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Communications Audit Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion

Communications Audit conducted by myself for Organizational Communications class at Gonzaga University (MA).

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Communications Audit Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion

  1. 1. Running head: COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 1 Communications Audit within Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion Margaret Shartel Gonzaga University Organizational Communication COML 504 Dr. Joe Ayres September 28, 2011
  2. 2. COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This communication audit examines in depth the communication that takes place withinan Army Recruiting Battalion that is geographically dispersed across several states within thePacific Northwest. The Battalion, while geographically scattered, also has many levels ofDepartment of the Army civilian employees making up the bulk of the headquarters staff, severalsmall companies headed by a junior officer and a senior non-commissioned officer as well asseveral junior non-commissioned officers in leadership roles separated between 42 stations. Thefindings presented within this audit were gathered through extensive field observations oftraining, focus groups conducted at the company (rather than headquarters) level, surveyquestionnaires, and interviews with mid-level supervisors, the chief of staff and the battalioncommander. Through the exhaustive research, many parallel communication strengths andweaknesses were analyzed so that a clear picture of training communication, internalcommunication and external communication can be recognized and/or addressed. The results of the four methods (observation, focus-groups, surveys and interviews) usedto gain analytical insight into the overall organizational communication of the Battalion show astrong desire to consistently meet the commanders communicated intent. Communicationbetween staff sections were often described as ―good, but there is always room for improvement‖and communication between the staff and the company command groups (CCG‘s) were alsorated as good. However, the audit also noted that communication had broken down between thecommander‘s intent and the station level implementing the previously stated intent.
  3. 3. Further, the audit also identified several key areas where there is room for improvementand accordingly, this audit concludes with recommendations of not only areas of improvement,but areas where communication is going well and can be expanded upon in the future. This auditalso contains the raw data collected throughout the study for further review and expansion of theaudit if requested at a later time.
  4. 4. Table of ContentsThe Purpose of this Study ………………………………………...5Description of the Recruiting Battalion……..…………………….7 The Structure of the Battalion……………………………..7 Grass Roots Advisory Board……………………………...12Research Methods……………………………………………..….13 Limitations…………………………………….…………..13 Methodology……………………………………………...14Organizational Analysis……………………………………………16 Systems Lens of the Organization....………………………..21 Formal and Informal Communication ………………….….26 Organizational Communication as Strategy...……………...33 Staff Motivation..............................................................…...35Summary of Major Findings..……………………………………...37Conclusions and Recommendations…………………………….....39References…………………………………………….……………43Appendices
  5. 5. Notwithstanding that the success of any Recruiting Battalion at any given time isdetermined by mission requirements, market share and many other factors, the underlying trendto being able to recruit the high-quality, dynamic applicants needed for today‘s Army dependsalmost solely on the ability to communicate. In an era of a quickly changing demographic, and ahighly social and interactive one at that, the ability to adapt to that change and still fill the needsof the Army is an intensive communicative process emphasized not only from the Battaliondown, but from the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) down. ―Althoughmany people accept the concept of communication as being important to organizationaleffectiveness, they often oversimplify its role, considering communication to be a mere messageexchange or a simple technique that if followed, can automatically mold a person into aneffective communicator.‖ (Downs & Adrian, 2004). The ability to not only recruit, but retainfuture soldiers is an integral part of the Battalion‘s recruiting mission, and therfore deeplyinformed by internal and external communication as well as soldier and civilian training. Accordingly, the Battalion Commander recognized the need for a full communicationaudit of his battalion staff, company leadership, and non-commissioned officers on the groundrecruiting and the process of retaining qualified applicants. In an effort to reach the recruitingpotential and market share of a seemingly difficult area to recruit in, and understanding that ―it isthrough communication that employees obtain information, make sense of situations theyencounter, and decide how to act,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) this audit was conducted. Thecomprehensive purpose of this study was to define areas necessary to improve upon withinthebattalion‘s specific communication realm as well as To analyze how the organization communicates with external audiences, stakeholders, the general public and the Battalion‘s grass-roots advisory board.
  6. 6. To observe how communication moves through the battalion, whether follow-up is conducted in a timely manner, or if internal communication channels can be improved upon for an increase in not only productivity but also job satisfaction To provide a cursey overview of training mechanisms within the civilian staff and the soldiers within the battalion footprint to identify if trainingstructures should be increased or decreased accordingly To estimate the awareness of the commanders intent for the recruiting year 2012 and the interaction required to emphasize the future soldier training program To highlight how communication can support defined organizational outcomes for the coming year and finally, To provide recoomondations to improve the overall functioning of the communications process in the battalion. The overall purpose of this study, consequently, is to define the organizationalcommunication process currently within the battalion, and to determine how to better engage thestaff and soldiers of the battalion in an effort to fully implement the commanders intent ofbattalion excellence within USAREC for Recruiting Year 2012.
  7. 7. ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION In order to fully audit and recommend courses of action, it is important tounderstand the command structure of the organization, the mission and the intent for the comingyear. MISSION OF THE BATTALION The Battalion‘s core mission is to support the needs of the Army by recruiting highlyqualified applicants to fill key vacancies within the officer and enlisted ranks of the RegularArmy (RA) and the Army Reserve (AR). The public website states the mission as the following: “Seattle Recruiting Battalion will recruit with integrity the high quality men and women necessary to meet the needs of the United States Army and Army Reserve through leader development, quality training, and caring of soldiers and families.” (Seattle Recruiting Battalion, 2009).As for Key Values, every single soldier learns the values throughout their career of Loyalty,Duty, Respect, Selfless-Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage (providing them with theacronymn LDRSHIP=leadership) as well as the warrior ethos to guide their principle decissionmaking during their years of service. However, the Battalion Commander of Seattle RecruitingBattalion has set aside four guiding principles in order to adhere to his key values and producemission success, they are: Care: There is no way to define the emphasis of caring throughout our command. Those in leadership positions must care for soldiers, civilians, family members and future soldiers. There is no greater leadership challenge than caring.
