Against intellectual property


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Against intellectual property

  2. 2. “Against Intellectual Property” first appeared as part of the symposiumApplications of Libertarian Legal Theory, published in the Journal ofLibertarian Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001).Copyright © 2008 Ludwig von Mises InstituteFor information, write the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 WestMagnolia Avenue, Auburn, Alabama 36832, U.S.A
  3. 3. AGAINSTINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY N. Stephan Kinsella Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn, Alabama
  4. 4. CONTENTSPROPERTY RIGHTS: TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE . ........7SUMMARY OF IP LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Type of IP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Trade Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Trademark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 IP Rights and Relation to Tangible Property . . . . . . . . . . . . 14LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVES ON IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 The Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Utilitarian Defenses of IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Some Problems with Natural Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23IP AND PROPERTY RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 Property and Scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Scarcity and Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Creation vs. Scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Two Types of Homesteading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5
  5. 5. 6 — Against Intellectual PropertyIP AS CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 The Limits of Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Contract vs. Reserved Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Copyright and Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Trade Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Trademark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59APPENDIX Some Questionable Examples of Patents and Copyrights . . 60BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
  6. 6. AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPERTY RIGHTS: TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE ll libertarians favor property rights, and agree thatA property rights include rights in tangible resources. These resources include immovables (realty) such asland and houses, and movables such as chairs, clubs, cars,and clocks.1 Further, all libertarians support rights in one’s ownbody. Such rights may be called “self-ownership” as long asone keeps in mind that there is dispute about whether suchbody-ownership is alienable in the same way that rights inhomesteadable, external objects are alienable.2 In any1 Terms like “realty,” “personalty,” and “tangible” are common-law terms; anal-ogous civil-law terms are “immovables,” “movables,” and “corporeals,” respec-tively. See N. Stephan Kinsella, “A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary,”Louisiana Law Review 54 (1994): 1265–305 for further differences betweencivil-law and common-law terminology. The term “things” is a broad civil-lawconcept that refers to all types of items, whether corporeal or incorporeal,movable or immovable.2 Debate over this issue manifests itself in differences over the issue of in-alienability and with respect to the law of contract, i.e., can we “sell” or alien-ate our bodies in the same manner that we can alienate title to homesteadedproperty? For arguments against body inalienability, see N. Stephan Kinsella, 7
  7. 7. 8 — Against Intellectual Propertyevent, libertarians universally hold that all tangible scarceresources—whether homesteadable or created, immovableor movable, or our very bodies—are subject to rightful con-trol, or “ownership,” by specified individuals. As we move away from the tangible (corporeal) towardthe intangible, matters become fuzzier. Rights to reputa-tions (defamation laws) and against blackmail, for example,are rights in very intangible types of things. Most, thoughnot all, libertarians oppose laws against blackmail, andmany oppose the idea of a right to one’s reputation.3 Also disputed is the concept of intellectual property(herein referred to as IP). Are there individual rights toone’s intellectual creations, such as inventions or writtenworks? Should the legal system protect such rights? Below,I summarize current U.S. law on intellectual propertyrights. I then survey various libertarian views on IP rights,and present what I consider to be the proper view.“A Theory of Contracts: Binding Promises, Title Transfer, and Inalienability”(paper presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference, Auburn, Alabama, April1999); and N. Stephan Kinsella, “Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply toGeorge Smith,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998–99): 79–93.For arguments favoring such alienability, see Walter Block, “Toward a Liber-tarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon,Smith, Kinsella, and Epstein,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 17, no. 2 (Spring2003): 39–85.3 For views in opposition to blackmail laws, see Walter Block, “Toward a Lib-ertarian Theory of Blackmail,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring2001); Walter Block, “A Libertarian Theory of Blackmail,” Irish Jurist 33(1998): 280–310; Walter Block, Defending the Undefendable (New York: FleetPress, 1976), pp. 53–54; Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York:New York University Press, 1998), pp. 124–26; and Eric Mack, “In Defenseof Blackmail,” Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 274. For libertarian views in favor of blackmail laws, see Robert Nozick, Anar-chy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 85–86; and RichardEpstein, “Blackmail, Inc.,” University of Chicago Law Review 50 (1983): 553. For libertarian arguments against defamation (libel and slander) laws, seeBlock, Defending the Undefendable, pp. 50–53; and Rothbard, The Ethics of Lib-erty, pp. 126–28; in favor, see David Kelley in David Kelley vs. Nat Hentoff: LibelLaws: Pro and Con, audiotape (Free Press Association, Liberty Audio, 1987).
  8. 8. N. Stephan Kinsella — 9 SUMMARY OF IP LAWTypes of IP Intellectual property is a broad concept that covers sev-eral types of legally recognized rights arising from sometype of intellectual creativity, or that are otherwise relatedto ideas.4 IP rights are rights to intangible things5—to ideas,as expressed (copyrights), or as embodied in a practicalimplementation (patents). Tom Palmer puts it this way:“Intellectual property rights are rights in ideal objects,which are distinguished from the material substrata inwhich they are instantiated.”6 In today’s legal systems, IPtypically includes at least copyrights, trademarks, patents,and trade secrets.74 In some European countries, the term “industrial property” is used instead of“intellectual property.”5 De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v Featherstone, 147 U.S. 209, 222, 13 S.Ct. 283,285 (1893).6 Tom G. Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Phi-losophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects,” in “Symposium: IntellectualProperty,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 13, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 818.As one commentator has noted, “intellectual property may be defined asembracing rights to novel ideas as contained in tangible products of cognitiveeffort.” Dale A. Nance, “Foreword: Owning Ideas,” in “Symposium: Intellec-tual Property,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 13, no. 3 (Summer 1990):757.7 A useful introduction to IP can be found in Arthur R. Miller and Michael H.Davis, Intellectual Property: Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights in a Nutshell, 2nd ed. (St.Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1990); see also “Patent, Trademark, and TradeSecret,” index.html. For a good introduc-tion to patent law, see Ronald B. Hildreth, Patent Law: A Practitioner’s Guide, 3rded. (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1998). More in-depth treatises withfurther information on IP law include Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents(New York: Matthew Bender, 2000); Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer,Nimmer on Copyright (New York: Matthew Bender, 2000); Paul Goldstein, Copy-right: Principles, Law, and Practice (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989); J. ThomasMcCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:West Group, 1996); and Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets (New York:
  9. 9. 10 — Against Intellectual PropertyCopyright Copyright is a right given to authors of “originalworks,” such as books, articles, movies, and computer pro-grams. Copyright gives the exclusive right to reproduce thework, prepare derivative works, or to perform or presentthe work publicly.8 Copyrights protect only the form orexpression of ideas, not the underlying ideas themselves.9 While a copyright may be registered to obtain legaladvantages, a copyright need not be registered to exist.Rather, a copyright comes into existence automatically themoment the work is “fixed” in a “tangible medium ofexpression,” and lasts for the life of the author plus seventyyears, or for a total of ninety-five years in cases in whichthe employer owns the copyright.10Patent A patent is a property right in inventions, that is, indevices or processes that perform a “useful” function.11 Anew or improved mousetrap is an example of a type ofdevice which may be patented. A patent effectively grantsthe inventor a limited monopoly on the manufacture, use,Matthew Bender, 2000). Useful information, brochures, and pamphlets areavailable from the United States Copyright Office,, and from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Department of Com-merce, Other useful sites are listed in this article’sappendix and bibliography.8 17 USC §§ 101, 106 et pass.9 Modern copyright law has superseded and largely preempted “common lawcopyright,” which attached automatically from the moment of a work’s cre-ation, and which essentially conferred only a right of first publication. Gold-stein, Copyright, §§ 15.4 et seq.10 17 USC § 302. Due to recent legislation, these terms are twenty years longerthan under previous law. See HR 2589, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term ExtensionAct/Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998.11 35 USC § 1 et seq.; 37 CFR Part 1.
