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المجلة المصرية للتنمية والتخطيط

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مجلة علمية محكمة يصدرها معهد التخطيط القومي

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المجلة المصرية للتنمية والتخطيط

  1. 1. ‫ا‬‫ﻟﻤﺠﻠﺔ‬‫اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔواﻟﺘﺨﻄﯿﻂ‬ ‫اﻟ‬ ‫اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺪ‬‫واﻟﻌﺸﺮون‬ ‫ﺮاﺑﻊ‬‫اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻰ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺪد‬ ‫دﯾﺴﻤﺒﺮ‬2016 §.‫اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﯾﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻮﯾﺔ‬‫ﻋﺜﻤﺎن‬ ‫ﻣﺤﻤﺪ‬ ‫ﻋﺜﻤﺎن‬ §‫ﻧﺤﻮ‬‫ﻧﻤﻮذج‬‫ﻣﻘﺘﺮح‬‫ﻟﺒﻨﺎء‬‫اﻟﺘ‬‫ﻮﺟﮭﺎت‬‫اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ‬‫ﻓﻲ‬‫اﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺎت‬‫اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﯿﺔ‬.‫اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﯾﺔ‬ ‫اﺣﻤﺪ‬ ‫ﻣﺤﻤﺪ‬ ‫اﻟﺠﯿﺰاوى‬ §‫ﻟﻤﺎذا‬‫ﺗﻔﻮﻗﺖ‬‫ﻛﻮرﯾﺎ‬‫اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ‬‫ﻋﻠﻰ‬‫ﻣﺼﺮ‬.‫اﻗﺘﺼﺎدﯾﺎ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫اﺑﻮ‬ ‫ﺳﻠﻄﺎن‬ §‫واﻟﻨ‬ ‫اﻟﻐﺰل‬ ‫وﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﻘﻄﻦ‬ ‫أزﻣﺔ‬. ‫اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﺔ‬ ‫ﺴﯿﺞ‬‫ﺧﻄﺎب‬ ‫ﻣﺨﺘﺎر‬ §‫اﻟﺒﺸﺮﯾﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺮ‬ ‫ﻋﺮض‬:‫اﻻﻧﻤﺎﺋﻰ‬ ‫اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة‬ ‫اﻷﻣﻢ‬ ‫ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ‬2015‫ﻋﻤﻞ‬ ‫ﻛﻞ‬ ‫ﻓﻰ‬ ‫)اﻟﺘﻨﻤﯿﺔ‬(.‫طﺒﺎﻟﺔ‬ ‫زﯾﺎت‬ §‫"اﻟﻌﺪاﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎب‬ ‫ﻋﺮض‬‫اﻹﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯿﺔ‬‫واﻟﻨﻤﺎذج‬‫اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻮﯾ‬‫ﺔ‬"‫ﻣﻊ‬‫اھﺘﻤﺎم‬‫ﺧﺎص‬‫ﺑﺤﺎﻟ‬‫ﺔ‬‫ﻣﺼﺮ‬. ‫ﺧﻀﺮ‬‫أﺑﻮ‬‫ﻗﻮرة‬ §‫ﻣﻦ‬"‫ھﺎﻣﺸﻰ‬‫إﻟﻰ‬‫ﻣﺤﺮك‬‫اﻟﻨﻤﻮ‬"‫ﻣﻔﮭﻮم‬‫اﻟﻘﻄﺎع‬‫ﻏﯿﺮ‬‫اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻰ‬‫ﻓﻰ‬‫ﻣﺼﺮ‬.‫أﺣﻤﺪ‬‫ﻋﺒﺪ‬‫اﻟﻌﺰﯾﺰ‬‫اﻟﺒﻘﻠﻰ‬ ‫اﻟﺗﺧطﯾط‬ ‫ﻣﻌﮭد‬ ‫ﯾﺻدرھﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﺣﻛﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻣﯾﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﺟﻠﺔ‬
  2. 2. ‫والتخطيط‬ ‫للتنمية‬ ‫المصرية‬ ‫المجلة‬ ‫يصذرهب‬ ‫هذكوت‬ ‫سٌىيت‬ ‫ًصف‬ ‫علويت‬ ‫هجلت‬ ‫القىمى‬ ‫التخطيط‬ ‫معهذ‬ ‫التحرير‬ ‫هيئة‬ : ‫التحرير‬ ‫رئيس‬ .‫أ.د‬‫عثوبى‬ ‫هذوذ‬ ‫عثوبى‬ : ‫التحرير‬ ‫هيئة‬ ‫أعضبء‬ .‫أ.د‬‫قىرة‬ ‫أبى‬ ‫خضر‬ .‫أ.د‬‫ش‬‫ي‬ً‫الشىارب‬ ‫ريي‬ .‫أ‬.‫د‬‫السالم‬ ‫عبذ‬ ‫فبديت‬ .‫أ.د‬‫خشبت‬ ‫هبجذ‬ ‫هذوذ‬ .‫أ.د‬‫هذي‬‫صب‬‫لخ‬‫الٌور‬ ‫االستشبرية‬ ‫الهيئة‬: ‫العيسىي‬ ‫أبراهين‬ .‫أ.د‬ ‫ًصبر‬ ‫سعذ‬ .‫أ.د‬ ‫صقر‬ ‫ادوذ‬ ‫صقر‬ .‫أ.د‬ ‫القبدر‬ ‫عبذ‬ ً‫عل‬ .‫أ.د‬ ً‫الرفبع‬ ‫فبئقت‬ .‫أ.د‬ ‫ه‬ .‫أ.د‬‫ع‬‫خىرشيذ‬ ‫خز‬ ‫التحرير‬ ‫سكرتبرية‬ ‫عبشىر‬ ‫أدوذ‬ .‫د‬ .‫أ‬‫خبطر‬ ‫هبشن‬ ‫ادوذ‬ ‫رهضبى‬ ‫ًعيوت‬ .‫د‬‫سليوبى‬ .‫أ‬‫اهلل‬ ‫ادوذعبذ‬ ‫هٌذ‬ ‫الو‬ ‫الوجلت‬‫صريت‬ ‫والتخطيط‬ ‫للتنمية‬ ‫والعشرون‬ ‫الرابع‬ ‫المجلذ‬–‫الثبنى‬ ‫العذد‬–‫ديسمبر‬6102 ‫االشتراكبت‬ ‫اربعىى‬ ‫لألفراد‬ ‫السٌىي‬ ‫االشخراك‬ ‫وقيوت‬ ،‫هصريب‬ ‫جٌيهب‬ ‫عشروى‬ ‫الوجلت‬ ‫هي‬ ‫الىادذ‬ ‫العذد‬ ‫بيع‬ ‫سعر‬ .‫العربيت‬ ‫هصر‬ ‫جوهىريت‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫للهيئبث‬ ‫جٌيهب‬ ‫وسخىى‬ ‫جٌيهب‬ ‫دوالرا‬ ‫عر‬‫ع‬‫عش‬ ‫خوسعت‬ ‫السعٌىي‬ ‫واالشعخراك‬ ‫ر‬ ‫يعبدلهعب‬ ‫هعب‬ ‫اأو‬ ‫دوالراث‬ ‫يوبًيعت‬ ‫الىادعذ‬ ‫الععذد‬ ‫بيعع‬ ‫سععر‬ .‫واألجٌبيت‬ ‫العربيت‬ ‫الذول‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫للهيئبث‬ ‫دوالرا‬ ‫وعشروى‬ ‫لألفراد‬ ‫المراسالت‬ : ً‫عل‬ ‫الخذرير‬ ‫رئيس‬ ‫ببسن‬ ‫الوراسالث‬ ‫جويع‬ ‫حىجه‬ ً‫القىه‬ ‫الخخطيط‬ ‫هعهذ‬ ‫سبلن‬ ‫صالح‬ ‫طريق‬–‫ًصر‬ ‫هذيٌت‬–‫القبهرة‬ ‫ح‬: ‫ليفىى‬77872622-77872722 : ‫فبكس‬77872222‫ا‬22727‫ر‬ :ًً‫االلكخرو‬ ‫البريذ‬ egyptionreview@yahoo.com : ‫االًخرًج‬ ً‫عل‬ ‫الوىقع‬ www.inplanning.gov.eg/www.mop.gov.eg