  8. 8. Integrety and Honor: Our business is based on trust, if we comprimise our integrity then we lose our honor and our trust among not only the command, but the community as a whole. Teamwork: We are a team comprised of teams, the ability to work within not only our individual teams but also to work up and down the chain, through the community as a team is key to our mission success. Every part of our teams, from sections, to units and to our civilian counterparts and advisory board define the essence of teamwork within the organization and throughout the community. Personal and Professional Excellence: There are no monetary gains such as bonuses or [monetary based] awards in our business for soldiers. The drive from personnel must come from inside them to exceed the standards set before all other soldiers and give 110% to our mission. The desire to recruit to our market potential rather than our mission emphasizes this personal and professional excellence. Therefore, this audit must take the mission, vision, values and future operations intoaccount when reviewing all data pertinent to the organizational communication.
  9. 9. STRUCTURE OF THE BATTALION The Battalion is organized with a command group consisting of a Battalion Commander,an Executive Officer, and a Battalion Command Sergeant Major all of whom share oneadministrative assistant (civilian). Within the staff, which is headquartered with the commandgroup, there is a section for personnel, (1 officer and 2 civilian staff members), an operationssection (1 officer, 4 enlisted and 2 civilian staff), a Fusion cell (1 Mission Market Analysis, 2Advertising and Public Affairs, and 1 Education Services staff members—all civilian), a trainingsection (with between 3 and 5 training non-commissioned officers), a Family Services Assistant(civilian), a Budget Analyst (civilian), 2 computer networking personnel (civilian) and aLogistics section with 4 civilian personnel. Those 30 some personnel make up the battalion staffand run the day-to-day operations of the battalion supporting 272 non-commissioned officers ineverything dealing with being a soldier, recruiting a soldier and helping maintain a soldier beforethey ship off to basic training. Outside the Battalion area there are 7 companies commanded by a captain, a firstsergeant and with a company secretary (generally, there is currently one company without acompany secretary due to budget and contracting constraints). Between the seven companies, 42stations are set up in key areas throughout the battalion ―footprint‖ or recruiting zones, whichcover areas within four separate states. This is a general lay-out of any recruiting battalion onlythe numbers of recruiting non-commissioned officers, number of stations, and to some extent thenumber of companies change. The size of the ‗footprint‘ is also different in any of the 43recruiting battalions in the country. Each Battalion reports to one of 7 Brigades, which all reportto the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Figure 1 illustrates the generallayout of the battalion structure:
  10. 10. Commander Family Support Operations ExecutiveCompany Human Resources OfficerCommanders Fusion Budget Cell Information Logistics Technology Command Sergeant Major Company First Sergeants Station Figure 1 Commanders Recruiting Non- commissioned Officers
  11. 11. COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 11 Communications Audit within Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion Description of this structure indicates a mix of traditional hierarchy combined with ateam-based organization. No one section takes absolute precedence over another in the day-to-day operations of the organization; however the hierarchy of rank and position are still adheredto. The commander has the ultimate say, and he works not only through the traditional channelsof the executive officer and company commanders, but also directly works with staff sections inorder to provide a more egalitarian feel in the office. The hierarchy of the non-commissionedofficer chain is more pronounced than within the battalion staff sections, even though thepersonnel involved tend to be more geographically dispersed than company commands andheadquarters elements. For example, the Battalion Command Sergeant Major is in Seattle, whilethe Alaska Company First Sergeant is in Anchorage, and his soldiers are throughout the state ofAlaska. The geographical differences as well as limits of technology may pose a communicationbreakdown risk later in the audit. If the organization were only a traditional hierarchical bureaucracy, clear lines ofdecision making would follow traditional lines of the organizational chart and lead one to thinkthat: ―Various groups of employees have specialized skills necessary to complete their assigned tasks efficiently and effectively, [and]… lines of authority are clear to all… Decision making and control are centralized. This means that all major decisions facing the organization are made by the people who occupy the positions at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Of course, all members of the organization are responsible for making routine decisions in their areas of responsibility. But they must base their decisions on policies and procedures that are established at the top.‖ (p. 69)
  12. 12. However, with the mixed nature of the two separate areas of the organization (the staffheadquarters element and the field recruiting element) it is easier to view the organization as anetworked organization: ―the team based structure of a network implies that leaders must be able to promoteteamwork…Because teams are self-managing, leaders should take on the role of coach, ratherthan directive leader advising the team and helping it to solve problems…Managers andmembers of units in networked organizations must also manage relationships with other unitsand organizations, because integrating functions are so important.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).This mixed structure will be discussed furtherin the audit.Grass Roots Advisory Board On the periphery of the organization lies the local Grass Roots Advisory Board. Thisboard was created in 2009 in order to engage local business leaders, educators and politicians inorder to define the role of Army Recruiting in the battalion footprint. The board is made up ofseveral regional leaders who provide guidance on issues such as school access, localorganizations willing to help discuss the Army in a proactive and positive way, and implementknowledge of the notion of the Army not being a ‗second choice‘ anymore. The board mainlyworks with the battalion leadership on issues of battalion wide importance, though each regionwithin the Washington State portion of the battalion has a leadership post on the board. Theinteraction of the board will be discussed further in the audit.
  13. 13. RESEARCH METHODS This audit used a variety of different forms of research in order to gain a thorough in-depth understanding of three main communicative processes in the Seattle Recruiting Battalion.From intensive interviews as far out in the battalion footprint as possible, to review of externalcommunication methods used on the World Wide Web, any resource available was used to gainthe bigger picture of the communication within Seattle Recruiting Battalion. LIMITATIONS While this research was certainly limited by the time allowed in finalizing the audit, theresearch was also stalled by the researcher, who did not include a thorough study of the Armysection of the Military Entrance Processing center located near the battalion headquarters andwhere several members of battalion staff also work, and each recruiting NCO takes their recruitsto process into the Army. Since this research was limited not only by the class time constraints,it was also conducted at the very end of a recruiting year, wherein much of the staff and soldierswere traveling or not available due to the nature of year-end processing or training. Also relatedto the time-limits of the audit conducted, the researcher was unable to engage the advisory boardfully in the research methods used throughout the rest of the battalion. Further, full access was granted to the researcher from battalion headquarters, however,this did not mean that anyone in the organization could be forced to take a survey or relent to aninterview; participation was voluntary. It should be noted, however, that the entire organizationgave the researcher all access needed, the entire communicationsoffice refused participation ineither completing the 20 question survey directly related to their positions, or allowing aninterview or observation. The external communication information was reviewed from
  14. 14. interviews of others in the battalion staff who work directly with or whom the communicationsoffice works directly for in order to measure engagement. Also, in reviewing the online presenceof the recruiting battalion, the research was limited to stations and companies the researcher wasa ‗fan‘ of on Facebook in order to conduct a thorough study of external interaction from therecruiter level. Nonetheless, these limitations had to be addressed as the audit went on, changing themethodologies throughout the process. METHODOLOGY Since the battalion also reports to a brigade, which reports to a command and further upthe chain of command through the pentagon and to the commander in chief, the scope of theresearch conducted needed to be limited to a free standing battalion within the reach of theresearcher. After an off-the-record discussion with the battalion commander, it was decided thata study of internal, external and to a smaller extent training communication be reviewed. Thiswas to be accomplished from training observation, observation of communication in the officeenvironment, survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews after the surveys were completed.Interviews were conducted after the surveys because of the nature of the relationship of theresearcher to the battalion as the researcher is a former employee of the battalion, and thereforeanswers to surveys may have been informed by who was conducting the audit. The interviews were limited by time to the battalion leadership, mid-level supervisors andon the ground recruiters. Questions began with cursory overview of what the audit process wasabout, and a formal review that the researcher kept all questions in strict confidentiality,including who answered what questions. Also, the researcher heavily emphasized that the she no
  15. 15. longer worked for the battalion, nor had ties in any way related to the organization save thecurrent project being conducted for educational purposes. This was conducted this way in orderto allow the free-flowing of information between researcher and interview subject to gain thefullest understanding of where communication stood from several levels within the organization.
