security Political Economic Social FARDC Kabila army Congo ? +K RCD+ rebel East Congo -K $ MLC+ Bemba rebel North Congo -K $ CNDP Nkunda rebel East Congo X -K,-FDRL $ ! Mai Mai various militia East Congo X <K> $ ! FDRL "refugee" army East Congo -R $ *LRA Kony rebel North Congo -U $ RWANDA army Border X =K $ Uganda army Border X =K $ Zimbabwe army Congo X +K !
<ul><li>Cease Fire and Dialogues Fail </li></ul><ul><ul><li>East dominated by splinter rebel groups & militias with shifting alliances who fight for control </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Congo forces ineffective – looting </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Former combatants in integrated battalions riot frequently </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ongoing cross-border raids by Rwanda Hutu (FDLR) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Institutionalized corruption </li></ul><ul><li>Lucrative rebel/militia trade with Rwanda & Uganda </li></ul><ul><li>Endemic poverty and disease </li></ul>
Doctors Without Borders Team reports horrifying abuse suffered by Congolese diamond miners forcibly driven across the border into the DRC from their homes in mining areas in Angola. In addition to being tortured with fire and machetes during the day, men were forced to perform sexual acts on soldiers while women were raped. Prisons for miners are surrounded by anti-personnel mines to prevent escape, contain between 1000 and 2000 people. <ul><ul><li>Genocide continues </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mutilation and rape are tools of war </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Kidnapping for forced labor, military service, ransom </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Denial of services, infrastructure, and international aid deprives citizens of basic needs </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>US/Global Interests </li></ul><ul><li>Regional Stability </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Conflict and war in the Great Lakes region undermines US and EU goals in Africa–stability, anti-terrorism, increased trade, Millennium Development Goals </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Resource Wealth </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The world has much to gain from stable and just resource extraction </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Development and peace decreases the seemingly never-ending regional demand for foreign aid from the US and international community </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Humanitarian/Human Rights Credibility </li></ul><ul><ul><li>5.4 million deaths, 300,000 rapes, and continuing violence unacceptable by any value judgment </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>Background and Mandate </li></ul><ul><li>The signatories to the July 10, 1999 Lusaka Agreement called for UN peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire and disarm the various militant groups throughout the country (Article III, par. 11.a) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Security Council agrees to creation of MONUC on September 30, 1999 (Res. 1279) and approves deployment of 5,537 peacekeepers on February 24, 2000 (Res. 1291) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>MONUC 4-Phase Approach </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Phase I: Implement Ceasefire </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phase II: Monitor/Report Violations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phase III: DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phase IV: Facilitate Elections </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>Challenge of Size </li></ul><ul><li>Mandate of 5,537 peacekeepers inadequate for massive size of Congo and termed a “meaningless number” by Rwanda’s UN envoy Joseph Mutaboba </li></ul><ul><ul><li>African leaders requested 15,000-20,000 troops </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>France advocated 10,000 deployed immediately </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>U.S. Ambassador to UN Richard Holbrooke and Secretary of Defense William Cohen felt 5,000 troops should be the maximum </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Zimbabwe’s foreign minister Stan Mudenge was more direct, asking “Why does the UN act so quickly to [control] conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor but drags its feet when it comes to the DRC, Somalia and Rwanda? One cannot but wonder if the racial composition is the reason.” </li></ul>
<ul><li>Challenge of Scope </li></ul><ul><li>UN entered conflict under Lusaka framework </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that MONUC represented “the substitution of armed force for the rule of law” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ceasefire lacked internal legitimacy as signatories used it to pursue their own interests </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Laurent Kabila depended heavily on foreign militaries and Inter-Congolese Dialogue threatened monopoly on political power </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Rwanda and Uganda kept 10,000-20,000 troops in DRC and funded rebel groups </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Security vacuum left by withdrawing foreign forces </li></ul><ul><li>Phase III of mandate required broad, assertive operations </li></ul><ul><li>Developed countries unwilling to contribute troops (only Sweden) </li></ul>
<ul><li>Challenge of Tactics </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of infrastructure and credible central government required UN to bring all supplies in from out of country </li></ul><ul><li>Pursuing armed groups and forcing disarmament not seen as credible peacekeeping functions </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Further complicated by fact that targets feared returning home and had trouble assimilating </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Disarmament inextricably linked with political change </li></ul><ul><li>MONUC failed to meet expectations of host populations, thus delegitimizing both Lusaka Agreement and MONUC mandate </li></ul><ul><li>Difficulty to control/regulate valuable natural resources </li></ul><ul><li>Intrastate nature of conflict required high-level diplomatic pressure </li></ul>
