“No Sacrifice in Vain”Red China, Great Britain, the French Union and American Intervention at Dien Bien Phu<br />Joseph Ma...
Background<br />Indochina<br />French Union<br />Associated States<br />Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam<br />United States<br />Pr...
Historiography<br />Melanie Billings-Yun<br />Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954<br />Ike’s three co...
Primary Sources<br />President Dwight D. Eisenhower “Ike”<br />The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower - The President: The Mid...
Thesis<br />Question<br />Why did the United States refuse to directly intervene on behalf of their French allies at Dien ...
National Security: Red China<br />“No More Chinas”<br />1949<br />“No More Koreas”<br />1950 – 1953<br />Ike’s Dilemma <br...
Hegemony: Great Britain<br />Post-WWII American hegemony<br />Political<br />Military<br />Economic<br />But was it limite...
Core Values: the French Union<br />Military Prowess<br />American fighting man<br />“No substitute for victory”<br />Frenc...
Conclusion<br />Dien Bien Phu<br />May 7, 1954<br />10,000 casualties<br />esprit de corps<br />Operation Vulture<br />Gen...
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No Sacrifice In Vain Pp

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A Powerpoint presentation detailing American resistance to intervene militarily on behalf of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

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No Sacrifice In Vain Pp

  1. 1. “No Sacrifice in Vain”Red China, Great Britain, the French Union and American Intervention at Dien Bien Phu<br />Joseph Marchwinski<br />
  2. 2. Background<br />Indochina<br />French Union<br />Associated States<br />Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam<br />United States<br />President Truman<br />1950<br />Eisenhower<br />Operation Castor<br />General Henri Navarre<br />Dien Bien Phu<br />November, 1953<br />The Siege<br />March – May, 1954<br />Geneva<br />Partition<br />Elections<br />Enter America<br />
  3. 3. Historiography<br />Melanie Billings-Yun<br />Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954<br />Ike’s three conditions (1954)<br />John R. Nordell<br />The Undetected Enemy: French and American Miscalculations at Dien Bien Phu, 1953 <br />American support for Operation Castor (1953)<br />Mark Atwood Lawrence<br />Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam <br />Truman’s decision (1950)<br />Lawrence and Frederick Logevall<br />The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis<br />“The Same Struggle for Liberty” <br />
  4. 4. Primary Sources<br />President Dwight D. Eisenhower “Ike”<br />The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower - The President: The Middle Way, Vol. XV. <br />Louis Galambos and Daun Van Lee<br />Ike’s Letters to a Friend 1941 – 1958 <br />Robert Griffith<br />“Swede” Hazlett<br />The Council on Foreign Relations<br />The US in World Affairs 1954<br />Richard P. Stebbins<br />
  5. 5. Thesis<br />Question<br />Why did the United States refuse to directly intervene on behalf of their French allies at Dien Bien Phu?<br />Thesis<br />My primary documents indicate broader American national security interests, the limits of its Cold War hegemony and the importance of domestic core values to US foreign policy.<br />National Security Lens<br />Red China<br />American fears of escalation – after Korea<br />Hegemonic Lens<br />Great Britain<br />The ability of the United Kingdom to resist backing the US<br />Core Values Lens<br />France<br />The contradictions of military defeatism, domestic disunity and colonialism<br />
  6. 6. National Security: Red China<br />“No More Chinas”<br />1949<br />“No More Koreas”<br />1950 – 1953<br />Ike’s Dilemma <br />Avoid confrontation and resist communism<br />“United Action”<br />SEATO<br />National Security Interests<br />Asian land war with China<br />Chinese backing of Viet Minh<br />The “buffer”<br />“Do more harm than good”<br />
  7. 7. Hegemony: Great Britain<br />Post-WWII American hegemony<br />Political<br />Military<br />Economic<br />But was it limited?<br />Churchill’s Britain<br />“Special Relationship”<br />UK interests – “You and Me”<br />The Empire<br />Hong Kong<br />Malay<br />The Commonwealth<br />Australia<br />New Zealand<br />Japan<br />Markets<br />Raw materials<br />Final Analysis<br />Britain believed its national interests were best served outside of “United Action”<br />“Frightened”<br />The House of Commons<br />
  8. 8. Core Values: the French Union<br />Military Prowess<br />American fighting man<br />“No substitute for victory”<br />French fighting man<br />Heroic but defeatist?<br />Lacking support<br />Domestic Unity<br />American people<br />1950s consensus<br />French government<br />Political weakness<br />European Colonialism<br />Self-determination and Democracy<br />Principles common to both France and US<br />French imperial rule<br />Regressive<br />Resistance to internationalization<br />
  9. 9. Conclusion<br />Dien Bien Phu<br />May 7, 1954<br />10,000 casualties<br />esprit de corps<br />Operation Vulture<br />Geneva<br />May 8, 1954<br />North and South<br />Ike’s three conditions precluded intervention<br />Congressional backing<br />Fully independent Vietnam<br />Concert of nations<br />Why?<br />National Security threat posed by Red China<br />Limits of US hegemony as seen in the successful resistance of the UK<br />Clashing core values between the French war effort and American ideals<br />

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