  16. 16. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS In order to gain insight into the organization before research fully began, the researchsought out how the organization communicated currently without emphasis on the project athand. This was done through a combination of narrative analysis and observation betweenbattalion leadership and a recruiting company. A variety of external sources were used,including: External Media: Through the web presence review of the organization, including thereview of the official website, the battalion blog and the Facebook pages of stations, it was notedthat updates are not being performed, nor is there a story of the battalion from a narrativeperspective. A review of media interaction was asked for, though not provided save during a fewinterviews, and this was in the end, determined to be hearsay. It should be noted, however, thatthe position held by the researcher did in fact create the external communications plan, andimplement it prior to her position being eliminated. The researcher‘s contract ran out in Augustof 2011, and through formal interviews it was noted that no battalion level Facebook posts, noblog entries, or tweets existed since that time—further there was no record of media advisories orpress releases being sent out. There had been external partnership events, but no stories relatedto the impact on either recruiting or adding to the narrative of the organization were available forreview. Internal Communication: Review of the internal command information newsletters alsodid not tell a story about the battalion, it was slapped together without regard for audience,storytelling, or gaining any interest of the organization. There was not a newsletter producedsince October of 2010. Informative emails were in abundance, however, through quietobservation it was noted that most personnel glossed over these emails in lieu of ―something
  17. 17. productive‖ or ―job related‖. The information between battalion and the advisory board wasscattered—some had pieces of information, and some had other pieces of information.Information sharing was not emphasized, especially in the Fusion Cell, which houses thecommunication office, although emails went between the personnel readily, a communicationbreakdown was emphasized by out-right open hostility toward the chief of the office, as notedduring several observation periods. Through cursory observations it was also noted that internalcustomer service was lacking (as well as external). When the researcher entered thecommunications office in order to explain the nature of the audit, the secretary held a hand up tothe researcher‘s face and stated, ―I don‘t have time for you.‖ The staff handbook is still inproduction phase and available electronically—therefore it could not be reviewed as in-depth asthe researcher wished. Training: In reviewing training, it was noted that traditionally the training is far differentwhen the battalion leadership is around—which is actually pretty traditional in organizations.The actual training conducted emphasized mandatory training sent down from higherheadquarters, and training for individuals working to advance their military career. Thereforequestions were raised and asked about civilian training mechanisms available and its emphasis inthe near future because this audit is a forward looking document as requested by the battalionleadership. The main question of the audit, therefore, is ―how can the battalion communicatebetter in the future in order to reach mission success and success throughout the command inrecruiting year 2012.‖ Therefore through an informal review of the organization the decision to emphasize athorough command wide review of external communication, internal communication (including
  18. 18. internal customer service and a review of the advisory board) and how training communicationtook place, was made. To fully understand the communication within the battalion, such questions as ―Do youknow what the advisory board is‖ and ―how do you communication throughout the battalion‖had to be asked. These questions were first emphasized in surveys conducted separately atbattalion headquarters and in the recruiting field, in order to gain insight into any differences incommunication that may become noticeable. It was decided to ask fully open ended questionsduring the interview process in order to not lead the interview subjects in any one direction. While other areas of communication will be looked at in a very slight way, these were theemphasizing traits of the audit as it unfolded and changed due to the time the audit wasconducted. Further, a review of the current communications programs were reviewed, an notedfurther in the study—as well as an in-depth examination of the operations office, who seem to betaking the future communication needs of the battalion and creating programs to benefit theorganization and decrease its communication shortfalls. In addition to fact finding through external organizational research and un-obstructiveobservation, this study relied heavily upon interviews. The first two interviews were with thebattalion commander and were mainly fact finding discussions. During this process wediscussed the commander‘s vision, his intent for the organization and where he preferred weemphasize some information gathering. These interviews were conducted off the record withlittle to no note-taking as a means to gain trust in what the researcher hoped to accomplish. The next interviews consisted of departmental heads, such as the supervisor of logistics,or the executive officer. There were also individual interviews conducted off site with recruiters,company level officers and first sergeants. Interviews lasted between 15 minutes and 1 hour 30
  19. 19. minutes. They were free response, phrased in such a way as to not lead an answer. If a certainquestion led to another line of inquiry it was followed, thus the difference in time between eachof the interviews conducted. Therefore the following basic questions were used from Assessing OrganizationalCommunication: Strategic Communication Audits by Cal Downs and Allyson Adrian: ―Describe the Way decisions are made in your section? The Organization? ―Describe the Organizations primary objectives for [recruiting year] 2012. What would success look like?‖ ―What are the major communication strengths of the organization? The weaknesses?‖ ―How would you describe the general communication climate here?‖ ―How does the communication climate effect your job satisfaction? Would you consider this reaction typical?‖ Interviews were set up in person along with a five minute (more or less) overview of thegeneral questions the researcher would be asking. Rarely was an interview set up over thephone, and if so it was due to time constraints or locational difficulty. For example, one followup interview had to be conducted with the battalion commander while he was traveling to hisstations, in which case the interview question was provided ahead of time so that he could gatherhis thoughts about that question. Further there was a heavy interaction during a focus group with one specific companychose for its distant location from the battalion and thusly furthest away from daily face-to-faceinteraction with battalion leadership and staff. Observations at recruiting stations with and
  20. 20. without company or battalion leadership led to some of the differences in communicationmethods between the lower echelons of staff and leadership. Finally, although actually conducted after the initial interviews with the commander, butbefore most observation and training was a survey. The survey consisted of 20 questions relatingto many aspects of internal and external communication. It was limited however, as the end ofthe recruiting year posed the difficulty of producing enough information from a short survey sothat personnel would be willing to take it. In the battalion staff, headquarters element, 25 papersurveys were handed to the staff, of which 11 were returned. Further, an electronic survey wassent to every recruiter, NCO and company staff element (amounting to about 200 surveys sentout) of which 38 were completed, and 89 additional started. Due to the limitations of theprogram where the survey online was completed, the 89 which were began but not completed arenot included in the final report. While the survey should have provided the most insight, thelimitations and lack of desire for staff to complete (or possibly time limits in their respectivepositions) still allowed for some valuable insight. However, it should be noted that theinterviews provided the most information as did focus groups and observation, even without theprimary survey as a strong enough method of data collection. Thusly, through the in-depth observational analysis, interviews, survey questionnairesand focus groups a better interpretive review of the organization and potential directions for thefuture could be gained.