  10. 10. N. Stephan Kinsella — 11or sale of the invention. However, a patent actually onlygrants to the patentee the right to exclude (i.e., to preventothers from practicing the patented invention); it does notactually grant to the patentee the right to use the patentedinvention.12 Not every innovation or discovery is patentable. TheU.S. Supreme Court has, for example, identified three cat-egories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”13Reducing abstract ideas to some type of “practical applica-tion,” i.e., “a useful, concrete and tangible result,”14 ispatentable, however. U.S. patents, since June 8, 1995, lastfrom the date of issuance until twenty years from the orig-inal filing date of the patent application15 (the previousterm was seventeen years from date of issue).Trade Secret A trade secret consists of any confidential formula,device, or piece of information which gives its holder acompetitive advantage so long as it remains secret.16 An12 Suppose A invents and patents a better mousetrap, which has a Nitinol(memory metal) spring for better snapping ability. Now suppose B invents andpatents a mousetrap with a Nitinol spring covered with non-stick coating, toimprove the ability to remove mouse remains while still providing the Nitinol-driven snapping action. B has to have a mousetrap with a Nitinol spring inorder to use his invention, but this would infringe upon A’s patent. Similarly,A cannot add the non-stick coating to his own invention without infringingupon B’s improvement patent. In such situations, the two patentees may cross-license, so that A can practice B’s improvement to the mousetrap, and so B canuse his own invention.13 Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981); see also 35 USC § 101.14 In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526, 1544, 31 USPQ2d 1545, 1557 (Fed Cir 1994)(in banc). See also State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, 149 F3d1368 (Fed Cir 1998).15 35 USC § 154(a)(2).16 See, e.g., R. Mark Halligan, esq., “Restatement of the Third Law—UnfairCompetition: A Brief Summary,” §§ 39–45,
  11. 11. 12 — Against Intellectual Propertyexample would be the formula for Coca-Cola®. Tradesecrets can include information that is not novel enough tobe subject to patent protection, or not original enough tobe protected by copyright (e.g., a database of seismic dataor customer lists). Trade secret laws are used to prevent“misappropriations” of the trade secret, or to award dam-ages for such misappropriations.17 Trade secrets are pro-tected under state law, although recent federal law hasbeen enacted to prevent theft of trade secrets.18 Trade secret protection is obtained by declaring thatthe details of a subject are secret. The trade secret theoret-ically may last indefinitely, although disclosure, reverse-engineering, or independent invention may destroy it.Trade secrets can protect secret information and processes,e.g., compilations of data and maps not protectable bycopyright, and can also be used to protect software sourcecode not disclosed and not otherwise protectable bypatent. One disadvantage of relying on trade secret pro-tection is that a competitor who independently invents thesubject of another’s trade secret can obtain a patent on thedevice or process and actually prevent the original inven-tor (the trade secret holder) from using the invention.Trademark A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, or design usedto identify the source of goods or services sold, and to dis-tinguish them from the goods or services of others. Forexample, the Coca-Cola® mark and the design that appearson their soft drink cans identifies them as products of thatcompany, distinguishing them from competitors such asPepsi®. Trademark law primarily prevents competitorsmhallign/unfair.html; also see the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), See the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).18 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 USC §§ 1831–39.
  12. 12. N. Stephan Kinsella — 13from “infringing” upon the trademark, i.e., using “confus-ingly similar” marks to identify their own goods and serv-ices. Unlike copyrights and patents, trademark rights canlast indefinitely if the owner continues to use the mark.The term of a federal trademark registration lasts ten years,with ten-year renewal terms being available.19 Other rights related to trademark protection includerights against trademark dilution,20 certain forms of cyber-squatting,21 and various “unfair competition” claims. IP alsoincludes recent legal innovations, such as the mask workprotection available for semiconductor integrated circuit(IC) designs,22 the sui generis protection, similar to copyright,for boat hull designs,23 and the proposed sui generis right indatabases, or collections of information.24 In the United States, federal law almost exclusively gov-erns copyrights and patents, since the Constitution grantsCongress the power “to promote the progress of scienceand useful arts.”25 Despite the federal source of patents andcopyrights, various related aspects, such as ownership ofpatents, are based on state law, which nevertheless tend tobe fairly uniform from state to state.26 Federal trademarks,19 15 USC § 1501 et seq.; 37 CFR Part 2.20 15 USC §§ 1125(c), 1127.21 15 USC § 1125(d); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, PL 106–113(1999); HR 3194, S1948.22 See 17 USC § 901 et seq.23 See 17 USC § 1301 et seq.24 See, e.g., HR 354 (introduced 1/19/1999), Collections of Information AntipiracyAct. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, “Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Pro-tection of Databases in the United States and Abroad,” University of CincinnatiLaw Review 66 (1997): 151.25 U.S. Cons., Art I, § 8; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 415 US 470, 479, 94 S.Ct.1879, 1885 (1974).26 See Paul C. van Slyke and Mark M. Friedman, “Employer’s Rights to Inven-tions and Patents of Its Officers, Directors, and Employees,” AIPLA QuarterlyJournal 18 (1990): 127; and Chisum on Patents, § 22.03; 17 USC §§ 101, 201.
  13. 13. 14 — Against Intellectual Propertyby contrast, not being explicitly authorized in the Con-stitution, are based on the interstate commerce clause andthus only covers marks for goods and services in interstatecommerce.27 State trademarks still exist since they have notbeen completely preempted by federal law, but federalmarks tend to be more commercially important and pow-erful. Trade secrets are generally protected under state, notfederal, law.28 Many laymen, including libertarians, have a poorunderstanding of IP concepts and law, and often confusecopyrights, trademarks, and patents. It is widely, and incor-rectly, believed that in the U.S. system, the inventor whofiles first at the patent office has priority over those whofile later. However, the U.S. system is actually a “first-to-invent” system, unlike most other countries, which do havea “first-to-file” system for priority.29IP Rights and Relation to Tangible Property As noted above, IP rights, at least for patents and copy-rights, may be considered rights in ideal objects. It is27 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 3; Wickard v Filburn, 317 US111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942).28 But see the federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 USC §§ 1831–39.29 Ayn Rand mistakenly assumes that the first to file has priority (and then sheis at pains to defend such a system). See Ayn Rand, “Patents and Copyrights,”in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (New York: New American Library, 1967), p.133. She also confusingly attacks the strict antitrust scrutiny given to patentholders. However, since patents are government-grant-ed monopolies, it is notunjust to use an anti-monopoly law to limit the ability of a patent owner toextend this monopoly beyond the bounds intended by the patent statute. Theproblem with antitrust laws is in their application to normal, peaceful businessdealings, not to limit real—i.e., government-granted—monopolies. A similarpoint might be made with regard to Bill Gates, whose fortune has largely beenbuilt based on the government-granted monopoly inherent in copyright. More-over, as Bill Gates is no libertarian, and doubtlessly does not oppose the legit-imacy of antitrust laws, one can hardly wring one’s hands in pity over his hav-ing to lie in the very bed he helped make.
  14. 14. N. Stephan Kinsella — 15important to point out that ownership of an idea, or idealobject, effectively gives the IP owners a property right inevery physical embodiment of that work or invention. Con-sider a copyrighted book. Copyright holder A has a rightto the underlying ideal object, of which the book is butone example. The copyright system gives A the right inthe very pattern of words in the book; therefore, by impli-cation, A has a right to every tangible instantiation orembodiment of the book—i.e., a right in every physicalversion of the book, or, at least, to every book within thejurisdiction of the legal system that recognizes the copy-right. Thus, if A writes a novel, he has a copyright in this“work.” If he sells a physical copy of the novel to B, in bookform, then B owns only that one physical copy of thenovel; B does not own the “novel” itself, and is not entitledto make a copy of the novel, even using his own paper andink. Thus, even if B owns the material property of paperand printing press, he cannot use his own property to cre-ate another copy of A’s book. Only A has the right to copythe book (hence, “copyright”). Likewise, A’s ownership of a patent gives him the rightto prevent a third party from using or practicing thepatented invention, even if the third party only uses hisown property. In this way, A’s ownership of ideal rightsgives him some degree of control—ownership—over thetangible property of innumerable others. Patent and copy-right invariably transfer partial ownership of tangible prop-erty from its natural owner to innovators, inventors, andartists.
  15. 15. 16 — Against Intellectual Property LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVES ON IPThe Spectrum Libertarian views on IP range from complete supportof the fullest gamut of IP imaginable, to outright opposi-tion to IP rights. Most of the debate about IP concernspatent and copyright; as discussed below, trademark andtrade secret are less problematic. Therefore, this articlefocuses primarily on the legitimacy of patent and copy-right. Pro-IP arguments may be divided into natural-rightsand utilitarian arguments. Libertarian IP advocates tend toadopt the former justification.30 For example, natural-rights, or at least not explicitly utilitarian, libertarian pro-ponents of IP include, from more to less extreme, Galam-bos, Schulman, and Rand.31 Among precursors to modern30 For conventional theories of intellectual property, see “Bibliography of Gen-eral Theories of Intellectual Property,” Encyclopedia of Law and Economics,; and Edmund Kitch, “The Natureand Function of the Patent System,” Journal of Law and Economics 20 (1977): 265.31 See Andrew J. Galambos, The Theory of Volition, vol. 1, ed. Peter N. Sisco (SanDiego: Universal Scientific Publications, 1999); J. Neil Schulman, “Informa-tional Property: Logorights,” Journal of Social and Biological Structures (1990); andRand, “Patents and Copyrights.” Other Objectivists (Randians) who support IPinclude George Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Ill.: JamesonBooks, 1996), pp. 388–89; David Kelley, “Response to Kinsella,” IOS Journal 5,no. 2 (June 1995): 13, in response to N. Stephan Kinsella, “Letter on Intellec-tual Property Rights,” IOS Journal 5, no. 2 (June 1995): 12–13; Murray I. Franck,“Ayn Rand, Intellectual Property Rights, and Human Liberty,” 2 audio tapes,Institute for Objectivist Studies Lecture; Laissez-Faire Books (1991); Murray I.Franck, “Intellectual Property Rights: Are Intangibles True Property,” IOS Jour-nal 5, no. 1 (April 1995); and Murray I. Franck, “Intellectual and PersonalityProperty,” IOS Journal 5, no. 3 (September 1995): 7, in response to Kinsella,“Letter on Intellectual Property Rights.” It is difficult to find published discus-sions of Galambos’s idea, apparently because his own theories bizarrely restrictthe ability of his supporters to disseminate them. See, e.g., Jerome Tuccille, ItUsually Begins with Ayn Rand (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1971), pp. 69–71.Scattered references to and discussions of Galambos’s theories may be found,however, in David Friedman, “In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on
  16. 16. N. Stephan Kinsella — 17libertarians, Spooner and Spencer both advocated IP onmoral or natural-rights grounds.32 According to the natural-rights view of IP held by somelibertarians, creations of the mind are entitled to protec-tion just as tangible property is. Both are the product ofone’s labor and one’s mind. Because one owns one’s labor,one has a natural law right to the fruit of one’s labor. Under this view, just as one has a right to the crops one plants, so one has a right to the ideas one generates and the art one produces.33This theory depends on the notion that one owns one’sbody and labor, and therefore, its fruits, including intellec-tual “creations.” An individual creates a sonnet, a song, asculpture, by employing his own labor and body. He is thusentitled to “own” these creations, because they result fromother things he “owns.” There are also utilitarian pro-IP arguments. FederalJudge Richard Posner is one prominent utilitarian(although not libertarian) IP advocate.34 Among libertari-ans, anarchist David Friedman analyzes and appears toJulie Cohen’s ‘Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help’,” Berkeley TechnologyLaw Journal 13, no. 3 (Fall 1998): n. 52; and in Stephen Foerster, “The Basicsof Economic Government,” Lysander Spooner, “The Law of Intellectual Property: or An Essay on theRight of Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in Their Ideas,” in TheCollected Works of Lysander Spooner, vol. 3, ed. Charles Shively (1855; reprint,Weston, Mass.: M&S Press, 1971); Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Ethics, vol.2 (1893; reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press, 1978), part IV, chap. 13, p.121. See also Wendy McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyright and Patent,” and; and Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” pp.818, 825.33 Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” p. 819.34 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,1992), § 3.3, pp. 38–45.
