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  1. 1. Commercial Crew Insight/Oversight Model Recommendations Frank H. Bauer Project Management Challenge February 9-10,
  2. 2. OverviewObjective Develop an insight/oversight model that will contribute to the safe flight and safe return of NASA crew members on commercial space vehiclesCo-Leads Wayne Hale/DAA SOMD-Strategic Partnerships Frank Bauer/ESMD Chief Engineer 2
  3. 3. ApproachSurvey different insight/oversight models (Human SpaceFlight, Launch Services Program, Robotic Spacecraft,COTS, Commercial)Factor in results from Constellation Insight/Oversight studyteam and NESC Hybrid Team Model White PaperAddress Technical Authority Engagement, FAAengagement and review team requirementsDevelop insight/oversight engagement strategy proposalObtain feedback & advice on proposed strategy fromagency senior leaders, crew office, key stakeholdersVet final product through HSF Mission Directorates, OCE,OSMA, OCHMO, Crew Office, CxP Insight/Oversight team,JSC Engineering 3
  4. 4. Insight and Oversight DefinitionsInsight The capacity to discern the true nature of the project’s efforts to design, develop, test and operate the vehicle system. It is NASA’s ability to penetrate into the commercial crew provider’s processes and their vehicle design, development, test and operations in an effort to certify the vehicle for human spaceflight operations and to improve the safety of operations and mission success.Oversight The watchful and responsible care and management of the commercial crew development, test and operations efforts. This is accomplished through overseeing the performance of the provider’s vehicle design, development and test efforts and their ability to certify their vehicle for safe human transportation. As such, there are elements of oversight which will require government approval and/or direction. 4
  5. 5. Spectrum of Insight/Oversight Models Low/No In/Oversight Medium In/Oversight Intense In/Oversight Human Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted Spaceflight ~1:250-1:10 ~1:10-1:4 COTS & Launch Services CRS Program ~1:17 ~1:80-1:20Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio
  6. 6. Insight and Technical Engagement OverviewInsight Model Utilize technical expert engagement, and technical reach-back approach similar to that used on the Launch Services Program, robotic spacecraft projects and COTS Advisory Team Use NESC approach to temporarily bring in experts to resolve major issues and ramp down expertise when complete—results in a more efficient use of NASA’s technical resources Government/industry partnership—must have Civil Servants on contractor floor • Facilitates much better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of vehicle design, build, test & operations--in line with NASA insight on Mercury, Gemini and Apollo In-depth government subsystem penetration which varies temporally and based on historic failure risk, contractor subsystem expertise, and design challenges • Core team follows design, development, test and verification • Assigns right experts at the right time • More experts assigned on challenging, high risk areas (e.g. abort systems, etc) 6
  7. 7. Commercial Crew Temporal Insight Support RecommendationInsightSupport Problem Resolution Team Example Sustaining Insight Mission Preliminary Critical Mate Launch Concept Design Design Review Review Review Review Key Decision Points In addition to Sustaining Engineering Expertise, Cadre of Agency ExpertsBrought in at Key Decision Points to Thoroughly Review and Critique Design 7
  8. 8. Risk-Informed Subsystem Engagement Based on perceived vehicle risk and historic failures, concentrate/augment insight in key areas:Risk-informed Concentration Propulsion 54% Pneumatics and Propulsion hydraulics 3% GN&C Operational ordnance 6% Avionics Structures 6% Software Electrical systems Guidance and 9% Software and Electrical navigation systems 13% computing systems 1980 -2007 9% Crew Systems Worldwide Launch Failure Causes Separation Systems Reference: FAA Launch Vehicle Failure Mode Database, May 2007Nominal Concentration (e.g. Power Thermal, Structures, Mission Operations, Ground Operations, PRA Experts, ECLS, Suit) These Experts and the Systems Engineering Team Comprise the Government Sustaining Insight Team 8
  9. 9. ClarificationsContractors supporting government employees, programmanagement, and programmatic administration personnel allbook-kept under government side of insight/oversight modelsRamp-up and Ramp-down of agency experts to support keymilestone reviews and problem resolution teams is an essentialcomponent of this model• Will require good coordination between program office and agency institutional expert pool; work prioritization• NASA has many good examples of this approach working for Human Spaceflight, Launch Services and Robotic Spacecraft• NESC represents the best example of this model working for NASA’s better goodGovernment lab independent testing not included at this time 9
  10. 10. Oversight Decision StrategyOversight Model NASA Oversight Decisions and Direction performed only when absolutely necessary---discrete oversight vs. current near-continuous oversight Follow well defined and documented design rules and processes—(e.g. GSFC Golden Rules, mandatory design and fabrication requirements) Requires Strong NASA Leadership that will implement discrete oversight strategy—Project Manager, Chief Engineer, Chief Safety Officer & Systems Engineering 10
  11. 11. Government Oversight ModelsOversight Decisions & Direction Current (Near -Continuous) Oversight Model MCR PDR CDR Mate LaunchOversight Decisions Review Lifecycle Timeline & Direction Commercial Crew (Discrete) Oversight Model MCR PDR CDR Mate Launch Review Lifecycle Timeline Development Production & Ops Oversight Decisions and Direction Substantially Less and More Focused in Commercial Crew Model 11
