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Cross Domain Deterrence

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Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity

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Cross Domain Deterrence

  1. 1. Cross Domain Deterrence November  18,  2014   LLNL  (Livermore)  
  2. 2. Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity Mission:    Develop  a  theory  of  cross-­‐domain  deterrence      Humility,  but  with  opportunity  (low  expectaFons)    Complexity  is  the  challenge,  not  the  objecFve    
  3. 3. Three(?) Harrison Fords of CDD •  Academics  tend  to  study  what  pracFFoners  already  know.     “That’s  all  well  in  pracFce,  but  how  does  it  work  in  theory?”     •  In  CDD  there  is  an  Inversion  of  pracFce/ideas/aTtudes:   •  Academic  perspecFve  (30,000  feet,  “too  cold”):   •  Academics  think  they  already  know  how  deterrence  works.   •  Simple  linear  argument  focusing  on  achieving  given  ends   •  CDD  skepFcism:    Not  interesFng.    “Nothing  [new]  to  see  here”   •  PracFFoner  perspecFve  (trenches,  “too  hot”?):   •  Deterrence  is  abstract,  not  always  helpful  in  formulaFng  policy.   •  Complex  process  involving  means  (“how”  to  deter)   •  CDD  defies  analysis:    really  interesFng,  but  too  complex.     •  Our  perspecFve  (“just  right”??):    Let’s  see  what’s  out  there               (Iowa:  field  of  dreams,  James  T.  Kirk  vs.  Missouri:  “show  me”).   •  This  is  the  beginning  of  a  process   •  I  will  share  iniFal  hunches  with  you  
  4. 4. Agenda •  The  CDD  project     •  CDD  as  a  policy  problem   •  CDD  as  a  theoreFcal  problem  
  5. 5. h^p://deterrence.ucsd.edu   DoD  Minerva  IniFaFve  Award:  “Deterring  Complex  Threats:  The  Effects  of  Asymmetry,  Interdependence,   and  MulF-­‐polarity  on  InternaFonal  Strategy”  supported  by  ONR  Research  Grant  N00014-­‐14-­‐1-­‐0071   DuraFon:  2013-­‐2018  
  6. 6. Basic  research  quesFon  for  CDD:   How  does  the  increasing  number  or  “types”   of  means  available  for  poliFcal  influence   affect  deterrence  in  theory  and  pracFce?   Prior  research  interests  and  policy  concerns:   Nuclear  force  posture   GlobalizaFon  and  interdependence   Cybersecurity  and  the  RMA   Outer  space  security   Chinese  military  modernizaFon   US  Grand  Strategy  
  7. 7. Agenda •  The  CDD  project     •  CDD  as  a  policy  problem   •  CDD  as  a  theoreFcal  problem  
  8. 8. More types of means, linkages, threats “The  fragility  of  chokepoints  in  air,  space,   cyberspace   and   on   the   sea   enable   an   increasing   number   of   enFFes,   states   and   non-­‐state  actors  alike  to  disrupt  the  global   economy   with   small   numbers   of   well-­‐ placed,   precise   a^acks…these   strategies   and   the   weapons   that   support   them   are   also   no   longer   the   exclusive   province   of   large   states…America’s   adversaries   today   are  embracing  a  strategy  of  access  denial   to  counter  American  power  projecFon.”   Gen.  Norton  A.  Schwartz  &  Adm.  Jonathan  W.  Greenert,     “Air-­‐Sea  Ba^le:  PromoFng  Stability  in  an  Era  of   Uncertainty,”  The  American  Interest  (February  2012)  
  9. 9. The “Third Offset” “The  criFcal  innovaFon  was  to  apply  and  combine  these  new   systems   and   technologies   with   new   strategic   operaFonal   concepts,  in  ways  that  enable  the  American  military  to  avoid   matching  an  adversary  “tank-­‐for-­‐tank  or  soldier-­‐for-­‐soldier.”   Secretary  of  Defense  Hagle   November  17,  Reagan  NaFonal   Defense  Forum  
  10. 10. Complexity is a challenge for strategy, and even grand strategy •  Emerging  capabiliFes   •  Accessible,  omen  civilian,  technologies—e.g.,  cyber,  space,   manufacturing,  bio,  etc.—have  a  latent  capacity  to  inflict   harm,  possibly  even  commensurate  with  strategic  weapons   •  (Yet  insFtuFonal  capacity  for  weaponizaFon  and  employment   of  technologies  is  underesFmated  in  techno-­‐centric  accounts)   •  Dense  linkages   •  The  most  connected  and  technology-­‐dependent  states  are   also  the  states  that  are  most  vulnerable  to  disrupFon   •  (Yet  interdependence  is  also  thought  to  promote  restraint)   •  Empowered  actors   •  Weaker  states  or  non-­‐state  actors  are  gaining  the  ability  to   inflict  costs  on  stronger  rivals  while  avoiding  retaliaFon   •  (Yet  rich  and  experienced  states  can  exploit  the  same   technologies  to  enhance  intelligence  and  military  power)  