  3. 3. Egyptian Review of Development And Planning Egyptian Review of Development and Planning Scientific Arbitrated Review Issued Biannually by Institute of National Planning Editorial Board Editor in Chief: Prof..Osman Mohamed Osman Board Members Prof Khadre Abou korah Prof . Shereen ElShawarby Prof . Fadia M.Abdel Salam Prof . Mohmed Maged Khashaba Prof . Hoda Elnemr Advisory Board Prof . Ibrahim El- Esawy Prof . Saad Nassar Prof . Saqer Ahmed Saqer Prof. Ali Abd El Kader Dr Faeka Al Refaae Prof Moataz Khorshed Editorial Secretary : Dr. Ahmed Ashour Ahmed Hashim Khater Dr. Naema Ramadn Soliman Hend Ahmed Abdalla Volum 24 No.2 December 2016 Subscriptions Egypt : Singcle copy Rate L.E 20 Annual Subscription for Individuals L.E40 Annual Subscription for Organizations L.E60 Other Countries: Single Copy Rate $8 Annual Subscription for Individuals $15 Annual Subscription for Organizations $20 Correspondences All correspondences should be addressed to Ceditor in Chief : Institute of National Planning Salah Salem Street – Naser City –Cairo Tel :22627840 -22629247 Fax:(00202)22634747 E-mail: egyptionreview@yahoo.com Web Site :wwwinplanning .gov. eg / www.mop.gov.eg
  4. 4. Subscriptions Egypt : Singcle copy Rate L.E 20 Annual Subscription for Individuals L.E40 Annual Subscription for Organizations L.E60 Other Countries: Single Copy Rate $8 Annual Subscription for Individuals $15 Annual Subscription for Organizations $20 Correspondences All correspondences should be addressed to Ceditor in Chief : Institute of National Planning Salah Salem Street – Naser City –Cairo Tel :22627840 -22629247 Fax:(00202)22634747 E-mail: egyptionreview@yahoo.com Web Site :wwwinplanning .gov. eg www.mop.gov.eg
  5. 5. ‫النشر‬ ‫قواعد‬ 1.‫انعشوض‬ ، ‫انًمبالث‬ ، ‫انًحكًت‬ ‫انعهًيت‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬ ‫األبحبد‬ ‫انًجهت‬ ‫حُشش‬ ‫وفعبنيبث‬ ‫نًؤحًشاث‬ ‫وانًخببعبث‬ ‫وانخغطيبث‬ ،‫وحمبسيش‬ ‫نكخب‬ ‫انُمذيت‬ ‫وانًشاجعبث‬ . ‫انصهت‬ ‫راث‬ ‫انًسبهًبث‬ ٍ‫ي‬ ‫غيشهب‬ ‫أو‬ ، ‫عهًيت‬ 2.‫واإلَجهيض‬ ‫انعشبيت‬ ٍ‫ببنهغخي‬ ‫انعهًيت‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬ ‫األبحبد‬ ‫انًجهت‬ ‫حُشش‬‫وانخي‬ ، ‫يت‬ . ‫أخشي‬ ‫عهًيت‬ ‫دوسيبث‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫نهُشش‬ ‫يمذيت‬ ‫ونيسج‬ ‫َششهب‬ ‫يسبك‬ ‫نى‬ 3.‫وغيشهب‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬ ‫األبحبد‬ ‫اسخمببل‬ ‫يخى‬( ‫يذيجت‬ ‫اسطىاَبث‬ ً‫عه‬CD)‫أو‬ ، ( ‫نهًجهت‬ ‫اإلنيكخشوَي‬ ‫انبشيذ‬ ‫طشيك‬ ٍ‫ع‬yahoo.com@egyptionreview‫ببسى‬ ، ) ، ‫انخحشيش‬ ‫هيئت‬ ‫سئيس‬‫يشفم‬‫نهببح‬ ‫يخخصشة‬ ‫راحيت‬ ‫سيشة‬ ‫بهب‬ ‫ب‬‫جهت‬ ‫بهب‬ ‫يىظحب‬ ‫ذ‬ ، ‫عًهه‬‫و‬. ‫يعه‬ ‫انًخخهفت‬ ‫انخىاصم‬ ‫وسبئم‬ 4.‫حجى‬ ‫يخشاوح‬‫حذود‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫انًمذيت‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬ ‫األبحبد‬6666-0666‫ال‬ ‫بًب‬ ‫كهًت‬ ‫يخجبوص‬35( ‫أوساق‬ ‫بًُط‬ ‫صفحت‬A4‫وانجذاول‬ ‫انخىظيحيت‬ ‫األشكبل‬ ‫يخعًُت‬ ، ) ‫َظبو‬ ‫يع‬ ‫يخىافمت‬ ‫وطببعت‬ ، ‫انًصبدس‬ ‫ولبئًت‬Microsoft Word‫ان‬ ‫حضيذ‬ ‫وال‬ .‫ًخببعبث‬ ٍ‫ع‬ ‫وانخمبسيش‬ ‫نهكخب‬ ‫انُمذيت‬ ‫وانًشاجعبث‬16. ‫صفحبث‬ 5.( ‫َسك‬ ً‫عه‬ ‫انعشبيت‬ ‫ببنهغت‬ ‫انًسبهًبث‬ ‫طببعت‬ ٌ‫حكى‬Simplified Arabic-14، ) ( ‫َسك‬ ً‫عه‬ ‫انعشبيت‬ ‫غيش‬ ‫وانهغت‬Times New Roman-14‫خط‬ ‫بحجى‬ ٍ‫وانعُبوي‬ ، ) 61. ٍ‫نهُسمي‬ 6.، ‫انعشبيت‬ ‫ببنهغت‬ ‫نهُشش‬ ‫انًمذيت‬ ‫ببألبحبد‬ ‫يشفك‬‫انعشبيت‬ ٍ‫ببنهغخي‬ ‫يهخصب‬ ٍ‫ع‬ ‫يضيذ‬ ‫ال‬ ‫واإلَجهيضيت‬266‫يع‬ ، ‫اإلَجهيضيت‬ ‫ببنهغت‬ ‫نألبحبد‬ ‫ويهخصب‬ ، ‫كهًت‬ ( ‫األبحبد‬ ‫نكبفت‬ ‫يفخبحيت‬ ‫كهًبث‬5-7‫اسفبق‬ ٍ‫ويًك‬ .)‫كهًبث‬‫حعشيفبث‬ ‫لبئًت‬ ‫انعهًيت‬ ‫نهًصطهحبث‬‫االخخصبساث‬ ‫أو‬. ‫انًسخخذيت‬ 7.‫كخب‬ ٍ‫ي‬ ‫انًصبدس‬ ‫لبئًت‬ ً‫وف‬ ، ٍ‫انًخ‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫انعهًيت‬ ‫انخىريك‬ ‫لىاعذ‬ ً‫حشاع‬ ‫إنيكخشوَيت‬ ‫ويىالع‬ ‫وحمبسيش‬ ‫ودوسيبث‬ً‫انخبن‬ ‫انخشحيب‬ ‫وفك‬:، ‫انًؤنف‬ ‫(اسى‬‫حبسيخ‬ ٌ‫انعُىا‬ ، ‫انُشش‬)‫انصفحت‬ ‫سلى‬ ،‫انُشش‬ ٌ‫يكب‬ ،‫واألشكبل‬ ‫انجذاول‬ ‫حىريك‬ ‫ويخى‬ ، . ‫األصهيت‬ ‫ببنًصبدس‬ ٍ‫انًخ‬ ‫داخم‬ ‫وغيشهب‬ 0.‫كبفت‬ ‫حخعع‬‫جبَب‬ ٍ‫ي‬ ًً‫انعه‬ ‫نهخحكيى‬ ‫نهُشش‬ ‫انًمذيت‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬ ‫األبحبد‬ ‫بعط‬ ‫ولبىل‬ ‫أههيت‬ ‫عذو‬ ‫حمشيش‬ ‫انخحشيش‬ ‫نهيئت‬ ‫ويجىص‬ ، ٍ‫يخخصصي‬ ‫وخبشاء‬ ‫أسبحزة‬ . ‫انُشش‬ ‫أو‬ ‫نهخحكيى‬ ‫انبحىد‬ 9.، ‫انًطهىبت‬ ‫وانخعذيالث‬ ‫انخحكيى‬ ‫وَخبئج‬ ، ‫انبحذ‬ ‫بًىلف‬ ٍ‫انببحزي‬ ‫ابالغ‬ ‫يخى‬ ‫ه‬ ‫نخطت‬ ‫وفمب‬ ‫يحذد‬ ‫انزي‬ ‫انُشش‬ ‫ويىعذ‬‫عذد‬ ً‫عه‬ ‫انببحذ‬ ‫ويحصم‬ ، ‫انخحشيش‬ ‫يئت‬ .‫اإلهذاء‬ ‫سبيم‬ ً‫عه‬ ‫انبحذ‬ ‫به‬ ‫َشش‬ ‫انزي‬ ‫انًجهت‬ 16.‫بكبفت‬ ‫انًجهت‬ ‫وححخفظ‬ ، ‫كخببهب‬ ‫َظش‬ ‫وجهت‬ ٍ‫ع‬ ‫انًجهت‬ ً‫ف‬ ‫انىاسدة‬ ‫اآلساء‬ ‫حعبش‬ ‫يىافمت‬ ً‫عه‬ ‫انحصىل‬ ‫ويهضو‬ ، ‫بهب‬ ‫انًُشىسة‬ ‫انًسبهًبث‬ ‫بخصىص‬ ‫انُشش‬ ‫حمىق‬ .‫انًسبهًبث‬ ‫حهك‬ ‫َشش‬ ‫إعبدة‬ ‫لبم‬ ‫يُهب‬ ‫كخببيت‬ 11.‫األبحبد‬ ‫إعذاد‬ ً‫ف‬ ًً‫انعه‬ ‫انبحذ‬ ‫وأخالليبث‬ ‫انعهًيت‬ ‫ببأليبَت‬ ‫االنخضاو‬ ‫نهُشش‬ ‫انًمذيت‬ ‫وانذساسبث‬.