<ul><li>Initial Security Focus </li></ul><ul><li>Phase I: Advance team sent to pave way for troop deployments (August 1999) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Warring parties exhibited initial resistance to even the advance team </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Phase II: Disengagement - Military observers, humanitarian assistance, and training Congolese police force </li></ul><ul><ul><li>MONUC infantry battalions approved to monitor disengagement of front line forces and protect foreign personnel; no active military engagement </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Due to continued violence and lack of U.S. support, first troops did not deploy until March 29, 2001; 1,869 by June, 2,408 by October </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Phase III: Withdraw foreign forces </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Accomplished by October 2002 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Increased MONUC troop mandate to fill security vacuum </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>Unrest in the East </li></ul><ul><li>Phase IV: DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration </li></ul><ul><ul><li>MONUC recognized ethnic tensions in the Northeast (Ituri), but only positioned 10 military observers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Intense violence spurred by Uganda </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Due to unwillingness for robust mandate, Security Council endorsed French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to pacify region (June 5, 2003) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>MONUC mandate increased to 10,800 troops and given full force authorization (July 28, 2003) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Phase V: Assist Transitional Government </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Robust operations against rebel groups; MONUC soldiers targeted </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Increased effectiveness of DDR – Battle in early 2005 encouraged over 13,000 Ituri militia to disarm from April to June </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>Brief Assessment </li></ul><ul><li>NEED INTERNAL ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE FRAMEWORK! </li></ul><ul><li>Phased approach intended to foster positive developments via the threat or “prospect” of intervention </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ignored the pressing need for security forces on the ground and eroded ceasefire legitimacy with extended delays </li></ul></ul><ul><li>MONUC achieved very limited, and long-delayed, successes in repatriating foreign forces and demilitarizing </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ethnic cleansing opened the world’s eyes to the need for robust operations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Once MONUC asserted itself, it was relatively effective </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Even with robust mandate, confusion of loyalties prevents effective protection of civilians </li></ul><ul><li>Lingering Questions </li></ul><ul><li>If UN/U.S. is unwilling or unable to intervene in a robust fashion, should regional actors be supported instead? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Empower Rwanda with a mandate to intervene, but then work closely with them to prevent abuses…? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Appropriate role for private sector peacekeepers under IPOA guidelines? </li></ul><ul><li>How to regulate natural resources? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Kimberley Process parallel for non-luxury goods in high demand? </li></ul></ul>
<ul><li>December 2008 </li></ul><ul><li>UN’s “Panel of Experts” publicly documents Rwandan support for Nkunda/CNDP </li></ul><ul><li>Sweden and Holland suspend aid to Rwanda, and the UK threatens to do the same </li></ul><ul><li>January/February 2009 </li></ul><ul><li>Laurent Nkunda arrested by Rwanda </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Leader of CNDP - Rwanda’s main proxy in Eastern Congo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nkunda had claimed to be fighting to protect Tutsi in Eastern Congo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nkunda was accused of war crimes and financed his operations through resources (coltan) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nkunda was becoming a liability for Rwanda </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Congo allows Rwandan troops to mount five-week operation to pursue FDLR within Eastern Congo </li></ul>
<ul><li>March 23, 2009 </li></ul><ul><li>CNDP signs peace agreement </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Signing overseen by special envoy Olusegun Obasanjo and head of MONUC </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CNDP agrees to become political party operating in North Kivu </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Questions Remain </li></ul><ul><li>What was the deal struck with Rwanda? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Arrest of Nkunda </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Allow Rwanda to operate in Congo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>DRC stops supporting FDLR </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CNDP goes from illegal militia to legitimate political party </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Why now? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Pressure was mounting on Paul Kagame from donors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nkunda was not a good proxy: loved media attention and was becoming more brutal </li></ul></ul><ul><li>What of the FDLR? </li></ul>
<ul><li>Preventing state failure is in the US/international community’s best interests. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Fully developing indigenous capabilities to provide internal security is necessary before disengagement. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Supporting corrupt leaders for separate security interests undermines indigenous state legitimacy. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Post-Failure Intervention </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Need internal acceptance of ceasefire/peace framework. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phased approach or the “prospect” of intervention inadequate to end violence. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Need for financial decentralization so that central government is not a zero-sum game. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Incentivize rebel soldiers into a national army with higher salaries and offer of stability. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>In resource conflict, intervention must address the demand side of commerce. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Kimberley Process? SEC Regulation… </li></ul></ul></ul>
<ul><li>“ The more the dead pile up, the more the killers become the focus, the dead only of interest as evidence.” </li></ul><ul><li>-Philip Gourevitch </li></ul><ul><li>“ A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.” </li></ul><ul><li>-Joseph Stalin </li></ul>
<ul><li>Francine Murengezi Ingabire </li></ul><ul><li>Age: 12 </li></ul><ul><li>Favorite Sport: Swimming </li></ul><ul><li>Favorite Food: Eggs and Chips </li></ul><ul><li>Favorite Drink: Milk and Fanta Tropical </li></ul><ul><li>Best Friend: Her Elder Sister Claudette </li></ul><ul><li>Cause of Death: Hacked by Machete </li></ul>