  21. 21. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS AS A LENS TO VIEW SEATTLE RECRUITING BATTALION One of the most important means to understand the communication within SeattleRecruiting Battalion is to recognize not only the extensive network it covers, but also how theinteractions of the different hierarchies within the battalion operate and communicate amongstthemselves. ―Most of us have been taught to break things into manageable parts, to focus on asingle problem and look for its cause‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). If looking for a single cause, thebattalion will use a Band-Aid to cover the bullet hole, rather than address the long-standingcommunication issues and moving forward. There are far too many minor issues, and majorissues as well that defeat morale, decrease productivity and eliminate the command and controlthe organization must have in order to function. In reviewing Seattle Recruiting Battalion, notonly the organization must be looked at, but the processes that define the organization as well—whether they are inherent or implied. In looking at Seattle Battalion as a system in and of itself, one must look at thecomponents that make up the system: ―If the components are units or departments, relationshipsinclude authority (which departments have authority over which other), communication (whichdepartments communicate with one another), and work (where departments fit into the work-flow of the organization; which departments work with which)‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).Secondly, in looking at the processes which define Seattle recruiting battalion, it was importantto also look at inherent and implied. The processes are much defined, though not recognizedthroughout the battalion like this: ―A cake is created from separate ingredients, but a cake istotally different from the assembled raw ingredients. In much the same way, an organizationalsystem is more than the sum of its individual members and units and their relationships with each
  22. 22. other.‖(Conrad & Poole, 2005). In this case there is no definition within the battalion of eitherthe organization, or the sum of its parts. When interviews began within the battalion, the most common response to ―describe thecommunication atmosphere here in battalion‖ was ―non-existent.‖ Implying that at its core, thebattalion itself not only lacked in-depth communication, but also a process that createdinformation flow within sections and between sections and the field. The concept of wholenesshere would be important, for if the battalion could become a whole system, or a whole team, witha defined narrative and defined goal, then ―the variables can be defined independently, but theirinfluence is due to how they interact with each other‖ within the system. However, there mustfirst be a defined system and a defined process. Therefore, in order to understand this process and the systems at work within thebattalion, analysis of both parts are reviewed. Throughout the remaining analysis of the systemsand subsystems within Seattle Recruiting Battalion, the audit will focus on the process of movingforward with an eye to the battalion commander‘s construct of an egalitarian organization,flattened at the top with a ―discipline in thought and deed.‖ (Robinson, 2011) Since this study was vastly limited on time, it was impossible to discuss communicationwithin all of the systems and subsystems within the battalion. Therefore, only the 1-5 corridorcompanies and stations available to the researcher were addressed, the further out from thebattalion the system or subsystem was, the less likely the researcher was to communicate withthem. However, it is important to note that within the battalion, subsystems such as station levelfuture soldiers, stations themselves and suprasystems such as the army advisory board do interactwith and influence the communication within the battalion. For example, the advisory board isset up in order to bring a different notion of service to the population through interaction with
  23. 23. centers of influence such as business leaders, educational leaders and political leaders throughoutthe state—however, the advisory board is limited to Washington State, and lacks sufficientexternal funding to encompass all of the particular state at any given time. Nonetheless, the data presented in the audit showed an acute breakdown of subsystemsdefining roles, and key to being a ―mover and shaker‖ within the organization was definedalmost wholly by membership to certain sub-groups—implied membership or actual. Thereforethe main conclusions are as follows: The management teams (first line supervisors) see a need toimprove internal and external communications as well as institute training mechanismsthroughout the battalion, not only for the soldier staff but for the civilian staff as well. Those thatare not in leadership roles define a lack of communication throughout the battalion, and readilyplace the blame on the ―flavor of the month,‖ however through observations rather than surveyand interview techniques, the flavor of the month ends up being someone who communicatesmore often with battalion leadership for whatever given purpose. Further, there is a lack ofdefined roles in the organization leaving everyone at every level to feel they have command andcontrol over things that should be elevated, regardless of the flatness of the organizationalhierarchy. The personnel within the organization often feel ―out of the loop‖ on numeroustopics, whether they are briefed to the individuals or the organization as a whole. The internalcommunication mechanisms need a process; a strategy in order for personnel to feel inside theorganization, but this, in and of itself may breed more detriment to the process or systemsalready in place. In contrast, those in leadership roles feel they give the information needed to create theproducts needed for mission success but feel limited because of lack of timely information fromhigher level headquarters (brigade and command). However, the single greatest question raised
  24. 24. without a defined answer is: ―what would communication success look like for RY 2012?‖ Thisquestion had as many answers as times it was asked, e.g., there was no battalion-level definedresponse; that is to say, no one knew. While line-staff did not participate in formal interviews, most personnel were asked offline many of the questions relating to the interviews given to supervisors and battalionleadership. Many expressed the notion that the company commanders of the organization are in anew set of defined roles and that this could be where the communication breakdown, bothinternally and externally could be stemming from. One interviewee explained it as this: ―In atypical Army organization, the First Sergeant fills the role of an administrative driving force.They ensure the soldier needs are met, while the commander would fill the role of operations,making sure mission is met. Here in recruiting, those roles are reversed—long term for the firstsergeant, but only for a two year period with commanders.‖ Because the roles are reversed, andreversed early on for first sergeants who have typically been in the recruiting field for years, thefirst sergeant cannot guide the commander in a way that a typical ―line-unit‖ company commandgroup would function. Since this switch is so immediate and forceful for the new commander, itis difficult to train them to communicate with battalion staff and their subordinates in a new way,before it is time to have them move to their next Army position which will likely not be inrecruiting. Interestingly, when asked about communication of initiatives throughout the battalionfootprint, only 18.75% of respondents felt that initiatives were communicated throughout thefootprint. The same question produced a response of neutral, some-what disagree, and disagreestrongly among over 45% of those surveyed. When asked to expand upon this question in aninterview setting many respondents either described where they believed the ―communication
  25. 25. breakdown‖ was, or said simply ―It‘s getting better, now.‖ If, however, ―Communicationeffectiveness is often judged in terms of normative ideals, that is, those that are assumed to becharacteristic of properly functioning organizations,‖ (Downs & Adrian, 2004) then gettingbetter or placing blame does not create a cohesive environment to moving forward inorganizational communication at the battalion level.