  17. 17. 18 — Against Intellectual Propertyendorse IP on “law-and-economics” grounds,35 a utilitarianinstitutional framework. The utilitarian argument pre-supposes that we should choose laws and policies that max-imize “wealth” or “utility.” With respect to copyright andpatent, the idea is that more artistic and inventive “innova-tion” corresponds with, or leads to, more wealth. Publicgoods and free-rider effects reduce the amount of suchwealth below its optimal level, i.e., lower than the level wewould achieve if there were adequate IP laws on the books.Thus, wealth is optimized, or at least increased, by grant-ing copyright and patent monopolies that encourageauthors and inventors to innovate and create.36 On the other hand, there is a long tradition of opposi-tion to patent and copyright. Modern opponents includeRothbard, McElroy, Palmer, Lepage, Bouckaert, andmyself.37 Benjamin Tucker also vigorously opposed IP in a35 David D. Friedman, “Standards As Intellectual Property: An EconomicApproach,” University of Dayton Law Review 19, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 1109–29;and David D. Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why itMatters (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), chap. 11. EjanMackaay also advocates IP on utilitarian grounds, in “Economic Incentives inMarkets for Information and Innovation,” in “Symposium: Intellectual Prop-erty,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 13, no. 3, p. 867. Earlier utilitarianadvocates of IP include John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. See ArnoldPlant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” in SelectedEconomic Essays and Addresses (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 44;Roger E. Meiners and Robert J. Staaf, “Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks:Property or Monopoly?” in “Symposium: Intellectual Property,” Harvard Journalof Law & Public Policy 13, no. 3, p. 911.36 See Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” pp. 820–21;Julio H. Cole, “Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?” See Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash Pub-lishing, 1962), pp. 652–60; Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, pp.123–24; Wendy McElroy, “Contra Copyright,” The Voluntaryist (June 1985);McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyright and Patent”; Tom G. Palmer, “Intel-lectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,” HamlineLaw Review 12 (1989): 261; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Jus-tified?”; on Lepage, see Mackaay, “Economic Incentives,” p. 869; Boudewijn
  18. 18. N. Stephan Kinsella — 19debate in the nineteenth century individualist-anarchistperiodical Liberty.38 These commentators point out themany problems with conventional utilitarian and natural-rights arguments given to justify IP rights. These and othershortcomings of standard pro-IP arguments are surveyedbelow.Utilitarian Defenses of IP Advocates of IP often justify it on utilitarian grounds.Utilitarians hold that the “end” of encouraging more inno-vation and creativity justifies the seemingly immoralBouckaert, “What is Property?” in “Symposium: Intellectual Property,” HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy 13, no. 3, p. 775; N. Stephan Kinsella, “Is Intellec-tual Property Legitimate?” Pennsylvania Bar Association Intellectual Property LawNewsletter 1, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 3; Kinsella, “Letter on Intellectual PropertyRights,” and “In Defense of Napster and Against the Second HomesteadingRule.” F.A. Hayek also appears to be opposed to patents. See The Collected Works ofF.A. Hayek, vol. 1, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, ed. W.W. Bartley(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 6; and Meiners and Staaf,“Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks,” p. 911. Cole challenges the utilitarianjustification for patents and copyright in “Patents and Copyrights: Do the Ben-efits Exceed the Costs?” See also Fritz Machlup, U.S. Senate Subcommittee OnPatents, Trademarks & Copyrights, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 85thCong., 2nd Session, 1958, Study No. 15; Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose,“The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History10 (1950): 1; Roderick T. Long, “The Libertarian Case Against IntellectualProperty Rights,” Formulations 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1995); Stephen Breyer, “TheUneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, andComputer Programs,” Harvard Law Review 84 (1970): 281; Wendy J. Gordon,“An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Con-sent, and Encouragement Theory,” Stanford Law Review 41 (1989): 1343; andJesse Walker, “Copy Catfight: How Intellectual Property Laws Stifle PopularCulture,” Reason (March 2000).38 McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyright and Patent.” Also stronglyopposed to IP was the nineteenth-century Jacksonian editorialist WilliamLeggett. See Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” pp. 818,828–29. Ludwig von Mises expressed no opinion on the issue, merely draw-ing the economic implications from the presence or absence of such laws. SeeHuman Action, 3rd rev. ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), chap. 23, section6, pp. 661–62.
  19. 19. 20 — Against Intellectual Property“means” of restricting the freedom of individuals to usetheir physical property as they see fit. But there are threefundamental problems with justifying any right or law onstrictly utilitarian grounds. First, let us suppose that wealth or utility could be max-imized by adopting certain legal rules; the “size of the pie”is increased. Even then, this does not show that these rulesare justified. For example, one could argue that net utilityis enhanced by redistributing half of the wealth of society’srichest one percent to its poorest ten percent. But even ifstealing some of A’s property and giving it to B increasesB’s welfare “more” than it diminishes A’s (if such a com-parison could, somehow, be made), this does not establishthat the theft of A’s property is justified. Wealth maximiza-tion is not the goal of law; rather, the goal is justice—givingeach man his due.39 Even if overall wealth is increased dueto IP laws, it does not follow that this allegedly desirableresult justifies the unethical violation of some individuals’rights to use their own property as they see fit. In addition to ethical problems, utilitarianism is notcoherent. It necessarily involves making illegitimate inter-personal utility comparisons, as when the “costs” of IPlaws are subtracted from the “benefits” to determinewhether such laws are a net benefit.40 But not all values39 According to Justinian, “Justice is the constant and perpetual wis h to renderevery one his due. . . . The maxims of law are these: to live honestly, to hurtno one, to give every one his due.” The Institutes of Justinian: Text, Translation, andCommentary, trans. J.A.C. Thomas (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975).40 On the defects of utilitarianism and interpersonal utility comparisons, seeMurray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy,” in TheLogic of Action One (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), esp. pp. 90–99;Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” inThe Logic of Action One; Anthony de Jasay, Against Politics: On Government, Anar-chy, and Order (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 81–82, 92, 98, 144, 149–51. On scientism and empiricism, see Rothbard, “The Mantle of Science,” in TheLogic of Action One; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism:
  20. 20. N. Stephan Kinsella — 21have a market price; in fact, none of them do. Misesshowed that even for goods that have a market price, theprice does not serve as a measure of the good’s value.41 Finally, even if we set aside the problems of interper-sonal utility comparisons and the justice of redistributionand we plow ahead, employing standard utilitarian meas-urement techniques, it is not at all clear that IP laws leadto any change—either an increase or a decrease—in overallwealth.42 It is debatable whether copyrights and patentsreally are necessary to encourage the production of cre-ative works and inventions, or that the incremental gains ininnovation outweigh the immense costs of an IP system.Econometric studies do not conclusively show net gains inThoughts on Donald McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of Economics,” Review of Austrian Eco-nomics 3 (1989): 179. On epistemological dualism, see Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundationof Economic Science: An Essay on Method, 2nd ed. (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews andMcMeel, 1962); Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, trans.George Reisman (New York: New York University Press, 1981); Hans-Her-mann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig vonMises Institute, 1995); and Hoppe, “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism.”41 Mises states: “Although it is usual to speak of money as a measure of valueand prices, the notion is entirely fallacious. So long as the subjective theory ofvalue is accepted, this question of measurement cannot arise.” “On the Mea-surement of Value,” in The Theory of Money and Credit, trans. H.E. Batson (1912;reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1980), p. 51. Also: “Money is neithera yardstick of value nor of prices. Money does not measure value. Nor areprices measured in money: they are amounts of money.” Ludwig von Mises,Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, 3rd rev. ed., trans. J. Kahane (Indi-anapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press, 1981), p. 99; see also Mises, Human Action, pp. 96,122, 204, 210, 217, and 289.42 For an excellent survey and critique of the cost-benefit justification forpatent and copyright, see Cole, “Patents and Copyrights: Do the BenefitsExceed the Costs?” For useful discussions of evidence in this regard, seePalmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Ap-proach,” pp. 300–2; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?”pp. 820–21, 850–51; Bouckaert, “What is Property?” pp. 812–13; LeonardPrusak, “Does the Patent System Have Measurable Economic Value?” AIPLAQuarterly Journal 10 (1982): 50–59; and Leonard Prusak, “The Economic The-ory Concerning Patents and Inventions,” Economica 1 (1934): 30–51.