  6. 6. ‫المجلد‬‫الرابع‬‫و‬‫العشرون‬‫العدد‬‫ا‬‫لثانى‬‫ديسمبر‬6102 115 3 :      
  7. 7. Vol. 24 No.2 December 2016 Contents  Economic populism. Osman Mohamed Osman Toward a proposed model for Building the strategic directions For KSA Governmental universities. Mohamed Ahmed El-gizawy Why South Korea Exceed Egypt Economically? . Sultan Abou Ali  Egyptian Cotton and Textile Crisis. Mokhtar Khattab  Human Development Report 2015 Review: Work for Human Development. Zinat Tobala  Social Justice and Models Of Development with Special reference to Egypt. Khadre Abou korah From the “Margins” to the “Engine of Growth “Conceptualisation" of the Informal Sector in Egypt. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 3 16 56 78 95 115 3
  8. 8. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 2
  9. 9. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 3
  10. 10. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 4
  11. 11. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 5
  12. 12. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 7
  13. 13. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 8
  14. 14. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 9
  15. 15. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 01
  16. 16. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 00
  17. 17. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 01
  18. 18. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 02
  19. 19. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 03 1- http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldiews/w p/2016/12/19/the-global-wave-of-populism.... 2- http://www.economist.com/node/2170995/ 3- http://www.foreignaffairs.com/111878 4- Idid 5- http://www.project-syndicate.eg/trump.agenda- america-economy 6- http://www.economist.com/node/21712128 7- http://www.foreignaffairs .com/111898 8- Idid 9- Idid 10-http://www.project-syndicat.org/is-populism-being- trumped-2016-10 11-http://www.project-syndicat.org/populism-driven-by- geopolitics-change-by...
  20. 20. ‫عثمان‬ ‫محمد‬ ‫عثمان‬ 04 %. 13-Idid 14-Idid 15-http://www.project.syndicate.org/popolist-revolt- crisis-of-capialism-by.... 16-Idid 17-http://www.project.syndicate.org/advanced-country- polticians-ignore-policy-cons.. 18-http://www.populism-being.trumped-2016-10
  21. 21. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 115 ** la sociologicritique : * **
  22. 22. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 116
  23. 23. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 111
  24. 24. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 111
  25. 25. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 111
  26. 26. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 121
  27. 27. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 121 : :
  28. 28. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 122
  29. 29. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 123
  30. 30. ‫قورة‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫خضر‬ 124
  31. 31. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 3 From the “Margins” to the “Engine of Growth”“Conceptualisation of the Informal Sector in Egypt” Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly*
  32. 32. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 4 Introduction: Informality has been a challenge for Egypt for some decades. The informal employment accounts for about 40% in 2012, and growing at faster pace than the formal employment.1 The Economic Research Forum in 2004, stated that 40% of the new entrants to the labour force in 1980s were informal, compared to 65% in 1998, resulting in about 57% of all employment were informal.2 Other data on the pattern of new entrants to the Egyptian labour markets since 1969 till 1998 (Figure 1) show that new entrants (18+) to the labour markets were disproportionately drawn into informal sector. Figure (1) shows that in 1969, around 75% of new workers (18+) were drawn into formal public employment and 20% into informal jobs. In 1990‟s, and due to the decline of employment opportunities in the public sector, and the formal private sector, Informal sector has been providing more employment than formal employment creating an unabated trend toward informalisation of the labour market. Thus, by 1998 about 70% of new workers (18+) were drawn into informal sector employment, and only about 20% into formal public jobs. The relative share of formal private employment has doubled, however remain modest. Moreover, 75 % percent of new entrants who entered the labor market during 2000-2005 were entering into informal work, resulting in the share of informal workers escalated to 61% of all employment in 2006.3 This trend continued, as another nationally representative data set, specifically the Egyptian Labor Market Survey (ELMS) of 2012, shows that among the 66.7% of young men who had a paid job, about 52% of them joined the informal sector, however, women‟s situation was different with lower share entering the informal sector.4 Moreover, data from Egypt “school- to-work transition survey” 2014 dataset suggests that this pattern remains.5 ‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬ * Associated professor at INP
  33. 33. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 5 Recent research argues that the era of the government being the major employer is gone as the role of the government shifted to be a regulator and facilitator for job creation and for the protection of workers‟ rights.6 Figure (1) Percent of New Entrants to Formal & Informal Employment 18 years old or more7 Source: El-Bakly, A. (2001) “The Informal Sector and Urban Labour Markets in Egypt: A Life Path Approach”, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Liverpool, UK. The negative impacts of informality are not restricted to individuals, households or institutions that are working in the informal sector but on the economy of Egypt as a whole. Many attempts were trying to deal with informality for different purposes, some attempts to integrate informal sector into formal one as a crucial approach to rescue Egypt‟s economy, and get it out of the unforeseen future.8 Others see the economic unites or individuals belong to the informal sector as potential tax payers, and that the informal sector has lost the government EGP 300bn in potential taxes.9 Moreover, others, have given the fact, that the government is no long a provider of Enough jobs, are seeking to find decent work in the informal sector.10 To formalise the informal sector, the main target should be eliminating freedom to choose between joining the formal and informal sectors, or encourage people to join the formal sector. However, such approach requires conceptualizing the informal sector, and identifies the framework in which it operates, and 0 20 40 60 80 100 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 % Year Formal Public Formal Private Informal
  34. 34. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 6 examining factors that influence people‟s choices in entering labour markets. Any approach which recommends mandatory legislative, executive and judicial reforms, aiming at depriving individual from joining the informal sector will not be fully effective, unless considering the socio-economic background of those, who joined or intend to join the informal rather, that the formal sector. Also attempts to integrate informal sector into formal one on the individual or firm basis, will go vain without knowing the main factors that play the major roles in determining people‟s choices in entering the labour market. Therefore, conceptualizing the informal sector in Egypt and identifies the framework, in which it operates is essential. Also, examining factors that influence people‟s choices in entering labour markets are also of major importance for policy and decision- makers. Therefore, the current research is an attempt for conceptualizing the informal sector in Egypt. 1- Definition of Informal Sector: Though the informal sector has been closely investigated for more than 40 years, a universal and satisfactory definition for it is not yet established. Part of the problem is that attempts to define the informal sector were just reversing formal sector features, indicating that the two sectors were distinct and contrasted.11 . However; subsequent studies have revealed that, there is a considerable overlap between formal and informal sector activities.12 The informal sector has been given various terms e.g. “informal”, “unofficial”, “non-organised“, “unprotected”, “residual”, and “transitional”.13 It seems that these terms imply a certain preconception of this sector, as well as a biased comparison of it, with the other sectors, which are often referred to as “formal”, “official”, etc. In the case of Egypt, the term “marginal sector”, of the modern economy was used by a number of Egyptian researchers, perhaps because it implies characteristics, such as
  35. 35. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 7 small, unstable, with irregular revenues and lack of organisation. This negative view of the informal sector was perhaps due to the fact, that the Egyptian government was looking always for establishing large-scale state-owned projects, aiming at the efficiencies of scale. Therefore, the other activities that would be outside this definition could be considered marginal. Such term „marginal‟ could have also meant that this sector of the economy is in fact being set aside, while it has a potentially important social role to play. It worth noting that, there are two different views in defining the activities encompassing the informal sector. To some, they consist of illegal, criminal or marginal activities hence parasitic; and to others they represent productive, small-scale self-employment and equity objectives. However, the present paper focuses on all activities, except the illegal. Defining the informal sector to assess its origin and to provide a abetter framework for effective assessment is worth to begin with. The term „informal‟ originated in a study on Ghana in 1971.14 Later, it was adopted by the ILO in 1972 which gave the term „informal sector‟ additional boost of popularity. The ILO/UNDP mission to Kenya assigned eight characteristics to informal activities: ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of business, small-scale of operations, labour-intensive and adapted technology, skills acquired outside the formal school system, operate in unregulated and competitive markets, and outside official government regulations. These characteristics were reconsidered and a number of new criteria to that of the ILO‟s were added.15 Subsequently, many definitions concentrating on some of these characteristics or new ones emerged. Out of the various characteristics identified by researchers, the main indicators included: the ease of entry, small scale operation and employment status, irregularity of work, illegal basis of operation, lack of registration, lack of credit from regular sources, low capital.
