This presentation was given as part of the Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in November 2014.
1. Role of Space
in Deterrence
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar
November 18, 2014
Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
retired
3. U.S. National Space Policy
“The United States considers
the sustainability, stability, and
free access to, and use of, space
vital to its national interests.”
4. Deterrence in Space
“Space deterrence” does not exist
• Deterrence does not operate by domain
• Deterrence operates in minds of potential
adversaries
But deterrence still has a role in space
• More nuanced, less determinative
• Inherently cross domain
6. Multiple Layers of Deterrence
Cause adversary leadership to understand that attacks
on our space assets will:
• break international norms;
• engage a coalition of space-faring countries;
• have limited impact on our war-fighting capabilities;
• risk prompting a damaging response including in
other domains.
Also risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
7. More Nuanced Message
“U.S. National Space Policy states clearly that use of space is vital to our national
interests. Thus any country contemplating interference with our space capabilities
must understand how seriously we would treat such an infringement.
“Attacking our space assets is not just another military tactic. Any leadership
contemplating interference with U.S. space capabilities should understand the
complex and dangerous nature of such a decision. Interference would infringe our
sovereign rights. It would likely engage the interest and capabilities of other countries
as well. Interference cannot be assured of success, particularly as we strengthen the
resilience of our architectures and the ability of our forces to operate through a
degraded environment. On the other hand, interference could prompt an asymmetric
response, imposing strategic or operational costs that outweigh any tactical benefits.
Finally, interference could create a real risk of miscalculation and rapid escalation.
“This is clearly not a decision for a tactical or operational commander, who may be
looking for a fleeting military advantage. This is a decision for national leadership,
who should better understand the escalation risks, the strategic consequences ... and
the wisdom of restraint.”
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy
Singapore, May 2012
9. But Deterrence in Space
Can Fail in Minds of Adversary
Disrupting space assets may seem trivial versus:
• confronting a superpower;
• sinking a frigate or attacking an airbase.
Pre-emptive attack may seem inviting if judged
possible in a manner that:
• provides little warning;
• is hard to attribute;
• avoids lasting damage.
10. Vulnerable Space Capabilities
• Erode war-fighting capabilities
• Erode overall deterrence and crisis
stability
• Increase risk of miscalculation and
unintended escalation
11. Resilience in Space
Ensuring mission success even when space
capabilities under attack.
Resilience can be increased by:
• improving space situational awareness
• better protecting individual satellites,
communication links, and ground stations
• distributing or hosting capabilities
• integrating commercial and allied systems
• having cross-domain backup capabilities
• being able to disrupt adversary counterspace
capabilities
13. Conclusion
• Deterrence does not operate uniquely in space or any separate
domain. It operates across domains and in the minds of a
potential adversary.
• Our space posture and policy can contribute to deterring
attacks on our space assets through a multilayered approach
to complicating adversary decision-making.
• That said, deterrence of such attacks can easily fail, with
important implications for our warfighting capabilities and
overall deterrence and crisis stability.
• More important than deterrence in space, is our resilience –
the capacity to ensure mission success despite interference
with our space assets.