Oracle Database Security A Monty Python approach
<ul><li>Database secure, system flawed… </li></ul><ul><li>Web App. – Database – OS – Network/LAN </li></ul><ul><li>Firewal...
<ul><li>Security is a chain! </li></ul><ul><li>A single weak link can break the entire system!  </li></ul><ul><li>http://w...
<ul><li>DBA = The Weakest Link? </li></ul><ul><li>NO! </li></ul><ul><li>So security is a  NONE  issue for DBA’s </li></ul>
<ul><li>So, it’s a dead parrot discussion! </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;I know a dead parrot when I see one,  </li></ul><ul><li...
<ul><li>Why is a DBA <> The Weakest Link? </li></ul><ul><li>Wants to know how it works </li></ul><ul><li>Is as accurate as...
<ul><li>Being  security minded  is a nasty habit ! </li></ul><ul><li>You can’t be creative anymore </li></ul><ul><li>Secur...
<ul><li>A DBA being aware of the  WLF </li></ul><ul><li>(the Weakest Link Factor)  realizes: </li></ul><ul><li>A DBA job  ...
<ul><li>CREATE USER ( Old  DBA style) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL>  CREATE USER  app_owner </li></ul><ul><li>IDENTIFIED BY  “#D1...
<ul><li>CREATE USER ( New  DBA style) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL>  CREATE USER  app_owner </li></ul><ul><li>IDENTIFIED BY  app_...
<ul><li>CREATE normal USER  </li></ul><ul><li>(This  is  the weakest link) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL>  CREATE USER  app_user <...
<ul><li>Oracle Critical Patch Update </li></ul><ul><li>Doesn’t make any sense anymore </li></ul><ul><li>So more free weeke...
<ul><li>Try to imagine what WLF can do for you! </li></ul><ul><li>Passwords on Post-it’s or text files named “passwords.tx...
<ul><li>Is this what we want? </li></ul><ul><li>   OFF COURSE NOT !    </li></ul><ul><li>… or at least, I hope you will a...
<ul><li>First steps to improvement </li></ul><ul><li>Create a holistic security minded approach </li></ul><ul><li>Do you b...
<ul><li>Threat Models </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>A good design starts with...
<ul><li>Questions to be asked… </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>What motivates t...
<ul><li>Threat model measures </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>Threat models all...
<ul><li>Threat model awareness </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>Does it makes se...
<ul><li>General consequence off all our efforts?  </li></ul><ul><li>We are security aware, we have control </li></ul><ul><...
<ul><li>Extra Result? </li></ul><ul><li>A happy, stress free DBA ! </li></ul><ul><li>A happy Development Team ! </li></ul>...
<ul><li>Brothers at Arms!  So protect our Stuff! </li></ul>
<ul><li>Who buys a dead parrot anyway…? </li></ul>
I Hope You Have Enjoyed It <ul><li>Marco Gralike </li></ul><ul><li>http://blog.gralike.com </li></ul>
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Security - The WLF Principle

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Security - The WLF Principle

