Fiduciary
Responsibilities &
Risk
New Jersey Society of CPAs
Audit of Employee Benefits Conference May 26, 2011
Mark D. Mensack, AIFA®
Piedmont Independent Fiduciaries
Joanne Szupka, CPA
Roland J. O’Brien, CPA
Robert A. Lavenberg, CPA, JD, LL.M
BDO USA, LLP

AGENDA
• Fiduciary Risks & Responsibilities
• Challenges to fulfilling fiduciary obligations
• Techniques to overcome these challenges
American Institute of CPAs 2

Who is a Fiduciary?
• “A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and
on behalf of another in a particular matter in
circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and
confidence.”
Bristol & West Building Society v Mathew
• A fiduciary is anyone “exercising any discretionary
authority or control regarding the management or
disposition of plan assets…”
ERISA §3(21)(A)
American Institute of CPAs 3

Two General Types of Fiduciaries
Named Fiduciary - Someone specifically named in the
plan document, or appointed by the plan sponsor.
Functional Fiduciary – Someone who acts in a fiduciary
capacity based on their job duties or responsibilities with
respect to a plan.
Individuals serving on investment committees, selecting service providers
to a plan, and/or having influence or any discretionary authority over
a plan are typically considered to be Functional Fiduciaries.
American Institute of CPAs 4

Are you a Functional Fiduciary?
• Do you exercise authority, control, or influence in managing the
plan?
▫ Who chose the salesperson?
▫ Who chose the product or service provider?
▫ Who chose the investment options in the plan?
▫ Who selects, monitors, or replaces investment options?
▫ Do you ever tell a participant how to invest their 401k?
▫ Do you ever approve a broker’s recommendations?
American Institute of CPAs 5

A Fiduciary
• Fiduciary status is determined either:
intentionally by being specifically named or appointed; or
unintentionally by the functions one performs
• Functions whereby one exercises authority, control or
influence over the plan are fiduciary functions:
▫ Hiring or firing service providers
▫ Selecting or changing investment options
▫ Making decisions, including approval of
recommendations
American Institute of CPAs 6

The ORC/Infogroup Survey
August 19-23, 2010
• 60% of U.S. investors mistakenly think that “insurance
agents” have a fiduciary duty to their clients.
• 66% of U.S. investors are incorrect in thinking that
stockbrokers are held to a fiduciary duty.
• 76% of investors are wrong in believing that “financial
advisors” – a term used by brokerage firms to describe
their salespeople - are held to a fiduciary duty.
American Institute of CPAs 7

Non-Fiduciary Service Providers
• Record-keepers
• Third-Party Administrators (TPA)
• Auditors
• CPA’s
• Stock Brokers = “Financial Advisors/Consultants”
• Insurance Agents
American Institute of CPAs 8

Fiduciary Service Providers
• Trust Company
• Registered Investment Advisors
▫ Necessarily assumes non-ERISA fiduciary status under
the Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940
• Independent Fiduciaries who by contract assume:
▫ ERISA 3(21) Fiduciary Status
▫ ERISA 3(38) Fiduciary Status
American Institute of CPAs 9

Personal Liability
• A fiduciary is personally liable for any losses the plan incurs by reason of
its breach. A fiduciary who has breached its duty is liable to restore to the
plan any profits the fiduciary made through its use of plan assets and for
any other equitable or remedial relief deemed appropriate by the
court, including removal of the fiduciary.
ERISA § 409
• The DOL can also access a civil penalty against a fiduciary who breached
its duty or any person who knowingly participated in a breach in the
amount of 20% of the amount recovered in a settlement with the DOL or
awarded in a civil suit.
ERISA § 502(l)
American Institute of CPAs 10

Personal Liability
LaRue vs. DeWolfe – February 20th, 2008 the Supreme Court
decided that individual employees can sue their employer for
breach of fiduciary responsibility.
“The threat to employers from an explosion of suits is real…I
think it's meaningful for employers because it will open up the
flood gates with respect to litigation." Ken Raskin, White & Case
Goldenberg vs. Indel Corporation (Rancocas, NJ)
1st Fiduciary Breach Lawsuit in Southern NJ
American Institute of CPAs 11