  21. 21. 22 — Against Intellectual Propertywealth. Perhaps there would even be more innovation ifthere were no patent laws; maybe more money for researchand development (R&D) would be available if it were notbeing spent on patents and lawsuits. It is possible that com-panies would have an even greater incentive to innovate ifthey could not rely on a near twenty-year monopoly.43 There are undoubtedly costs of the patent system. Asnoted, patents can be obtained only for “practical” applica-tions of ideas, but not for more abstract or theoreticalideas. This skews resources away from theoretical R&D.44It is not clear that society is better off with relatively morepractical invention and relatively less theoretical researchand development. Additionally, many inventions are pat-ented for defensive reasons, resulting in patent lawyers’salaries and patent office fees. This large overhead wouldbe unnecessary if there were no patents. In the absence ofpatent laws, for example, companies would not spendmoney obtaining or defending against such ridiculouspatents as those in the Appendix. It simply has not beenshown that IP leads to net gains in wealth. But should notthose who advocate the use of force against others’ prop-erty have to satisfy a burden of proof?43 See Cole, “Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?” forfurther examples of costs of patent and copyright laws.44 Plant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” p. 43. Seealso Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, pp. 658–59: It is by no means self-evident that patents encourage an increased absolute quantity of research expenditures. But certainly patents dis- tort the type of research expenditure being conducted. . . . Research expenditures are therefore overstimulated in the early stages before any- one has a patent, and they are unduly restricted in the period after the patent is received. In addition, some inventions are considered patentable, while others are not. The patent system then has the fur- ther effect of artificially stimulating research expenditures in the patentable areas, while artificially restricting research in the nonpatentable areas.
  22. 22. N. Stephan Kinsella — 23 We must remember that when we advocate certainrights and laws, and inquire into their legitimacy, we areinquiring into the legitimacy and ethics of the use of force.To ask whether a law should be enacted or exist is to ask:is it proper to use force against certain people in certaincircumstances? It is no wonder that this question is notreally addressed by analysis of wealth maximization. Utili-tarian analysis is thoroughly confused and bankrupt: talkabout increasing the size of the pie is methodologicallyflawed; there is no clear evidence that the pie increases withIP rights. Further, pie growth does not justify the use offorce against the otherwise legitimate property of others.For these reasons, utilitarian IP defenses are unpersuasive.Some Problems with Natural Rights Other libertarian proponents of IP argue that certainideas deserve protection as property rights because theyare created. Rand supported patents and copyrights as “thelegal implementation of the base of all property rights: aman’s right to the product of his mind.”45 For Rand, IPrights are, in a sense, the reward for productive work. It isonly fair that a creator reap the benefits of others using hiscreation. For this reason, in part, she opposes perpetualpatent and copyright—because future, unborn heirs of theoriginal creator are not themselves responsible for the cre-ation of their ancestors’ work. One problem with the creation-based approach is thatit almost invariably protects only certain types of creations—unless, that is, every single useful idea one comes up withis subject to ownership (more on this below). But the dis-tinction between the protectable and the unprotectable isnecessarily arbitrary. For example, philosophical or math-ematical or scientific truths cannot be protected under45 Rand, “Patents and Copyrights,” p. 130.
  23. 23. 24 — Against Intellectual Propertycurrent law on the grounds that commerce and social inter-course would grind to a halt were every new phrase, philo-sophical truth, and the like considered the exclusive prop-erty of its creator. For this reason, patents can be obtainedonly for so-called “practical applications” of ideas, but notfor more abstract or theoretical ideas. Rand agrees with thisdisparate treatment, in attempting to distinguish betweenan unpatentable discovery and a patentable invention. Sheargues that a “scientific or philosophical discovery, whichidentifies a law of nature, a principle or a fact of reality notpreviously known” is not created by the discoverer. But the distinction between creation and discovery isnot clearcut or rigorous.46 Nor is it clear why such a dis-tinction, even if clear, is ethically relevant in defining prop-erty rights. No one creates matter; they just manipulate andgrapple with it according to physical laws. In this sense, noone really creates anything. They merely rearrange matterinto new arrangements and patterns. An engineer whoinvents a new mousetrap has rearranged existing parts toprovide a function not previously performed. Others wholearn of this new arrangement can now also make animproved mousetrap. Yet the mousetrap merely followslaws of nature. The inventor did not invent the matter outof which the mousetrap is made, nor the facts and lawsexploited to make it work.46 Plant is correct in stating that “[t]he task of distinguishing a scientific dis-covery from its practical application, which may be patentable . . . is often baf-fling to the most subtle lawyer.” “The Economic Theory Concerning Patentsfor Inventions,” pp. 49–50. On a related note, the U.S. Supreme Court hasnoted that “[t]he specification and claims of a patent . . . constitute one of themost difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy.” Topliff v Topliff, 145 US156, 171, 12 S.Ct. 825 (1892). Perhaps this is because patent law has no moor-ings to objective borders of actual, tangible property, and thus is inherentlyvague, amorphous, ambiguous, and subjective. For the latter reason alone, onewould think that Objectivists—ardent, self-proclaimed defenders of objectivityand opponents of subjectivism—would oppose patent and copyright.
  24. 24. N. Stephan Kinsella — 25 Similarly, Einstein’s “discovery” of the relation E=mc2,once known by others, allows them to manipulate matterin a more efficient way. Without Einstein’s, or the inven-tor’s, efforts, others would have been ignorant of certaincausal laws, of ways matter can be manipulated and uti-lized. Both the inventor and the theoretical scientist engagein creative mental effort to produce useful, new ideas. Yetone is rewarded, and the other is not. In one recent case,the inventor of a new way to calculate a number repre-senting the shortest path between two points—anextremely useful technique—was not given patent protec-tion because this was “merely” a mathematical algorithm.47But it is arbitrary and unfair to reward more practicalinventors and entertainment providers, such as the engi-neer and songwriter, and to leave more theoretical scienceand math researchers and philosophers unrewarded. Thedistinction is inherently vague, arbitrary, and unjust. Moreover, adopting a limited term for IP rights, asopposed to a perpetual right, also requires arbitrary rules.For example, patents last for twenty years from the filingdate, while copyrights last, in the case of individualauthors, for seventy years past the author’s death. No onecan seriously maintain that nineteen years for a patent istoo short, and twenty-one years too long, any more thanthe current price for a gallon of milk can be objectivelyclassified as too low or too high. Thus, one problem with the natural-rights approach tovalidating IP is that it necessarily involves arbitrary distinctions47 In re Trovato, 33 USPQ2d 1194 (Fed Cir 1994). Recent case law has expandedthe types of mathematical and computer algorithms and business methods thatcan be protected by patent. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Finan-cial Group, 149 F3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998). However, no matter where the lineis drawn between unpatentable “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas” andpatentable “practical applications,” patent law still necessarily makes a distinc-tion between the two.
  25. 25. 26 — Against Intellectual Propertywith respect to what classes of creations deserve protec-tion, and concerning the length of the term of the protec-tion. Of course, one way to avoid this difficulty is to claimthat everything is protectable by IP, with perpetual (infinite)terms. Spooner,48 for example, advocated perpetual rightsfor patent and copyright. Schulman advocates a muchbroader concept of creations or ideas protectable by IP. Heargues for property rights called “logorights” in any “logos”that one creates. The logos is the “material identity” oridentity-pattern of created things. The owner of a logoswould own the order or pattern of information imposedupon, or observed in, material substances. The most radical of all IP proponents is Andrew JosephGalambos, whose ideas, to the extent that I understandthem, border on the absurd.49 Galambos believed that manhas property rights in his own life (primordial property)and in all “non-procreative derivatives of his life.”50 Sincethe “first derivatives” of a man’s life are his thoughts andideas, thoughts and ideas are “primary property.” Sinceaction is based on primary property (ideas), actions areowned as well; this is referred to as “liberty.” Secondaryderivatives, such as land, televisions, and other tangiblegoods, are produced by ideas and action. Thus, property48 Spooner, “The Law of Intellectual Property”; McElroy, “Intellectual Prop-erty: Copyright and Patent”; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Jus-tified?” pp. 818, 825.49 See Galambos, The Theory of Volition, vol. 1. Evan R. Soulé, Jr., “What Is Voli-tional Science?” I have readonly sketchy accounts of Galambos’s theories. I also met a real, live Galam-bosian once, much to my surprise (I had supposed that they were fictional cre-ations of Tuccille [It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand, pp. 69–71]), at a Mises Insti-tute conference a few years ago. My criticism of Galambos’s ideas in whatfollows only applies to the extent that I am properly describing his views.50 Friedman, “In Defense of Private Orderings,” n. 52; Foerster, “The Basics ofEconomic Government.”