  36. 36. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 8 However, the most commonly used measurable indicator is based on the size of establishment. For example, in Egypt, number of workers in the establishments (less than 10 workers) is used as a basis for differentiating between the formal and informal sector economic units,16 while others used the less than five workers category to identify informal sector units.17 Studies on the informal sector can be divided into several groups according to the methodological elements. These includes: the definition of the sector, study unit and study method that includes macro approach studies, micro-level studies for a given geographical area and sectorial perspective studies that, approach the informal sector at the level of specific informal activity. According to the definitions of the sector used in previous studies three main groups can be identified:  The Functional Definition: Under the assumption that there is a relationship and link between jobs and the stakes of the formal and informal sectors, came the functional definition. Where the informal sector is a source of manpower required for employment in the formal sector, and a receiver of surplus labour of it. Moreover, the informal sector is considered the main producer of low-cost goods and services for low-income population.18 However, the advantage of this definition requires evaluation of the degree of movement of the labour force between the formal and informal sector that revealed to be very low in Egypt.19 The Operational Definition: This definition is based on the application of a number of criteria to describe the nature of the sector or its units. This method was used in the ILO reports on Kenya, where eight standards for the informal sector were assigned to the informal sector, and a number of criteria were added later and the presence of one or more of these standards considered enough for the operational units to be a part of the informal sector.20
  37. 37. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 9  The Empirical Definition: This method based on the utilisation of one single criterion to define the operational units, like for example: lack of registration, the size of the establishment measured by number of workers, the production technique used, among other characteristics.21 As mentioned above, the size of the establishments was the most commonly used criterion. This is clear in many previous studies conducted within the Egyptian context.22 Insinuations: Here, it might be useful to suggest that a universal definition is not needed, even though it would help in cross-country comparison. Since heterogeneity is one of the characteristics of the informal sector activities,23 one should not expect that any general definition would hold true for all informal activities. This could clarify the diversity among the definitions used in the literature in the context of different countries. While the diversity found in the definitions used within one country is not justifiable.24 It is also apparent that most of the previous studies were trying either to define the informal sector, or to assign specific characteristics to it. In doing that, most of the definitions and criteria were trying to classify the economic units into either formal or informal, where most of the definitions used criteria relied on size, registration, invested capital, or the used technology. Using economic unites as the target in defining the sector, formal or informal, leads in many cases to incorrectly allocating informal sector workers to the formal sector. This especially clear when “number employed in the establishment” is used in differentiating between the two sectors. However, till the beginning of the 21st century, there was no attempt to define informal sector workers regardless the characteristics of the work place, which could be of great importance at least in estimating the size of the informal sector. Therefore, there was an attempt to define the informal sector workers as “those individuals who own or participate in an economic organisation, that is not formally regulated by legal
  38. 38. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 10 sanctions (registration and taxation of work place) and/or those working individuals (self employed, paid or un-paid workers) who, are not protected by any means of formality (no contract, social or health welfare systems) provided by the State”.25 Lack of contract is taken for granted when the workplace is not registered. Therefore, non-registration of the workplace, lack of social insurance and lack of health insurance are the three criteria that can be used to identify the informal sector workers. 2- Framework and Conceptualisation of the Informal Sector: Urban economies have variously been described. As was the national economy, urban economies have been divided into three different sub-systems. These are the primary, secondary and tertiary sub-systems. The tripartite division of activity originated from Colin Clark‟s tripartite division of the economy.26 This approach has been criticised for its inability to represent the heterogeneity of activities found within each sub-system in the third world urban economy. Therefore, it was considered not suitable for studying the third world economies.27 In explaining the developing economies, the term „dualism’ was introduced. Underdeveloped societies were divided into two different sectors, the traditional or peasant and the modern or capitalist sector.28 A concept which has been adapted by so many subsequent scholars.29 It was argued that dualism stems from the introduction of capitalism into pre-capitalist economies or primitive societies,30 for some, the two „circuits‟ are the outcome of the technological modernisation occurred after the penetration of capitalism into the developing economies during the colonial period.31 Technological modernisation creates limited numbers of jobs in capital rather labour-intensive industries. This, coupled with the decrease in employment in agriculture, again, through technical modernisation, has resulted in a more small-scale activities belong to the informal economy concentrated in urban areas (or the “lower circuit” as it was termed).
  39. 39. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 11 Dualism was considered as a standard feature of underdeveloped countries.32 By contrast, others justify dualism as a feature of the traditional step of the economic development of underdeveloped countries.33 This theory of transition seems unacceptable. By accepting this theory, we have to consider the current situations in underdeveloped countries are stages toward the contemporary developed countries.34 As that was about forty years ago, the difference between the current situation in LCD‟s and that of the developed ones in the 1970s justify the unacceptability of the transition theory.35 „Dual‟ approach still has some shortcomings. For example, it fails to cover activities such as small-scale workshops that are a result of relatively advanced technology and not traditional activities (for example IT companies and computers). Also, by the dual approach, urban economy is divided into „modern‟ and „tradition‟ sub-systems, and pre-capitalist activities belong to the traditional sector. The use of the term „traditional‟ gives the impression that these activities are static and has no elements of dynamism. In the contrary, others consider the traditional sector as a dynamic one, characterised by upward mobility,36 and it was demonstrated by more other scholars.37 Other study titled “Egypt informal sector: Engine of growth”, implies that this sector of the economy is a dynamic sector and has the ability to develop and support the development of the national economy, a view that will be discussed below.38 Scholars of the dualism school deal with formal and informal sector as isolated separate economies. This approach fails to take account of the realities in the LCD‟s, where it was argued that there are considerable relations between the formal and the informal activities as parts of the total economy in LCD‟s.39 Separate economy approach, for example, fails to account for the movement of some activities from the formal to the informal economy, and vice-versa, mostly on a daily basis,40 a phenomenon shared by many others.41 Separate economy approach fails also to account for the existence of the phenomenon of holdings multiple jobs.42
  40. 40. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 12 With more emphasis on the linkage between the formal and the informal sectors of the economy, the sectorist school of thought appeared. To them, both the formal and the informal sectors are different and interpenetrated sectors operating under one single economy. The relations between the two sectors “represent the functioning of a single society in which the two poles are integral parts”.43 Although some supports the concept of dualism, they assert that there is a considerable relationship between the upper and the lower circuits.44 For them, the relationships between the two sectors may vary from domination to subordination. Shifting from LDC‟s to the Arab world seems appropriate, where the present paper focuses on Egypt. It seems that no analytical work has been done, to integrate the informal sector activities within the framework of macro-economic or urban- economic theories. This could be explained by the fact, that Arab scholars have applied western models, with regard to the informal sector concept within LCDs. On the other hand, the most acceptable reason could be, that the scarcity of available research on the informal sectors in the Arab countries prevents scholars from developing a realistic framework of the informal sector. However, what little literature is available, although not fully concerning the informal sector conceptualisation, suggests that the informal sector in the Arab countries studied, Jordan and Egypt operate within the sectorist school. With reference to class differentiation and the informal sector in Amman, Jordan, a study gives the impression that the informal sector is an integral part of one single economy, even if it is not regulated by the state.45 Jordanian informal sector (small-scale industries) is described as „complementary and inseparable from the industrial pyramid in a manner that they prepare the inputs for large firms or assemble and complete the final products‟.46 For Egypt, it was indicated, the informal sector is part of the national economy and the relationship between the formal and the informal sectors not just a relationship
  41. 41. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 13 of complementarity but also the informal sector is a competitive sector to the formal sector.47 These interest in the informal sector within the Egyptian context as a resilient and dynamic sector48 and its complementarity and competitiveness features49 could be a response to two main features of the Reform and Structural Adjustment Policy (ERSAP) Egypt went through. Firstly, negative consequences or the recessionary conditions that the ERSAP inflicted on the poor. Structural Adjustment creates severe economic conditions for the most unprivileged group of the population: increased unemployment and decrease in real incomes for waged and salaried workers, it was imperative for the government with scholars support to look for alternative economic sector to bear the responsibility of employment creation and income generation for those unemployed and poor segments of the population. Secondly, redefinition of the role of the state due to the ERSAP resulted in growing retrenchment of the public sector role,50 in the wake of the negligible role of the formal private sector, the informal sector is recognised, where it absorbed a huge segments of the labour force over decades, and even encouraged to act as a key element of the development growth. Some concluded that the main benefit of informality stems from its role as a shock absorber, providing employment to those who cannot find jobs in the formal sector during difficult times.51 In conclusion, the shift of discourse on the informal sector is, by any definition, a substantial change, from the notion “margins” of the “modern” economy to the “engine of growth” of the economy. From the early 1950s till the end of the 1960s, the “margins” population or the informal sector was a problematic segment of any society, to the extent that it became the focus of some charity organisations and international agencies.52 Suddenly, this problematic segment of the economy became a solution to the economic crisis, just by redefining this part of the society from being the “marginal” as “informal economy” and the “survival”
  42. 42. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 14 strategy of the poor as “micro-business” to the “engine of growth”. In Egypt, for example, plenty of studies and reports start to appear arguing that the informal sector can play an important role in addressing Egypt‟s employment crisis.53 These studies follow the general interest in small enterprises in Developing Countries since the early 1970‟s.54 By this changing discourse informal sector instead of being marginal part of the economy or encompasses poor people trying to survive, became an essential segment of the economic development and entrepreneurs who could make it themselves independently of any government subsidies or handouts. More importantly, instead of encouraging those people to survive, the government and the IMF officials saw them as segments of the economy that are not taxed. Therefore, the poor became a mine of gold that could be utilised to help balance national budgets through taxation, direct and indirect.55 In sum, to help the informal sector population, and relying on previous study we have to define them properly and realise that they are neither entrepreneurs nor micro-business owners.56 Simply, they are poor people trying to find a way of survival, either a self-employed worker or an employed worker. 3- Determinants of People’s Choices on Entry into the Informal Labour Market: Possible determinants of people‟s choices in the labour markets can be set out at two different levels (macro and micro) and the determinants were viewed from two perspectives (starting point of the informal sector and its growth). 4-1 Macro Factors: Initiatives of the informal sector in Developed Countries are likely to be determined by different macro-factors than those in the informal sector in Developing Countries. Failure of the modern economy in the Developed Countries to provide sufficient jobs for the growing number of job seekers was suggested to be the main cause for the appearance of an informal sector. While the sudden
