The Role of FIDO in a Cyber Secure Netherlands: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Rust.randy
1. "Requirements Driven versus Risk Informed Design"
Requirements Driven versus
Risk Informed Design
Randy Rust
SR&QA Lead,
Altair Project
Johnson Space Center
Sensitive But Unclassified– For NASA Internal Use Only
2. Transportation Components of Program
Constellation
Earth Departure
Stage
Crew Exploration
Vehicle
Heavy Lift
Launch
Vehicle
Lunar
Crew Launch Lander
Vehicle
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3. Typical Lunar Reference Mission
MOON
Vehicles are not to scale.
Ascent Stage
100 km Lander Performs LOI Expended
Low Lunar
Orbit
Earth Departure
Stage Expended Service
Low Module
Earth Expended
Orbit
EDS, Lander
CEV
Direct Entry
Land Landing
EARTH
3
4. Altair Lunar Lander
♦ 4 crew to and from the surface
• Seven days on the surface
• Lunar outpost crew rotation
♦ Global access capability
♦ Anytime return to Earth
♦ Capability to land 14 to 17
metric tons of dedicated cargo
♦ Airlock for surface activities
♦ Descent stage:
• Liquid oxygen / liquid hydrogen
propulsion
♦ Ascent stage:
• Hypergolic Propellants or Liquid
oxygen/methane
4
5. Design Approach
♦ Project examined the multitude of concepts developed in the post-ESAS era, took
lessons learned and began to develop a real design.
♦ Altair took a true risk informed design approach, starting with a minimum
functionality design and adding from there to reduce risk.
♦ Lunar Design Analysis Cycle (LDAC) 1 developed a “minimum functional”
vehicle.
• “Minimum Functionality” is a design philosophy that begins with a vehicle that will perform the
mission, and no more than that
• Does not consider contingencies
• Does not have added redundancy (“single string” approach)
• Provides early, critical insight into the overall viability of the end-to-end architecture
• Provides a starting point to make informed cost/risk trades and consciously buy down risk
• A “Minimum Functionality” vehicle is NOT a design that would ever be contemplated as a
“flyable” design!
♦ LDAC-2 determined the most significant contributors to loss of crew (LOC) and
the optimum cost/risk trades to reduce those risks.
♦ LDAC-3 (current LDAC) is assessing biggest contributors to loss of mission
(LOM) and optimum cost/risk trades to reduce those risks.
♦ Goal of the design process is to do enough real design work to understand and
develop the requirements for SRR.
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6. Lander Design Analysis Cycle 1
♦ Lander design process kicked off with Design Analysis Cycle 1
♦ Took a “minimal functionality” approach for LDAC-1
♦ LDAC-1 completed November 2007
Jun 07 Sept 07 Dec 07 Mar 08 Jun 08 Sept 08 Dec 08 Mar 09 Jun 09 Sept 09
CxP LCCR
LDAC-1 Minimum Functional Vehicle
In-House Design
LDAC-2 Safety / Reliability Upgrades (LOC)
Effort
Upgraded Flyable Vehicle
LDAC-3 Additional safety, reliability and
functionality (LOM); Global access
LDAC-4
Upgraded Flyable Vehicle
Close the gap with the CARD
LDAC-X
Requirements Development
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7. New Philosophy Needed
♦ For previous programs and projects, the general thought was to
apply a failure tolerance philosophy
• One failure tolerant for loss of mission failures, and two failure tolerant to prevent loss of
crew.
♦ For the Lander, where mass is extremely critical, this philosophy
alone will not yield an optimal design solution.
• There are ways other than redundancy to improve reliability and still reduce the risk of loss
of crew.
♦ We needed a new philosophy where we could develop a spacecraft
that provides a required level of safety for the crew and is reliable
enough to perform the mission.
• Defined the minimum set of functions necessary to accomplish the mission objectives.
• Made it work. Created the simplest & lowest mass conceptual design of the contemplated
system.
• Consistent with NESC RP-06-108, Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E)
Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems)
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8. LDAC-1 Starting Point
♦ ‘Hard’ Requirements
• 4 Crew
• 7 Day Sortie
• 210 Day Outpost
• Airlock (implemented on sortie mission only)
• CxP transportation architecture
− 8.4 meter shroud, TLI Loads, Lander performs LOI burn, CEV IRD, etc
• Control Mass
− Total Lander mass at TLI for crewed missions: 45,000 kg
− Total Lander mass at TLI for cargo missions: 53,600 kg
♦ 3 DRMs with Mission Timelines and Functional Allocations
• Sortie Mission to South Pole
− 4 Crew / 7 Days on Surface / No support from surface assets
− No restrictions on ‘when’ (accommodating eclipse periods)
• Outpost Mission to South Pole
− 4 Crew with Cargo Element (LAT Campaign option 2)
− Outpost provides habitation on surface (down and out)
− 210 Days with surface support (power)
• Cargo Mission to South Pole
− Short duration, large payload
♦ One Lander design, with variants (kits) if required for the different DRMs
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9. Results of LDAC1
Sortie Variant Outpost Variant
45,000 kg 45,000 kg
Descent Module Descent Module
Ascent Module Ascent Module
Airlock
Avionics Power
Mass Available for Payload
Structures and Mechanisms
Manager's Reserve
Propulsion
Thermal Control
Life Support Cargo Variant
Other 53,600 kg
Non-Propellant Fluids Descent Module
Cargo on Upper Deck
Propellant
Sortie Mission Lander
Mass distribution 9
10. Lander Design Analysis Cycle 2
♦ LDAC2's focus was to buy down the Loss of Crew (LOC) safety risks in the point of
departure design.