Newark Star-Ledger
August 28th, 2010
American Institute of CPAs 12

A Breach of Fiduciary Responsibility
could result in:
• Extinction-level event for your firm
• Negative impact on the retirement security of your
employees
• Financial ruin for you and other firm leadership
• Criminal penalties including imprisonment:
▫ ERISA Section 501 contains criminal fines of up to $5,000
with potential imprisonment of up to a year.
▫ Sarbanes-Oxley increased these to a maximum of $100,000
with potential imprisonment of 10 years.
American Institute of CPAs 13

Fiduciary Risk
• Fiduciary responsibility carries personal liability.
• There is no “corporate veil” for fiduciaries.
• DOL Sanctions can be between 20%-50% of plan assets.
• The 2008 LaRue decision permits individual participants to
sue plan sponsors for fiduciary breaches.
• The Plaintiff ’s Bar sees over $3 trillion in US 401k assets.
• There are potential criminal penalties including
imprisonment
American Institute of CPAs 14

What is Fiduciary Responsibility?
• Act solely in the interest of plan participants and their beneficiaries
and with the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them;
• Carry out your duties prudently;
• Follow the plan documents (unless inconsistent with ERISA);
• Diversify plan investments; and
• Pay only reasonable plan expenses.
• Fiduciary obligations are among the “highest known to the law.”
Brussian v. RJR Nabisco, 5th Circuit Court, 2000
American Institute of CPAs 15

ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility Overview
• Duty of Prudence – A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries :
-with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims;
ERISA § 404 (a)(i)(b)
• Duty of Exclusive Purpose - “A fiduciary shall discharge his duties .
. for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. . . .”
ERISA §404(a)(1)(A)
American Institute of CPAs 16

ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility Overview
• Duty to Diversify – A fiduciary must diversify investments so as to minimize
the risk of large losses. Where participants make the investment decisions, at
least three diversified investment option with materially different
potential risk and reward characteristics must be available.
ERISA § 404 (a)(1)(C)
• Duty to follow plan documents unless contrary to ERISA - A fiduciary
must discharge his/her “duties in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of Titles I and IV of ERISA.
ERISA §404(a)(1)(D)
American Institute of CPAs 17

ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility Overview
• Duty to avoid Prohibited Transactions
ERISA 406 (a)(1)(c) prohibits all transactions between a plan and a
party in interest, and lists several specific transactions that constitute
self-dealing or a conflict of interest. Existing ERISA 408(b)(2) provides
exemptions to ERISA 406 (a)(1)(c) if three requirements are met:
▫ The service must be necessary for the establishment or operation
of the plan.
▫ The service must be furnished under a contract that is reasonable.
▫ No more than reasonable compensation may be paid for the
service.
American Institute of CPAs 18

Fees, Expenses & Compensation
“assure that the compensation paid directly or indirectly by [a plan to a
service provider] is reasonable, taking into account the services provided
to the plan as well as any other fees or compensation received by [the
service provider] in connection with the investment of plan assets. The
responsible plan fiduciaries therefore must obtain sufficient
information regarding any fees or other compensation that [the
service provider] receives with respect to the plans investments
….to make an informed decision whether the [service providers]
compensation for services is no more than reasonable.”
DOL - Frost (97-15A) and Aetna (97-16A)
American Institute of CPAs 19

Fees, Expenses & Compensation
The DOL has taken the position that fiduciaries have a duty to
know and evaluate indirect payments. In performing that
evaluation, fiduciaries need to consider whether the total amounts
received, directly and indirectly, by their service providers are
reasonable. Further, fiduciaries must evaluate whether the
payments cause potential conflicts of interest and, if
so, whether the plan and participants are protected from those
conflicts…The failure to evaluate those issues is a fiduciary
breach. Revenue Sharing: What Is It , Fred Reish
American Institute of CPAs 20

Participants’ & 401k Fees
• There are over 72 million 401k participants in America invested
in more than 483,000 plans which contain over $3 trillion in
assets.
• 71% Believed they paid no fees
• 81% Believed it was very important/somewhat important in
making investment decisions
401(k) Participants’ Awareness and Understanding of Fees,
AARP, 2011
American Institute of CPAs 21