  11. 11. What is a domain? •  DoD  war-­‐fighFng  domains:  sea,  air,  land,  space,  cyber   •  Are  these  disFnct  strategic  environments  or  bureaucraFc  turfs?   •  Space  and  cyber  are  driving  policy  concerns  about  CDD   •  There  are  other  ways  to  parse  the  means  of  influence   •  Military  vs.  non-­‐military  tools   •  Specialized  experFse,  economic  sectors,  or  jurisdicFons   •  Differences  among  domains  are  probably  more  important   analyFcally  than  defining  boundaries  between  them   •  “Cross  domain  deterrence”  is  the  use  of  one  type  of  means  to   dissuade  the  target  from  using  some  other  type  of  means  
  12. 12. Agenda •  The  CDD  project     •  CDD  as  a  policy  problem   •  CDD  as  a  theoreFcal  problem  
  13. 13. The Conceptual Limits of Cross-Domain Deterrence •  “Domains”  are  arFficial  constructs   •  Underlying  differences  in  capabiliFes  and  environments  are  real   •  DefiniFonal  debates  risk  becoming  “academic”  (angels  +  pins)   •  NaFons  (even  the  United  States)  don’t  just  wish  to  deter   •  Deterrence  implies  a  staFc/limited  noFon  of  influence   •  Symmetry:    if  someone  is  deterring,  others  are  compelling/conquering     •  Even  deterrence  involves  reallocaFng  security  or  influence   •  What  does  it  mean  to  “cross”  a  domain?   •  Arbitrary  boundaries  imply  arbitrary  transiFons   •  CapabiliFes/threats  may  not  be  specific  or  may  be  mulF-­‐  domain  
  14. 14. CDD is not new: Actors have long combined or shifted domains for strategic advantage Yet  the  number  and  complexity   of  means  now  available  make  it   hard  to  choose  wisely.  We  need   more  explicit  a^enFon  to  the   logic  of  combinaFon  of  means.   (Deterrence  itself  was  not  new,  but  “ripened”   when  nuclear  weapons  made  it  essenFal  to   consider  security  in  the  absence  of  defense.)  
  15. 15. War is politics by many means •  Strategic  bargaining  is  a  contest  between  sets  of  means   and  ends   •  TradiFonal  deterrence  theory  focuses  on  ends   •  PrioriFes,  resolve,  credibility,  mispercepFon   •  The  means  have  usually  been  assumed  to  be  nuclear,  while   consequences  were  generally  characterized  as  existenFal   •  Chicken  games:    “swerving”  is  different  in  a  steam  roller   •  CDD  focuses  on  means  (tension  between  policy/theory)   •  OpFons,  combinaFons,  tradeoffs   •  CDD  relaxes  the  assumpFons  of  tradiFonal  deterrence:    More   means  available,  more  linkages  across  them,  and  more  actors   with  different  porqolios  and  vulnerabiliFes   •  Rock,  paper,  scissors  games  
  16. 16. How do means matter? •  The  proliferaFon  of  capabiliFes  for  defense:   •  “porqolio”  approach:    More  of  same  not  as  good  as  variety   •  If  defense  is  increased  by  variaFon  in  capabiliFes…   •  This  must  improve  deterrence  (det.  by  defense)   •  Can  also  produce  deficiencies   •  We  already  know  lots  about  this  tacFcally   •  Combined  arms,  air/land/sea  ba^le  (Biddle)   •  Apply  it  to  deterrence  (strategy/grand  strategy)   •  What  are  “best  response”  acFons  to  threats?   •  Can  we  develop  rules  of  thumb  (similar  to  combined  arms)?   •  Humility  moment   •  Real  limits  to  what  theory  can  do,  but…   •  Decisions  in  anFcipaFon  of  consequences  requires  theory   •  RelaFve  area  of  advantage:    “first”  is  be^er  than  “best”  
  17. 17. Unpacking deterrence/TOW •  Deterrence  involves  at  least  three  objecFves:   1.  Reduce  risk  of  escalaFon/war  (accommodaFon)   2.  “Win”  policy  dispute  (internaFonal  “tug-­‐o-­‐war”)   3.  Minimize  cost  of  achieving  first  two  objecFves   •  Tradeoffs  (“speak  somly  AND  carry  a  big  sFck”)   •  If  war  is  a  product  of  different  expectaFons  about  BOP  or  BOT   –  the  informaFonal  theory  of  war   •  Then  deterrent  acFons/capabiliFes/threats  that  minimize   uncertainty  about  BOP/BOT  reduce  the  risk  of  war  (1)   •  ...  But  reducing  uncertainty  does  not  necessarily  maximize  2,  3.   •  Can  also  minimize  risk  of  war  by  conceding  policy  dispute   •  Increasing  condiFons  increases  risk  of  deterrence  failure   •  Use  of  deterrence  is  omen  response  to  low  risk  tolerance  