♦ LDAC2 completion date was May 2008.
Jun 07 Sept 07 Dec 07 Mar 08 Jun 08 Sept 08 Dec 08 Mar 09 Jun 09 Sept 09
CxP LCCR
LDAC-1 Minimum Functional Vehicle
In-House Design
LDAC-2 Safety / Reliability Upgrades (LOC)
Effort
Upgraded Flyable Vehicle
LDAC-3 Additional safety, reliability and
functionality (LOM); Global access
LDAC-4
Upgraded Flyable Vehicle
Close the gap with the CARD
LDAC-X
Requirements Development
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11. Overview of LDAC-2 risk buy back process
System Teams
DAC1 Vehicle Top Risks Develop Options &
Baseline LOC Divided into 33 Tasks Safety estimates LOC
For Each Option
Task Options Chosen
By Mass ∆ and LOC ∆
Task’s Option LOC System Level Rolled Up DAC2
Rolled Up to System Level to Vehicle Level Baseline LOC
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12. Example Risk Buyback Task:
#33, Improve Comm System Reliability
♦ Purpose: Improve Comm System Reliability to be able to update the state
vector
♦ Brief description of problem addressed by your task
• There are currently 6 single point failures that could cause loss of the state vector
input to the bus to the flight computer. This study identifies several options increase
communications reliability.
• Inability to obtain state vector results in LOC for ascent.
Proposed Solutions:
• (A) Redundancy with 2 SDRs (instead of XPDR’s), cross-strapped to single
diplexer/antenna pair (common EVA comm)
• (B1) PA/LNA Bypass (with switches)
• (B2) PA/LNA Bypass (with cables - IFM)
• (C) Redundancy with 1 XPDR & 1 Dissimilar comm system
• (D) Redundancy with 2 XPDRs, cross-strapped to single diplexer/antenna
pair
• (E1) Full Redundancy with 2 SDRs strings (common EVA comm)
• (E2) Full Redundancy with 2 XPDRs strings
• (E3) Full Redundancy, 1 XPDR & 1 SDR strings (common EVA comm)
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13. Example Risk Buyback Task: #33, Improve Comm System Reliability
Graphical Summary of Options
(Baseline)
(D)
(E1)
(B2)
(E2)
(E3)
(C)
Top Contenders:
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14. Another Example: Active Thermal
L D A C 2 T h erm al S y s tem O p tio n s (D elta Mas s V s . L O C ) vs. LOC)
(Unallocated Differential
1.00E ‐01
B as eline L D A C 1_delta
O ption A 1 dual internal loop
O ption A 1f dual internal loop
O ption B 1 dual c ritic al
c omponents
O ption C 1 emergenc y loop
O ption C 1f emergenc y loop
P robability
O ption D 1 s ublimator driven
1.00E ‐02
c oldplate
O ption E 1 fully redundant loops
O ption E 1fh fully redundant loops
O ption E 1f fully redundant loops
O ption F 1 s ingle loops with
redundant c omponents
O ption G 1 mix and matc h
O ption G 1f mix and matc h
1.00E ‐03
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
UnallocatedDe lta Ma ss (K g .) (kg)
Differential
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15. LDAC-2 Overview
♦ The initial Lander Design and Analysis Cycles (May-November 2007) created a
“minimal functionality” lander design that serves as a baseline upon which to add
safety, reliability and functionality back into the design with known changes to
performance, cost and risk.
♦ LDAC-2 completed in May 2008. Goal was to “buy down” Loss of Crew (LOC) risks.
♦ “Spent” approximately 1.3 t to buy down loss of crew (LOC) risks.
♦ “Spent” an additional 680kg on design maturity.
P a y lo a d M a s s to S u rfa c e - C re w S o rtie LO C
(45.0 m t c ontrol m as s ; perform anc e reflec ts M G A and P M R )
0 .1 7 0 .1 6 6
4000
3651 CA RD s p e c 0 .1 2
3500 p a y lo a d ma s s
C AR D S p e c
P LO C
3000
0 .0 7
B o tto ms -u p L D AC P L O C
2500
DA C p a y lo a d
ma s s 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 5
2000
kg
0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4
1671
1500 Pa ra me tric f u lly -0 .0 3 L D AC -1 1 1 /0 7 L D AC 2 * 0 5 /0 8
f u n c tio n a l
1000 p a y lo a d ma s s LDAC
500 500 500
0 * Note: Based on simplified models that address identified risks.
LD A C -1 LD A C -2
11/07 5/08
D A C /D a te
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16. Lessons Learned During Risk
Buy-down
♦ Full redundancy was usually heaviest, frequently NOT most effective for
improving LOC
• Conclusion may be different for LOM
♦ Quantitative risk tool was necessary to inform good design decisions
• Always necessary to correlate engineering judgment with tool results
• Tool forces team to reconsider
• However, cannot rely solely on tool results. Must be able to technically explain
decision.
♦ A risk tool the designers can interact with is a significant aid – improves
tool and design
• e.g., when a result did not correlate with engineering experience, designers could
easily understand model in tool. Sometimes changed model and sometimes did not.
♦ Designing for minimum risk
• results in lower weight design
• is much harder and time consuming than simply adding redundancy
• But, design team ends up much more intelligent on risk and design
drivers
♦ Design for Minimum Risk is the way to go if you are trying to build a smart
design team
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