Why does it matter to the participant?
Participant
Contributions
Current
401k
Assets Balance
Needed to
Retire
Excess
Fees
1% in excess fees over the average American’s working
lifetime, reduces their nest egg at retirement by 28%.
DOL, EBSA Website
American Institute of CPAs 22

Self-dealing, Conflicts of Interest or Other
Improper Influence Affect Expenses
• Plan Sponsor – “We aren’t changing our service provider; we’re with ABC
Bank and we have our lending relationship there.”
• Firm selling 401k products – We only provide our clients with 401k products
that pay us for “shelf space.”
• 401k Product Provider – We only include mutual fund options on our
platform that pay us for “shelf space.”
• TPA – I recommend XYZ 401ks; once we have $25 million with them they
pay us an additional 10 bps override
• Salesperson – I recommend investment options that pay me a higher 12b-1
fee.
American Institute of CPAs 23

Rule 408(b)(2)
Interim Final Service Provider Disclosure
Service providers receiving at least $1,000 must:
• Disclose all direct and indirect compensation it, or its
affiliates or subcontractors, receives.
• Provide a description of the services to be provided.
• Disclose whether they are providing any fiduciary services.
• Final regulation is effective as of January, 2012
It also includes a class exemption from the prohibited transaction
provisions for a fiduciary who enters into a contract without knowing
that the service provider has failed to comply with its disclosure
obligations.
American Institute of CPAs 24

Form 5500 Schedule C
• Applies to “large plans.” (100+ eligible Participants)
• Compensation above $5000 is reportable
• Compensation Types
▫ Direct – Paid directly from the plan
▫ Indirect – “Revenue Sharing,” investment management
fees, finder’s fees, float revenue, brokerage
commissions, securities lending revenue, etc.
See section on Moral Hazard/Fallacy of Disclosure
American Institute of CPAs 25

Challenges to Fulfilling
Fiduciary Obligations
• Fiduciary Expectation
• Moral Hazard / Fallacy of Disclosure
• Revenue Sharing
American Institute of CPAs 26

Fiduciary Expectation
• Auditor says:
There were no noteworthy issues found during our audit.
• TPA says:
You’ve passed your ADP & ACP testing
• Broker says:
You’ve got a fiduciary warranty!
• Employees say:
We have no complaints about our 401k
• Plan Sponsor hears:
I am fiduciarily squared-away!
American Institute of CPAs 27

Fiduciary Expectation
Fiduciary Non-fiduciary
TPA
(service provider)
Plan Sponsor Recordkeeper
(service
provider)
Has all fiduciary CPA/Attorney
(service
responsibility and provider)
all potential Consultant(s)
(service
liability. provider)
Custodian
(service provider)
American Institute of CPAs 28

Moral Hazard
Many types of 401k sales people offer fiduciary
education, advice or assistance, but then deny in writing
fiduciary responsibility.
For example:
ABC Firm and ABC Firm Financial Advisors do not provide tax or legal
advice, are not “fiduciaries” (under ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code or
otherwise) with respect to the services or activities described herein, and this
material was not intended or written to be used for the purpose of avoiding tax
penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer. Individuals are urged to consult
their tax or legal advisor before establishing a retirement plan or to understand
the tax, ERISA and related consequences of any investments made under such
plan.
American Institute of CPAs 29

Moral Hazard
Fiduciary Warranties
• “This unprecedented program offers plan sponsors and fiduciaries greater
confidence, security and peace of mind by providing specific assurance for their fund
selection. We’re so confident, we promise to restore any losses to the plan and pay litigation
costs related to the suitability of our investment process and Fund lineup for 401(k)
plans.”
• “We recognize that fund selection and monitoring is an important part of the due diligence
process for plan fiduciaries, and we are confident that our investment selection and
monitoring process meets the highest standards. We are willing to put our name behind the
Funds selected from our investment lineup and promise that our Funds….”
• “…we are committed to helping you meet the highest fiduciary
standards in the investment selection and monitoring process and
commit to restore losses and pay litigation costs in the event that legal
action is broughtofagainst qualifying plans. Now that’s security for30
American Institute CPAs
your

Moral Hazard
Fiduciary Warranties
“…since past performance is not a guarantee of future
results, we cannot warrant or guarantee either that any
investment option will yield any specific return, or even
that it will yield a positive return. Nor does our
Fiduciary Standards Warranty extend to claims
that any expenses paid directly or indirectly by the
Plan are reasonable.”
American Institute of CPAs 31