  43. 43. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 15 insertion of capitalism associated with the twentieth-century techniques was assumed to create the initiatives of the informal sector in Developing Countries. Informal sector growth is likely to be affected by diversity of factors that are common between the Developed and Developing Countries: state regulations and legislation, economic recession, and macro policies.57 All of these factors can either hinder individuals from joining the formal sector or stimulate or force them to enter the informal sector. State legislation and regulations, for example, may impose an additional economic burden on capitalists and stimulate them to informally conduct their business to avoid such economic burden. However, with regard to the informal sector growth in Egypt and its associated factors, over-regulation and over-taxation that occurred during different time periods have contributed to the growth of the informal sector. The restricted permission arrangements applied since Mohammed Ali era by the formalised Guild system, and over-control at the end of the Mohammed Ali administration, were among the factors that hindered people joining the formal rather than the informal sector. Recently, labour market rigidities are considered as drivers of informality.58 Recent study on MENA region, including Egypt, concluded that although Labor laws aim to protect workers and increase labor market efficiency, however, over-protective labor regulations may result in higher in- formality.59 The study argues that to reduce the incentives for employers to hire workers informally, it is central increasing the flexibility of labor market regulations, as well as to ensure that employers are not discouraged from creating jobs or resort to using more capital-intensive technologies to get round rigid employment laws. In the case of Egypt, introducing the labor law (Law 12 of 2003) with the goal of increasing flexibility in hiring/firing in private sector and in state-owned enterprises shows that the change in law has had a positive impact on formalization of labor employment in Egypt and has reduced informal work that is non- contracted.60
  44. 44. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 16 The effect of over-taxation, a long-standing structural feature in Egypt, is clear. The existence of over-taxation is also evident during the 1990‟s and remains. Tax burden ratio was calculated at about 18.6% for 1991/92 raised to 21.8% in the following year, and further to 23.2% for 1993/1994.61 However, a 2013 World Bank report “Paying Taxes 2013” finds that Egypt's average total tax rate stands at 42.6%,62 the figure remain the same in 2014.63 Annual growth rate of tax revenue increased from 2.6% during the period between 1981/82-1991/92 to over 12% during the period between 1991/92-1996/97, moreover, it was planned to increase tax revenues for the fiscal year 2014-2015 to (FY) 2015-2016 by about 16.8%.64 In reducing budget deficit, in addition to cutting public expenditure, the Egyptian government relied on increasing tax rate, especially the indirect one. Direct taxes in 1996/97 accounted for only 36.3% of total taxes,65 this figure increased to 40% in 2001.66 Also, Economic recession and macro-policies have had a strong effect on the informal sector in Egypt. The economic recession that led by the 1838 free trade convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire was the main factor that severely affected the industrial project of Mohammed Ali, and led to a more flourishing informal sector. The effect of the economic recession on the informal sector is also observed during the period of post First World War and, late 1940‟s, 1970‟s, and 1980‟s. The inability of the formal sector to generate employment because of different reasons in all these periods increased the informal sector that acted as a last resort, absorbing excess job seekers.67 Recently, macro-economic policies of the last three decades in Egypt neither stimulated the growth of the industrial sector sufficiently nor encouraged private sector investment. Empirical evidence suggests that “informalisation” has increased in Egypt during the 90s as a result of economic reforms.68 In particular, new entrants to the labor market seemed to bear the brunt where by the end of the 90s, some 69% of new entrants to the labor markets
  45. 45. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 17 managed to only secure informal jobs.69 This trend sustained during first and half decades of the 21st century.70 Structural Adjustment and its associated macro policies had a negative effect on the formal sector to generate employment, stimulating the ability of the informal sector to generate jobs for several segments of the population. The majority of those who joined the private non-agricultural sector might have joined the informal sector. Moreover, it is evident that redundant workers, new entrants to the labour markets and low-income group of populations are among the most vulnerable groups seeking employment within the informal sector as their main job or as a second source of income.71 Life history analysis of informal sector workers reveals that the guaranteed employment policy initiated in early 1960s was the one avenue used to join the formal sector. However, returning migrants in mid-1970 and the unemployed, when scarcity of formal jobs was at its highest during that decade, were forced to join the informal sector. This reflects the effect of the macro-policies implemented in Egypt during the 1970‟s on the ability of the formal sector to create jobs in sufficient numbers. As mentioned above, economic reforms since early 1990‟s has a negative impact on formal job creation leaving the new entrants to the labor market but to be drawn into the informal sector. Also, poverty, inequalities and economic exclusion of a large part of the population coupled with economic exclusion, corruption and bureaucratic regulations may have forced the poorest and middle income categories to accept informal employment.72 4-2 Micro Factors: Micro determinants such as poverty, education, and skill level have been identified as influencing the growth of the informal sector at the individual level. Such factors were considered as consequences of joining the informal sector. However, previous study provides evidence that such individual characteristics are causes of joining the informal sector more than its consequences.73 Although poverty is identified as one of the causes of joining the informal sector in Egypt,74 studying the causality dilemma in
  46. 46. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 18 Egypt, it is stated that poverty is one of the consequences of joining the informal sector.75 Low educational level is one of the factors that push people into the informal sector,76 but joining the informal sector in itself hinders individuals from continuing their education. It is evident that those who join the informal sector are different from those who join the formal sector.77 Informal sector workers are likely to be less educated, more likely to be married, self-employed, and to be male, compared with their formal sector counterparts. Formal sector workers are more likely to live in better housing conditions, to own more household goods, and hence are more likely to have higher income levels. However, the two groups seem to be similar with respect to their age, family type, and family size.78 Education is statistically shown to have the greatest contributions in differentiating between the two groups, where low education is more strongly associated with informal sector workers. It reflects not only the current situation of the informal sector workers, but also their initial status before joining the labour markets. This means that low level of education associated with the informal sector is one of the determinants of people‟s choices of entry into the labour markets.79 It is also revealed, that poverty and low educational status are crucial factors shaping informal sector workers‟ individual life paths. Individuals can be victims of poverty, and enter the informal labour market to help their families financially. Entry patterns into the informal labour market are affected by family economic circumstances as well, to the extent that young members of the family would be taken out from school and reluctantly enter the informal labour market as a coping mechanism for family survival. Their educational achievement is permanently affected, a step that affect their whole life paths. The little or no education they have acquired has a substantial effect on their subsequent life paths, where they had no alternative but to accept the type of work that has been chosen for them by their families. Those relatively
  47. 47. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 19 advantaged with high educational levels have the ability to choose their own working life paths, although within the limited labour market opportunities.80 Moreover, family resources, and social networks are also important in shaping individual life paths. In practice, family connections are important in searching for or obtaining a job, especially within the informal labour market. The role of family is clear at the beginning or entry, and at all stages of the individuals‟ life path. The effect of provision of material subsistence through the family is evidently clear in shaping informal sector workers‟ life paths. For example, providing a place of work for an individual to start his/her working life as self-employed person is an important element shaping his/her working life.81 Utilising family social networks in building trust with customers is another mechanism for family impact. Family business is another vehicle for the family role in shaping individuals‟ life paths. It affects not only the entry pattern into the informal labour market, but also the workers‟ whole life paths. Moreover, social networks and local community neighbours are revealed to have similar effects as that of the family. They provide alternative means of participation, i.e. business ideas, or in material sense, they provide a real job opportunity in the informal labour market.82 4-3 Macro-Micro Linkages: National economic transformations of Egypt have not had an entirely positive impact on the employment situation in the formal private sector. Macro economic policies of Egypt in the last three decades neither stimulated the growth of the industrial sector nor encouraged formal private sector investment, as mentioned above. The trend toward downsizing the public sector and privatisation has had a major negative impact on large segment of the labour force, which is not surprising, given that the state was and remains one of the biggest employers in Egypt. Concern is mounting that certain social groups will remain excluded, such as unemployed youth, older redundant workers, those with low skills, and not to mention those with low education. Those social groups are facing even
  48. 48. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 20 more obstacles to formal employment. It is clear that those groups are able to take advantage of their place in the informal sector by using their social capital and networks in order to sustain their households, despite pressure from recession and structural economic change. The exclusion of those groups from the institutions of the State, for example, is highlighted in the international literature on informality.83 The literature on the informal sector stresses the segments of society that are not in compliance with the State‟s rules and regulations. This non-compliance can be viewed as a manifestation of exclusion. As it discussed, the State‟s rules and regulations are conceived in such a way as to make it virtually impossible for large segments of society to secure their livelihoods, thus forcing them to operate outside these rules.84 Once they become defined as rule-breakers, it becomes easy to deny them access to the multitude of services, and institutions, provided by the State, and the formal private sector. The numbers of instances where, for example, the poor are systematically excluded from government institutions in Egypt are striking. Their exclusion from access to formal source of credit is just a start, with the denial of their collective existence as squatters or street vendors, to a denial of their very existence as individuals because of their lack of official identity papers. In promoting the formal private sector, the government sought to initiate a flexible and responsible training and retraining systems and greater investment in skill development as a prerequisite step for economic structure change and privatisation. Such training systems would have raised labour productivity and hence incomes even in the informal sector through the formal-informal interrelationship such as subcontracting. However, given that the informal sector currently generates most of the new jobs, there is a need to focus on improving productivity, incomes and conditions for informal workers.
