Strategies for the war on terrorism [compatibility mode]


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Strategies for the war on terrorism [compatibility mode]

  1. 1. STRATEGIESfor the WAR on TERRORISM ~from a Japanese perspective ~ December 4th, 2002 CAPT. Takamichi Takahashi JAPAN MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE
  2. 2. OVERVIEW• Introduction• The objective of the war and the desired end state• The enemy Who or what is the enemy? The characteristics of the enemy The enemy’s strength and weakness• The strategy for the War on terrorism• Conclusion
  3. 3. INTRODUCTION(1/2)● QUESTION & PHENOMENON How does the coalition for the war on terrorism terminate the war? Will the theater be expanded beyond Afghanistan? What is the objective of the war? Bombings in the Philippines ; the Bali Bombing The number of terrorist organizations increases from 29 to 33 a bad omen for regeneration and the rise of new threats● THE CAUSE OF THE PHENOMENON • Lack of discussion on the objective and the desired end state (No strategy for how to terminate the war ) • no clear definition of the enemy courses of action are producing the bad effects.
  4. 4. INTRODUCTION(2/2)Objective and desired end state of the war Definition of the enemy Characteristics of the enemy STRATEGY What should international society do?What should international society consider?
  5. 5. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WAR● WHAT’S NEW AFTER 9-11? Mass murder resulting from terrorism is realized. (Concern for terrorism by WMD; Possible to visualize a tactical scene of a war) Al-Qaeda has a sizable base and network (A kind of peer competitor against nation states) Challenge to international order (None can try to change the status quo of international relations through violence.) (To accept diversity, and seek commonalities)● OBJECTIVETo safeguard the international order from sizable andindiscriminate attacks by organizations such as al-Qaeda
  6. 6. THE DESIRED END STATE● WHAT INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY CAN DO It is impossible for anyone to eliminate terrorism Can weaken terrorists Can prevent terrorists from conducting sizable or successful operations● PRACTICAL DESIRED END STATE To weaken terrorists to the extent to which it cannot conduct sizable or successful operations (After reaching this state) The war must be terminated
  7. 7. THE ENEMY(1/6)● WHO or WHAT IS THE ENEMY?• BUSH’s DEFINITION Our war on terror…will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. by President Bush, Sep.20th, 2001 every terrorist group of global reach is too ambiguous as the definition ○ “terrorist” itself is ambiguous e.g Pearl Harbor ? A-Bomb ? SNIPER around DC area ? Chechnya? Sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo? Bali Bombing? ○ There are some terrorists which are definitely not the enemy. ○ It is impossible for anyone to implement this statement.No universal definition of terrorism, but a definition of the enemy is required
  8. 8. THE ENEMY(2/6)• WHAT IS TERRORISM? • The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) 2656f(d) • The term means “the intentional” use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism Common points; 1. the use of violence 2. political (social) aim or motivation 3. targets include civilians (noncombatants) Terrorism can be generalized as indiscriminate violence in order to achieve a political objective
  9. 9. THE ENEMY(3/6)• THE DEFINITION OF THE ENEMY Terrorism can be generalized as indiscriminate violence in order to achieve a political objectiveThis is still too broad. The suicide bombing by Hamas/Hizballah must match with this definition. but International society requested for Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities, last March. United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1402 inconsistency Back to the objectiveThe terrorism as the enemy of the war : 1. Method used is indiscriminate (mass) murder 2. Objective is to challenge the current international order 3. Organization is sizable and is a peer competitor against nation states
  10. 10. THE ENEMY(4/6)● THE CHARACTERISICS OF THE ENEMY Three characteristics: 1. The enemy has a criminal aspect. Domestically, terrorists have been treated as a kind of criminal, because violence is illegal. 2. The enemy is a transnational organization. 3. The enemy is a sort of human “network” or a “network” with a radical value system. ENEMY STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES
  11. 11. THE ENEMY(5/6)● THE ENEMY’S STRENGTH & WEAKNESSES • STRENGTH 1. The enemy can act within the loopholes of multilateral cooperation. Country: B Execute Country: A PLAN HIDE Country: C 2. Leaders & members of the organization cannot quit and propose to change their strategy and tactics. (change mind : treachery) 3. The enemy can find potential recruits and shelter among the people, who do not approve violence but do have sympathy. (Northern Ireland, Basque) 4. There are a lot of groups which might join the enemy under specific conditions. (E.g. Abu Sayyef: before the war: foreigner was target of kidnapping after the war broke out: bombing targets on foreigner ) nonnegotiable, non-deterrable, sustainable
  12. 12. THE ENEMY(6/6)• WEAKNESSES The enemy needs continuously large scale or effective operations. The bigger the operation they try to plan, the more conspicuous the movement makes them. (The more communication, more money flow, and more activities must be required.) In order to conduct a big operation, the enemy cannot keep its covert status and will hurt its strength. We can hunt down the enemy.