  26. 26. N. Stephan Kinsella — 27rights in tangible items are relegated to lowly secondarystatus, as compared with the “primary” status of propertyrights in ideas. (Even Rand once elevated patents overmere property rights in tangible goods, in her bizarrenotion that “patents are the heart and core of propertyrights.”51 Can we really believe that there were no propertyrights respected before the 1800s, when patent rightsbecame systematized?) Galambos reportedly took his own ideas to ridiculouslengths, claiming a property right in his own ideas andrequiring his students not to repeat them;52 dropping anickel in a fund box every time he used the word “liberty,”as a royalty to the descendants of Thomas Paine, thealleged “inventor” of the word “liberty”; and changing hisoriginal name from Joseph Andrew Galambos (Jr., pre-sumably) to Andrew Joseph Galambos, to avoid infringinghis identically-named father’s rights to the name.53 By widening the scope of IP, and by lengthening itsduration to avoid making such arbitrary distinctions asRand does, the absurdity and injustice caused by IPbecomes even more pronounced (as Galambos demon-strates). And by extending the term of patents and copy-rights to infinity, subsequent generations would be chokedby ever-growing restraints on their own use of property. Noone would be able to manufacture—or even use—a lightbulb without getting permission from Edison’s heirs. Noone would even be able to build a house without gettingpermission from the heirs of the first protohuman wholeft the caves and built a hut. No one could use a variety51 Rand, “Patents and Copyrights,” p. 133.52 Friedman, “In Defense of Private Orderings,” n. 52.53 Tuccille, It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand, p. 70. Of course, I suppose that anyGalambosian other than Galambos himself, having the same type of dilemma,would be unable to change his name as a solution to the problem, because thissolution was Galambos’s inalienable, “absolute” idea.
  27. 27. 28 — Against Intellectual Propertyof life-saving techniques, chemicals, or treatments withoutobtaining permission of various lucky, rich descendants.No one would be able to boil water to purify it, or usepickling to preserve foods, unless he is granted license bythe originators (or their distant heirs) of such techniques. Such unbounded ideal rights would pose a seriousthreat to tangible-property rights, and would threaten tooverwhelm them. All use of tangible property would bynow be impossible, as every conceivable use of property,every single action, would be bound to infringe upon oneof the millions of past, accreted IP rights, and the humanrace would die of starvation. But, as Rand noted, men arenot ghosts; we have a spiritual aspect, but also a physicalone.54 Any system that elevates rights in ideas to such anextreme that it overrides rights in tangible things is clearlynot a suitable ethical system for living, breathing humanbeings. No one living can actually act in accordance withsuch an unrestricted view of IP. The remaining advocatesof IP all qualify their endorsement by limiting the scopeand/or terms of IP rights, thus adopting the ethically arbi-trary distinctions noted above. A deeper problem for the natural-rights position lies inits undue emphasis on “creation,” instead of scarcity, as giv-ing rise to property rights, as discussed below. IP AND PROPERTY RIGHTSProperty and Scarcity Let us take a step back and look afresh at the idea ofproperty rights. Libertarians believe in property rights intangible goods (resources). Why? What is it about tangible54 Harry Binswanger, ed., The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z (New York:New American Library, 1986), pp. 326–27, 467.
  28. 28. N. Stephan Kinsella — 29goods that makes them subjects for property rights? Whyare tangible goods property? A little reflection will show that it is these goods’scarcity—the fact that there can be conflict over these goods bymultiple human actors. The very possibility of conflict overa resource renders it scarce, giving rise to the need for eth-ical rules to govern its use. Thus, the fundamental socialand ethical function of property rights is to prevent inter-personal conflict over scarce resources.55 As Hoppe notes: [O]nly because scarcity exists is there even a problem of formulating moral laws; insofar as goods are superabun- dant (“free” goods), no conflict over the use of goods is possible and no action-coordination is needed. Hence, it follows that any ethic, correctly conceived, must be for- mulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the as- signment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means. Because only then does it become possible to avoid otherwise inescapable and unresolvable conflict.56Others who recognize the importance of scarcity in defin-ing what property is include Plant, Hume, Palmer, Roth-bard, and Tucker.5755 The fundamental economic, or catallactic, role for private property rights,along with money prices arising from exchanges of property, is to permit eco-nomic calculation. See N. Stephan Kinsella, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict,and Law: Review Essay of Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and theRule of Law,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 49–71.56 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston: KluwerAcademic Publishers, 1989), p. 235 n. 9.57 Plant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” pp.35–36; David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: With a Supplement:A Dialogue (1751; reprint, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957); Palmer, “Intel-lectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,” pp.261–66 and n. 50 (distinguishing between “static” and “dynamic” scarcity),also pp. 279–80; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” pp.860–61, 864–65; and Rothbard, “Justice and Property Rights,” in The Logic ofAction One, p. 274; on Tucker, see McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyrightand Patent.”
  29. 29. 30 — Against Intellectual Property Nature, then, contains things that are economicallyscarce. My use of such a thing conflicts with (excludes) youruse of it, and vice versa. The function of property rights isto prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources, byallocating exclusive ownership of resources to specifiedindividuals (owners). To perform this function, propertyrights must be both visible and just. Clearly, in order for indi-viduals to avoid using property owned by others, propertyborders and property rights must be objective (intersubjec-tively ascertainable); they must be visible.58 For this reason,property rights must be objective and unambiguous. Inother words, “good fences make good neighbors.”59 Property rights must be demonstrably just, as well as vis-ible, because they cannot serve their function of preventingconflict unless they are acceptable as fair by those affectedby the rules.60 If property rights are allocated unfairly, orsimply grabbed by force, this is like having no propertyrights at all; it is merely might versus right again, i.e., thepre-property rights situation. But as libertarians recognize,following Locke, it is only the first occupier or user of suchproperty that can be its natural owner. Only the first-occupierhomesteading rule provides an objective, ethical, and non-arbitrary allocation of ownership in scarce resources.6158 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 140–41. I do not mean torestrict rights to the sighted; the term “visible” here means observable or dis-cernible. I owe this clarification to Gene Callahan.59 Robert Frost, “The Mending Wall,” in North of Boston, 2nd ed. (New York:Henry Holt, 1915), pp. 11–13. (Please do not e-mail me about this. I do notcare what Frost “really” meant in that poem. I just like the saying.)60 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 138.61 See, on the proper approach to homesteading and the first-user rule (theprior-later distinction), Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 141–44;Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Boston: Kluwer Academic Pub-lishers, 1993), pp. 191–93; Jeffrey M. Herbener, “The Pareto Rule and Wel-fare Economics,” Review of Austrian Economics 10, no. 1 (1997): 105: “Once theitem is owned by the first-user, others no longer have the option of being its
  30. 30. N. Stephan Kinsella — 31When property rights in scarce means are allocated inaccordance with first-occupier homesteading rules, prop-erty borders are visible, and the allocation is demonstrablyjust. Conflict can be avoided with such property rights inplace because third parties can see and, thus, sidestep theproperty borders, and be motivated to do so because theallocation is just and fair. But surely it is clear, given the origin, justification, andfunction of property rights, that they are applicable only toscarce resources. Were we in a Garden of Eden where landand other goods were infinitely abundant, there would beno scarcity and, therefore, no need for property rules;property concepts would be meaningless. The idea of con-flict, and the idea of rights, would not even arise. Forexample, your taking my lawnmower would not reallydeprive me of it if I could conjure up another in the blinkof an eye. Lawnmower-taking in these circumstances wouldnot be “theft.” Property rights are not applicable to thingsof infinite abundance, because there cannot be conflictover such things. Thus, property rights must have objective, discernibleborders, and must be allocated in accordance with the first-occupier homesteading rule. Moreover, property rights canapply only to scarce resources. The problem with IP rightsis that the ideal objects protected by IP rights are notscarce; and, further, that such property rights are not, andfirst-user; thus, their preferences at that point in time have no bearing on thePareto-superior nature of the acquisition by the first-user”; and de Jasay, AgainstPolitics, pp. 172–79. On the ethical justifications of such a property-rightsscheme, see Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, chap. 7; Hoppe, The Eco-nomics and Ethics of Private Property; Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty; Rothbard, “Jus-tice and Property Rights,” in The Logic of Action One; N. Stephan Kinsella, “A Lib-ertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 30(Spring 1996): 607; N. Stephan Kinsella, “New Rationalist Directions in Lib-ertarian Rights Theory,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 12, no. 2 (Fall 1996):313–26.