Moral Hazard QUIZ
• How many documents must a plan sponsor review in
order to read all of the available information before
adopting a group annuity 401(k) plan?
(Lets assume there is just one mutual fund in the plan!)
• a) 2 / 127 / 6 b) 7 / 542 /56 c) 34 / 827 / 99
American Institute of CPAs 32

Moral Hazard Quiz Answer: B
• Prospectus – 72 pgs ▫ 5 pgs reference
▫ 9 pgs reference fees, compensation or COIs
fees, compensation or conflicts • Plan Level Documents – 58 pgs
of interests ▫ 9 pgs reference
• SAI– 285 pgs fees, compensation or COIs
▫ 17 pgs reference • Adm Service Agreement – 11 pgs
fees, compensation or COIs ▫ 2 pgs reference
• Annual Report – 44 pgs fees, compensation or COIs
▫ 6 pgs reference
fees, compensation or COIs 7 Documents
• Semi-Annual Report – 36 pgs
539 Pages
▫ 8 pgs reference
fees, compensation or COIs
• Group Annuity Contract – 33 pgs
American Institute of CPAs 33

Moral Hazard
Found on one of 542 pages. Your plan assets spent on:
• Payments for placement of funds on a Financial Intermediary’s list of mutual funds
available for purchase by its customers or for including funds within a group that
receives special marketing focus or are placed on a “preferred list”;
• “Due diligence” payments for a Financial Intermediary’s examination of the funds
and payments for providing extra employee training and information relating to the
funds;
• “Marketing support fees” for providing assistance in promoting the sale of fund
shares;
• Sponsorships of sales contests and promotions where participants receive prizes
such as travel awards, merchandise, cash or recognition; etc.
SAI Page 180 of 285
American Institute of CPAs 34

Revenue Sharing I
• Revenue Sharing generally refers to a compensation practice in which
money is paid to plan service providers out of the 401(k) investments, or
by their managers (and affiliates.) It can be straightforward, hard to
find, or hidden. Here are just two types, the first of which is
straightforward, and the second of which is sometimes harder to find:
▫ 12(b)(1) fees - Ongoing “trail” commission paid to sales company for
distribution and service. Typically range between 0.25% - 1% and
deducted from fund assets.
▫ Sub-TA fees (Sub-Transfer Agency) – Asset-based fee and/or a per
head fee and deducted from plan/fund assets. Intended to pay for
administration performed by an intermediary; e.g. record keeper or
TPA.
American Institute of CPAs 35

Revenue Sharing I
Retail vs. Wholesale
A R-1 R-2 R-3 R-4 R-5 R-6
Management fees 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43%
Distribution
and/or service 0.24 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 none none
(12b-1) fees
Other expenses
0.18 0.21 0.48 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.09
(Sub-TA Fees)
Total annual fund
operating 0.85 1.64 1.66 1.15 0.86 0.56 0.52
expenses
Integrity has no need of rules. Albert Camus
American Institute of CPAs 36

Revenue Sharing I
$11,141.18 $3,941.08
American Institute of CPAs 37

Revenue Sharing I
• $7,726.30 Hard Dollar
• $11,141.38 12(b)(1) fees
• $3,941.08 Sub-TA fees
• $22,808.76 Total (67.7% higher )
• $15,082.46 Unknown to Plan Sponsor
“…several billion dollars of revenue-sharing fees are being hidden
annually from plan sponsors and plan participants…”
Jay Sanders, The CPA Journal,
NYSSCPA, 2005
American Institute of CPAs 38

Revenue Sharing II
Group Annuity Separate Accounts
• Group annuity contracts are often more complex than plan
sponsors realize, riddled with hidden charges and lock-up
periods… Marketing materials touted low-cost to employers,
but left out all of the charges their workers would be
subjected to.
Forbes, Retirement Plans From Hell
• “Insurance-company charges sometimes range as high as two
to four percentage points annually. Added to management
fees of the underlying investments, typically mutual funds,
"You can be looking at annual charges of 3% to 5.5%...”
Matthew D. Hutcheson
American Institute of CPAs 39