  49. 49. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 21 The basic message here is that it will no longer be enough for countries to provide basic education, however necessary to meet the increasing demand for new marketable skills and qualifications, training will need to be given the highest priority. Although a serious question can arise when the costs of proper training are enormous and the results not guaranteed, skill acquisition can have an enormous impact on the working life paths of the informal sector workers.85 4- Summary and Conclusion: This paper provides a discussion on the informal sector conceptualisation through range of literature on the Less Developed Countries with the main focus on Egypt. The discussion covers the terms and definitions used, the framework in which the informal sector theoretically operates, the determinants and factors that assumed or explored to affect the informal sector whether the starting point or its growth. The main result is that a universal definition of the informal sector cannot hold true for every single country context. In addition, instead of defining the informal sector unites a shift occurred toward defining the informal labour market workers. Although, this would help in avoiding the misclassification of the workers, informal sector workers are not explicitly defined, however, there are number of criteria to be utilised in assigning labour market workers into informal or formal sector. As some would use all or part of these criteria depending on data limitations, therefore, a cross-country comparison would probably be less valid. For data limitations or simplicity reasons, each study uses different definition, a phenomenon that is expected to continue in the future. The three criteria suggested to identify the informal sector workers, include non-registration of the workplace, lack of contract, lack of social insurance and lack of health insurance. The conceptualisation and the framework in which the informal sector operates have changed over time. From the tripartite division of activity that failed to represent the heterogeneity of activities found under each subsystem, to the sectorist school that view
  50. 50. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 22 informal and formal parts of the economy as two sectors operating under one economic system characterised by either a complementarity or competitiveness relationship. Dualism view is another school that came in between the other two mentioned views. Dualism suggested that the two sub-systems are operating under one universal system, but not isolated as there is an overlap between the two sectors. Depending on the available studies on the informal sector within the Arab countries, informal sector is assumed to be operating within the sectorist view. On other hand, a shift of discourse on the informal sector is a substantial change, from the notion “margins” of the “modern” economy to the “engine of growth” of the economy. Till the end of the 1960s, the informal sector (margins population) was a problematic segment. After 1960‟s, this problematic segment became a solution to the economic crisis just by redefining it to the “engine of growth” and can play an important role in addressing employment crisis. Determinants of the informal sector are reviewed and analysed at two different levels (macro and micro) and from two perspectives (starting point of the informal sector and its growth). It seems that the determinants or factors that affect the growth of the informal sector differ between Developed and Developing Countries, while there are common factors between the two groups that affect the growth of the informal sector. The main results suggest that the failure of the modern economy in the Developed Countries to provide sufficient jobs for the growing number of job seekers was the starting point of the informal sector, while the sudden penetration of capitalism associated with twentieth-century techniques creates the initiatives of the informal sector in the Developing Countries. However, the starting point of the informal sector in the MENA region including Egypt is not clear, as studies investigated the informal sector in the MENA region were using the western model in conceptualising the sector. This is explained by the scarcity of informal sector studies in the region that allows a conceptualisation prospect.
  51. 51. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 23 References: 1 El-Sayed, Abdel Moneim, (2014) The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES), unpublished report, In Doaa, Farid, Informal sector volume records around EGP 1.5tn, Daily News Egypt, September 23, 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/23/informal-sector-volume-records- around-egp-1-5tn-eces/. 2 Assaad, Ragui, (2007), “Labor Supply, Employment and Unemployment in the Egyptian Economy, 1988-2006”, Economic Research Forum (ERF) Working paper series, No. (0701). 3 Assaad, Ragui, (2007), “Labor Supply, Employment and Unemployment in the Egyptian Economy, 1988-2006”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (0701). 4 Amer, Mona, (2014), “Patterns of Labor Market Insertion in Egypt 1998- 2012”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (849). 5 International Labour Organization, (2015) School-to-work transition survey (SWTS) micro data files, http://www.ilo.org/employment/areas/WCMS_234860/lang--en/index.htm. 6 Barsoum, Ghada, (2014), Young People‟s Job Aspirations in Egypt and the Continued Preference for a Government Job, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No.(838); Nazier, Hanan and Racha Ramadan, (2014), “Informality and Poverty: A Causality Dilemma with Application to Egypt”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (895). 7 El-Bakly, A. (2001) “The Informal Sector and urban Labour Markets in Egypt: A Life Path Approach”, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Liverpool, UK. 8 Kassem, Taha, (2014), “Formalizing the Informal Economy: A Required State Regulatory and Institutional Approach: Egypt as a Case Study, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJHSS), ISSN(P): 2319-393X; ISSN(E): 2319-3948, Vol. 4, Issue 1, Jan 2014, 27-48. 9 El-Sayed, Abdel Moneim, (2014), Ibid. 10 El Mahdi, Alia, (2002), “Towards Decent Work in the Informal Sector: The Case of Egypt, International Labour Office Geneva, Employment Paper, Series on the Informal Economy. 11 Sethuraman, S.V. (1981) The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Employment, Poverty and Environment, Geneva: ILO. 12 Abdel-Fadil, M. (1992) On the Dynamics of Interface between Formal and Informal Economies in LDCs, Institute of Development Studies, Discussion Paper No. 301, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
  52. 52. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 24 13 Rizk, S. (1991) ”The Structure And Operation of the Informal Sector in Egypt”, in Handoussa, H. and Potter, G., Employment and Structure Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990's, Cairo, Egypt: AUC Press, pp. 167-185. 14 Sethuraman, S.V. (1976) ”The Urban Informal Sector: concept, measurement and policy”, in International Labour Review, Vol. 114, (1), July-August, pp. 69-81. 15 Sethuraman, S.V. (1976), Ibid., pp. 69-81. 16 Mead, D. C. (1982) “Small Industries in Egypt: An Exploration of The Economics of Small Furniture Producers”, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 159-171.; Abdel-Fadil, M. (1983) “Informal Sector Employment in Egypt”, Technical paper No. 1, ILO/UNDP Comprehensive Employment Strategy Mission to Egypt, 1980, Geneva: ILO.; Hofmann, M. (1985), “The Informal Sector in an Intermediate City: A case in Egypt”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 263-277, October, 1985.; Handoussa, H. (1992), “Wages, Production and Inflation: The Case of Egypt Since the Infitah”, in S. Soliman, ed., The Dynamic of Inflation in Egypt, The Centre of Economic and Financial Research and Studies, Cairo, Egypt: Cairo University, p. 385. 17 Rizk, S. (1990), “The Unorganised Economic Sector, A preliminary Report, CAPMAS, December (in Arabic), pp. 8.; Rizk, S. (1993), “The Unrecognised Economic Sector: Definitions and main Characteristics, Cairo, Egypt: CAPMAS, October (in Arabic). 18 El Mahdi, Alia, (1995), “The Informal Sector in Egypt: A Brief Literature Review, Paper presented in Workshop on The Dynamicz of the Informal and Small – Scale Enterprise Sector, Aswan, Egypt, 1-2 December, 1995), pp. 2. 19 Abdel-Fadil, M. (1983), Ibid.; Rizk, S. (1991), Ibid.; pp. 167-185.; Wahba, J. and Moktar, M. (1999), “Informalization of Labour in Egypt”, in Labour Market and Human Resource Development in Egypt, Conference held by Economic Policy Initiative Consortium jointly with Centre for the Study of Developing Countries, November 29-30, Cairo, Egypt: Cairo University.; El- Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid., Tansel Aysit and Zeynel Abidin Ozdemir, (2014), “Determenant of transitions Across Formal/Informal Sectors in Egypt, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No.(899); Ahmed Elsayed and Jackline Wahba, (2016), “Informalization Dynamics and Gains: Why Want a Job Contract?”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (1001). 20 El Mahdi, Alia, (1995), Ibid., pp. 2. 21 El Mahdi, Alia, (1995), Ibid., pp. 3.