  1. 1. Oracle Database Security A Monty Python approach
  2. 2. <ul><li>Database secure, system flawed… </li></ul><ul><li>Web App. – Database – OS – Network/LAN </li></ul><ul><li>Firewall’s don’t help; don’t rely on… </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.myserver.com/main.jsp?table=usertable </li></ul><ul><li>?user=app_owner </li></ul>
  3. 3. <ul><li>Security is a chain! </li></ul><ul><li>A single weak link can break the entire system! </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul>
  4. 4. <ul><li>DBA = The Weakest Link? </li></ul><ul><li>NO! </li></ul><ul><li>So security is a NONE issue for DBA’s </li></ul>
  5. 5. <ul><li>So, it’s a dead parrot discussion! </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;I know a dead parrot when I see one, </li></ul><ul><li>and I'm lookin' at one right now.&quot; </li></ul>
  6. 6. <ul><li>Why is a DBA <> The Weakest Link? </li></ul><ul><li>Wants to know how it works </li></ul><ul><li>Is as accurate as possible </li></ul><ul><li>Takes responsibility </li></ul><ul><li>Has to clean up the mess </li></ul><ul><li>Is security aware! </li></ul>
  7. 7. <ul><li>Being security minded is a nasty habit ! </li></ul><ul><li>You can’t be creative anymore </li></ul><ul><li>Security is just no fun </li></ul><ul><li>You are doing a lot of extra work, which should have be done by some else at the first place </li></ul><ul><li>Security makes life complex </li></ul><ul><li>No one likes you (if you start talking about security measures) </li></ul>
  8. 8. <ul><li>A DBA being aware of the WLF </li></ul><ul><li>(the Weakest Link Factor) realizes: </li></ul><ul><li>A DBA job can be healthy ! </li></ul><ul><li>No stress anymore ! </li></ul><ul><li>Everyone loves you ! </li></ul><ul><li>The CREATE USER example… </li></ul>
  9. 9. <ul><li>CREATE USER ( Old DBA style) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> CREATE USER app_owner </li></ul><ul><li>IDENTIFIED BY “#D1ff1cultP@ssw0rd” </li></ul><ul><li>DEFAULT TABLESPACE app_data_01 </li></ul><ul><li>TEMPORARY TABLESPACE app_temp </li></ul><ul><li>QUOTA 10M ON app_data_01 </li></ul><ul><li>PROFILE app_owner </li></ul><ul><li>PASSWORD EXPIRE; </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> GRANT create session TO app_owner; </li></ul><ul><li>Plus X extra measures to ensure that it is difficult to use this account </li></ul>
  10. 10. <ul><li>CREATE USER ( New DBA style) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> CREATE USER app_owner </li></ul><ul><li>IDENTIFIED BY app_owner; </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> GRANT dba TO app_owner; </li></ul><ul><li>This can now be implemented because off the Weakest Link Factor! </li></ul>
  11. 11. <ul><li>CREATE normal USER </li></ul><ul><li>(This is the weakest link) </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> CREATE USER app_user </li></ul><ul><li>IDENTIFIED BY app_user; </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> GRANT dba TO app_user; </li></ul><ul><li>SQL> GRANT select any dictionary TO </li></ul><ul><li> app_user; </li></ul>
  12. 12. <ul><li>Oracle Critical Patch Update </li></ul><ul><li>Doesn’t make any sense anymore </li></ul><ul><li>So more free weekends, less work </li></ul><ul><li>No testing requirements </li></ul><ul><li>Stable database systems </li></ul><ul><li>No changes ;-) </li></ul><ul><li>GREAT and all this, Just because we are Now Weakest Link Factor aware ! </li></ul>
  13. 13. <ul><li>Try to imagine what WLF can do for you! </li></ul><ul><li>Passwords on Post-it’s or text files named “passwords.txt” </li></ul><ul><li>Unlocked keyboard, Unprotected access to PC’s </li></ul><ul><li>Super user privileges for everyone </li></ul><ul><li>Etcetera </li></ul><ul><li>“ Life becomes so easy…” </li></ul>
  14. 14. <ul><li>Is this what we want? </li></ul><ul><li> OFF COURSE NOT ! </li></ul><ul><li>… or at least, I hope you will agree, this isn’t what we want and be-aware that YOUR system is also compromised… </li></ul>
  15. 15. <ul><li>First steps to improvement </li></ul><ul><li>Create a holistic security minded approach </li></ul><ul><li>Do you best possible (ask college’s | Google!) </li></ul><ul><li>Invest in knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>Be realistic, but also be prepared </li></ul><ul><li>(paranoia systems, backup and recover) </li></ul><ul><li>Threat Models (not only “general” architecture design) </li></ul>
  16. 16. <ul><li>Threat Models </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>A good design starts with a threat model: what the system is designed to protect , from whom , and for how long </li></ul><ul><li>The threat model must take the entire system into account - not just the data to be protected, but the people who will use the system and how they will use it </li></ul>
  17. 17. <ul><li>Questions to be asked… </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>What motivates the attackers? </li></ul><ul><li>Must attacks be prevented, or can they just be detected? </li></ul><ul><li>What kind of disaster recovery is possible? </li></ul><ul><li>Analyze the real risks! </li></ul>
  18. 18. <ul><li>Threat model measures </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>Threat models allow both product designers and consumers to determine what security measures they need. </li></ul>
  19. 19. <ul><li>Threat model awareness </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.schneier.com/essay-037.html </li></ul><ul><li>Does it makes sense to encrypt your hard drive if you don't put your files in a safe? </li></ul><ul><li>Are the audit logs good enough to convince a court of law? </li></ul><ul><li>Does all this effort make sense as long people do not lock there keyboards and / or do not care ? </li></ul>
  20. 20. <ul><li>General consequence off all our efforts? </li></ul><ul><li>We are security aware, we have control </li></ul><ul><li>We have become smarter </li></ul><ul><li>Less damage, </li></ul><ul><li>if security fails… </li></ul><ul><li>Protected investment </li></ul>
  21. 21. <ul><li>Extra Result? </li></ul><ul><li>A happy, stress free DBA ! </li></ul><ul><li>A happy Development Team ! </li></ul><ul><li>A happy Customer ! </li></ul><ul><li>Great Team Work ! </li></ul>
  22. 22. <ul><li>Brothers at Arms! So protect our Stuff! </li></ul>
  23. 23. <ul><li>Who buys a dead parrot anyway…? </li></ul>
  24. 24. I Hope You Have Enjoyed It <ul><li>Marco Gralike </li></ul><ul><li>http://blog.gralike.com </li></ul>

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