  26. 26. THE DIVISIVE MIX OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION Through observations and interviews, the audit showed a confused dynamic of formalcommunication being disregarded, and informal communication being taken as initiative. FormalCommunication broke down first (during observation) from the communications office, whoorganized a partnership game with a local sports franchise, but would not follow through oninformation sharing until all the personnel had reported the names of the soldiers going. Becausethe communication office held onto information in order to give it to everyone at once, improperand inadequate information was given to the field and one soldier showed up in an improperuniform at the last minute, unable to change into something more fitting for the event. (She worepumps and a skirt to an event wherein she had to help run a flag across a mud-soaked field at fullspeed). This breakdown of formal communication led to a sense of animosity from the fielddirected not only at the communications office but toward the entire battalion. Further thestatement was made during the same focus group: ―Nothing is going to change, no matter whatwe say, no matter if we complain. The battalion leadership doesn‘t care, or they would take careof the fact that people ‗up there‘ refuse to give us what we need to do our mission.‖ (FocusGroup, 2011). However, since this was a focus group, it must be noted that: ―Comments must beinterpreted in context as auditors try to get a ‗feel‘ for the organization and as they try to drawout the subtle, complex aspects of organizational processes and relationships.‖(Downs & Adrian,2004). In this case, there was very little subtlety, this subgroup of the organization felt alienatedand separate from the organization as a whole, and set out to ―just do our mission.‖(FocusGroup, 2011). Further, within the realm of formal communication there were many narrative piecesmissing from the battalion. There has not been an update to the website, internal or external
  27. 27. since the battalion commander took over in 2010, there has not been an internal newsletter sinceOctober 2010—and the battalion newsletters before that time told no narrative of theorganization, which would create a sense of organizational cohesion. There was no formalinternal email format unless there was a big event of change that needed to be addressed quickly.However, one can argue that the biggest issue with internal communication within the battalionis not that there is a lack of product for the organization, but rather a lack of organizationalnarrative. In the narrative, it would be useful to explain that the battalion commander sees hisorganization as a network—and sets the strategy accordingly. Because the organizational leaderemphasizes team-work in a flattened organization, the commander must ―be able to deal withworkforce management in a responsive, creative manner.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). However,because of past processes not being the same dynamic, personnel in the field do not know how toreact to the commander‘s ideal of egalitarian teamwork and instead say, ―If there is a set of rulesfor our organizational dynamics, a hierarchy that should be followed,it should be implementedwithout regard to other people‘s feelings.‖(Focus Group, 2011). Informal communication is another matter entirely, because it stems from the sameinadequate processes that the formal communication of the battalion stems from. Oneinterviewee stated about the informal lines of communication that ―there is a lack of protocol,there is no knowledge of how to manage civilian personnel, and because of that the badpersonnel will be here forever.‖ ((1), 2011). In this instance the interviewee was relating topersonnel who do not work within the dynamic of the office and because of inadequate personnelstaffing, those who are the most detriment to the organization will likely be there until they canretire. Informal communication also began a rumor mill, which is alive and well throughout thebattalion. It is through these internal forms of rumor management that the subsystems in the
  28. 28. battalion thrive. Mentioned in the survey results were statements such as ―I get information fromthose who ‗have the ear of the commander‘‖ and a disagreement with being able to go to thecommand on any issue because ―I have seen informal discipline and shutting-out when someoneused the open-door policy.‖ It must be noted, however, that this may not be in direct relationshipto the current command—as the former command is brought up regularly as a description ofrepression in the organization. Many informal interviews and anonymous surveys, however,noted what was described as ―blatant favoritism‖ stemming from the command group—however,analytically one can go back to the subsystems within the battalion lacking knowledge of whoreally runs the office—even with the obvious statement that the commander does. Nonetheless, it must be noted that these formal and informal communication breakdownswere monitored in the battalion headquarters—and further, there were two subsystems that werenot in the mix of the informal communication lines: Logistics and Operations. While Logisticsstayed out of the rumor mill as a whole, and internalized all their processes in a very effectivemanner, Operations took on the role of informing the battalion when the need presented itself. While logistics sees not only ―a ton of informal norms‖ of communication within thebattalion, but also the network of ―confidants who are avenues of information‖ ((2), 2011), theoffice as a whole communicates not only amongst themselves at a very high level, but alsothroughout the battalion. However, the section supervisor mentioned a lack of personalinteraction during VCS (virtual classroom service) meetings and conferences. Further he notesthat there is not enough personal interface between the sections that the sections do notunderstand that they are in actuality dependent upon each other. Where the Logistics section tries to stay out of informal lines of communication, theOperations section sets up processes to defeat them, taking on a role of informational gatekeeper
  29. 29. and releaser. The section has implemented information flows through in-depth taskings,operational orders, and a streamlined avenue of share-point releases of PowerPoints andinformational papers. However, the section supervisor notes that it takes both sides for theinformation to flow—for if he posts something there is no guarantee it will be read or followed,regardless of how many people it pertains through in the battalion. Formal meetings and the interaction gained during them were a definitive topic for theaudit analysis—for while all staff meetings rarely existed, instead less formal pot-lucks weregiven for team-building and morale purposes two separate questions were asked with some-whatdifferent responses.Formal meetings accomplish what they shouldOrder Answer Responses Percent1 I agree 12 32%2 I somewhat agree 14 37%3 I neither agree nor disagree 6 16%4 I somewhat disagree 4 11%5 I disagree 2 5% AndThere is a goal to face-to-face meetings and those goals are communicated clearlyto those in attendance.Order Answer Responses Percent1 I agree 10 26%2 I somewhat agree 19 50%3 I neither agree nor disagree 6 16%4 I somewhat disagree 1 3%5 I disagree 2 5%