  53. 53. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 25 22 Mead, D. C. (1982), Ibid., pp.159-171.; Abdel-Fadil, M. (1983), Ibid.; Hofmann, M. (1985), Ibid.; Handoussa, H. and Potter, G. (1992) Egypt‟s Informal Sector: Engine of Growth? Paper Presented to MESA Conference, Portland, October 28-31.; Rizk, S. (1993), Ibid. 23 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 24 For example, in the context of Egypt and Turkey, most of previous studies on Egypt informal sector used the less than 10 or 5 workers as definition of the informal sector units, while the Annual Industrial Production Statistics un- justifiably used the 10 workers or more category, as its framework, to search for and identify the informal sector industrial units (CAPMAS, 1996, Annual Industrial Production Statistics: The Un-organised private Sector 1992/1993, Cairo, Egypt: CAPMAS. CAPMAS (1997), Annual Industrial Production Statistics: The Un-organised private Sector 1994/1995, Cairo, Egypt: CAPMAS. In Turkey the definition of the informal sector differs according to the source of data, although all sources are official, state organised, and conducted on the national level. For example, according to the Household Labour Force Survey, informal sector workers defined as those workers who are working in a mobile and small-scale work place. Although information on registration of workplace was collected, it is not included in the definition. However, in the labour Force Survey Listing Questionnaire informal workers defined as those who were engaged in home based economic activity and those who engaged in mobile premises. Moreover, within the Supplementary Questionnaire the informal sector was defined as those characterised by small- scale (less than 5 workers), have no tax files, and the self-employed (Ozel, H. (1995) “Informal Sector Data Collection: The Case of Turkey”, Paper presented in Workshop on The Dynamicz of the Informal and Small – Scale Enterprise Sector, Aswan, Egypt, 1-2 December, 1995). 25 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 26 Santos, Milton (1979) The Shared Space: The Two Circuits of the Urban Economy in Underdeveloped Countries, London: Methuen, pp. 88. 27 Bauer, Peter T. and Yamey, Basil S. (1957) “The Economics of underdeveloped Countries, Market Control and Marketing Reform, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 28 Boeke, J. H. (1953) Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, As Exemplified by Indonesia, Haarlem: H. D. Tyeenk Willink and Zoon N. V. 29 Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid.; Furtado, Celso (1966) Development et Sous- developement, Paris: P.U.F.; Lewis, Arthur (1954) “Economic Development With Unlimited Supply of Labour”, Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, Vol. XIII, May, PP. 139-51.; Turin, L. (1965) Combat pour le development, Ed. Paris, Ouvrieres.; Hirschman. Albert O. (1958) The Strategy
  54. 54. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 26 of Economic Development”, New Haven: Yale University Press.; Belshaw, C. (1965) “Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets”, Prentice-Hall, Inc., N.J : Englewood Cliffs. 30 Boeke, J. H. (1953), Ibid., Hirschman. Albert O. (1958), Ibid.; Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid. 31 Santos, M., in 1979 state that the colonists made the introduction of capital- intensive form of production. It was different from the traditional production process existed. Colonists also paid higher wages for industry and civil services workers. Participants in the commercial sector also enjoyed higher incomes. These groups concentrated in the urban areas. Thus the colonists created an economic, social and spatial inequality of the underdeveloped countries. Through the international demonstration effect, this high-income groups developed consumption aspiration, like that of developed societies. This resulted in reducing demand for local products and more individuals drawn into modern consumption without a parallel increase in incomes. This acted as an obstacle to capital formation and hence development. 32 Boeke, J. H. (1953), Ibid.; Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid. 33 Hirschman. Albert O. (1958), Ibid.; Mattera, Philip (1985) Off the Books: The Rise of the Underground Economy, London: Pluto Press. 34 Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid., pp. 26. 35 For example, in 1990, the income gap between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% of the world‟s countries is wider than that found in 1960. The ratio was 30:1 in 1960 and increased to 60:1 in 1990. A ratio that would have been stable over time if the theory of transition is conceivable. Corbridge, Stuart, (1993), “Ethics in Development Studies: The Example of Debt”, in Scuurman, Frans J. Beyond the Impasse: New Direction in Development Theory, London & New Jersy: Zed Books, pp. 123-139). 36 Beaujeu-Garnier, J. (1970) “Large Overpopulated Cities in the Underdeveloped World”, in W. Zelinsky, L. Kosinski, R. M. Prothero (eds.), Geography and a Crowding World, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 269-78. George, P., (1969), “Population et Peuplement”, Paris: P.U.F. 37 Mangin, William (1967) “Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and Solution”, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 2 (3), Summer, pp. 65- 98.; Turner, John (1969) “Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policy”, in G. Breese (ed.), The City in Newly Developing Countries, Prentice-hall , N. J.: Englewood Cliffs, pp. 507-34.; Laquian, A. (ed) (1971) Rural-Urban Migrations and Metropolitan Development, Toronto, Intermet. Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid., pp., 135. 38 Handoussa, H. and Potter, G. (1992), Ibid.
  55. 55. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 27 39 Abdel-Fadil, M. (1992), Ibid. 40 Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid.; Abdel-Fadil, M. (1992), Ibid.; pp. 3., Handy, C. (1984) The Future of Work: A Guide to a Changing Society, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 41 For example : Abdel-Fadil, M. (1992), Ibid.; Gershung 1978; Birbeck 1979; Saba 1980; Brusco 1982; Mingione 1983; Robert 1989 and Castells and Portes 1989. 42 Abdel-Fadil, M. (1992), Ibid.; El-Bakly, A. (2001) , Ibid. 43 Stavenhagen, Rodolfo (1968) “Seven Fallacies About America Latina”, in James Petras and Maurice Zeitin (eds.), Latin America, Reform or Revolution? A Reader, Connecticut: Fawecett World Library, pp. 13-31. 44 Santos, Milton (1979), Ibid.; Bose, M. (1990) The Urban Informal Sector revisited: Some Lessons from the field, IDS Discussion paper 276, Brighton: IDS. 45 Doan, R. M. (1992) “Class Differentiation and the Informal Sector in Amman, Jordan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24 (1), pp. 27-38. 46 Karmoul, A. (1995) “The Dynamics of the Informal and Small-Scale Enterprises Sector in Jordan”, Paper presented in Workshop on The Dynamics of the Informal and Small-Scale Enterprise Sector, Aswan, Egypt, 1-2 December, pp. 7. 47 Rizk, S. (1991), Ibid., pp. 167-185. 48 Handousa, H. and Potter, G. (1991), Ibid. 49 Rizk, S. (1991), Ibid., pp. 167-185. 50 Handoussa, H. (1993), Ibid. 51 Elshennawy, Abeer, (2016), “Trade Liberalization in Egypt: Let the Informal Labor Market Take the Strain”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Policy Brief, No. 11. 52 Cross, J. (1997b) “Developing the informal Economy: Micro business and Macro Dollars”, Business Monthly, Cairo, Egypt: American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, July. 53 (Mashhour and Al-Mahdi, 1989; The Informal Sector In Maarouf District, Cairo, Cairo, Egypt: National Council for Social and Criminal Researches ( in Arabic).; Handousa, H. and Potter, G. (1991) Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s, Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press.; ILO (1991) The Challenge of Job Creation in Egypt: Report of the ILO Multidisciplinary Mission on Return Migrants from the Gulf, Geneva: ILO.; Rizk, S. (1991) ”The Structure And Operation of the Informal Sector in Egypt”, in Handoussa, H. and Potter, G., Employment and Structure Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990's, Cairo, Egypt: AUC Press, pp. 167-185.; World Bank (1991) Egypt: Alleviating Poverty during Structural Adjustment,
  56. 56. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 28 Washington, DC, The World Bank.; Handoussa, H. and Potter, G. (1992), Ibid.; Handoussa, H. (1993) The Role of the State: the Case of Egypt”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No.(9404). 54 Sisken, Daniel S. (1994) “Beyond Informality: The Importance of Macro & Local Level Environments in the Development of Small Firms in Egypt”, Economic Research Forum (ERF) Working paper series, No. 9634. 55 El-Sayed, Abdel Moneim, (2014), Ibid. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/23/informal-sector-volume-records- around-egp-1-5tn-eces/. 56 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 57 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 58 Elshennawy, Abeer and Dirk Willenbockel, (2014), “Trade Liberalization and the Costs and Benefits of Informality an Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model for Egypt“, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (888). 59 Wahba, Jackline, (2016), Labor Market Regulations: Job Security versus Labor Flexibility, Economic Research Forum (ERF) Policy Brief No. 19. 60 Wahba, Jackline, (2016), Ibid; Jackline Wahba and Ragui Assaad, (2015), „Flexible Labor Regulations and Informality in Egypt, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (915). 61 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 62 Ahram Online, issue: Monday 26 Nov 2012, World Bank's 'Paying Taxes 2013' report. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/59185/Business/Economy/Egy pt%E2%80%99s-tax-rates-below-global-average-World-Bank.aspx 63 World Bank, (2014) Paying Taxes 2014, the Global Picture, World Bank, www.pwc.com/payingtaxes. 64 Abdel Razek Al-Shuwekhi : Government aims for 15.8% tax revenues growth in FY 2015-2016, Daily News Egypt, June 20, 2015,. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/23/informal-sector-volume-records- around-egp-1-5tn-eces/. 65 INP (1998) Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, Cairo, Egypt: INP. 66 Soliman, Samar, 2011, The Autumn of Dictatorship, Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak”, Translated by Peter Daniel, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. https://books.google.com.eg/books?id=- pk9qbhRjxoC&pg=PA116&lpg=PA116&dq=direct+tax+as+percent+of+total +tax+in+egypt&source=bl&ots=9e8Fcza0Rg&sig=VkvCsnmBCNR- TTAQGyF287zMsnA&hl=ar&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAmoVChMIj6eV-