Why would anyone knowingly pay
3% to 5% in 401k fees?
I cost 1.3%
American Institute of CPAs 40

They wouldn’t!
I cost
1.3% I cost
1.21%
I cost
0.37%
I cost
0.25%
Expense I cost
Ratio 1.51%
IM & A
Charge
Annual Charges
& Fees Contract Asset
Charge Transaction
Costs
"Pay no attention toInstitute of CPAs
the man behind the curtain" Wizard of Oz
American 41

Revenue Sharing II
Group Annuity Separate Accounts
1.30% Total Expense Ratio
1.21% Investment Management & Admin Charge
0.37% Annual Charges & Fees
0.25% Contract Asset Charge
1.51% Transaction Costs
4.64% Actual Cost
Honesty pays, but it doesn't seem to pay enough to suit some people.
Frank McKinney "Kin" Hubbard
American Institute of CPAs 42

A Note of “Transaction Costs”
• Broker-dealer costs for securities transactions within a mutual fund
are not reportable under the new fee disclosure rule; however:
• In order to be Rule 404(c) compliant: The participants or beneficiary is
provided…the following information, which shall be based on the latest
information available to the plan: (i) A description of the annual
operating expenses of each designated investment alternative
(e.g., investment management fees, administrative fees, transaction
costs) which reduce the rate of return to participants and beneficiaries…
ERISA 404c-1 (2)
American Institute of CPAs 43

Revenue Sharing II
Group Annuity Separate Accounts
Expense Ratio of underlying fund* 0.26
Administrative Maintenance Charge 0.50
Sales & Service Fee 0.25
= Expense Ratio of Separate Account 1.01
Base Charge 0.60
Participant Fee 1.00
Total Cost 2.61%
*Vanguard Value Index Fund, Investor Share
Info provided by: David Wade, 401k Direct. Uncovering Hidden Fees in Insurance Company 401ks
American Institute of CPAs 44

Revenue Sharing II
Group Annuity Separate Accounts
Since* Expense
1 mo. 3 mos. YTD 1 yr. 3 yrs. 5 yrs. 10 yrs.
Inception Ratio
Vanguard Target
-0.54 10.59 7.58 9.53 -3.67 N/A N/A 1.90 0.94
Retirement 2030 Ret Opt
Performance shown is average annual total separate account investment choice
returns (except 1 month, last quarter, and year-to-date) for the period indicated,
net of the total operating expenses of the separate account or underlying investment
as listed on the individual investment fact sheets. Performance returns reflect
reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions. Application of the contract
asset charge and any discontinuance charges or service fees deducted from the
account would reduce this return.
Group Annuity 401k Participant Website
American Institute of CPAs 45

Techniques to Overcome
These Challenges
• Prudent Process
• Prudent Expert
• Delegation – Fiduciary Line of Defense
• Finding Fiduciaries
• Benchmarking
• Total Retirement Outsourcing
American Institute of CPAs 46

Prudent Process
Investment Policy Statement
• First step in Prudent Process
• Most Fundamental Fiduciary Function
• Supports the “paper trail.”
• Keeps investment process intact during market volatility.
• Provides working framework for fiduciaries
• Sets guidelines for making investment decisions.
• Negates “Monday morning quarterbacking.”
American Institute of CPAs 47

Prudent Process - Monitoring
48

Prudent Expert
• “Unless they possess the necessary expertise to evaluate such factors,
fiduciaries would need to obtain the advice of a qualified,
independent expert.”
DOL Reg. § 2509.95-1(c)(6)
• “…where the trustees lack the requisite knowledge, experience and
expertise to make the necessary decisions with respect to investments,
their fiduciary obligations require them to hire independent
professional advisors.”
Liss v. Smith, 991 F.Supp. 278, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
American Institute of CPAs 49

Prudent Expert
ERISA 3(21)(A)(ii)
Recordkeeper
Plan (service provider)
Sponsor
CPA/Attorney
(service provider)
TPA
Fiduciary (service provider)
Advisor
ERISA
3(21)(a)(ii) Custodian
(service provider)
American Institute of CPAs 50