  30. 30. In this case, 69% of respondents agreed in some manner that formal meetings accomplishwhat they should, but 76% reported that there was a purpose to meetings, and the purpose iscommunicated. It should be further noted, that generally formal meetings are held between thebattalion executive officer and the staff supervisors or leads and this response group is from thefield organizations. However, when the staff-sections only are looked at in the survey, there is ahigher propensity for the answer of ―neither agree nor disagree‖ with a write-in of ‗sometimes‘being included mostly by section leads. Generally section members do not feel adequatelycommunicated with regarding the meetings their supervisors went to. Therefore the first major conclusion is that within the lack-of-narrative philosophy, thereis a lack of communication between staff leads and staff as well as between commanders andnon-commissioned officers. Again, this audit returns to most personnel feeling that they are incharge of every-day decisions (and profess such through the informal communications in thebattalion) and leaders (especially those in undefined roles) acting as gatekeepers of information.It is also important to remember that this organization is a new network organization – it has notbeen egalitarian as it is now, before the new commander took the reins. Therefore, ―It is often noteasy to determine who is responsible for what in network organizations. Unless units [within theorganization]specifically work out how they will coordinate activities and constantlycommunicate with each other, important things can fall through the cracks.‖(Conrad & Poole,2005). In returning to the divisive nature of the informal and formal communications channels, itis important to note that this commander has a liberal open door policy, and tries to walk throughthe organization at regular intervals in order to gain the feel of the organization at that time.(Robinson, 2011). The commander observes regularly, and communicates on many levels with
  31. 31. the organizational members, however the chief of staff is the executive officer—he is tasked withimplementing the commander‘s intent through the formal channels of communication. It shouldbe noted also, that over 65% of the organization stated that they agree with the statement: ―I cango to the command on any issue.‖ Considering the nature of the responses in retrospect the auditshould have included the question: ―when I go to the command, my grievances are heard andaddressed.‖ The problem therefore is not the formal or informal lines of communication, but thecentralized units those two conflicting notions breed—and the informal rigidity now seen in theheadquarters. ―Another reason why networks tend to become rigid is that the units in highestprestige, centrally, and closeness tend to grow more powerful over time. They have theinformation that other units do not have; they enjoy the status due to their centrality; they cancontrol the flow of information.‖(Conrad & Poole, 2005). Another notable piece of information was the lack outside the battalion headquartersknowledge of the subsystem of the grass roots advisory board. The Fusion Cell, the CommandLeadership, and Operations all knew the intent and function of the board, but the recruiter levelwas blissfully unaware. Because the board can be such an important part of the battalioncommunication process, this lack of knowledge was telling in that an outside, volunteerorganization that can really help mission accomplishment in fitting within the commander‘s keyvalues is unknown and underutilized. Over 60% of the headquarters staff wrote in ―N/A‖ or ―Idon‘t work with the WSAAB‖ on their surveys on all three questions relating to the board.While 27% percent of the field stated they agree or somewhat agree that ―I am regularly told ofadvisory board help available.‖ 32% of the field understood the purpose of the advisory board,and 34% of the recruiter force believes the board is effective in meeting mission goals. Byengaging this subsystem in the communication plan of the organization, further productivity and
  32. 32. recruiting use can be met. The board was created in 2009 and one survey responded: ―The long-term effectiveness of the board may not ever be realized.‖ Two other notable trends noted were lack of civilian training, and lack of supervisor stakein training across the board, as well as lack of future soldier communication skills. Since futuresoldiers communication skills is, while not entirely separate from this audit, a system in and ofitself, it should be addressed separately as a training module for the staff and NCO‘s who need toknow how to communicate with this new generation of recruits. Overall, while many interviewers stated there is always room for improvement within thebattalion communication methods, most noted that it did not affect their personal job satisfaction.Again, this audit was limited on time, and not all personnel were involved in the study—theinterviews were generally conducted at battalion headquarters. Since this organization showed such a pervasive interdependence on formal and informalcommunication channels, it was impossible not to review one without alluding to the other. Andsince informal communication channels are opened during meetings, holding those via VCS maynot ensure camaraderie or esprit de corps are built in more formal, recognized ways.
  33. 33. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION AS STRATEGY Every military organization has a strategy to implement in order to meet missionrequirements, and within this rule, Seattle Recruiting Battalion is no different. It is one thing,however to have a strategy, it is another entirely to express that strategy to the soldiers tasked toimplement and follow through on strategy. Within the term as used by Seattle recruitingbattalion it is important to remember: 1) ―The term strategy derives from the ancient Greek term for ―artifice‖ or ―trick,‖ and its early use referred to suppressing the enemy in battle.‖ 2) ―The person who conceived the strategy, the strategos, was a general‖ (in this case a Lt. Col.). 3) They knew that situations often changed and the strategos had to adapt. In our day too strategy has an element of improvisation and cannot follow a rigid plan.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) A srategy therefore of defining a narrative of the organization, of implementing changeand following through must come from not only the commander, but across the levels of staffleads. If the organization is going to be flattened at the top and more egalitarian, it must be so inall respects, or further rigidness will ensue, and those percieving themselves to have positions ofpower over others with naturally move to enforce their notion of power-holding. It may seemcounter-productive, but a standard of conduct, or a standard of information sharing must bedeveloped, implemented and disseminated throughout the battalion footprint. While thecommander has a leadership philosophy, a set of key values, there is no connecting of the dotsamongst the staff elements in order to see the communication vision through.