  57. 57. Ahmed Abdel Aziz El-Bakly 29 DqyAIVSNMaCh2wtw43#v=onepage&q=direct%20tax%20as%20percent%2 0of%20total%20tax%20in%20egypt&f=false. 67 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 68 McCormick, B. and J. Wahba, (2004), “Migration and Mobility in the Egyptian Labor Market,” ERF research report no 0401. 69 El Mahdi, A., (2000), “The Labor Absorption Capacity of the Informal Sector in Egypt,” in Assaad, R. (ed.) The Labor Market in a Reforming Economy: Egypt in the 1990s, Ch. 3, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002; Wahba, Jackline, (2009), Informality in Egypt: a Stepping Stone or a Dead End?, Economic esearch Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (456). 70 International Labour Organization, (2015), Ibid. 71 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 72 Sadeq, Tareq, (2014), “ Formal – Informal Gap in Return to Schooling and Penalty to Education-Occupation Mismatch a Comparative Study for Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (894). 73 Amer, Mona, (2014), Ibid, P. 4; Krafft, Caroline and Ragui Assaad, (2014), “Why the Unemployment Rate is a Misleading Indicator of Labor Market Health in Egypt”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Policy Perspective No.14. 74 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 75 Nazier, H. and Ramadan, R. (2014), “Informality and Poverty: A Causality Dilemma with Application to Egypt, ERF working paper, pp. 1. 76 Abou-Ali, Hala and Reham Rizk, (2015), “MSE‟s Informality and Productivity: Evidence from Egypt”, Economic Research Forum (ERF), Working paper series, No. (916). 77 El-Bakly, A. (2002) “Labour Characteristics in Egypt: Informal vs Formal”, Egyptian magazine for Population and Family Planning, Statistical Institute, Cairo University, Egypt. 78 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid, El-Bakly, A. (2002), Ibid, Amer, Mona, (2014), Ibid. 79 Mona, (2014), Ibid, P. 4. 80 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 81 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 82 El-Bakly, A. (2001), Ibid. 83 Portes, A. (1994) The Informal Economy and its Paradoxes, in Smelser, Nand Swedberg, R. Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press.; De Soto, Hernando, (1989) The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, New York, Harper Row.; Assaad, R., Y. Zhou, and O. Razzaz (1997) Why is Informality a Usful Analytical Category for Understanding Social Networks and Institutions? Minnesota-Stanford Wisconsin MacArthur
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  106. 106. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 22
  107. 107. ‫أ‬ ‫محمد‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 22 (1-1-1)4.3793.67685 (2-1-1)4.4138.50123 (3-1-1)3.8621.74278 (4-1-1)4.2069.61987 (5-1-1)4.0690.75266 (1-2-1)4.3793.82001 (2-2-1)4.4483.50612 (3-2-1)4.3103.71231 (4-2-1)4.1034.72431 (5-2-1)4.2069.61987 (6-2-1)3.9655.82301 (7-2-1)4.1724.65841 (8-2-1)3.9655.94426 (1-3-1)4.1034.30993 (2-3-1)3.8966.55709 (3-3-1)3.7931.90156 (4-3-1)3.4483.94816 (5-3-1)3.7931.81851 (6-3-1)3.8966.77205 (7-3-1)4.0000.84515
  108. 108. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 22 (1-1-2)4.1379.58089 (2-1-2)3.9310.75266 (3-1-2)3.9310.75266 (4-1-2)3.8966.72431 (5-1-2)3.9310.75266 (6-1-2)3.9655.90565 (1-2-2)3.86211.15648 (2-2-2)3.96551.01710 (3-2-2)3.72411.16179 (4-2-2)4.06901.06674 (5-2-2)ISI/ SCOPUS4.1724.88918 (6-2-2)4.4828.50855 (1-3-2)3.79311.01346 (2-3-2)3.58621.40197 (3-3-2)3.48281.32613 (4-3-2)3.4828.94946 (5-3-2)3.6897.66027 (1-4-2)4.5862.68229 (2-4-2)4.7931.41225 (3-4-2)4.5862.50123
  109. 109. ‫أ‬ ‫محمد‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 21 (1-3)4.2414.78627 (2-3)4.1379.74278 (3-3)4.1538.78446 (4-3)4.0345.82301 (5-3)3.9310.88362 (6-3)4.0345.82301
  110. 110. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 21 (1-4)4.3793.49380 (2-4)4.3793.67685 (3-4)3.9310.99753 (1-1-5)3.6538.68948 (2-1-5)3.8077.84943 (3-1-5)3.6538.68948 (1-2-5)3.51721.08958 (2-2-5)3.51721.08958 (1-3-5)4.2759.92182 (2-3-5)4.06901.16285
  111. 111. ‫أ‬ ‫محمد‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 21
  112. 112. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 21 PESTSWOT
  113. 113. ‫أ‬ ‫محمد‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 22
  114. 114. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 26 ASEP
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  118. 118. ‫محمد‬‫أ‬‫الجيزاو‬ ‫حمد‬‫ي‬ 22
  119. 119. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 87 *
  120. 120. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 87
  121. 121. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 October, 2011
  122. 122. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 October, 2011
  123. 123. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  124. 124. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 October, 2011
  125. 125. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  126. 126. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 October, 2011
  127. 127. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  128. 128. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 October, 2011 )
  129. 129. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 77 Market failure
  130. 130. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 77 The Egyption Cotton Gazette , ALCOTEXA NO.135 )
  131. 131. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  132. 132. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  133. 133. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  134. 134. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78
  135. 135. ‫مختار‬‫خطاب‬ 78 ILO
  136. 136. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 65
  137. 137. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 65
  138. 138. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 65
  139. 139. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 65
  140. 140. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56 ( 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
  141. 141. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56 0 5 10 15 20 19611965196919731977198119851989199319972001200520092013
  142. 142. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56 0 1 2 3 4
  143. 143. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56
  144. 144. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56
  145. 145. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56
  146. 146. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 55
  147. 147. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 55 (Max Weber ,1905
  148. 148. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 55 (Dawjahn,2013    (
  149. 149. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 55 (North ,1990 and Dobler ,c,2011
  150. 150. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56
  151. 151. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56
  152. 152. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56 .
  153. 153. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56
  154. 154. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 56 (Huntington
  155. 155. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 56
  156. 156. ‫ع‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬‫لى‬ 55
  157. 157. ‫على‬ ‫أبو‬ ‫سلطان‬ 55 -T.L.Leon,”Similar Policies, Different Outcomes: Two Decades of Economic Reforms on N. Korea and Cuba,”Korean Econ.Lnst.Academic Papers Series. - R. Barro, 1996,Determinants f Economics Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Stugy, NBER Working Paper 5698; Acemoglu D. and J.Robinson Crown Business: World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Policy, Oxford University Press. 3- Max Weber.(1930), The Protestantant Ethies and Spirit of Capitalism, Boston, University, - T.M.Domijahn, 2013, “What (if anything) can Developing Countries Learn From South Domjahn” , Asian Culture and Kistory, Vol.5.No.2. - A.Shirokanova,AComparative Study of Work Ethics Among Muslims and Protestants:Multi level Evidence Social Compass, Vol.62(4).PP.615-631 - D.North,1990.Institutions Institutional Chamge, and Ecomnomic Performance Cambridge; Growth: A Case Study on the Mena Region, Peter Lang” Acemogly D., S> Johnson and J. Robinson, “ Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Ling Run Growth”: , NBER, Working Paper 10481, Cambridge, Mass , 2004. - J.Mincer, Human Capital and Economic Growth and Becker, S, and L. Woessman, “Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History, QJE, 2009

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