  31. 31. 32 — Against Intellectual Propertycannot be, allocated in accordance with the firstoccupierhomesteading rule, as will be seen below.Scarcity and Ideas Like the magically-reproducible lawnmower, ideas arenot scarce. If I invent a technique for harvesting cotton,your harvesting cotton in this way would not take away thetechnique from me. I still have my technique (as well as mycotton). Your use does not exclude my use; we could bothuse my technique to harvest cotton. There is no economicscarcity, and no possibility of conflict over the use of ascarce resource. Thus, there is no need for exclusivity. Similarly, if you copy a book I have written, I still havethe original (tangible) book, and I also still “have” the pat-tern of words that constitute the book. Thus, authoredworks are not scarce in the same sense that a piece of landor a car are scarce. If you take my car, I no longer have it.But if you “take” a book-pattern and use it to make yourown physical book, I still have my own copy. The sameholds true for inventions and, indeed, for any “pattern” orinformation one generates or has. As Thomas Jefferson—himself an inventor, as well as the first Patent Examiner inthe U.S.—wrote, “He who receives an idea from me,receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as hewho lights his taper at mine, receives light without dark-ening me.”62 Since use of another’s idea does not deprive62 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Monticello, August 13, 1813, letter,in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, ed. A.A. Lipscomb and A.E. Bergh(Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), pp.326–38. Jefferson recognized that because ideas are not scarce, patent andcopyright are not natural rights, and can be justified only, if at all, on the util-itarian grounds of promoting useful inventions and literary works (and, eventhen, they must be created by statute, since they are not natural rights). SeePalmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and EconomicsApproach,” p. 278 n. 53. Yet this does not mean that Jefferson supportedpatents, even on utilitarian grounds. Patent historian Edward C. Walterscheidexplains that “throughout his life, [Jefferson] retained a healthy skepticism
  32. 32. N. Stephan Kinsella — 33him of its use, no conflict over its use is possible; ideas,therefore, are not candidates for property rights. EvenRand acknowledged that “intellectual property cannot beconsumed.”63 Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizinga right in an ideal object, one creates scarcity where noneexisted before. As Arnold Plant explains: It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copy- rights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the ob- jects which become appropriated. They are not a conse- quence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law, and, whereas in general the institution of pri- vate property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending . . . to lead us “to make the most of them,” property rights in patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained.64about the value of the patents system.” “Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Actof 1793,” Essays in History 40 (1998).63 Rand, “Patents and Copyrights,” p. 131. Mises, in Human Action, p. 661, rec-ognizes that there is no need to economize in the employment of “formulas,”“because their serviceableness cannot be exhausted.” On p. 128, he points out: A thing rendering such unlimited services is, for instance, the knowledge of the causal relation implied. The formula, the recipe that teaches us how to prepare coffee, provided it is known, ren- ders unlimited services. It does not lose anything from its capacity to produce however often it is used; its productive power is inex- haustible; it is therefore not an economic good. Acting man is never faced with a situation in which he must choose between the use-value of a known formula and any other useful thing.See also p. 364.64 Plant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” p. 36.Also Mises, Human Action, p. 364: “Such recipes are, as a rule, free goods astheir ability to produce definite effects is unlimited. They can become eco-nomic goods only if they are monopolized and their use is restricted. Anyprice paid for the services rendered by a recipe is always a monopoly price. Itis immaterial whether the restriction of a recipe’s use is made possible by insti-tutional conditions—such as patents and copyright laws—or by the fact that aformula is kept secret and other people fail to guess it.”
  33. 33. 34 — Against Intellectual Property Bouckaert also argues that natural scarcity is what givesrise to the need for property rules, and that IP laws createan artificial, unjustifiable scarcity. As he notes: Natural scarcity is that which follows from the relation- ship between man and nature. Scarcity is natural when it is possible to conceive of it before any human, institutional, contractual arrangement. Artificial scarcity, on the other hand, is the outcome of such arrangements. Artificial scarcity can hardly serve as a justification for the legal framework that causes that scarcity. Such an argument would be completely circular. On the contrary, artificial scarcity itself needs a justification.65Thus, Bouckaert maintains that “only naturally scarce enti-ties over which physical control is possible are candidatesfor” protection by real property rights.66 For ideal objects,the only protection possible is that achievable through per-sonal rights, i.e., contract (more on this below).6765 Bouckaert, “What is Property?” p. 793; see also pp. 797–99.66 Bouckaert, “What is Property?” pp. 799, 803.67 It could also be argued that ideal objects deserve legal protection as propertybecause they are “public goods,” that is, because of negative externalities whicharise if IP is not legally protected. However, the concept of public goods is nei-ther coherent nor justifiable. See Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Pos-nerian Law and Economics Approach,” pp. 279–80, 283–87; Hans-HermannHoppe, “Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security,”Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 27; also Hoppe, The Econom-ics and Ethics of Private Property, chap. 1. As Palmer points out: the cost of producing any service or good includes not only labor, capital marketing, and other cost components, but also fencing (or exclusion) costs as well. Movie theaters, for example, invest in exclu- sion devices like ticket windows, walls, and ushers, all designed to exclude non-contributors from enjoyment of service. Alternatively, of course, movie owners could set up projectors and screens in public parks and then attempt to prevent passers-by from watching, or they could ask government to force all non-contributors to wear special glasses which prevent them from enjoying the movie. ‘Drive-ins,’ faced with the prospect of free riders peering over the walls, installed—at considerable expense—individual speakers for each car,
  34. 34. N. Stephan Kinsella — 35 Only tangible, scarce resources are the possible objectof interpersonal conflict, so it is only for them that prop-erty rules are applicable. Thus, patents and copyrights areunjustifiable monopolies granted by government legisla-tion. It is not surprising that, as Palmer notes, “[m]onopolyprivilege and censorship lie at the historical root of patentand copyright.”68 It is this monopoly privilege that createsan artificial scarcity where there was none before. Let us recall that IP rights give to pattern-creators par-tial rights of control—ownership—over the tangible prop-erty of everyone else. The pattern-creator has partial own-ership of others’ property, by virtue of his IP right, becausehe can prohibit them from performing certain actions withtheir own property. Author X, for example, can prohibit a thirdparty, Y, from inscribing a certain pattern of words on Y’sown blank pages with Y’s own ink. That is, by merely authoring an original expression ofideas, by merely thinking of and recording some originalpattern of information, or by finding a new way to use hisown property (recipe), the IP creator instantly, magicallybecomes a partial owner of others’ property. He has somesay over how third parties can use their property. IP rights thus rendering the publicly available visual part of the movie of lit- tle interest. . . . The costs of exclusion are involved in the production of virtually every good imaginable. There is no compelling justifica- tion for singling out some goods and insisting that the state under- write their production costs through some sort of state-sanctioned collective action, simply because of a decision to make the good avail- able on a nonexclusive basis.Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and EconomicsApproach,” pp. 284–85. There is no way to show that ideas are clearly publicgoods. Moreover, even if ideas were public goods, this does not justify treat-ing them as property rights, for the same reasons that even wealth-increasingmeasures are not necessarily justified, as discussed above.68 Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and EconomicsApproach,” p. 264.
  35. 35. 36 — Against Intellectual Propertychange the status quo by redistributing property from indi-viduals of one class (tangible-property owners) to individ-uals of another (authors and inventors). Prima facie, there-fore, IP law trespasses against or “takes” the property oftangible property owners, by transferring partial owner-ship to authors and inventors. It is this invasion and redis-tribution of property that must be justified in order for IPrights to be valid. We see, then, that utilitarian defenses donot do the trick. Further problems with natural-rightsdefenses are explored below.Creation vs. Scarcity Some inconsistencies and problems with natural-rightstheories of IP were pointed out above. This section dis-cusses further problems with such arguments, in light ofthe preceding discussion of the significance of scarcity. As noted before, some libertarian IP advocates, such asRand, hold that creation is the source of property rights.69This confuses the nature and reasons for property rights,which lie in the undeniable fact of scarcity. Given scarcityand the correspondent possibility of conflict in the use ofresources, conflicts are avoided and peace and cooperationare achieved by allocating property rights to suchresources. And the purpose of property rights dictates thenature of such rules. For if the rules allocating propertyrights are to serve as objective rules that all can agree uponso as to avoid conflict, they cannot be biased or arbitrary.70For this reason, unowned resources come to be owned—homesteaded or appropriated—by the first possessor.7169 See Rand, “Patents and Copyrights”; Kelley, “Response to Kinsella”; Franck,“Intellectual and Personality Property” and “Intellectual Property Rights: AreIntangibles True Property?”70 See Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, chap. 7, esp. p. 138.71 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 142; de Jasay, Against Politics, pp.172–79; and Herbener, “The Pareto Rule and Welfare Economics,” p. 105.
  36. 36. N. Stephan Kinsella — 37 The general rule, then, is that ownership of a givenscarce resource can be identified by determining who firstoccupied it. There are various ways to possess or occupyresources, and different ways to demonstrate or prove suchoccupation, depending upon the nature of the resource andthe use to which it is put. Thus, I can pluck an apple fromthe wild and thereby homestead it, or I can fence in a plotof land for a farm. It is sometimes said that one form of oc-cupation is “forming” or “creating” the thing.72 For example,I can sculpt a statue from a block of marble, or forge a swordfrom raw metal, or even “create” a farm on a plot of land. We can see from these examples that creation is rele-vant to the question of ownership of a given “created”scarce resource, such as a statue, sword, or farm, only to theextent that the act of creation is an act of occupation, or isotherwise evidence of first occupation. However, “cre-ation” itself does not justify ownership in things; it is nei-ther necessary nor sufficient. One cannot create some possi-bly disputed scarce resource without first using the rawmaterials used to create the item. But these raw materialsare scarce, and either I own them or I do not. If not, thenI do not own the resulting product. If I own the inputs,then, by virtue of such ownership, I own the resultingthing into which I transform them. Consider the forging of a sword. If I own some rawmetal (because I mined it from ground I owned), then Iown the same metal after I have shaped it into a sword. Ido not need to rely on the fact of creation to own thesword, but only on my ownership of the factors used tomake the sword.73 And I do not need creation to come to72 Occupancy or taking possession “can take three forms: (1) by directly grasp-ing it physically, (2) by forming it, and (3) by merely marking it as ours.”Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” p. 838.73 I also do not need to rely on “ownership” of my labor; strictly speaking, laborcannot be owned, and labor ownership need not be relied on to show that Imaintain ownership of my property as I transform it.