  34. 34. Since ―communication is generally defined as a process through which people, actingtogether, create, sustain, and manage meanings through the use of verbal and non-verbal signsand symbols withing a particular context,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) the strategy of the battalioncommunication must include all those parts. Through the analytical review of the surveys andinterviews, the battalion currently has the people and management of meanings, but is lacking inthe acting together, (not in the notion of one on one conversation, but as a team) nor can theycreate or sustain the processes there to provide the command with proper communications. ―Justas we created relationships through conversation, we also create organizations throughconversation,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) therefore without a narrative of the organization, a storythat makes Seattle Recruiting Battalion unique, the organization can not be created in a flattenedway without stakeholders pushing the conversation forward—and further, being heard by theinteded recievers. ―The miracle of organizational communication processes is that they allowlarge numbers of people, from very different backgrounds, ways of thinking, needs and goals tocoordinate their actions and create ―organizations‖ that at least seem to be stable containerswithin which information flows from person to person.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). In reviewing the communication as a strategic notion, also, within the battalion, whatwould success for 2012 look like? Several staff members were asked this question during theinterview process, and always a numerical quotient was given. The general consensus, thereforewas ―success would bring the battalion to number x on the list of battalions within USAREC.‖ Ifthe audit takes this at face value, that a numerica quotient exists so that the battalion can describehow well or how poorly they are doing, then certainly a strategy must exist to bring thatnumerical score to fruition. The strategy, therefore of narrative of the organization andorganizational goals must be vocalized and realized by all levels of staff.
  35. 35. STAFF MOTIVATION Since Seattle Recruiting Battalion is inherently hierarchical (by nature as a militaryorganization), but with a staff level of a networked organization, defining what will engage staffmotivation is difficult at best. Since networked staffs are generally motivated through threedefined processes, we will look at those: 1) A network of trust. ―Trust is the ideal cement for the network organizations. They have little or no hierarchy, so hierarchy cannot be a source of authority to coordinate control.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) 2) Inspiration or meaningful tasks. ―A meaningful task or goal can inspire units and individuals in the network to work hard and ensure they coordinate with other units.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) 3) Formal systems of monitoring and control. ―Networked systems may attempt to develop structures to formally coordinate unit activities.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) Therefore within these three frames of reference, where would Seattle Recruiting Battalion stand, according to the communication audit study conducted? Since trust was not formally reviewed, only analysis of the information provided can be rendered. Earlier, a communication breakdown in the communications office produced animosity from the field recruiters to the battalion staff and command, in one mentioned instance. However, considering that the follow-on statement was ―Nothing is going to change, no matter what we say, no matter if we complain. The battalion leadership doesn‘t care, or they would take care of the fact that people ‗up there‘ refuse to give us what we need to do our mission‖ (Focus Group, 2011) one could deduce that trust is not inherant in the
  36. 36. organization as it now fucntions-especially between certain staff elements and the field- force. Next, we look at inspiration, and meaningful tasks. The battalion commander states asone of his key values, Personal and Professional Excellence: ―There are no monitary gains suchas bonuses or monetary based awards in our business for soldiers. The drive within personnelmust come from inside them to exceed the standards set before all other soldiers and give 110%to our mission. The desire to recruit to our market potential rather than our mission emphasizesthis personal and professional excellence.‖ (Robinson, 2011). In this context there is a need forinherant good deeds done for the betterment of the organization. However, there is littleinsipration, nor description of meaningful tasks within the organization. Finally, formal systems of conduct and control. While the battalion is flattened andegalitarian at the top, there currently is no established method of recourse if a staff member is notmeeting their fair share of duties, or keeping with their end of the organizational bargin. Becausethere is so little recourse, staff members revert to ―the way its always been done,‖ and rarely areinadequacies at the staff level adressed. To be fair, while this is an anaylisis from empircalevidence given in the form of focus groups and interviews, there is a difficulty in removingdifficient civilian personnel and senior soldiers from certain positions because of the lengthlypaperwork process required by the Office of Personnel Management and Humand ResourcesCommand. The process of couseling and removing those who do not adhear to the battalionmentality may in essence breed the lack of buy-in of the commanders organizational structure atthe staff level.
  37. 37. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS Through focus groups, interviews, survey questionares and observational analysis, SeattleRecruiting Battalion can be viewed through many interpretive lenses as certain models oforganizational behavior. The complex network of structures, from the traditional heirarchy seenin the field to the flattened egalitarian nature of the organizational headquarters staff, serve as aninteresting mix of dynamics. Through a systematic look at the different organizational levelsthat the communication between those involved, each individual, section and subsystem withinthe organization views the organization and by proxy its communication differently.Strengths fo the organization as defined by the audit: 1) The battalion as a whole generally strives for success at the individual and organizational level. Every person interviewed or spoken with described recognition that there is always room for improvement, and that they want to improve as a organization. 2) Staff officers and civilians generally have a good communicative relationship—they work together as a team, or strive to. Further, communication between the executive officer (chief of staff) and staff supervisors is also good. 3) Proceedures and processes of communicating the commanders intent to the field are currently being set up, and the process is moving forward.Weaknesses of the organization as defined by the audit are as follows: 1) There is little buy-in at the staff level of the commander‘s initiatives, reccomondations and desire to generate a egalitarian networked organization.
  38. 38. 2) External communication is non-existant, and internal communication suffers without a battalion narrative to engender the staff, recruiters and future soldiers to the positive relationship the commander desires with the community.3) The informal communication channels are devisive and often dismiss the formal communication sent out by the command. Rumors abound throughout the battalion, though in more hushed terms than previously noticed by the command.