  12. 12. Commercial Crew Program and Projects Government Insight/Oversight Teams Commercial Crew Role: Makes Government Program Office Oversight Decisions Oversight Team Project A Project B Project C Project DInsight Team Insight Team Insight Team Insight TeamRole: Expert Insight, Early Issue Identification & Oversight Recommendations 12
  13. 13. Government-Commercial Insight/Oversight Interactions Program Office Commercial Crew Oversight Team Discrete Provider Oversight Decisions & Understanding & Direction OversightRecommendations Insight Project Embedded Insight Team Penetration, Team Collaboration, & Influence 13
  14. 14. Technical Authority EngagementTechnical Authorities, ISS Rep, Crew Office Rep and FAA Rep areembedded, matrixed from home organizations as the SystemsEngineering Team leadersLeadership roles include Chief Engineer (OCE TA), Chief SafetyOfficer (OSMA TA), Chief Health/Medical (OCHMO TA), ISS Rep(ensures ISS Safety and Requirements Compliance), Crew OfficeRep (ensures crew safety, vehicle compatibility with crew, andcrew training approach) and FAA Rep (ensures FAA requirementscompliance)Additional cadre of senior systems experts support systemsengineering leadership team and perform SE oversightTAs will work with Program and Agency to appropriately tailor7120/7123 and NASA requirements and standards to support thecommercial crew model 14
  15. 15. NASA Participation in Major ReviewsCivil Servant Sustaining Insight/Oversight Team, consisting ofsystems engineers, relevant subsystem experts, and cognizantFAA experts, serve as members of NASA Review Team (NRT) NASA Review Team is augmented with other independentexperts from NASA, FAA or industry as appropriateTechnical, Cost, Schedule presented to NASA Review Team atKey Decision Points, in-line with NPR 7120.5 and NPR 7123requirementsNRT review products include key findings, concerns, actions andrecommendations, similar to Key Decision Point (KDP) milestonedecision productsNRT contract reach-in primarily limited to supporting majorreviews, as compared to current, more continuous StandingReview Board (SRB) model 15
  16. 16. Insight/Oversight Model Recommendation Low/No In/Oversight Medium In/Oversight Intense In/Oversight Human Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted Spaceflight ~1:250-1:10 ~1:10-1:4 Commercial Crew Insight- Oversight COTS & Launch Services “Sweet CRS ~1:17 Program Spot” ~1:80-1:20Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio
  17. 17. SummaryOverall Summary Examined NASA’s safety and mission reliability role in the commercial spaceflight market and explored and recommended an insight/oversight model for commercial crew systems Provides recommendations for the right balance of civil servant workforce insight/oversight that will contribute to the safe flight & return of NASA crew members on commercial vehiclesKey Message Recommendations represent a Huge Culture Shift in NASA’s development of Human Spaceflight Vehicles Culture changes require outstanding, effective culture change leadership within the commercial crew leadership team to move the agency on the right course To be successful, team must simultaneously embrace criticality of safe, reliable flight and adopt insight/oversight changes necessary to accomplish in a commercial crew environment Crucial for agency senior leadership to invest time---early and often—to guide and mentor the NASA commercial crew teams to be successful in this culture change endeavor. Culture change inertia can only be overcome through actively engaged senior leadership setting the proper course 17
  18. 18. Backup
  19. 19. AcknowledgementsRalph Roe/NESCAlan Lindenmoyer/C3POGeoff Yoder/ESMDMarc Timm/ESMDMike Ryschkewitsch/OCEBryan O’Connor/OSMAEngineering Management Board (EMB) and Safety and MissionAssurance team membersMark Geyer and Mark Kirasich/Orion ProjectKathy Leuders and Amy Stencil/ISS CRS ProjectCxP Insight/Oversight Assessment Subteam 19
  20. 20. Forward Work1) NASA needs to develop a well defined decision authority with clearly defined roles and responsibilities (ESMD, SOMD, program, project, agency institution, other)2) NASA Governance Model has potential for being an insight/oversight driver • Need to tailor NPR 7120/7123/8705.2 early in program formulation • Full complement of design, fabrication and test standards, processes and requirements need to be defined and negotiated between the project and the institution • Direct or Perceived role of Technical Authorities critical in option development3) Certification of Flight Readiness Process a critical driver • CoFR signatories will require more or less insight depending on how this process is structured. • Need to define CoFR process early-on to guide assignment of accountability • This should be a high priority effort • Factor in lessons learned from OSP 20
  21. 21. Forward Work (Continued)4) Procurement must be structured to enable badge-less government “in-reach” by the insight team and strong financial incentives which shift mission success to the provider and their suppliers as an accountable deliverable5) Crucial to identify clear goals, objectives, requirements, and vehicle operability (ground and flight operations) constraints early6) Once the vendor is selected, the early identification of risks (cost, schedule, technical, safety) will drive oversight model FTE requirements7) Development, prior to provider selection, of a compiled list of pre- declared independent analyses to be performed by the insight team and test verifications that will be reviewed by the insight team. 21