  37. 37. 38 — Against Intellectual Propertyown the factors, since I can homestead them by simplymining them from the ground and thereby becoming thefirst possessor. On the other hand, if I fashion a swordusing your metal, I do not own the resulting sword. In fact,I may owe you damages for trespass or conversion. Creation, therefore, is neither necessary nor sufficientto establish ownership. The focus on creation distractsfrom the crucial role of first occupation as a property rulefor addressing the fundamental fact of scarcity. First occu-pation, not creation or labor, is both necessary and suffi-cient for the homesteading of unowned scarce resources. One reason for the undue stress placed on creation asthe source of property rights may be the focus by some onlabor as the means to homestead unowned resources. Thisis manifest in the argument that one homesteads unownedproperty with which one mixes one’s labor because one“owns” one’s labor. However, as Palmer correctly pointsout, “occupancy, not labor, is the act by which external thingsbecome property.”74 By focusing on first occupancy, ratherthan on labor, as the key to homesteading, there is no needto place creation as the fount of property rights, as Objec-tivists and others do. Instead, property rights must be rec-ognized in first-comers (or their contractual transferees) inorder to avoid the omnipresent problem of conflict overscarce resources. Creation itself is neither necessary norsufficient to gain rights in unowned resources. Further,there is no need to maintain the strange view that one“owns” one’s labor in order to own things one first occu-pies. Labor is a type of action, and action is not ownable;rather, it is the way that some tangible things (e.g., bodies)act in the world.74 Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?” p. 838 (emphasisadded), citing Georg W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox.(1821; reprint, London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 45–46.
  38. 38. N. Stephan Kinsella — 39 The problem with the natural rights defense of IP,then, lies in the argument that because an author-inventor“creates” some “thing,” he is “thus” entitled to own it. Theargument begs the question by assuming that the idealobject is ownable in the first place; once this is granted, itseems natural that the “creator” of this piece of property isthe natural and proper owner of it. However, ideal objectsare not ownable. Under the libertarian approach, when there is a scarce(ownable) resource, we identify its owner by determiningwho its first occupier is. In the case of “created” goods (i.e.,sculptures, farms, etc.), it can sometimes be assumed thatthe creator is also the first occupier by virtue of the gath-ering of raw materials and the very act of creation (impos-ing a pattern on the matter, fashioning it into an artifact,and the like). But it is not creation per se that gives rise toownership, as pointed out above.75 For similar reasons, theLockean idea of “mixing labor” with a scarce resource isrelevant only because it indicates that the user has possessed75 Even such advocates of IP as Rand do not maintain that creation per se is suf-ficient to give rise to rights, or that creation is even necessary. It is not neces-sary because unowned property can be homesteaded by simply occupying it,which involves no “creation” unless one stretches the concept without limit. Itis also not sufficient, because Rand would certainly not hold that creating anitem using raw material owned by others gives the thief-creator ownership of theitem. Rand’s view even implies that rights, including property rights, only arisewhen there is a possibility of conflict. Rand, for example, views rights as asocial concept arising only when there is more than one person. See Rand,“Man’s Rights,” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 321: “A ‘right’ is a moralprinciple defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom of action in a social con-text.” Indeed, as Rand argues, “Man’s rights can be violated only by the use ofphysical force,” i.e., some conflict over a scarce resource. “The Nature ofGovernment,” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 330. On p. 334, Randattempts (unsuccessfully) to justify government, the agent that enforces rights,based on the fact that there can be “honest disagreements”—i.e., conflict—evenamong “fully rational and faultlessly moral” men. So, in Rand’s theory, creationper se is neither necessary nor sufficient, just as in the theory of property advo-cated herein.
  39. 39. 40 — Against Intellectual Propertythe property (for property must be possessed in order to belabored upon). It is not because the labor must berewarded, nor because we “own” labor and “therefore” itsfruits. In other words, creation and labor-mixing indicatewhen one has occupied—and, thus, homesteaded—unowned scarce resources.7676 It is for these reasons that I disagree with the creation-centered approach ofObjectivists David Kelley and Murray Franck. According to Franck, “Intellec-tual and Personality Property,” p. 7, “although property rights help ‘ration’scarcity, scarcity is not the basis of property rights. The view that it is . . .appears to reverse cause and effect in that it sees rights as a function of soci-ety’s needs rather than as inherent in the individual who in turn must live insociety.” I am not sure what it means to say that rights, which are relational con-cepts that only apply in a social context, are “inherent” in an individual, or thatthey are “functions” of anything. The former notion verges on the positivistic(in implying rights have a “source,” as if they could be decreed by God or gov-ernment), and the latter borders on the scientistic (in using the precise math-ematical and natural-sciences notion of “functions”). And the argument forproperty rights is not based on a need to “ration” scarce items, but, instead, onthe need of individuals to employ means to achieve ends, and to avoid inter-personal conflict over such means. Thus, scarcity is not the “basis” for prop-erty rights, but a necessary background condition that must obtain beforeproperty rights can arise or make sense; conflict can arise only over scarceresources, not abundant ones. (As pointed out in the preceding footnote,Objectivism also holds that conflict-possibility is just such a necessary condi-tion for property rights.) Moreover, the scarcity-based argument set forth here is no more a “func-tion of society’s needs” than is Franck’s Objectivist approach. Franck believesthat men “need” to be able to create things in order to survive—in a social set-ting where the presence of other men makes disputes possible. “Thus,” lawshould protect rights to created things. But the scarcity-based argument recog-nizes that men “need” to be able to use scarce resources and that this requiresconflicts to be avoided; thus, law should allocate property rights in scarceresources. Whatever the relative merits of the creation-based and the scarcity-based positions, the scarcity argument is not more collectivist than the creationargument, and the creation argument is not more individualist than the scarcityargument. Kelley, in “Response to Kinsella,” p. 13, writes: Property rights are required because man needs to support his life by the use of his reason. The primary task in this regard is to create val- ues that satisfy human needs, rather than relying on what we find in nature, as animals do. . . . [T]he essential basis of property rights lies
  40. 40. N. Stephan Kinsella — 41 By focusing on creation and labor, rather than on firstoccupancy of scarce resources, as the touchstone of prop-erty rights, IP advocates are led to place undue stress onthe importance of “rewarding” the labor of the creator,much as Adam Smith’s flawed labor theory of value led toMarx’s even more deeply-flawed communist views onexploitation.77 As noted above, for Rand, IP rights are, in a in the phenomenon of creating value. . . .Scarcity becomes a relevant issue when we consider the use of things in nature, such as land, as inputs to the process of creating value. As a general rule, I would say that two conditions are required in order to appropriate things in nature and make them one’s property: (1) one must put them to some productive use, and (2) that productive use must require exclu- sive control over them, i.e., the right to exclude others. . . . Condition (2) holds only when the resource is scarce. But for things that one has created, such as a new product, one’s act of creation is the source of the right, regardless of scarcity.” (emphasis added). My reasons for disagreeing with Kelley here should be apparent, but letme point out that all human action, including creation of “values,” has to relyon the use of scarce means, that is, the material stuff of the world. Each act ofcreation employs things made of already existing atoms; neither this fact, northe recognition of it, is animal-like in any pejorative sense. That men, asopposed to animals, wish to create higher-order values by using scarceresources does not change this analysis. Second, Kelley advocates two separaterules for homesteading scarce resources: by first use of the resource, and bycreating a new, useful, or artistic pattern with one’s own property, which givesthe creator the right to stop all others from using a similar pattern, even withtheir own property. As discussed below, these two homesteading rules are inconflict, and only the former can be justified. Finally, Kelley states that the cre-ator of a new product owns it because he created it, regardless of scarcity. IfKelley here means a tangible product, such as a mousetrap, such a good is anactual, scarce, tangible thing. Presumably, the creator owned the scarce rawmaterials which he transformed into the final product. But he does not needto have a right in the ideal object of the mousetrap-idea or pattern in order toown the final product itself; he already owned the raw materials, and still ownsthem after he reshapes them. If Kelley instead means that, by creating a pat-tern or idea, one acquires the right of control over all others’ scarce resources,then he is advocating a new type of homesteading rule, which I criticize below.77 See, e.g., Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith: An AustrianPerspective on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 1 (Brookfield, Vt.: Edward Elgar,1995), p. 453: “It was, indeed, Adam Smith who was almost solely responsiblefor the injection into economics of the labour theory of value. And hence itwas Smith who may plausibly be held responsible for the emergence and the
  41. 41. 42 — Against Intellectual Propertysense, the reward for productive work, i.e., labor. Rand andother natural-rights IP proponents seem to adopt a mixednatural rights—utilitarian rationale in holding that the per-son who invests time and effort must be rewarded or ben-efit from this effort (e.g., Rand opposed perpetual patentand copyright on the grounds that because distant descen-dants did not create their ancestors’ works, they deserve noreward).78 In addition, in a strange admixture of natural-rights andutilitarian thinking, the natural-rights IP approach impliesthat something is property if it can hold value. But asHoppe has trenchantly shown, one cannot have a propertyright in the value of one’s property, but only in its physicalintegrity.79 Moreover, many arbitrarily-defined “things” canacquire economic value if government grants a monopolyover the thing’s use, even if the thing is not otherwise ascarce resource (e.g., the Postal Service’s monopoly powerto deliver first-class letters). Thus, because ideas are not scarce resources in thesense that physical conflict over their use is possible, theyare not the proper subject of property rights designed toavoid such conflicts.momentous consequences of Marx.” Even otherwise sound thinkers some-times place undue stress on the importance of labor to the homesteadingprocess and its ability to be “owned.” Rothbard himself, for instance, impliesthat an individual “owns his own person and therefore his own labor.” Rothbard,“Justice and Property Rights,” p. 284, emphasis added; see also Rothbard, TheEthics of Liberty, p. 49. It is a misleading metaphor to speak of “owning one’slabor” (or one’s life or ideas). The right to use or profit from one’s labor isonly a consequence of being in control of one’s body, just as the right to “freespeech” is only a consequence, or a derivative, of the right to private property,as Rothbard recognized in The Ethics of Liberty, esp. chap. 15.78 See also Reisman, Capitalism, pp. 388–89.79 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 139–41, 237 n. 17.