Fiduciary Delegation
• ERISA section 402(c) allows for a plan sponsor to
delegate fiduciary responsibility. A prudently selected
and appointed fiduciary can alleviate a plan sponsor
from nearly all fiduciary liability. The one residual
fiduciary responsibility is to monitor the performance
of the appointed fiduciaries.
▫ An Investment Manager under ERISA 3(38)
▫ An Independent Fiduciary under ERISA 3(21)
American Institute of CPAs 51

Fiduciary Delegation
ERISA 3(38)
Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Line Non-Fiduciary
of Defense Service Providers
Plan Recordkeeper
(service provider)
Sponsor
CPA/Attorney
(service provider)
Formal TPA
Appointment (service provider)
ERISA 3(38)
Investment
Fiduciary
Custodian
(service provider)
American Institute of CPAs 52

Fiduciary Delegation
ERISA 3(21) Full Scope
Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Line Non-Fiduciary
of Defense Service Providers
ERISA 3(21) Recordkeeper
(service provider)
Plan Sponsor Full Scope
Fiduciary CPA/Attorney
(service provider)
Formal
Appointment TPA
(service provider)
Formal
Appointment
ERISA 3(38) Custodian
Investment (service provider)
Manager
American Institute of CPAs 53

Fiduciary Resources
www.e-Luminary.com
www.MyNRSP.com
American Institute of CPAs 54

SUMMARY
• Confirm in writing fiduciary & non-fiduciary service providers
• Maintain a “Prudent Process”
• Discover & evaluate all fees & compensation
• Retain a Prudent Expert
• Delegate to an Independent ERISA 3(38) or 3(21) Fiduciary
• Monitor & Document
• Beware “Our plan is free”
• Beware “fiduciary warranties”
• Beware “fiduciary assistance” without contractual assumption
of responsibility
American Institute of CPAs 55

Mark D. Mensack, AIFA®
• Mark is a Managing Director and the
Chief Ethics Officer of Piedmont
Independent Fiduciaries, a Fee-only
SEC Registered Investment
Advisory firm. With more than 15
years experience in financial services
and a background in ethical
philosophy, Mark focuses on the
ethical imperative of fiduciary
Piedmont Independent Fiduciaries responsibility to educate plan
Managing Director, sponsors and other fiduciaries on
their fiduciary duties. As an
Chief Ethics Officer independent fiduciary, Mark assumes
ERISA 3(21)(a)(ii) and/or ERISA
T: 856 528 9524 3(38) status in order to protect and
E: mdm@piedmontria.com enhance the retirement income
security of retirement plan
participants.
American Institute of CPAs 56

Joanne Szupka, CPA
• Joanne Szupka has over 13 years
of accounting experience with
regional and national public
accounting firms in areas of
employee benefit plans. She has
been responsible for all areas
related to audits and reviews of
single employer, multiemployer
BDO USA, LLP
and multiple-employer sponsored
Assurance Manager,
plans, including defined
Employee Benefit Plan Specialist
benefit, defined contribution and
T: (215) 636 – 5591
health and welfare benefit plans.
E: jszupka@bdo.com
American Institute of CPAs 57

Roland J. O’Brien, CPA
• Roland O’Brien has over 25 years
of accounting experience with
local, regional and national public
accounting firms. He has been
responsible for all areas related to
the audits and reviews of single
employer, multiemployer and
multiple-employer sponsored
plans, including employee
benefits, qualified
BDO USA, LLP retirement, health and welfare and
Director, fringe benefits plans. Roland has
Employee Benefit Plan Practice been responsible for creating and
presenting technical training
programs, as well as providing
T: (215) 636-5778 quality assurance services related to
E: rjobrien@bdo.com employee benefit plans.
American Institute of CPAs 58

Robert Lavenberg,
CPA, JD, LL.M
Bob Lavenberg has more than 25
years of experience with the
Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and
related business advisory services.
His expertise spans
reporting, government compliance
BDO USA, LLP and assessment of tax implications
for plans, including employee
National Partner in Charge of Employee Benefit benefits, qualified
Plan Audit Quality, Chair of AICPA’s 403(b) Plan retirement, health, welfare, and
Audit Task Force fringe benefits. Bob currently
serves as the Chair of the AICPA
Employee Benefit Plan Audit
T: (212) 885-8313 Quality Center Executive
Committee and is a former
E: rlavenberg@bdo.com member of the AICPA Employee
Benefit Plan Audit Expert Panel.
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