  18. 18. Why act across domains? •  Crossing  domains  can  either:   1.  Alter  BOP/BOT  (presumably  advantage  defender)   2.  Reduce  uncertainty  about  intensions   •  First  cut:    “ComparaFve  advantage”   •  Threaten/deploy  capabiliFes  to  win  if  war  happens   •  Maximize  influence  –  max  BOP/BOT,  diplomaFc  leverage   •  Mobility  is  an  advantage  in  war  but  a  disadvantage  in  signaling   •  Threaten/deploy  capabiliFes  that  make  war  less  likely   •  “Tripwires”  are  bad  military  tacFcs  but  great  for  deterrence   •  Example:    NATO  acFons  in  response  to  Ukrainian  crisis  
  19. 19. Why do actors escalate? •  EscalaFon—like  war  itself—reflects  uncertainty   •  Why  take  acFons  that  don’t  deter  in  hindsight?   •  EscalaFon  reflects  effort  to    deter/compel  at  lower  cost.       •  Cross  domain  may  lessen  or  heighten  escalaFon   •  Lessen:    deterrent/compellent  acFons  must  do  more  to   inform  opponents  about  eventual  outcome  of  conflict   •  Heighten:       •  TentaFve  a^empts  to  “win”  indicate  ambivalence   •  Increase  opponent’s  belief  that  persisFng/escalaFng  will  prevail   •  An  increase  in  opFons  _inherently_  increases  uncertainty   •  Actors  themselves  don’t  know  what  they  will  do  in  a  crisis  
  20. 20. How do combinations work? •  Tough:    Can  fall  back  on  some  theory/heurisFcs   •  EffecFve  combinaFons  win  wars,  affect  BOP/BOT   •  More  costly/heighten  uncertainty  about  who  will  win   •  Removing  opFons  for  an  opponent  also  creates  a  “wedge”   •  More  likely  to  get  opponent  to  back  down   •  More  likely  to  get  opponent  to  escalate  (which  do  you  prefer?)   •  However,  “hybrid”  combinaFons  may  be  be^er   •  ComparaFve  advantage  could  be  Fed  to  signaling   •  2nd-­‐mover  advantage  (mostly  focus  on  1st  mover)   •  Power  projecFon  creates  depth   •  Especially  useful  in  period  of  status  quo/decline   •  Stability/instability  across  domains   •  No  domain  is  stable/unstable  by  itself  given  CDD  
  21. 21. Cyber and space (our final frontier!) •  IniFal  work  by  project  on  cyber:   •  StuxNet  as  model  (Lindsay)   •  The  myth  of  cyber  Pearl  Harbor  (Gartzke)   •  DecepFon  as  alternaFve  strategy  (Gartzke  and  Lindsay)   •  Nature  of  cyber  coercion  (Lindsay  and  Gartzke)   •  Where  we  are  headed:   •  SubsFtutes  and  complements   •  When  is  cyber  used  instead  of  other  capabiliFes?   •  When  is  cyber  used  because  of  other  capabiliFes?   •  Interdependence—similariFes/differences  between   cyber,  nuclear  and  economic  modes  of  interdependence   •  Space—deterrence  in  space  has  never  been  in  space.  
  22. 22. Some thoughts about empirics •  PreconcepFon:    cannot  measure  CDD   •  Historical  use  of  CDD/CDC  creates  basis  for  analysis   •  InternaFonal  Crisis  Database   •  Code  domains/capabiliFes  (acFons  and  outcomes  already  coded)   •  Deterrence  data  (Huth)   •  Uncertainty  and  war  project  (Gartzke  and  Kaplow   •  Nuclear  force  structure  project  (Gartzke,  Kaplow  and  Mehta)   •  Space  ISR/launch  data—informaFon  theory,  vulnerabiliFes   •  Modeling/measuring/theorizing   •  Complementarity  of  different  components   •  Caveat:    when  “general”  deterrence  works,  there  is   nothing  to  see  (Russians  not  crossing  German  border)      
  23. 23. Interdependence & Multi-polarity •  Interdependence  (economic,  nuclear,  cyber)   •  Increase  consequences  for  unrestricted  warfare   •  Deterrent  effect  on  escalaFon  (fewer  big  contests)   •  Decrease  consequences  of  restricted  forms  of  conflict   •  Stability/instability  paradox  (more  lower  intensity  contests)   •  Passive  effect  of  interdep.  (PuFn:    sancFons  vs  markets)   •  MulFpolarity   •  Increased  uncertainty  (inherent  increase  in  conflicts)   •  Pivotal  paradox:    declining  US  leverage  with  enemies  actually   increases  US  leverage  with  its  (many)  friends.     •  More  and  more  circumspect  contests   •  Increased  use  of  asymmetric  capabiliFes  (on  both  sides)   •  A  “rock/paper/scissors/…  carrots/sFcks”  world   •  Worth  understanding  how  these  offsets  work,  are  exploited  
  24. 24. Thank you! rock   paper   scissors   sFcks  and  carrots   cyberwar!  

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