  39. 39. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMONDATIONS A change of the magnitude the Seattle Recruiting Battalion is in the middle of cannotever take place in a singe meeting, memo or communication audit. However, certain issues andreccomondations to those issues must be addressed at the staff level because ―the flatness ofnetworked organizations necessitates a negotiator for the manager.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).Failing to negotiate in a flattened organization or communicate across the disciplines within theorganization can lead to burn out, turn-over and loss of highly productive and motivatedindividuals who can move the battalion forward in the coming years. When asked what one would do if they were in charge for a day, one respondent said: ―Iwould enforce the nature of the hierarchical organization. I would ensure enforcement andfollow-though were adheared to and that no one individual on the staff had more of a say thananyone but the commander.‖ ((3), 2011). This juxtapostion of the commanders intent of aflattened organization and a reoccuring theme of ―lack of command and control‖ should beaddressed as soon as possible. Without staff buy-in of a flattened organization, the commanderis viewed as weak and ineffectual by the traditional hierarchical standards of a militaryorganization. In describing his purpose as part of the greater narrative of the organization, abetter buy in from the staff level may be possible and create a better sense of unity andcoheision. That being said, if the commander is going to be egalitarian, be egalitarian. Nowhere inin networked organizations can (perceived) favortism take place without creating a more (non)traditional hierarchy. One staff member commented during an interview, ―It‘s all about who cantalk to the commander, who he wants to hear.‖ ((2), 2011). If moving forward in the direction ofan innovative, productive team who works for the good of the organization is the desired effect
  40. 40. of this transition of organizational behavior, the commander must be egalitarian in responding toindividual‘s voices. Ideas and processes seem to be stiffled, according to the feelings of certainstaff members based on percieved favoritism. If ideas and processes are addressed accordingly,heard, then innovation and production can increase. The innovation and production can not bequantified by monetary value either, to borrow a quote from Steve Jobs, ―It‘s not about money.It‘s about the people you have, how you‘re led, and how much you get it.‖ (Valentino-DeVries,2011). The team mentality must be fostered at the local level, and internal customer service mustbe expanded upon. While being completely egalitarian may not be feasible right away—the very nature ofthe positions within the battalion dictate that at some points some subsystems are in fact moreimportant than others, the notion of honest and transparent communication can be. A system ofcommunicating not only within the organization can be created, in the form of something simplelike a weekly email from the battalion commander or executive officer telling the officepersonnel where they stand as a battalion. If the key values are going to be implemented at thebattalion level to be disseminated throughout the companies as well, explain that. Why is thisdirection being pursued? ―Team-based organizations should give rewards to teams rather thanbasing salaries and promotions individual performance. But most people are accustomed toexpect rewards based on an individual basis, as specified in the traditional strategy and passed onto the relational strategy.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). However, in direct relationship to moving forward, the battalion can certainly implementsome form of participatory decision making. If the organization will be involved in a flatteningat the top, and buy-in can be achieved, by following through on a program of PDM, though time-consuming, morale should increase, as well as buy-into the tenants of leadership and key values
  41. 41. in relationship to Seattle Recruiting Battalion‘s stated mission for RY2012. Nonetheless,―Regardless of its particular form, PDM will increase organizational performance only if certainrequirements are met: 1) Subordinates must want to be involved in the decision making… 2) Supervisors must be willing to allow their subordinates participate legitimately… 3) The issues being discussed must be important to the participants… 4) All the participants must have expertise and information relevant to the problems being discussed… 5) Managers must foster and support the beliefs, values, and attitudes neccisary to legitimate participatory systems…‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). In engaging and creating a new form of PDM, it could take the simple form of openingthe lines of staff communication through formal or informal meeting held in the conferenceroom. By inviting participants within the flattened organization, this will foster a desire oforganizational involvement, provide them with a legitimate say in the organization and itsprocesses, validate experience and knowledge of individuals on the team, and create a sense ofconnectedness to the organization. Further, the organization must have an external voice. This notion goes without saying,except it is not being utilized. In this time of lowered budget for advertising, the battalion mustlearn to actually communicate and not rely on the tired methods used when they had a budget 4times the size it is currently. Again, the researcher must take certain ownership in this lack ofexternal voice—as it was her position before it was eliminated. The information for continuingan external communication program is at the battalion level, perhaps in hands that cannotimplement them. Just as an internal narrative must be constructed, so must the external
  42. 42. narrative—the website must be updated, communication lines with the media and potentialexternal publication produced on the web should be looked into. Not one media advisory orpress release could be found to review for current operations. This information, as stated above isin the hands of the battalion, as well as templates in constructing a battalion story—it wasexpected to be reviewed during the audit process, but instead the information was not found inthe communications office. This is wholly the responsibility of the researcher and not thebattalion leadership or communications office—for not providing it to the communications officeand instead following the process of the fusion cell. The external media, or bloggers or evenpotential recruits do not hear about the battalion and its education initiatives in the communitythrough new media or word-of-mouth. If market share is going to be reached for RY 2012, newinnovative ways of communicating with the target demographic must be implemented or thebattalion will recruit numbers and not the high quality recruits it is capable of recruiting. Inrecruiting those high-quality recruits, therefore, the battalion can be a force of shaping the Armyof the future, they can have a say in the next generation of soldiers. Finally the single thing most lacking in the organization and which should be addressedfirst, is the team. The team needs more informal methods of communication. Setting up trainingand conferences via VCS, while generally more productive, does not allow for interaction andengagement. The organization all sits at their desks during VCS meetings, without cross-talk, orinnovative ideas during the meetings. ―But innovation comes from people meeting up in thehallways or calling each other at 10:30 at night with a new idea, or because they realizedsomething that shoots holes in how we‘ve been thinking about a problem. It‘s ad hoc meetings ofsix people called by someone who thinks he has figured out the coolest new thing ever and whowants to know what other people think of his idea.‖(Valentino-DeVries, 2011). Without the
  43. 43. cross-talk in meetings or the internal search of those new ideas, a flattened and transparentorganization will do nothing. Without a team really honestly being a team, and with a narrativeto move the organization forward, the hierarchy will return, and everyone in the organization willreturn to their independent, ―it‘s not in my job description‖ mentality.
  44. 44. Bibliography(1), A. (2011, 09 30). (M. Shartel, Interviewer)(2), A. (2011, 10 03). Communication in Seattle Battalion. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)(3), A. (2011, 09 30). Seattle Recruiting Battalion Communication. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)Seattle Recruiting Battalion. (2009). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from, C., & Poole, M. S. (2005). Strategic Organizational Communication in a Global Economy. Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.Downs, C. W., & Adrian, A. D. (2004). Assessing Organizational Communication. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.Focus Group, 7. C. (2011, 09 22). Communications Audit Focus Group Meeting. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)Robinson, L. C. (2011, 10 09). Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion Commander. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)Valentino-DeVries, J. (2011, 08 24). Washington Street Journal Blogs. Retrieved 10 09, 2011, from Digits:
  45. 45. The following Appendices should follow from here: 1) Example of Battalion Newsletter 2) Example of Media Advisory 3) Example of In-processing checklist 4) Example of Tasking Email 5) Example of OPORDER 6) Example of Social Media OPORDER (sent from USAREC) While the researcher saw these items, they were not provided in a timely enough mannerto include in this final product.