  13. 13. THE STRATEGY (1/8)● BASIC CONCEPT We cannot deter the enemy. We cannot eliminate the enemy. We can huntdown (arrest or kill) the terrorists.Strategy:Weakening the enemy to the level on which it can not conduct sizable &effective operation, by arresting or killing. Model of attrition Groups Groups The People ENEMY Groups (Pool of recruits) Reducing the enemy’s pool of recruits Hunting + & groups to join the network
  14. 14. THE STRATEGY (2/8)● REDUCING ENEMY’S POOL OF RECRUITS AND THE GROUPS TO JOIN THE NETWORK • ENGAGING APPROACH : difficult To eliminate “the root cause” of poverty and premodern political system (political, economical, social, educational reform/aid) This approach must touch cultural issues or people’s values. If you are explicitly told by anyone that ‘your culture is bad, the level of your education is low you are poor, and therefore you may join terrorist”, what would be your response? Before the reform is completed, some people may begin to feel sympathy for the enemy and join them.
  15. 15. THE STRATEGY (3/8)• MODERATE COURSETo avoid the bad effect by activities, including the reform, to fight on terrorism Four groups of considerations 1. Engaging approach: avoiding the impression of compulsion • Change of culture or social system must be gradually realized through practice and experience of the people • It must be made clear that such an aid as educational and humanitarian aid will be provided in response to the receiver’s request. • The aid through NGO or an international organization such as UNICEF is better than that directly provided by a foreign government. • Government aid must not be flaunted in this case. Continued on the next page
  16. 16. THE STRATEGY (4/8)• MODERATE COURSE (cont.) 2. It must be careful to label a group as a part or an ally of the enemy. Objective of the group must be examined. Clear evidence of the cooperation with the existing enemy must be required. Absayeef became more radical after labeling. (?) Xinjian became relatively quiet after 9-11. (?) 3. Law enforcement efforts by a national government are better received than measures that include military force. Even if the military are employed, the mission should be taken over by domestic law enforcement agency as soon as possible. Continued on the next page
  17. 17. THE STRATEGY (5/8)• MODERATE COURSE (cont.) 4. A foreign policy, which may relate to terrorism but has an ambiguous must be carefully handled. (e.g Iraqi issue ) (Origin) NPT and regional stability issue → (after 9-11) linked to “terrorism” People think this as just an excuse to justify the attack on Iraq. + Sympathize with Iraq as the member of the same religious group. antagonism toward the United States antagonism : individual level → country level
  18. 18. THE STRATEGY (6/8)● HUNTING DOWN THE ENEMY In order to conduct a big operation, the enemy cannot keep its covert status.What becomes noticeable ?a node of the network:a party of people including a local leader. a Hunting nodes is a practical way to weaken the enemy Means: law enforcement, military, intelligence, finance etc
  19. 19. THE STRATEGY (7/8)• LAW ENFROCEMENTLaw enforcement agencies must be the main force in home land.• Terrorist node is usually criminal in nature in light of domestic law• The government should not use the military on its own people.• The law enforcement agency has the know-how to search facilitiesand arrest suspicious people without impacting on local society.The coalition needs to establish a network of law enforcementagencies.In home land, the military must be support force. e.g. consequence management, equipment, intelligence
  20. 20. THE STRATEGY (8/8)• MILITARY○ Military becomes the primary force in the case that the enemyescapes into a nation, which harbors to the enemy, or where theenemy locate itself outside of areas of government contorol.○ International cooperation is critical. Necessity of access to the geographic theater & sustainability Careless use of military may harm international cooperation for the law enforcement efforts. • Sharing a common definition of the enemy and sharing information (intelligence) as proof of the enemy’s existence in the nation or area. • The use of the military must be decided by the international scheme or process.
  21. 21. CONCLUSION(1/2) OBJECTIVE To secure the current international order from sizable and indiscriminate attacks from terrorist organizations. ENEMY 1. the method is indiscriminate (mass) murder 2. the objective is to challenge the current international order 3. the organization is sizable and a peer competitor of a nation stateSTRATEGY: Model of Attrition Reducing the enemy’s pool of recruits and Hunting down the enemy’s node groups which joining the enemy. Law Military Four considerations enforcement Reform/Aid Two conditions to avoid bad effect International cooperation
  22. 22. CONCLUSION(2/2)● WHAT SHOULD JAPAN DO?As a member of international society, Japan should commit itself this campaign.● WHAT SHOULD JAPAN DO, IN THE CASE OF THE US UNILATERALISM? Japan should continue to support the United States. • The more countries leave from the coalition, the weaker international cooperation will be. • In the short term, there is no alternative for the security strategy of Japan. This is only option for the Japanese government to take. Some people willstrongly oppose it and begin to think of the necessity of alternatives. In the long term, this issue might be fatal for Japan-US relations. Japan should convince the US government to pay attention to international cooperation.
  23. 23. Any ThankQuestion? you.