  42. 42. N. Stephan Kinsella — 43Two Types of Homesteading What, though, is really wrong with recognizing “new”property rights? After all, since new ideas, artistic cre-ations, and innovations continually enrich us, what is theharm in moving with the times by recognizing new formsof property? The problem is that if property rights are rec-ognized in non-scarce resources, this necessarily meansthat property rights in tangible resources are correspond-ingly diminished. This is because the only way to recognizeideal rights, in our real, scarce world, is to allocate rights intangible goods. For me to have an effective patent right—a right in an idea or pattern, not in a scarce resource—means that I have some control over everyone else’s scarceresources. In fact, we can see that IP rights imply a new rule foracquiring rights in scarce resources, which undercuts thelibertarian homesteading principle. For, according to Lock-ean-libertarian homesteading, it is the first occupier of a pre-viously unowned scarce resource who homesteads it, i.e.,becomes its owner. A late-comer who seizes control of allor part of such owned property is simply a thief, becausethe property is already owned. The thief effectively pro-poses a new and arbitrary homesteading rule to replace thefirst-occupier rule, namely, the particularistic rule “Ibecome the owner of property when I forcibly take it fromyou.” Of course, such a rule is no rule at all, and is clearlyinferior to the first-possessor rule. The thief’s rule is par-ticular, not universal; it is not just, and it certainly is notdesigned to avoid conflicts. Proponents of IP must also advocate a new home-steading rule to supplement, if not replace, the first-pos-sessor homesteading rule. They must maintain that there isa second way for an individual to come to own tangibleproperty. To wit, the IP advocate must propose somehomesteading rule along the following lines: “A personwho comes up with some useful or creative idea which can
  43. 43. 44 — Against Intellectual Propertyguide or direct an actor in the use of his own tangible prop-erty thereby instantly gains a right to control all other tan-gible property in the world, with respect to that property’ssimilar use.” This new-fangled homesteading technique isso powerful that it gives the creator rights in third parties’already owned tangible property. For example, by inventing a new technique for digginga well, the inventor can prevent all others in the world fromdigging wells in this manner, even on their own property. To takeanother example, imagine the time when men lived incaves. One bright guy—let’s call him Galt-Magnon—decides to build a log cabin on an open field, near hiscrops. To be sure, this is a good idea, and others notice it.They naturally imitate Galt-Magnon, and they start build-ing their own cabins. But the first man to invent a house,according to IP advocates, would have a right to preventothers from building houses on their own land, with theirown logs, or to charge them a fee if they do build houses.It is plain that the innovator in these examples becomes apartial owner of the tangible property (e.g., land and logs) ofothers, due not to first occupation and use of that property(for it is already owned), but due to his coming up with an idea.Clearly, this rule flies in the face of the first-user home-steading rule, arbitrarily and groundlessly overriding thevery homesteading rule that is at the foundation of allproperty rights. There is, in fact, no reason why merely innovating givesthe innovator partial ownership of property that othersalready own. Just because a rule can be proposed does notmean that it is workable or just. There are many arbitraryrules one could dream up by which property rights couldbe allocated. For example, a racist could propose that anywhite person can homestead any property already firsthomesteaded by a black person. Or: the third occupier of ascarce resource becomes its owner. Or: the state can home-stead all capital goods, even if already first acquired by
  44. 44. N. Stephan Kinsella — 45individuals. Or: by legislative decree, the state can home-stead, in the form of taxes, part of the estates that arealready owned by private individuals. All such arbitraryhomesteading rules, including the IP rule that innovatorshomestead partial control of all others’ tangible resources,are unjustifiable. They all conflict with the only justifiablehomesteading rule, first occupation. None of them establishfair, objective rules that avoid interpersonal conflict overscarce resources. Discussions of protecting rights in “ideas,”“creations,” or “things of value” only serves to obscure thefact that the proponent of IP opposes the unadulteratedright to homestead and own private property. IP AS CONTRACTThe Limits of Contract The law, then, should protect individual rights to one’sbody, and to legitimately acquired scarce resources (prop-erty). There is not a natural right to ideal objects—to one’sintellectual innovations or creations—but only to scarceresources. Many opponents of IP rights typically supportonly contractual arrangements to protect ideas and innova-tions—private contracts between property owners.80 Sup-pose, for example, that A writes a book and sells physicalcopies of it to numerous purchasers B1, B2 . . . BN, with a con-tractual condition that each buyer B is obligated not to makeor sell a copy of the text. Under all theories of contract, any80 See McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyright and Patent”; Roy Halliday,“Ideas as Property,” Formulations 4, no. 4 (Summer 1997); Bouckaert, “What isProperty?” pp. 804–5; Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Lawand Economics Approach,” pp. 280, 291–95; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copy-rights Morally Justified?” pp. 821 n. 8, 851–55, 864; and Richard O. Hammer,“Intellectual Property Rights Viewed as Contracts,” Formulations 3, no. 2 (Win-ter 1995–96).
  45. 45. 46 — Against Intellectual Propertyof the buyers B becomes liable to A, at least for damages,if he violates these provisions.81 But the advocates of the contractual approach to IP aremistaken if they believe that private contract can be usedto recreate the same type of protection afforded by mod-ern IP rights. Patent and copyright are good against allthird parties, regardless of their consent to a contract. Theyare real rights that bind everyone, in the same way that mytitle to a parcel of land binds everyone to respect my prop-erty—even if they do not have a contract with me. A con-tract, by contrast, binds only parties to the contract. It is likeprivate law between the parties.82 It does not bind thirdparties, i.e., those not in “privity” with the original parties.83 Thus, if the book purchaser B relates to third parties Tthe plot of the purchased novel, these third parties T arenot bound, in general, by the original contractual obliga-tion between A and B. If I learn how to adjust my car’s car-buretor to double its efficiency, or if I learn of a poem ormovie plot someone else has written, why should I have topretend that I am ignorant of these things, and refrainfrom acting on this knowledge? I have not obligated myselfby contract to the creator. I do not deny that contractualobligations can be implicit or tacit, but there is not even animplicit contract in such situations.81 See, e.g., Kinsella, “A Theory of Contracts”; Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,chap. 19; Williamson M. Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Con-tracts,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1977): 3–13; and Randy E.Barnett, “A Consent Theory of Contract,” Columbia Law Review 86 (1986):269–321.82 Under the international law meta-rule pacta sunt servanda (contracts are to beobserved), contracts between sovereigns (states, in the international law context)create a “law of the agreement” between the parties. See Paul E. Comeaux andN. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspectsof Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1997), chaps. 2, 5.83 For a definition of “privity of contract,” see Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St.Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1990), p. 1199. See also, in the IP context,Bouckaert, “What is Property?” pp. 795, 805.
  46. 46. N. Stephan Kinsella — 47 Nor can it be said as a general matter that I have stolenor fraudulently acquired the information, as there are manylegitimate ways for individuals to acquire information. Artis-tic works, by their very nature, typically are made public. Sci-entific discoveries and innovations likewise can becomeknown beyond the parties to confidentiality agreements. Andit certainly cannot be said that my use of my carburetor, orwriting a novel using the same plot, physically interferes withthe creator’s use of his own tangible property. It does noteven prevent the creator from using his own carburetor ideato improve his own car or others’, or from using that plot. So, my adjusting my carburetor is not a breach of con-tract; it is not theft; and it is not physical trespass on theinventor’s tangible property. Twiddling my carburetor doesnot violate the inventor’s rights. At most, my use of thisidea will diminish its value to the inventor by hampering hisability to monopolistically exploit it. As we have seen, how-ever, one cannot have a right to the value of one’s prop-erty, but only in its physical integrity.84 Thus, the use of contract only gets us so far. A bookpublisher may be able to contractually obligate his pur-chasers to not copy his book, but he cannot prevent thirdparties from publishing and selling it, unless some contractprohibits this action.Contract vs. Reserved Rights Third parties, then, who are not parties to the contractand are not in privity with the contractual obligor andobligee, are not bound by the contractual relationship. Forthis reason, although an innovator can use contract to stopspecified individuals from freely using his ideas, it is diffi-cult to use standard contract law to prevent third partiesfrom using ideas they glean from others. Perhaps sensing84 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 139–41, 237 n. 17.